

AN INTRODUCTION TO SOCIOLOGY

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TO
SOCIOLOGY

BY
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TO
JOHN A. NOWELL
TO WHOSE FRIENDSHIP
AND INTELLECTUAL STIMULUS
I, AMONG MANY OTHERS,
AM GREATLY INDEBTED

"The social sciences are very youthful studies; but they are not therefore games for untrained minds. Their study needs a learning of the very highest order if it is to find a way of letting man endure man."

EDGAR A. SINGER, *Fool's Advice*.

"A full understanding of the conditions of social action is as yet possessed by no one. When such an understanding is achieved . . . —when the 'conditions' are absorbed into the action, sociology will be an established science, not a struggle to found a science."

ARTHUR F. BENTLEY, *The Process
of Government a Study of Social
Pressures*.

PREFACE

It is a truism that man is a social being. He lives with his fellows, and without them his life is barren. With them, alas, it is often conflict. Man can not get along without his fellows; neither, it seems, can he get along with them. He solves one problem only to find that a host of new problems have sprung up overnight. The world of physical nature he now understands fairly well, and he can control its forces and utilize its resources; but the world of human nature he is merely beginning to understand, and he has not yet learned to control it. The social sciences developed late and have matured slowly. Their methods are still in the making and their findings are often untrustworthy. This may be because the best minds have been little concerned with a field like that of sociology, in which much is vagueness, mere hypothesis, or meaningless statistics. The reason for the neglect can not be that the data of the social sciences lack inherent interest or importance, for in the world of men and their vagaries we must live.

The approach to sociology adopted in this book turns away from the usual paths, not because they are too well trodden, but because they seldom lead to profitable adventures. The work is an attempt to come to grips with the realities of the social world. It describes forms of social organization, those of our ancestors as well as those of our contemporaries — their social life, institutions, ideals, practice, and theory.

We need a descriptive interpretation of the social world in which we live, in order that we may orient ourselves in it, both in practice and in mental outlook. Attitudes can not be divorced from philosophies, for "it is impossible to hold any view about life without thereby contributing to its realization." If we perceive the larger social world, we react to immediate environment as a portion of it; whereas, if we fail to perceive the larger sphere, we react only to the immediate environment.

The bibliographies appended to the respective chapters have not been selected to support the convictions of the author, but rather to present both sides of controversial issues, so that readers may find fuller statements of arguments which of necessity are usually dealt with summarily in this book. Reviews of current literature will be found in

various sociological journals, especially the *Journal of Social Forces*,¹ the *American Journal of Sociology*,² *Sociology and Social Research*,³ and the *Sociological Review*.⁴

Professor Edwin R. Guthrie, of the University of Washington, has read the chapters in PART IV and has given me many helpful suggestions. A like service has been performed by Professor John M. Gaus, of the University of Minnesota, in connection with PARTS I-IV; and Mr. Paul B. Thomas, of Alfred A. Knopf, Inc., has helped throughout. I am indebted to my wife, Grace Allen Wallis, for criticisms and suggestions in regard to content and presentation. Professor Floyd H. Allport, of Syracuse University, has read and has discussed with me all of the chapters in PART IV, and his criticisms have been exceedingly valuable. Professor Harold D. Lasswell, of the University of Chicago, has read the entire manuscript and has discussed with me in some detail all of the major points. Much of the content has been influenced by his suggestions. Professor Malcolm M. Willey, of Dartmouth College, has read PARTS I-IV and has helped me in many ways in the treatment of topics in those chapters.

My friends are not responsible for errors and shortcomings in this book, but they have given many helpful suggestions and criticisms, and I am happy to be much indebted to them.

W. D. W.

MINNEAPOLIS,
January, 1927

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⁴ Sociological Society, London, England.

CONTENTS

INTRODUCTION 1

PART I

SOCIAL LIFE IN CULTURE PERSPECTIVE

CHAPTER

I SOCIAL LIFE IN PRIMITIVE SOCIETIES 8

1. KINSHIP AND PERSONAL RELATIONS 8
2. SOCIAL FORCES AND AUTHORITY 12
3. THE TRIBAL ORIENTATION OF CULTURE 14
- REFERENCE READING 17

II SOCIAL LIFE IN ORIENTAL CIVILIZATIONS 19

1. SOCIAL LIFE IN CHINA 19
2. SOCIAL LIFE IN JAPAN 22
3. SOCIAL LIFE IN HINDU CIVILIZATION 23
4. SOCIAL LIFE IN PERSIA 24
5. SOCIAL LIFE IN EGYPT AND BABYLONIA 25
- REFERENCE READING 27

III SOCIAL LIFE IN GREEK AND ROMAN CIVILIZATIONS 29

1. SOCIAL LIFE IN GREECE 29
2. SOCIAL LIFE IN ROME 33
- REFERENCE READING 35

IV SOCIAL LIFE IN WESTERN EUROPEAN CIVILIZATION 37

1. EARLY GERMANIC SOCIETY 37
2. SOCIAL LIFE IN MEDIEVAL TIMES 38
3. SYNCRETISM AND SURVIVALS 41
4. SIMILARITY WITH OTHER CULTURES 42
- REFERENCE READING 44

PART II

SOCIAL THEORY

V THE ANCIENT CIVILIZATIONS 48

1. SOCIAL THEORY IN PRIMITIVE CULTURE AND IN ORIENTAL CIVILIZATIONS 48
2. GREEK SOCIAL THEORY 49
3. THE STOICS 54
4. THE EPICUREANS 56
- REFERENCE READING 57

CHAPTER

VI SOCIAL THEORY IN CHRISTIAN COUNTRIES
BEFORE THE FRENCH REVOLUTION 58

1. EARLY CHRISTIAN THEORY 58
2. MEDIEVAL THEORY 58
3. JEAN BODIN 59
4. JAMES HARRINGTON 60
5. FONTENELLE 60
6. MONTESQUIEU AND VOLTAIRE 61
7. ROUSSEAU 62
- REFERENCE READING 65

VII SOCIAL THEORY AFTER THE POLITICAL AND
INDUSTRIAL REVOLUTIONS 67

1. THE POLITICAL REVOLUTIONS 67
2. THE INDUSTRIAL REVOLUTION 67
3. THE SOCIALISTS 68
4. THE ECONOMISTS 73
5. PROUDHON AND ANARCHISM 74
6. THE UTILITARIANS 75
- REFERENCE READING 76

VIII RECENT SOCIAL THEORY 78

1. COMTE AND HERDER 78
2. PHILOSOPHIES OF HISTORY 78
3. HERBERT SPENCER 81
4. MILL AND DURKHEIM 84
5. THE REVIVAL OF BIOLOGICAL SOCIOLOGY 85
- REFERENCE READING 86

PART III

EXTERNAL FACTORS INFLUENCING SOCIAL LIFE

IX PHYSICAL ENVIRONMENT 92

1. THE LIMITATIONS IMPOSED BY THE ENVIRONMENT ARE RELATIVE 92
2. THE RELATION BETWEEN ENVIRONMENT AND CULTURE 93
3. ENVIRONMENT DOES NOT EXPLAIN CULTURE 94
4. ENVIRONMENT CAN BE INTERPRETED ONLY IN TERMS OF CULTURE 95
- REFERENCE READING 96

X RACE 99

1. THE RACES OF MANKIND 99
2. THE CULTURE SIGNIFICANCE OF RACE 100
3. RACE TRAITS ARE NOT RESPONSIBLE FOR CULTURE 107
4. THE BASIS OF BELIEF IN RACE SUPERIORITY AND RACE INFERIORITY 108
- REFERENCE READING 108

XI HEREDITY AND PHYSICAL TYPE 110

1. PHYSICAL TYPES WITHIN THE RACES 110
2. THE EUGENIC IDEAL 111
- REFERENCE READING 118

CONTENTS

xi

CHAPTER

XII ECONOMIC FORCES 120

1. THE COMPARATIVE INDEPENDENCE OF ECONOMIC FORCES 120
2. THE INFLUENCE OF ECONOMIC FORCES 121
- REFERENCE READING 125

PART IV

CULTURAL AND PSYCHOLOGICAL FACTORS INFLUENCING GROUP LIFE

XIII SOCIETY AND THE INDIVIDUAL 131

1. SOCIETY 131
2. THE INDIVIDUAL 138
- REFERENCE READING 140

XIV THE GROUP AS AN ENTITY 144

1. THE INSTINCTS 144
2. GROUP BEHAVIOR AS THE BASIS OF SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 147
3. THE UTILITY OF SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 155
4. THE GROUP AS A PURPOSEFUL ENTITY 157
5. THE IMPORTANCE OF SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 160
- REFERENCE READING 161

XV CROWD PSYCHOLOGY 163

1. SOME TRAITS OF CROWD PSYCHOLOGY 163
2. THE CROWD AS AN ENTITY 165
3. THE FORMATION OF CROWDS 166
4. SOME TYPES OF CROWDS 167
5. THE UTILITY OF AN UNDERSTANDING OF CROWD PSYCHOLOGY 170
- REFERENCE READING 171

XVI LANGUAGE AND CUSTOM 172

1. THE IMPORTANCE OF LANGUAGE 172
2. THE ANTIQUITY OF LANGUAGE 173
3. LANGUAGE AS A SOCIAL TOOL 173
4. LANGUAGE AND CULTURE 174
5. CUSTOM AS SOCIAL HABIT 177
6. THE PREVALENCE OF CUSTOM 178
7. THE UTILITY OF CUSTOM 179
8. THE UNDESIRABLE FEATURES IN CUSTOM 180
- REFERENCE READING 181

XVII HISTORY, TRADITION, AND OPINION 183

1. HISTORY 183
2. TRADITION AS SELECTION OF THE PAST 186
3. THE UTILITY OF TRADITION 189
4. OPINION AS A SOCIAL INFLUENCE 190
5. PUBLIC OPINION 193
- REFERENCE READING 194

CHAPTER

XVIII NATIONALISM 197

1. THE CHARACTERISTICS OF NATIONALITY 197
2. THE RISE OF NATIONALISM 203
- REFERENCE READING 206

XIX INTERNATIONALISM 208

1. THE GENESIS OF INTERNATIONALISM 208
2. THE DEVELOPMENT OF INTERNATIONALISM 211
3. THE BASIS OF INTERNATIONALISM 213
4. THE NEED FOR INTERNATIONALISM 217
- REFERENCE READING 218

XX WAR 221

1. WARFARE IN SAVAGERY 221
2. WAR IN CIVILIZATION 223
3. THE INFLUENCE OF WAR UPON CULTURE 223
4. THE INFLUENCE OF THE WORLD WAR UPON WESTERN CULTURE 225
- REFERENCE READING 228

PART V

PHASES AND PROBLEMS OF MODERN SOCIETY

XXI THE FAMILY 235

1. SOCIAL CHANGES AFFECTING THE FAMILY 235
2. PERSONAL RELATIONS WITHIN THE FAMILY 240
3. THE IMPORTANCE OF FAMILY LIFE 245
- REFERENCE READING 246

XXII RELIGION 249

1. RELIGION REFLECTS CHANGES IN SOCIAL AND INTELLECTUAL LIFE 249
2. RELIGION AND LABOR 253
3. RELIGION AND CAPITALISM 256
4. RELIGION AND THE POLITICAL ORDER 256
5. RELIGION AND THE CHURCHES 257
- REFERENCE READING 258

XXIII EDUCATION 261

1. PRIMARY AND SECONDARY EDUCATION 262
2. HIGHER EDUCATION 263
3. SOME RECENT TRENDS IN HIGHER EDUCATION 264
4. TECHNIQUE AND METHOD 268
5. EDUCATION AS DEVELOPMENT OF PERSONALITY 270
- REFERENCE READING 271

XXIV THE PRESS 274

1. THE MAKING OF THE NEWSPAPER 274
2. THE NEWSPAPER AND SOCIETY 278
- REFERENCE READING 285

CONTENTS

xiii

CHAPTER

XXV POLITICS AND LAW 287

POLITICS 287

1. THE NEED FOR AN INTERNATIONAL ORIENTATION 290
2. CHANGING POLITICAL IDEALS 291
3. THE RÔLE OF THE POLITICIAN 292
4. NEW POLITICAL IDEALS 294

LAW 299

5. THE SOURCES OF LAW 299
 6. CONSERVATISM IN LAW 300
 7. CHANGES IN LEGAL METHODS AND IN LEGAL ATTITUDES 301
 8. LAW AS AN INSTRUMENT OF SOCIETY 302
- REFERENCE READING 303

XXVI INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION 306

1. INDIVIDUALISM 310
 2. THE INDUSTRIAL REVOLUTION 311
 3. THE REWARDS OF LABOR 312
 4. SOME RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN THE INDUSTRIAL ORDER 315
- REFERENCE READING 320

XXVII POVERTY 323

1. POVERTY IN WESTERN CIVILIZATION 324
 2. SOME CAUSES OF POVERTY 325
 3. THE RELIEF OF POVERTY 327
 4. THE PREVENTION OF POVERTY 329
- REFERENCE READING 330

XXVIII MENTAL DEFICIENCY 332

1. SOME CAUSES OF MENTAL DEFICIENCY 332
 2. FEEBLE-MINDEDNESS 334
 3. PSYCHOLOGICAL TESTS 336
 4. INSANITY 338
- REFERENCE READING 340

XXIX DELINQUENCY 342

1. DELINQUENCY AND SOCIAL PROGRESS 342
 2. POVERTY AND DELINQUENCY 343
 3. FEEBLE-MINDEDNESS AND DELINQUENCY 344
 4. INSANITY AND DELINQUENCY 344
 5. THE PUNISHMENT OF CRIME 345
- REFERENCE READING 348

XXX RACE PROBLEMS 351

1. THE INCEPTION OF RACE PROBLEMS 351
 2. THE THREE RACES 352
 3. ECONOMIC CONFLICTS AS THE CAUSE OF RACE PREJUDICE 353
 4. THE NEGRO PROBLEM 354
- REFERENCE READING 358

CHAPTER

XXXI IMMIGRATION AND POPULATION 360

1. HUMAN MIGRATIONS 360
2. CAUSES OF IMMIGRATION 361
3. SOME PROBLEMS OF IMMIGRATION 363
4. MALTHUS' THEORY OF POPULATION 364
5. INCREASE IN POPULATION 365
- REFERENCE READING 367

PART VI

THE TREND OF SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT

XXXII THE DEVELOPMENT AND DIFFUSION OF CULTURE TRAITS 374

1. CONDITIONS FACILITATING THE SPREAD OF A CULTURE TRAIT 376
2. THE PROCESSES OF ASSIMILATION 377
3. SPECIFIC CREATIVE TALENTS IN THE VARIOUS CULTURES 378
- REFERENCE READING 379

XXXIII WIDENING HORIZONS 380

1. THE ENLARGING HORIZON 380
2. THE ENLARGING GEOGRAPHICAL HORIZON 382
3. ENLARGING HORIZONS OF KNOWLEDGE 383
4. ENLARGING SOCIAL AND POLITICAL HORIZONS 384
5. ENLARGING ECONOMIC HORIZONS 384
6. THE SIGNIFICANCE OF ENLARGING HORIZONS 385
- REFERENCE READING 386

XXXIV THE DRIVE AND THE DRAG OF SOCIAL LIFE 387

1. SOME UNTOWARD PHASES OF THE DRIVE 387
2. THE TENDENCY FOR THE DRIVE TO INVOLVE A DRAG 388
3. ECONOMIC DRIVE AND DRAG 390
4. NATIONALISTIC DRIVES 391
5. THE DRIVE MUST BE CONTROLLED 392
- REFERENCE READING 392

XXXV SOCIAL REALITY AND SOCIAL IDEALISM 393

1. THE SEARCH FOR REALITIES 393
2. THE SEARCH FOR SOCIAL REALITIES 394
3. THE SERVICE OF STATISTICS 395
4. THE VALUE OF METHOD AND TECHNIQUE 397
5. THE LIMITATIONS OF REALISM 399
6. IDEALISM AS A BASIS FOR REALISM 400
7. ETHICS 400
8. ETHICS AND CUSTOM 401
9. SOCIAL ETHICS 402
10. THE SPHERE OF DUTIES 402
11. ETHICS AN INTEGRAL PART OF SOCIOLOGY 403
- REFERENCE READING 403

CONTENTS

xv

CHAPTER

XXXVI LITERATURE AND THE PROSPECT OF UTOPIA 405

1. LITERATURE AS A REFLECTION OF CULTURE 405
2. CHANGING TIMES BRING A NEW LITERATURE 408
3. LITERATURE AS ART 409
4. THE PROSPECT OF UTOPIA 409
5. EARLY UTOPIAN THOUGHT 410
6. CHRISTIAN UTOPIANISM 410
7. THE UTOPIA OF SCIENCE 412
8. OTHER UTOPIAS 413
9. THE UTILITY OF UTOPIA 414
- REFERENCE READING 414

XXXVII SOCIAL PROGRESS 417

1. PROGRESS AS INCREASE IN POWER 417
2. PROGRESS AS THE SATISFACTION OF NEEDS 418
3. THE SUPERIORITY OF CIVILIZATION OVER SAVAGERY 419
4. PROGRESS INVOLVES INTEGRATION OF SOCIAL FORCES 420
5. THE FALL OF CIVILIZATION DOES NOT DISPROVE PROGRESS 421
6. PROGRESS AND THE INDIVIDUAL 422
- REFERENCE READING 423

CONCLUSION 425

INDEX 429

INTRODUCTION

Man is a social animal. He lives with his fellows, and this living together involves mutual understanding and confidence. Though he is a child of nature he meets the physical world with an equipment bestowed by the social medium in which he lives. He is born no better equipped for life than are the beasts of the field, and indeed is not so well prepared for self-defense. Into his hands are placed the weapons with which he defends himself against the beasts which attack him or captures the prey which becomes his food. Unaided he would not learn the use of club or spear, and he would have no bow and arrow with which to ward off his enemies. He communicates with others through language. Speech, however, is not an invention of his own, but something which he learns from his fellows. Through it and through the concepts current in the group he is carried back to days which he can not remember, and he learns events which lie beyond his experience.

Everything that man has which is significant he acquires by virtue of being a member of society. Isolate him at birth and it is doubtful if he could live; in any case he could not live abundantly but only as those animals live which have no accumulated civilization. An account of life in this social world is offered in the pages which follow. We shall see it as it is lived by those primitive folk whom we call savages, by those peoples of the Far and the Near East who sometimes seem so different from ourselves, and as it was and is lived by us.

There will be occasion to ponder over its problems and perplexities, and at the same time to inquire into proposed remedies for some of its evils. For the social order which can help can also harm, and none is wholly without both good and bad elements.

PART I

SOCIAL LIFE IN CULTURE PERSPECTIVE

INTRODUCTORY

When we speak of "civilization" we usually refer to our own civilization, the culture of Western Europe. Since this is the case we shall employ the word "culture" to refer to any form of civilization — primitive, savage, barbarian, or the most advanced. Culture connotes all aspects of a civilization, such as language, art, religion, science, social organization, manufactured objects, and all industries and activities which are a phase of group life. When people know only their own culture they are prone to assume that any other people must live in a similar if not identical system of activities, organizations, and values. This is because man is not human-minded but group-minded; he thinks in terms, not of human values, but of the values current in his group, and his outlook upon life is deeply tinged by his culture. As a matter of fact, however, there is a great diversity in cultures, which are of almost every conceivable kind, exhibiting activities and values with a range greater than that displayed by the civilizations described by the historian. Moreover, no culture is world-wide but each has geographical limitations.

There is a geography of culture just as there is a psychology, a history, and a sociology of culture. In the New World in pre-Columbian days there were many aboriginal culture areas. The Eskimos of the Far North comprised one, as did the Sioux of the Plains area, in which the buffaloes were hunted as the main source of food, clothing, and utensils. In the upper Colorado River region and adjacent territory another type of culture flourished, while Central America and the Andean region furnished still other types.

From area to area in savagery there are pronounced differences in forms of government, property-systems, marriage, and religion; for the world of savagery comprises a great variety of cultures, and each of them is relatively though not absolutely independent of every other. Eskimo culture would be little affected if all others were to disappear, and Aztec culture could have flourished much as it did if all others had dropped out of existence. Each has an independence comparable with

that of European civilization, which might continue much the same if others vanished.

The individual is oriented, not in human civilization, but in the culture of his group, and in order to understand him one must know the group culture. The obverse of adaptation to the culture of one's group is lack of adaptation to the cultures of other groups. Only with difficulty does an Eskimo accommodate himself to our civilization or a European to Eskimo Culture. The ease with which a man moves in the culture of his group has its counterpart in the difficulty with which he moves in an extraneous culture to which he is not adjusted.

The independence and the self-sufficiency of a culture are, however, only relative, for each is under obligation to others. Western European civilization has borrowed liberally from the older Mediterranean cultures — Rome, Greece, Egypt, Babylonia, the Hebrews, the Persians, the Phœnicians, the Arabs, and even from the Chinese and the American Indians.

From the aborigines of the New World we know that European civilization has obtained not only new territories to exploit but also many valuable products, such as maize, coca, chocolate, quinine, potatoes, tomatoes, tobacco, etc. In primitive life also one culture is indebted to others. The Plains Indians have received traits from tribes in the Southwest and vice versa, as shown by common elements appearing in the folklore, ceremonialism, and art of the two areas; and tribes in California, through their neighbors to the North, are indebted to tribes of the Northwest Coast for ideas incorporated in the ceremonial religious life. Each culture also owes something to the past, borrowing from earlier times many important traits. Take away from a culture all the traits which it has received from outside sources, and it is reduced to a minimum. If not beggars, all are at least borrowers.

A culture takes from neighbors ideas in science, religion, mythology, and ethics. Borrowing, however, is not a simple transfer of a trait of culture from one region to another. The element which has been borrowed must be made over so that it will function as an integral part of the new complex. A culture adopts tobacco, for example, but the herb and its uses must be assimilated into the new culture, and this assimilation is not always easy. Maize enters the sphere of European culture, but the use of it and the methods of raising it must be adapted to conditions in the new home. Adoption always implies adaptation.

To transfer a culture trait is in some sense to transmute it, for the old trait must perform a new function, often one markedly different

from that which it performed in another setting. Culture horizons, therefore, are not so absolutely fixed by geographical boundaries as at first appears to be the case. The culture horizon of European civilization stretches beyond the boundaries of Western Europe. It overlaps the area of Mediterranean culture, traverses the Far East, and includes even portions of the world of savagery, absorbing many traits which had previously been restricted to the New World. Culture horizons, not fixed but fluctuating, vary from century to century and from decade to decade.

We do not know all of the laws of culture development, but the anthropologist would not deny that there are such laws. Continuity in development is one of them. The lines along which development can proceed are many, but they are probably not unlimited, and much might be included in a few generalizations. Problems of culture contact are being worked out patiently by detailed studies in the fields of contiguous cultures, and we learn something of the machinery by which traits pass from area to area and are adopted by other cultures. Man, everywhere different, is everywhere alike. Since his fundamental needs are much the same, however variously he interprets them and seeks to satisfy them, the multiform cultures which he has builded contain many common elements. Social organization, for example, is a phase of practically every culture, and in all large social groups authority is recognized. Custom, tradition, and public opinion everywhere hold sway. If the first law of sociology is that man is by nature a social animal, the second law is that he is by nature a culture animal; for every social group has a characteristic culture incorporated in the activities of its component individuals, and this culture carries over from one generation to another.

In the Near and Far East are the Oriental civilizations. The greater part of the remainder of the world not occupied by Europeans is inhabited by peoples of simpler cultures, whom we commonly call savage, barbarian, or semi-civilized. Part I will treat briefly of social life in these cultures. It will contain also an account of social life in ancient Greece, in ancient Rome, and in Germanic civilization after the fall of Rome. Social life differs from one culture to another and from one century to another; yet many traits of social life are fundamentally alike the world over, and many traits of the ancient civilizations have persisted to our own day. Much of antiquity is contemporary with us and many phases of civilization are but savagery in more gaudy attire. Scratch a civilized man and you find a savage.

CHAPTER I

SOCIAL LIFE IN PRIMITIVE SOCIETIES

Though we often refer to primitive culture as if the term connoted positive attributes distinguishing it from the culture of Western Europe, the fact is that the term is merely denotative, referring to peoples whose culture is simple and who have no written records. Yet primitive culture has positive attributes, and these are diverse. Eskimo culture differs from that of West Africa in economic activities, mechanical devices, social organization, folklore, religion, ethical ideas, methods of disposing of the dead — in short, in every important feature. Indeed, the Eskimos differ from all other peoples in North America, and in no two tribes of the many hundreds on this continent are the cultures identical, though often in neighboring tribes and even in those widely separated there are striking similarities.

I. KINSHIP AND PERSONAL RELATIONS

The family is found in all cultures, parents and children constituting the typical family group. Usually each family has a separate habitation, though among some peoples, such as the Veddas of Ceylon, two or three families share a habitation. Everywhere, however, the integrity of the family group is to some degree maintained. There is also a larger kinship group composed of those of acknowledged relationship who are referred to by specific terms not applied to those outside the kinship group. Members of the latter do not live together but are scattered through the tribe, much as in our society one's aunts, cousins, and other relatives live in various portions of the community, though ties of kinship link them together. In many tribes the relationship terms connote distinctions not observed by us. Thus the individual may distinguish between those related to him through his father and those related to him through his mother, and likewise he may discriminate between descendants, designating by one set of terms those related in the male line and by another set those related in the female line.

Another common kinship distinction is based on relative age. In many areas brothers older than the speaker are addressed by a different

term from that applied to younger brothers, while a similar distinction is made with regard to sisters. Similarly mother's sisters older than one's mother are addressed by one term and those younger than the mother by another term, the mother likewise making a distinction between them. The same applies to the brothers and sisters of the father and often to the children of father's and those of mother's younger and older brothers and sisters, respectively.

In matters pertaining to the larger social group the authority of the father usually is absolute, though he interferes little in affairs of the household. Family life in savagery is more democratic than in Oriental or in early Germanic civilization, the almost unlimited power of the Hebrew, Greek, or Roman father being practically unknown in savagery. Likewise the power of the husband over the wife is much more limited in savagery than in the above-mentioned cultures.

Almost everywhere the wife's kin or clan protect her against the tyranny or cruelty of the husband, though the savage husband seldom attempts to be cruel or tyrannical. The domicile is under the wife's charge and is relatively free from interference on the part of the husband or other males. In some tribes the women participate freely in almost all social activities; in others they are excluded from many or all of them. Their work is different from that of the men, being sometimes more and sometimes less arduous. Seldom, save in agricultural communities, do they engage extensively in activities outside the household.

In the Andaman Islands "a man hunts, using bow and arrow and harpoon; he makes his own bows and arrows, his adze and knife, cuts canoes, and makes ropes for harpoon lines. A woman collects fruits and digs up roots with her digging stick; she catches prawns and crabs and small fish with her small fishing net; she provides the firewood and the water of the family and does the cooking (i. e. the family cooking, but not the common cooking, which is done entirely by men); she makes all such objects as baskets, nets of thread, and personal ornaments either for herself or her husband."¹

In savagery children are well treated. Punishment is almost unknown, and practically unlimited freedom is given to children, who are subject to little discipline. The statement regarding the Andamanese is applicable to almost all savage tribes. "Children are reproved for improper behavior, but they are never punished. During their years of infancy they are much spoiled, not only by their parents but by everyone."²

¹ Brown, *The Andaman Islanders*, pp. 44, 47, 85-86, Cambridge, 1922. ² *Op. cit.*

The position of the aged varies considerably, though as a rule they are well taken care of and kindly treated. In some areas, where life is a hard struggle or the means of subsistence are strictly limited, the aged are done away with as painlessly as possible.

In Australia age and social influence frequently go hand in hand. The right to live may be denied the new-born child, though under ordinary conditions a few days of mundane existence is a guarantee that its life will be respected — as is the case even in Polynesia, where infanticide is common. When, however, hunger is gnawing hard, the young one may be killed in order to provide food for the elders. The young are often the victims of tabus and injunctions from which their elders are exempt. In western Victoria they are not allowed to paint their faces or heads in time of mourning, but must lacerate their brows and wail loudly as an earnest of grief. The lad may not eat of the female opossum, because this makes him peevish and discontented; and in some tribes every female quadruped is tabu to him. If he eats of the magpie lark his hair will turn prematurely white. The Narrinyeri boy who eats wallaby will rapidly grow grey, and sore legs will be the result of his eating the fish called *tyiri*.

So important are age distinctions in Australia that many kinship terms carry with them a connotation of age; for age has a social significance. Not a few of the duties and privileges of the aborigine are dependent upon age and vary with it. Among the Dieri, for example, senior male *Piraurus*, a group of men having marital rights over a group of women, take precedence of junior *Piraurus*; and it is also the duty and the pleasure of the senior *Pirauru* to take the wife of a *Noa* husband when the latter is away from home. In the Urabunna the relationship of *Piraungaru* between a man and a woman can be established only with the sanction of the old men of the group, the initiative in the matter being taken by the elder brothers of the would-be husband. In Queensland frequently old men have the youngest and handsomest wives, a young man being fortunate if he secures even an old woman as his wife. In the Gregory district the older men claim the *jus primae noctis* and often practically monopolize the women of their marriage class. Kurnai old men monopolize the women to the practical exclusion of the younger men, while among the Wailwun it is common for old men to secure young girls as wives, the old women falling to the lot of the young men. Moreover, there are physical evidences of the social progression accompanying age. In some tribes of southeast Australia age is denoted by the extent or the style of scarification, five marks indicating an adult. On

the Herbert River a boy under a certain age is not decorated, but in the course of time he receives a few cross stripes on his chest and stomach. The number of these is gradually increased, a crescent-shaped line being applied to each side of the chest of a grown man.

Respect for age differs greatly from area to area. That the Green- and Eskimos are not devoid of respect for the aged is shown by the proverb: "Old women do not fling their words about without meaning, and we believe them. There are no lies with age." In Labrador the Eskimos treat the aged with great respect, and the word of old men or old women is final. They have lived a long time, say the Eskimos, and in general they understand things better than do their juniors; they also embody the wisdom of the ancestors. Among Alaskan Eskimos the words of old men or old women are law and are not lightly spoken. Yet the Eskimos put old people out of the way when they become a burden to those upon whom they are dependent. The manner of despatch usually is in accord with the wishes of the person concerned, and the killing is considered a proof of devotion. Among the Hudson Bay Eskimos aged people who have no relatives on whom they may depend for food and shelter are quietly put to death. When, for example, an old woman becomes a burden to the community she is usually neglected until, weak from hunger, she is unable to keep up with the people, who suddenly are seized with a desire to move to a distant locality. Aged women usually devote their energies and affections to the care of illegitimate children. Sometimes the old women in one settlement send a deputation to another and are able to settle a dispute which has harassed the two settlements during an entire winter. In Australia women themselves perform this ambassadorial service, usually with success.

The Peruvians, as also the Aztecs, recognized ten age-grades:

A baby in arms.

A child able to stand.

A child under six years of age.

A "Bread Receiver," age six to eight.

One capable of doing light work, age eight to eighteen.

A "Coca-picker," one able to work, age sixteen to twenty.

One "Almost a Youth," a worker, age twenty to twenty-five.

"Able Bodied," a tribute payer and the head of a family, age twenty-five to thirty.

"Half Old," doing light work, age fifty to sixty.

"Old Man Sleeping," sixty years of age or over.

But age is not the only avenue to prestige. In some tribes a man gains influence by virtue of accomplishments in fighting, in others by

reason of the possession of wealth, or because he is the wielder of powerful magic, or because he is a priest in touch with the supernatural. His skill in hunting or fishing, or in making implements, may bring him prestige. Sometimes those who are accomplished in a given line have a community of interests which virtually makes them a group to themselves within the larger tribal group. Those who have taken scalps, counted coup, or, in some areas, taken a head, by virtue of that fact may be set apart and feel that they have much in common. In the Plains area of North America there are many dance or ceremonial organizations in which membership carries with it a certain social prestige. This is particularly true of the organization of the Clowns, who among the Wahpeton Dakotas are powerful medicine-men.

2. SOCIAL FORCES AND AUTHORITY

The primitive tribal group is a socially self-sufficient unit, functioning as an entity in a world of similar groups. Whether this is a cause or an effect of the ties which hold it together, we can not determine; but the one is a counterpart of the other. The ties are of the nature of authoritative influences, whether enforced by the tribe or voluntarily accepted by the individual.

Custom and tradition are among the most powerful of these influences. Custom keeps tribal life much the same year after year and generation after generation. A subconscious perception of the utility of custom leads to an exaggeration of its importance and makes it difficult to change. Custom unifies the group and enables individuals to live together with little friction.

If custom is the warp of tribal life, tradition is the woof, transmitting to one generation the beliefs and ideals which have guided preceding generations. Savages have great respect for the ways of their fathers; they are heedful of instructions hoary with age and follow the leading-strings of tradition.

In the simpler cultures a relatively more important part is played by opinion than is the case in more sophisticated civilizations where the range of individual differences is greater. Thus among the Andamanese many actions which are not offensive to any particular individual are regarded as anti-social, and opinion is brought to a focus to prevent or to mitigate them. An example is laziness, which is regarded as unseemly and reprehensible.

The subtle and effective manner in which opinion operates in the

Simple culture of the Andamanese is described by Brown as follows: Every man is expected to take his proper share in providing both himself and others with food. Should a man shirk this obligation, nothing would be said to him, unless he were a young unmarried man, and he would still be given food by others, but he would find himself occupying a position of inferiority in the camp, and would entirely lose the esteem of his fellows. Other qualities or actions that result in a similar loss of esteem are marital unfaithfulness, lack of respect to others and particularly to elders, meanness or niggardliness, and bad temper. One man was mentioned to me as being a bad man because he refused to take a wife after he had reached the age when it was considered proper for a man to marry. In recent times at least one young man has refused to undergo the privations connected with the initiation ceremonies. This was of course a case of gross rebellion against the customs of the tribe, but there was no way of punishing him or of compelling him to conform, save by showing him that he was an object of contempt and ridicule to others. Probably such a refusal to conform to tribal customs could not have taken place before the British occupation of the islands. . . . The only painful result of anti-social actions was the loss of the esteem of others. This in itself was a punishment that the Andamanese, with their great personal vanity, would feel keenly, and it was in most instances sufficient to prevent such actions. For the rest, good order depended largely on the influence of the more prominent men and women.”³ The expressions of approbation or disapprobation, and the conditions which elicit them, differ from area to area, but the essence of what applies to the Andaman Islanders holds everywhere in savagery. As regards the opinions of others the savage is not thick-skinned, for he fears nothing so much as the taunts of his fellows. The tongue and not the club is the instrument of “savage” discipline. This applies to the treatment of adults no less than to that of children.

Authority in savagery, especially in areas in which social and political organization has undergone little development, usually centers in the older men. In the Andamanese village there is no organized government, community affairs being regulated entirely by the older men and women. Opinion and custom cause the younger members of the community to respect the elders and submit to their injunctions. To them are given the best and most ample allotments of food. If the question of shifting the camp arises, and the young men differ with the old men as to the advisability of the move, the opinion of the latter prevails. The older men are

³ *Op. cit.*

seldom tyrannical or selfish; if they were, their dominance over the younger probably would not persist. Respect for tradition and for the greater experience of the older men encourages submission to seniority, and the influence of the older men is efficacious in preventing serious quarrels. These statements regarding the Andamanese hold in modified form for most of savagery.

Often personal authority resides in an individual who is not of the class of the elders but who derives authority from the consent of the group because of the possession of special qualities or by virtue of having had some peculiar experience which elevates him above his fellows. Among the democratic Eskimos a man may acquire prestige through success in hunting or the possession of wealth. In the Plains area of North America a dream from the Thunder Beings may inspire a man to organize and lead a war party, and those who volunteer to join it must obey the leader. Usually these forms of authority are ephemeral, lasting only for the occasion which called them into existence, or while the success or wealth of the lucky or thrifty individual continues. In many cases, however, the authority of the individual rests solely upon his superior ability in oratory, counsel, or the supervision of affairs.

The typical manifestation of personal authority is exemplified in chieftainship, which is little developed in the simpler societies but is more securely established in the higher stages of savagery. In the former there is no chieftainship of an unqualifiedly hereditary character, and none in which much arbitrary power is allocated to the chief. With the development of a more complex social life and with increase in numbers in the tribal unit there is a tendency to strengthen the chieftainship and make it at least contingently hereditary.

3. THE TRIBAL ORIENTATION OF CULTURE

Everywhere in savagery there is a tribal orientation of culture. The activities of the individual are circumscribed by the bounds of the tribe. The tribe is composed of his associates, and to it and to them he owes allegiance. Ethical standards are largely tribal both in origin and in implication. Inter-tribal obligations are acknowledged, but in the main one owes the performance of duties only to members of one's own tribe. The killing of a man who is not a member of the tribe is not punished by the fellow-tribesmen of the offender but only by those in the group of the man who has been killed.

In some tribes the primary obligation is not to the tribe directly but

to a smaller unit, a clan or group of clans to which the individual belongs. Thus some tribes on the Northwest Coast of North America contain clans grouped in two divisions, and the individual's obligations are primarily to his clan and division rather than to the tribe. Sometimes relations between the two divisions become strained to the breaking-point, whereupon fighting ensues. On such occasions the tie to the division is so binding that a woman, who belongs always to a different division from that of her husband, supports her division against his, and children are aligned against fathers. The influence of the division, therefore, cuts through the family circle and divides it into two potentially hostile portions. But this is exceptional in savagery. Seldom does allegiance to the clan or moiety supersede allegiance to the family, although in many tribes father and children or mother and children belong to different social units. Many things tend to emphasize and enforce tribal unity. Such is warfare, which integrates the various units within the tribe. Such also is the tribal dance, during which personal animosities are laid aside and the group is happily united. Community singing increases group unity. Such manifestations are a feature of life in nearly every primitive group.

The ceremonial activities which play a part in the life of many tribal groups serve a similar purpose. In the *Intichiuma*, the totemic ceremonies of Central Australia, the entire male adult portion of the tribe participates sympathetically or directly, and the ceremonies strengthen tribal solidarity. The numerous ceremonial organizations in the Plains area of North America have limited membership, but in many cases the ceremonies, which are witnessed by practically the entire band, emphasize tribal interests.

The dances, feasts, and other celebrations held before a fight or after the return of the warriors to the camp, likewise strengthen tribal unity. Even marriage ceremonies and funeral rites have tribal significance. A marriage ceremony is a tribal celebration. Funeral rites are participated in by the entire tribe and not merely by relatives and friends of the deceased. Hunting, fishing, or trading expeditions seldom are merely the enterprises of the individuals who participate directly in them, but pertain to the entire tribe. In many phases of magic the social reference is emphatic. Among the Andaman Islanders magical value is attributed to fire and to certain trees and vines from which the weapons are made — a value often expressed in a ceremonial manner. No doubt the belief in the protective power of such things as fire and the material from which weapons are made preserves in the mind of the individual the feeling of

his dependence upon society. "Viewed from another aspect the beliefs in question may be regarded as expressing the social value of the things to which they relate. . . . The social value of a thing (such as fire) is a matter of immediate experience to every member of the society, but the individual does not of necessity consciously and directly realise that value. He is made to realise it indirectly through the belief impressed upon him by tradition, that the thing in question affords protection against danger. A belief or sentiment which finds regular outlet in action is a very different thing from a belief which rarely or never influences conduct. Thus, though the Andaman Islander might have a vague realisation of the value of *Hibiscus*, for example, that would be something very different from the result on the mind of the individual of the regular use of the leaves of that tree in initiation ceremonies as a protection against unseen dangers. So that the protective uses of such things are really rites or ceremonies by means of which the individual is made to realise his own dependence on the society and its possessions, and the social value of the things in question." Hence, "any object that contributes to the well-being of society is believed to afford protection against evil; the degree of protective power it is believed to possess depends on the importance of the services it actually renders to the society; the kind of special protection it is supposed to afford is often related to the kind of special service that it does actually render."⁴

Life in tribal society is lived at different levels. Considering the range of the respective cultures, individuals differ from the average or prevailing type perhaps relatively as much in savagery as in civilization, though the range of activities is not so great. In almost every tribal area certain individuals have the ability to compose new songs. In the Andaman Islands each man composes his own songs, the song being one of the most important phases of the culture. At a dance a man does not sing a song composed by another. There are no traditional songs, though there is a traditional manner of composition, a pattern which all composers follow. If the song does not conform with tribal pattern it is not acceptable, does not succeed, and is given up. As a man fashions a canoe or a bow, or as he paddles a canoe, he composes his song, singing it softly to himself until he is satisfied with it. He then awaits the dance, which affords him the only opportunity he will have to sing it in public; for savages are sticklers on convention and propriety.

Before the dance the singer teaches the chorus of the song to one or two of his female cousins, and they lead the chorus of female voices. At

⁴ *Op. cit.*, pp. 264-265.

he dance he sings his song. If it wins popular approval, he sings it on many subsequent occasions, thus making it a part of his repertory. If the chorus and the dancers do not like it, the poor fellow must abandon it and count it as lost labor. As in our own group, some men are recognized as more expert song-makers than others, though even young boys undertake the composition of songs. Practice and education do not remove the individual differences of the Andamanese. In Australia, Africa, North America, and elsewhere conditions are similar. In every area the song must conform with the tribal pattern, but everywhere there is individual expression; and especially in magical practices the singer often is the composer of the song.

In folklore and story there is a like range of individual ability and expression, though here, too, the tribal pattern is a model for the story-teller. In the Andamans, "two men of the same tribe may relate what is substantially the same story, yet each chooses his own words and gestures, and to some extent they may even arrange the incidents differently."⁵ This applies to every tribal group, being perhaps more marked in African tribes than in any other large ethnographical area. As among the Andamanese, so almost everywhere, the story-teller builds up his own particular legends, and rarely do two men tell the same story in the same way. A story-teller "may obtain for himself a reputation by relating legends of the ancestors in a vivid and amusing way. Such a man would be able to invent new stories by combining together in his own way some of the traditional incidents. The desire on the part of each *oko-jumu* (story-teller) to be original and so to enhance his own reputation is a fertile source of variations in the legends."⁶

In fundamental make-up, therefore, savages are not very different from civilized men. They experiment with life in much the same manner, though with a different kind of life. The difference in the result is attributable mainly to the difference in the social environment in which the individual works out his salvation. Each attempts to solve his problems in his own way; but of necessity, every individual conforms with the tribal pattern, though he may introduce variations and new elements.

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CHAPTER II

SOCIAL LIFE IN ORIENTAL CIVILIZATIONS

“ East is East, and West is West, and never the twain shall meet ” — is a sentiment with which we are all too familiar, for we see the truth in it but usually fail to detect its falsity; and it contains as much error as truth. Much of the East is in the West and much of the West is in the East, and they have been meeting for centuries.

But East differs from West in many ways. The East is an older civilization, and its elements are more firmly rooted in traditions of the past. It has a solidity, a calm, sometimes a stolidity, not commonly found in the more active, vigorous, changeful, and perhaps more ephemeral West. Placidity characterizes the East, and along with placidity a disposition to accept with resignation the dictates of the fates. For manifold generations the world has been as it now is, and it will persist much the same through the coming ages — such is its philosophy. The changes, the rapid historical developments, the contacts with varied civilizations, which have been the heritage of the West, more particularly during the last century, have had little effect upon most portions of the East. The Orient does not lightly put aside customs or costumes which have been in vogue for centuries, though Turkey since the World War has presented in many respects a striking exception. It is conservative, keeping true to the past and resisting changes, which are few and seldom abrupt. The Near East of the ancient civilizations is more like the Far East of our day than like ancient Greece or Rome. In spirit more than in formal social life Greece and Rome belong to our civilization, whereas by comparison Babylonia, Egypt, and Judæa are of another world.

I. SOCIAL LIFE IN CHINA

Social life in China centers about the family. That this institution should gain a strong hold on the imagination of the Chinese is not surprising. Ancient Chinese historians trace the institution of marriage to the legendary ruler, Fu-shi, believed to have lived 2852–2738 B.C. The basic principles of the present Chinese family organization are traced to the time of Yaou, 2357–2258 B.C., when the older matrilineal de-

scent had given way to the patrilineal descent which has since prevailed.

Yaou commissioned a General Regulator of his domain to "set forth carefully the beauty of the five cardinal duties, and to cause them to be universally observed" by the people. They prescribe the proper relations between husband and wife, parent and child, older and younger brothers, friends, and the ruler and the governed.

Under the Chow dynasty, 1255-1122 B.C., a period sometimes held to be the climax of the civilization of ancient China, the family system existed practically in its present form. Three thousand years ago, then, the family was the fundamental social group, consisting of a man, his wife and his sons, their wives and children, and his unmarried daughters. At marriage a woman became a member of the family group of her husband. Upon the death of the father the eldest son became the head of the family, the "honored head," the brother next to him in age being the "small honored head" — a position higher than that of his younger brothers, for he succeeded the "honored head" upon the death of the latter. Male children received equal portions of the property left by the father at his death, daughters inheriting nothing. After five generations the descendants of the "small honored head" constituted a separate group and might emigrate to another locality. They were self-sufficient but remained conscious of the bonds which united them to the family group from which they had separated. The various family groups in a given locality were therefore inter-related.

Parents acknowledged a moral and a legal duty to support and care for children even after the latter had married. They trained their children carefully for the duties of manhood and womanhood.

Age was important even as between members of the family who were of the same generation. Though legally brothers were on the same footing, unwritten social and ethical law imposed upon them the duty of respectful obedience to older brothers. A man had to obtain permission from his oldest brother to offer sacrifices to the family ancestors, for this duty and privilege inhered in the oldest living male descendant.

Deceased ancestors were a part of the family group, and the demands which they made upon the living often exceeded those of surviving members. The ancestral spirits, being disposed to interfere in the affairs of the living, were informed of any important contemplated action, and their advice regarding it was sought. When sacrifice was made to them the descendants of the ancestors assembled, male and female, young and old. After the brief ceremony of obeisances and prostrations

before the tables on which the names and dates of birth and death of deceased ancestors were inscribed, there was a feast which lasted through the afternoon. Those attending the ceremonies went to their seats one by one in order of age, and later participated in the feasting and drinking. The ceremony was thus an annual reunion of the family, present and past, and helped to cement the family bonds.

So fundamental is the family in Chinese life that for thousands of years the State has been modeled upon it. Even to-day, although radical changes are taking place in both State and family organization, the term by which the country or the nation is referred to is the compound form "*Kuo-Chia*," "country and family." (Compare the British "King and country.")

Because of the importance of the family, marriage is carefully regulated. Owing to their lack of experience and consequent inability to appreciate and weigh the importance of their actions, young people can not be trusted to make desirable choices, so that the choosing of a mate falls to the fathers and not to the parties concerned. Usually it is arranged by a go-between, possibly a survival of marriage by purchase. The present *Provisional Civil Code* requires the consent of parents to a contemplated marriage.

In addition to the family group proper there is also a "greater family," comprising members of families which have the same surname. It consists of a village or a portion of a village in which there is a common ancestral temple that serves as the center of the social and religious life of the group. The "greater family" possesses property left by the founder of the original family or accumulated through contributions from the constituent families or obtained through special endowments from wealthy members of the group. The income from it is applied to the up-keep of the ancestral temple and is used for the seasonal sacrifices and for the repair of the ancestral graveyards. In China, therefore, every individual is a member of a family group which functions as a unit within a larger social life. There is an intricate web of inter-relationships. The crimes of a member are fraught with serious consequences for the entire family and for members of allied groups. Correspondingly, the virtues of a man radiate throughout the family and reflect merit upon every member of the group. Filial piety, the honoring of parents, is the highest duty.

"The chief thought is, to the end of life, not to disgrace them." "When the parents are dead, and the son carefully watches his actions so that a bad name involving his parents may not be handed down, he

may then be said to maintain his filial piety to the end." "He whom the superior man pronounces filial is he whom all the people of his State praise, saying with admiration, 'Happy are the parents who have such a son as this.'"

"So act," says a Chinese maxim, "that your ancestors shall be proud of you."

2. SOCIAL LIFE IN JAPAN

Social life in Japan before contact with European civilization is essentially like that in China, whence Japan borrowed the fundamental elements of her civilization. Ancestor worship unites the dead with the living; they are inter-dependent, the contentment and prosperity of the living depending largely upon the peace and happiness of the dead. The welfare of the latter, in turn, depends upon proper attention from living descendants, who render homage by means of rites, ceremonies, and funereal repasts, much as in China. If ancestral spirits are neglected they degrade to the rank of malevolent demons and wander restlessly in perpetual misery. Reduced to this state they may bring retribution upon living descendants by inflicting a malign disease upon the family group or by making the soil sterile. Such disgruntled spirits allow the living no rest until the sacrifices and offerings of food are renewed and the spirits have been restored to the tomb and raised to their divine attributes. The dead, therefore, play an important part in the affairs of the living, just as the living determine the fate of the dead.

Since a man who dies without a son receives no offerings and is exposed to perpetual hunger, ancestor worship provides a strong motive to perpetuate the family name, which is continued in the male line. As in China, the wife belongs to her husband's group and lives under obligations to it by virtue of her subordination to him. Failure to bear children is ground for divorce unless the husband has adopted a child or has acquired a son through a concubine. The family consists of a group of people who are related through a common male ancestor and are under religious obligations to invoke the same sacrifices and offer funereal repasts to the same ancestors.

There is also, as in China, the "greater family," a village community bound together for good or ill. If a member of the village family offends the *Ujigami*, the ancestor of the village community, the entire community may suffer misfortune. Hence it is interested in the proper observance of the rites by each member, since the fate of all depends upon each. A crime or a breach of custom committed by one member is a

crime against the family, the larger community, and the ancestors. Consequently it is the duty of the community to supervise the conduct of a member, and it is the duty of each member to report the misdemeanors of others.

To the eldest son the father entrusts his business, sometimes when the father is in the prime of life. The son then has the responsibility of supporting parents as well as wife and children, and also any member of his father's family who is in need of assistance. This places a heavy burden of responsibility upon the son, and no less onerous duties fall to the son's wife. The custom is now observed with increasing disfavor—a change of attitude which is only one of several indications that many links of the long chain of family customs and ideals which govern Japanese life no longer hold so tenaciously and will eventually break. The result will be the gradual disintegration of the whole patriarchal system, and a reconstructed, modernized family ethics and morality."

In rural communities the *kumi* of feudal days still survives. This is a group of five households which choose one of their members as head, through whom all the general business of the group is transacted and without whose stamp of approval no community business is valid. In many respects the private affairs of a member come under the supervision of the *kumi* as a body, thus preventing the shiftless from incurring liabilities which may prove troublesome to the community. The *kumi* is responsible for the defaults of its members and for those of wives, children, and servants. The carelessness or evil-doing of an individual involves not only his family but the *kumi* as well.

Thus, "every man felt himself not only a citizen, but a responsible official, to whose fidelity the welfare of others was entrusted. Out of the sense of mutual responsibility must have grown by an inevitable necessity the impulse to mutual service which has given to the land that atmosphere of human kindness in which foreigners, escaping from the fierce competitions of the Western world, find it so pleasant to live."

3. SOCIAL LIFE IN HINDU CIVILIZATION

In early Hindu civilization, in the period known as the Vedic age, from about 2000 B.C. to about 1400 B.C., there were no caste distinctions. The people were a united body and called themselves the *Visas*, that is, "the people." Kings maintained court priests for the performance of elaborate sacrifices, but in the humbler classes every householder

was a family priest, who lighted the sacrificial fire, made offerings and libations, and chanted the sacred hymns.

In the Epic age, from about 1400 B.C. to about 800 B.C., the beginnings of the caste system are discernible. Religious rites were more pompous and elaborate, but the hereditary performers of them were not set apart from the rest of the people.

In the Buddhist age, from 500 B.C. to 500 A.D., the people lived peacefully in village communities, managed their own affairs, and enjoyed village autonomy, though they paid a tax to the king. Wars were waged solely by professional soldiery and seldom disturbed the peace of industrial or agricultural populations. "The husbandmen," says a Greek traveler, Megasthenes, "are regarded as a class that is sacred and inviolable; the tillers of the soil, even when the battle is raging in their neighborhood, are undisturbed by any sense of danger." This is the first picture by a European of a people who lived in autonomous village communities.

In the Hindu civilization which has survived until the present day two features are of primary importance: the caste and the village community. A peculiarity of the caste system is the prohibition against marrying outside the caste and that against eating food with one who is not a member of the caste. The castes are hereditary and they are also occupational groups.

The village community is very old. Such self-governing groups existed in India from the dawn of history to the close of the eighteenth century A.D., surviving the fate of dynasties and empires, and escaping the danger and destruction that necessarily accompanied the struggle of rival chiefs and peoples for imperial power.

The caste and village groupings overlap. In a village are many castes, while, conversely, a caste is composed of individuals in various villages. Caste and village tend separately and independently, rather than coöperatively, toward the maintenance of small self-contained societies which resist the shock of outside aggression and the disintegrating forces of national, social, and political calamities. The caste and the village have been likened to communities of zoöphytes which tides and currents ruffle but do not uproot.

4. SOCIAL LIFE IN PERSIA

In ancient Persia, or Iran, the people were divided into groups calling themselves Aryans, by which designation they set themselves off

from the gentile world which they called non-Aryan. A bond of unity, their religion, can be traced back to approximately 2000 B.C. Its prophet and founder, Zarathustra, was interested solely in his followers, and the God of Iran extended his protection over them alone. It is the story of the Hebrews and Jahwe in another setting.

Society was divided into four classes, a division which tradition ascribes to Yima, before 2000 B.C.: the priests, the warriors, the husbandmen, and the artisans. With the exception of the priestly order none of these classes developed into a caste.

The family was the fundamental and perhaps the primary unit in Aryan life. It consisted of parents, children, and those related by blood who lived under one roof. In the ideal family the householder resided with wife and children "in a house in which the cattle thrive, the fire grows, virtue increases, welfare arises, and the dog prospers." The cock reserves to be included; it was his duty to wake the members of the family at dawn.

The family was usually large. The custom of living under a common roof required periodic enlargements of the dwelling to accommodate the increasing number of descendants, with the result that shelters and houses clustered around the original ancestral abode. Sons and grandsons brought their wives to the family household, the sons remaining at the ancestral hearth after the death of the father. The hearth was sacred and on it a fire was kept burning which might never be extinguished. It was tended by the mistress of the house, who covered it with ashes when the family had retired for the night and revived the live coals in the morning after ceremonially washing and cleansing her hands. If, however, the lord of the house approached the fire at early dawn and fed it with fuel, it blessed him with herds of oxen, sons, long life, and happiness.

For protection and convenience several families united in a village community, in which the eldest man was chief. He presided over the meetings of the villagers and the seasonal feasts, and tried at the village tribunal those accused of violating village law. Some villages were federated in an organization presided over by a chief who called assemblies and promulgated the decrees.

5. SOCIAL LIFE IN EGYPT AND BABYLONIA

Of personal relations in ancient Egypt the records disclose very little, nor do they apprise us of the social groupings which characterized

those early centuries. The accounts contain mainly matters of political, priestly, and national concern.

A priest who lived during the reign of Sesostriis II (1906-1887 B.C.) gives, however, some reflections upon the times which show a dawning social philosophy, an interest in problems of the day, and a concern as to what they betokened. "I am," he says, "meditating on the things that have happened, the events that have occurred in the land. Transformations go on, it is not like last year, one year is more burdensome than the next. Righteousness is cast out, iniquity is in the midst of the council-hall. The plans of the gods are violated, their dispositions are disregarded."¹

Ipuwer, who lived about 1700 B.C., a successor to this priest, continued the pessimistic strain of his predecessor. He complained that government was practically suspended, with the result that confusion stalked through the land. His plaint ended with a messianic note rather than with any inspiring social philosophy.

Another school in this Feudal Age of the Pharaohs rejected both the unqualified pessimism and the messianic leanings. Its adherents demanded a body of upright officials who would remedy the social and political ills and mete out justice. They advocated principles of right living to be followed in the daily life of the members of the official classes — in a word, political reforms.

In Babylonia the family was at times patriarchal in character, while at other times the wife and mother had an independent and dignified position. As early as 1800 B.C. women were owners of property, and throughout the period of Babylonian civilization they could, in their own name, enter into partnership with others, buy and sell, lend and borrow, appear as plaintiffs or as witnesses in a court of law, and bequeath property without limitations. A deed of 555 B.C. records the transfer of property by a father to his daughter, the father reserving to himself the use of it during the remainder of his life; and in return for this transfer the daughter agrees to provide the father with the necessities of life — food and drink, oil and clothing. As early as the time of Abraham the right of a woman to hold private property over which male heirs exercised no control, was recognized by the law, and the same right is referred to in many contracts of later times. Other deeds record the borrowing of money by husband and wife in partnership, the selling of a slave to a wife on her own account, and an action brought

¹ Breasted, *Development of Religion and Thought in Ancient Egypt*, p. 200, New York, 1912.

by a woman for the recovery of the price of a slave whom she had sold. There is reference also to a woman who served as witness to the sale of house.

In the religious cult women seem to have been on a par with men. Some of them lived like nuns in the service of the Sun-god; they were educated and could read as well as men.

Children went to school and were taught to read and write, though in Assyria, and probably also in Babylonia, education was largely restricted to the upper classes.

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CHAPTER III

SOCIAL LIFE IN GREEK AND ROMAN CIVILIZATIONS

Many changes took place in ancient Greece and Rome during the period of their recorded history, and there we see social life in the making. Each of these civilizations bequeathed a heritage which awakened new life in Western Europe and made it Græco-Roman. Many of these culture traits persist in our civilization, and some of them have received new emphasis in recent times. To Greece especially we turn for inspiration in an age which sometimes feels that it has run its course, that its accomplishments are a matter of history. Nowhere has there been a more intelligent appreciation of the problems which confront the individual and the group than among those ancient Greeks who lived the simple life and left imposing monuments in philosophy, literature, history, sculpture, and architecture.

Greek civilization seems destined to stand for all time as a triumphant demonstration of the great possibilities of life under narrow restrictions of time and space if the spirit of man is free.

I. SOCIAL LIFE IN GREECE

In the Homeric age, the period of early Greek civilization recorded in the poems of Homer, there are indications of a social organization not unlike that of the Far East. The precise character of the tribes and brotherhoods of which Homer speaks can not be determined, but it seems clear that the bond of that early society was the tie of kinship strengthened by a common religion. As in China, though not in identical manner, there probably was a grouping of families tracing descent from common ancestor and sharing a common burial ground at which offerings were made to deceased ancestors. A group of families, or *gentes*, comprised a larger unit, the phratry or brotherhood, relationship being traced in the male line. A group of phratries constituted a *phyle* or tribe, possibly comparable with the "greater family" among the Chinese. The brotherhood or phratry protected its members, and exacted vengeance if one were injured or killed by a man not belonging to the broth-

erhood. The head of each of these social units — family, gens, brotherhood, tribe — was a male. A group of tribes sometimes acknowledged a common authority. Members of the aristocracy possessed land in their own right as individuals. Among the common people the land belonged to the family group, being administered by the head of the family, much as in the patriarchal period of Old Testament times. The religious affairs of the larger community were in the hands of the king, to whom disputes were brought for settlement. To him Zeus had entrusted the scepter and the judgment in order that he might rule wisely. A sense of justice rather than strict judicial precedent guided him in making decisions, which had whatever measure of prestige his personality imparted to his acts. A council of elder men assisted the king in making decisions, supplementing and conditioning his power of jurisdiction. Even when the members of the council were not old they were referred to as old men, an indication of the respect for old age. This advisory council, which the king was expected to consult in important matters of policy, embodied the collective experience of the community. Out of it grew the *Gerousia* at Sparta and the Council of the Areopagus at Athens. In the *Senate* of Rome and in our own *Senate* there is etymological record of the importance attaching to age in councilors.

But in spite of the authority attaching to age in the Homeric period, as soon as the king or chief grew feeble he was set aside for a younger and more vigorous man. An old man, unless like Nestor he maintained himself by unusual usefulness, had to be supported by his children — a claim which they recognized if they were dutiful and affectionate. Otherwise the lot of the useless old man was a hard one. In the later Attic period the poet Euripides represents old age as feeble and ridiculous, making it the comic element in his tragedies. In accordance with a law commonly taken advantage of, old men could be haled into court by their children on the charge of being incapable of managing their property, and if the charge was substantiated their possessions were taken from them and given to their heirs.

In Ceos the lot of the aged appears to have been even harder than in Athens, for according to one account when people approached the age of sixty and felt themselves becoming useless they disposed of themselves by drinking hemlock. Attic Greek recognized four stages, based on age, in the life of a male: *pais*, *ephebos*, *aner*, *geron* — roughly equivalent to child, youth, grown man, old man. A man or a woman who no longer performed his or her tribal functions had ceased to be a man or a woman in the social sense and had become an ex-man, a *geron*, or

an ex-woman, a *graus*. The respect paid them varied with their social usefulness, but the advice of the aged was important. "From time to time new emergencies arise, the like of which we have never seen, and they frighten us. We must go to the Gerontes, the Old Men of the Tribe; they will perhaps remember what our fathers did. What they tell us will be *presbiston*, a word which means indifferently 'oldest' and 'best.' 'Young men are forever being foolish.' If the Old Men fail us, we must go to those older still, go to our ancestors, the heroes, the Chthonian people lying in their sacred tombs, and ask them for help."¹ In Sparta age distinctions were sharper and more numerous than in Athens, centering in the initiation ceremonies of the *Iranes*, the full grown youths devoted to the goddess Orthia or Bortheia. These initiation ceremonies, called *teletai* (completions), mark the rite of transition from the immature, charming, but half useless boy or girl, to the *teleios aner*, the full member of the tribe as fighter or councilor, or to the *teleia guna*, the full wife and mother.

In Athens the family was a religious cult as well as a social unit, worshipping around the same hearth-fire, paying homage to the same ancestral spirits, and living under the control of the father. The gens was composed of two social units: people who were "of the same milk," *homogalacteis*, or, as we say, of the same blood, and the *orgeones*, those who participated in the family ritual, having been adopted into the family religious cult.

Throughout Greek history ancestor worship played an important part. As in China, the fate of the dead depended upon the living, and the former could assist the latter or could return as vengeful spirits. Said *sæus*, an Athenian orator: "All men who are about to die take forethought for themselves — that there may be some one who shall offer a sacrifice to them and perform all the customary rites." In the performance of religious ceremonies the son was associated with the father throughout the life of the latter. It was the solemn duty and privilege of the heir to visit the family altars and offer sacrifices to the dead ancestors, and children were required by law to adorn the tombs of deceased parents. The most dreadful wrongs inflicted by a father on a son did not release the latter from the duty of performing the customary funeral rites in honor of his deceased parent.

In course of time the nomadic communities took up settled abode around a high point, an acropolis, which became the citadel of defense and the location of the temples of the gods. Around the village a wall

¹ Murray, *Five Stages of Greek Religion*, p. 53, New York, 1925.

was built for defense. In its center was the *agora*, the market-place, which became a meeting place for the exchange of gossip among those who came to trade. Later it became the place for the free public discussion which characterized life in the democratic city-state. Economic enterprises paved the way to political activities and the market-place discussions decided affairs of state. Life, however, was not everywhere the same in the various Greek city-states. It differed from one to another as much as today it differs from one country to another, and much more than it differs from city to city within a given nation. Sparta, for example, stands out in strong contrast with Athens, which, most illustrious of Greek cities, typifies the highest achievements of Greek civilization. In Sparta there was a rigid military organization fortified by custom and education. The city was an armed camp, always prepared for offensive or defensive war. Thought of war being uppermost, the citizens exalted martial virtues above all others.

In large part, too, the social life of Sparta was communistic. There were public tables for meals, and no soldier might eat alone or partake of any food save that which was for all. All contributed toward a common fund for the purchase of food. Limitations were placed upon the construction and decoration of houses, so that everybody might live in the same kind of abode. Inequalities in wealth were practically absent, so that no man might fare better than his fellows. The aim was to secure social solidarity by the elimination of envy and inequalities.

Athens was a city of finer structures, freer life, and more varied thought and activity. Here the artistic impulses found unrestricted play and individualism was fostered. Men met to learn new things, to propose new projects, to forget the practical and roam in the theoretical for the sheer pleasure of the intellectual excursion. The current values of life were not unreservedly accepted, but were subjected to severe criticism and even to ridicule. The Athenians esteemed beauty, and they liked the variety and the challenge of new ideas.

The spirit of Athens at its best is set forth by Pericles in a funeral oration delivered in honor of those who fell in the first year of the Peloponnesian War:

"We are lovers of the beautiful, yet simple in our tastes, and we cultivate the mind without loss of manliness. Wealth we employ, not for talk and ostentation, but when there is a real use for it. To avow poverty is no disgrace; the true disgrace is in doing nothing to avoid it. An Athenian citizen does not neglect the State because he takes care of his

own household; and even those of us who are engaged in business have a very fair idea of politics. We alone regard a man who takes no interest in public affairs, not as a harmless, but as a useless character; and if few of us are originators, we are all sound judges of a policy. The great impediment to action is, in our opinion, not discussion, but the want of that knowledge which is gained by discussion preparatory to action. For we have a peculiar power of thinking before we act and of acting too, whereas other men are courageous from ignorance but hesitate upon reflection. And they are surely to be esteemed the bravest spirits who, having the clearest sense of both the pains and the pleasures of life, do not on that account shrink from danger. In doing good, again, we are unlike others; we make our friends by conferring, not by receiving favors."² Here patriotic fervor outruns sober fact, but nevertheless these lines express ideals of which the Athenians were conscious, and they are a high tribute to their genius.

Much that was primitive, however, survived in Athens. There was full measure of belief in the power of the word and in that of the uttered formula. Slavery flourished almost as abundantly as in the Oriental civilizations. Women were in a degraded position, untaught, unhonored, and unsung. Only the prostitutes were intelligent, prosperous, and in possession of a measure of social freedom. Intolerance flourished along with tolerance. The civilization which produced a Socrates produced also a jury which found him guilty of corrupting the youth and condemned him to death. Many of the ablest men, politically defeated, were ostracized. Even Plato floundered in the Pythagorean mysticism of numbers. Imaginary and occult things, such as the harmony of the spheres, exercised a potent influence upon thought. In many respects life was crude; the marvel is that so much that was beautiful and admirable was created and nourished in an atmosphere so sordid.

2. SOCIAL LIFE IN ROME

Rome probably began as an amalgamation of settlements about the seven Hills commanding the crossing of the Tiber River at the point where the city was founded. This fortified location on a strategic trade-route suggests a combination of trade and defense similar to that found in the Greek city-states. The defense was a wall about the city as well as natural eminences within it. The forum corresponded to the *agora*

² The entire oration should be read in *Thucydides*, Bk. II, pp. 35-46, English translation by Jowett. A portion is given in Zimmern, *Greek Commonwealth*, Chap. VIII, London, 1921.

of the Greek city-state, an open place for assemblage, discussion, and transaction of affairs of state. Here, as well as on the eminences within the city, were the temples. If individual freedom and love of art were characteristic of the Athenian, the virtues of the Roman were patriotism, conservatism, and discipline — qualities deeply ingrained in his character. According to Livy, the leading Roman historian, the attributes of the ideal Roman were industry, diligence, self-restraint, perseverance, manliness, dignified seriousness, and steadfast purpose. The family was the basis of social and political life. At its head was the father, who had absolute authority over its members, including his sons' wives and children, though his daughters when married went to another family group where the father no longer had authority over them. Over the members of his family he had the power of life and death, being solely responsible for the welfare of the family and for the administration of its property. At a later time custom limited this absolute authority, so that in matters of importance it became imperative, though solely by custom, for the father to consult a family council before taking final action. A group of related families composed the gens. They bore the same surname and were descended from a common male ancestor. Citizenship in the city-state was conferred by virtue of membership in the gens, but those admitted to the gens by adoption were not full members and did not share the political privileges enjoyed by those who were members by birth.

The family bond was the strongest in the State. It was fortified by worship of the *lares*, the guardian spirits of the home, who were sometimes the souls of departed kinsmen, and of the *penates*, the gods who were guardians of private and family affairs. To maintain the family was the first duty of a male. To be the last of one's line was a calamity and a curse, avoided only by the adoption of a son. Family life, as befitted Roman citizens, was plain, stern, and pure — more especially rural family life, which in spirit was not unlike the austere life of the Puritan settlers in New England. In early days each member of the family bore a personal name and a family name. Later each possessed also a middle name, indicative of the larger gens to which he belonged. The name was bestowed upon a girl when eight days old and upon a boy when nine days old. It was an important occasion, accompanied by a sacrifice at the family altar in behalf of the child, who was then presented in one or more of the temples and commended to the especial protection of the god.

The first instruction was given at home, the mother being the teacher; or, if several sons with children lived under the parental roof,

a freedwoman or a female relative acted as governess. Here the children were taught reading, writing, arithmetic, and the laws. Later they were sent to school. There were separate schools for boys and girls. The teacher was a slave or a freedman who acted as private tutor or instructed a small class in the veranda, the *pergula*, attached to the house or the shop. The higher education of the boy was entrusted to a Greek slave, the poems of Homer being the text-book. Memory was the all-important faculty, although the pupil had to learn not merely poetry, but also geography, astronomy, history, and mythology. Every well-bred boy learned to ride, run, leap, box, and swim. These accomplishments, similar to the pursuits of the rich Athenian youth, were considered indispensable as a training for his later military career.

As in Greece, slavery was common. Slaves born in the house were usually trained for the personal service of the children; they were a privileged class, and many of them shared in a considerable number of the educational and other opportunities of the children of the family. Occasionally a highly prized slave was given his freedom, either as a matter of grace or in gratitude for some signal service. A slave was entitled to his earnings, with which in the course of time he might purchase his freedom.

There were numerous trade-guilds, all of which at first met with determined opposition upon the part of the government. In 150 A.D. the only guilds with a recognized legal existence were those of the farmers of taxes, the workers of gold and silver, the salt miners, some of the old guilds at Rome, and a few others. Marcus Aurelius was the first emperor to favor the guilds. He gave to them, and also to the funeral societies, the right to receive legacies, and made them "civil persons" with the right to possess property, capital, and slaves. In the main the guilds were social fraternities rather than economic units, and did much to break down distinctions between bond and free, and also to gratify the social ambitions of the lowly.

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CHAPTER IV

SOCIAL LIFE IN WESTERN EUROPEAN CIVILIZATION

Contemporary Western European civilization is an amalgam. We can point to no one group of people and to no single period of time as its sole source. In blood and in institutions Western and Northern Europe, and therefore North America, are at bottom Germanic with important culture influences from the Mediterranean area. Whether we speak of it as Germanic leavened with the culture of Greece and Rome or call it Græco-Roman civilization in Western Europe, is a matter of choice, a question of emphasis.

I. EARLY GERMANIC SOCIETY

Early Germanic society, as described by Roman writers, Cæsar and Tacitus, was crude in the extreme. It compared unfavorably with the early Eastern societies — China, Japan, Persia, India, Babylonia, Egypt, Judæa — and was more savage than the earliest historical society in Greece and Rome. The Germanic tribes were wandering hordes; the people were clad in skins, lived in rude habitations, knew little or nothing of agriculture, and were totally ignorant of the fine arts of life. Hardihood, daring, and a willingness to fight were their characteristics, rather than love of home, industry, or an inclination toward political development. These remained their distinguishing traits until Rome civilized them, conquering by arts where arms had failed.

The unit of social life was the blood group, *Blutsverband*, a group embracing kinship on the male side. Those related in the line of the mother did not belong to the kin group. In Scandinavia this group included the descendants in the male line of the four great-grandfathers, all rights being counted in the male line. There was also a smaller group known as the "most consanguineous (six) hands," *die gesipptesten Hände*, consisting of father, mother, sister, brother, son, daughter. The administration of law rested in the hands of the kin group. There was group responsibility for crimes committed by a member of the kin group, which were expiated by the payment of blood-money to the group of the injured man.

2. SOCIAL LIFE IN MEDIEVAL TIMES

Social life in medieval times is not a picture over which one likes to linger. Compared with that in Athens or Rome, it was poor and empty.

Civilization was little more than a shell of form and ceremony, and few shared its benefits — probably an even smaller proportion than that of the privileged classes in Rome or in Athens. Feudalism, the characteristic institution, was based on a system of land-holding with military prerogatives and duties. The lord gave land to a vassal, who in return owed to the lord certain obligations, usually of a military character. Only within the domain of the lord could protection be invoked. Each estate was a law unto itself and there the lord was absolute, the Church being the only other powerful institution. Throughout medieval times the Church was a unit, and such common justice as was recognized was due largely to its influence.

The Roman guilds lingered on in Europe, at least in Paris, until the time of St. Louis, in the latter part of the thirteenth century. They played an important part in the life of the workers in the larger towns and cities where the handicrafts flourished.

The feudal order appears to have been superimposed upon an older tribal system, such as prevailed among the early Germanic peoples. In England the manor was the keystone of the structure; the lord of the manor was the local representative of the feudal aristocracy and the personal representative of the king. Two classes were under his control: free tenants and villains. The latter were essential to the life of the manor, which was supported mainly by their work and dues. They owed their status to the fact that their condition of slavery was being transformed into one of serfdom. A considerable portion of their time and labor belonged to themselves, and they controlled the plot of ground on which they had settled. Though in law their tenure of the land was precarious, custom, stronger than law, brought the latter into conformity. Some were degraded ceorls or sons of degraded ceorls who had lost former prerogatives. In many cases "material helplessness and agricultural dependence had set in . . . long before the Norman lawyers devised and carried out the doctrine that the king has no need to interfere in the relations between a manorial lord and his villains."¹ The free tenants were attached to the manor by only a slight tie — perhaps a survival of earlier tribal allegiance. The theory of the Common Law that freeholders were tenants by free contract and assured of their tenure,

¹ Vinogradoff, *English Society in the Eleventh Century*, pp. 471-479, Oxford, 1908.

as a legal fiction developed to meet the situation when the courts denied protection to villains in their dealings with the lords.

The important territorial organization which underlay the feudal system in England "is of more ancient date than the feudal arrangements, and it has by no means lost its vitality and importance even in the feudal age. The divisions of shires, hundreds, and wapentakes stretch all over the kingdom as a complete organization for the management of military, fiscal, and judicial affairs. The primary cell in this organization is not the manor but the township: it is called upon to perform various administrative duties — to deliver evidence at inquests, to catch and watch thieves, to mend roads, to contribute in keeping up bridges and walls, to assess the levy taxes, to witness transactions, etc. In some cases townships had to be constituted artificially to meet these divers administrative requirements, but there can be no doubt that the main stock of English townships was of natural growth and not constituted at pleasure by higher authority."²

The towns were much preoccupied with managing their own affairs. Their yearly routine of such affairs was a very full and complicated one, especially in districts where champion-farming prevailed. Even in regions with scattered settlements the management of pasture and wood recalled to the mind of the individual farmers that neither they nor their lords were quite free to do what they liked with a considerable part of the land used by them. In open-field country the restrictive and regulating influence of the township extended to all the principal operations of husbandry — to the laying out and apportioning of the arable land], to the rotation of crops, the regulation of seasons, the order of ploughing, sowing, hay-harvest and corn-harvest, to the division and allotment of meadows, the erection and removal of fences, the framing and keeping up of numberless rules in regard to agrarian limits and strips, to roads and right of way, to the use of cattle on the pastures, to stinting the commons in various directions, to responsibility for trespassing, etc."³

These villages contained strong elements of communism, though neither the English villages nor the Germanic village communities on the Continent aimed at a complete subjection to the rule of the union of the individuals within it; neither was there exclusion of all private interests. "On the contrary, individuals were left free to do what they liked with their labor and to start on private enterprises."⁴

Even in the eleventh century there was developing in England, much

² *Ibid.*

³ *Ibid.*

⁴ *Ibid.*

earlier than on the Continent, a tendency to rule the semi-servile class not directly but by the courts. "Whatever arbitrary personal sway may have been exercised in practice by masters, landlords, their stewards and officers of various names, the communal arrangement of administration, justice, and police is always considered as the right and regular means of governing the humbler classes of the nation. This certainly need not be attributed to liberal instincts and considerations on the part of the predominant race, but it turns out to be the outcome of properly understood interests and of the necessities of the situation. The master's rule over slaves must have been at the root of the relation of the feudal lord to many of his dependants, but although many of the incidents of villain tenure undoubtedly go back to these attributes of slaveholding, the management of the affairs of the peasantry as a whole is not derived from it. On the contrary, in every respect, in regard to criminal and civil justice, to police, to conveyancing and to economic arrangements, matters are referred for discussion and decision to moots and courts."⁵

The creative factors in political life were at bottom tribal. They were expressed in wergelds, blood-feuds, the procedure of oath-helpers, and the various attributions of the *maegths* in domain of civil law, that is, in succession, guardianship, restraint on alienation, marriage, and such matters. The Crusades, however, brought Western Europe into contact with another civilization and with new material resources. These contacts stimulated trade and increased the importance of markets both at home and abroad. The introduction of gunpowder gave a new power to the common man. He had had no armor in which to fight the mailed knight, but when he could wield a gun he became potentially as strong as the strongest.

Towns sprang up and grew to considerable dimensions. Their inhabitants united for protection and organized municipal government. They fostered the beginnings of responsible government and democratic control. But life in the towns was insecure. The streets were ill lighted and ill kept, there was no police system, robbers were plentiful, travel was unsafe, the roads were poor, and the service of the coaches was uncertain.

Books were scarce, and scarcer still were persons who could read them. Sanitation was unknown, and pestilence stalked through the land. The knowledge of medicine and surgery was crude, and thousands died who today could be saved by ordinary precautions or by modern medical

⁵ *Ibid.*

ience. Johann Dietz, a barber surgeon of the latter part of the seventeenth century, describes an occasion when "the contagion had got the upper hand here in Halle, in the year 1682, so that there were days when fifty, sixty, and more suddenly died of it. There were days when the townsfolk, big and little, would be sitting together in the wine-cellars (as was then the custom) thinking no evil; filling themselves with good wine, which was not dear in such resorts. But when of a night they started this man and that was already dead and was put away by out-st men, being thrown into a great pit at the back of God's Acre.

"To the credit of those in authority, and the Council, mention could be made of those charitable institutions which existed in order to provide the poor and forsaken with food and drink, preachers, *medicis* and *chirurgis*, notaries and will-makers. And although here and there the streets were boarded up and soldiers were posted round the city so that no one could leave or enter, markets were held by the outer moat and the counter-scarps, and the money, before it was taken, was dropped into water and washed, so that as yet no one was suffering from want or starvation."⁶

3. SYNCRETISM AND SURVIVALS

If we view Western civilization in perspective nothing stands out more significantly than the fruitful processes of syncretism, the fusing of cultures. The most important periods of development are those in which syncretism is most marked. Europe borrows from the regions to the south, most of all from Greece and Rome; but she borrows also from other culture areas, from the Near and the Far East, through well-established trade routes, and especially from the Arabic civilization in Spain.

"We owe all the main features of our commercial system to the Phœnician of five thousand years ago; the Syrian, Phœnician, Carthaginian, and Roman have been the successive channels of those ideas. To Persia we owe the great principle of government, a firm centralised control with wide divergence of local self-management. To Palestine we owe the sense of moral obligation and religious ideals. To Etruria we owe — through Rome — the system of subduing nature by immense engineering works. To North Syria is due the systematising of a compact alphabet. China showed the way to printing, centuries before

⁶ Miall (translator), *Johann Dietz, Surgeon in the Army of the Great Elector and Barber to the Royal Court*, pp. 31-32, London, 1923.

Europe. We are the heirs of all these fertile brains, of all the tentative shaping of these new ideas."⁷

After the discovery of a New World Europe became indebted to lands across the seas for new products and ideas which influenced the development of her resources and her ideals of progress. Many a man, like Portia's suitor, had "bought his doublet in Italy, his round hose in France, his bonnet in Germany, and his behavior everywhere."

Men do not lay aside the old as soon as it is outgrown. Many elements in our civilization are survivals from an earlier day, features which once served a purpose but now linger on by the inertia of custom and thought. We recite certain creeds because they were accepted by a council at Nicæa fifteen hundred years ago. Priests wear a gown because the Romans wore a toga, and services are conducted in Latin because it was the language of the early popes.

Because barbers were once also surgeons and used a post for the support of the person who was being bled, the modern barber finds it appropriate to use as his insignia a striped white and blood-red post. The pawnbroker proclaims his calling by the use of three pills because this was the coat-of-arms of the famous Italian pawnbroker family of the Medici or "Doctors." Physicians use Arabic signs on their prescriptions because Europe learned medical prescriptions from Moorish physicians, along with much abracadabra. We celebrate Easter by the moon and solstice calendar because it was used by the Hebrews in determining the date of the Passover, and we celebrate Christmas after the winter solstice because the pagans of Europe chose that time to celebrate the return of the sun. Our belief in a Ptolemaic system survives in the "rising" and the "setting" of the sun. But it is not necessary to turn to survivals to demonstrate the numerous links between the life of today and that of the past. There are common elements in social life, whether the culture be crude or advanced, which make us all close kin.

4. SIMILARITY WITH OTHER CULTURES

As in other cultures, sex dichotomizes our social life, assigning to the male a sphere different from that of the female. In recent decades many of the old social barriers between the sexes have disappeared, but new barriers have arisen and new distinctions have been drawn. Woman has acquired new privileges, but a distinction still remains — though for the most part women have profited by the change. Also, social dis-

⁷ Petrie, *Some Sources of Human History*, pp. 78-79, London, 1922.

inctions based on age are found in civilization as in savagery. The children of civilized people live in a world of their own which is different from that of the adults, for their interests are not the same. Political institutions preserve age distinctions in many departments, a specified minimum age being a prerequisite for the bench, the legislature, the executive, and the franchise. The name is still important, and at marriage the change of status of the woman is accompanied by change of name.

Funeral rites reflect the economic, social, political, or age status of the deceased. A visit to a cemetery discloses more than the epitaphs proclaim.

When all is done, upon the tomb is seen,
Not what he was, but what he should have been —

yet the funeral rites and the type of monument tell a truer story.

The uniform of soldiers is based on the psychology that uniformity of dress gives uniformity of intention to a group, fosters an *esprit de corps*, and maintains a *morale*. Uniformity in dress assists in making intention uniform — at least on the lower levels of group action. Conversely, freedom in dress means freedom in social behavior. In all countries the emancipation of women has been accompanied by greater freedom in dress and in coiffure.

Adornment tells a similar story. There is an appropriate adornment for each of the sexes, another based on age, another on economic or professional status. The military glories in it; with uniform, insignia, chevrons, and badges, a man's military biography is exposed to all eyes.

Though we have no formal initiation ceremonies for boys or girls, the "highest" and "most refined" circles still hold fast to the ceremony of the *début*, which inducts the girl into the new life leading to matrimonial adventure.

Freedom in the choice of a mate is not absolute. We are free provided we choose a mate of our own color, race, nationality, and social stratum. With varying success do the adventurous defy differences in wealth, religion, education, or culture.

There is, then, no great gulf between savagery and civilization, or between Eastern and Western culture. The difference is one of degree and of atmosphere, and is due to the difference in social heritage. There is, indeed, a fundamental likeness in the forms of social life in the various civilizations. In all, the social forces are directive, educative, stimulative, circumscribing. In savagery as in civilization the individual

is intent upon making the most of life and upon orienting himself in the social atmosphere in such a way as to insure the fulfilment of aims. He is everywhere both the creature of social life and the creator of individual career. Everywhere the problems of men are similar in essentials, though different in details.

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PART II
SOCIAL THEORY

INTRODUCTORY

Man is a thinking animal; he is not content to engage merely in physical and social activities but enjoys intellectual pursuits as well. At times he transcends the limitations of the world in which he lives and constructs one which does not exist on sea or land, and he may urge the adoption of means which would make the world of imagination a world of fact. He is idealist as well as realist, searcher for future as well as explorer of present and past worlds. Man's thought is not unrelated to the times in which it is enunciated, but usually it is a selection rather than merely a reflection of prevailing ideas, a blindness to some things and a wakeful awareness of others. Because of the relation between social theories and the historical period in which they are formulated, in order to understand the former one must know the institutions contemporary with them.

Hence the important thing to ascertain regarding the opinions of an age is not so much their peculiar nature as the historical background of the ideas and institutions and the problems and purposes amid which they develop; for "deeper than men's opinions are the sentiment and circumstances by which opinion is predetermined." But ideas are causes as well as effects, and they shape institutions though they are shaped by them. We can not understand our institutions without a knowledge of the ideas which have preceded them. Still less can we understand contemporary social theory without a knowledge of the earlier social theory out of which it has grown.

CHAPTER V

THE ANCIENT CIVILIZATIONS

I. SOCIAL THEORY IN PRIMITIVE CULTURE AND IN ORIENTAL CIVILIZATIONS

Primitive peoples have not advanced far in the development of social theory. Most of them offer accounts of the origin of man and often of the tribal social life, but these accounts appear to be the outcome of speculative thought guided by little appreciation of historical realities and they seldom point to explanations which to us seem probable. The older historical civilizations have advanced further in rational theories and their speculations have a truer ring. Even so, however, they seldom impress us as grounded on observations of the social life and the social processes of the world in which the theorizer lived. The earliest writers are disposed to hark back to a distant past of which there are no historical records and of which anything can be said because nothing can be disproved. Their story of the development of social life is built largely on a mythical past.

The ancient Chinese attributed the institution of marriage to a legendary ruler, Fu-shi, believed to have lived 2852-2738 B.C. Before this time, and also to some extent during the reign of Fu-shi, the life of human beings was as unregulated as that of animals, and no child knew its paternity. "In winter," says Confucius, "they lived in caves which they had excavated; in summer, in nests which they had framed. They knew not yet the transforming power of fire, but ate the fruits of plants and trees and the flesh of birds and beasts, drinking the blood of these and swallowing the hair and feathers. They knew not yet the use of flax and silk, but clothed themselves with feathers and skins."

In a different strain is the account which the early Hindus give of the beginnings of human society. In the infancy of the human race, say the Hindu sages, nature was bountiful of her blessings and no man was in want. The climate was mild and equable; no shelters were necessary, and hence there were no houses; neither did men need clothing. The trees yielded abundant edible fruit and the rivers flowed with delicious wine. A change in climatic conditions brought degeneration in vegeta-

tion, and the trees no longer supplied all needs. To insure food it was necessary to own trees, and to provide shelter it was necessary to own habitations. This was the beginning of private property. Degeneration had set in and bad proceeded to worse. Hindu thought contains also a theory of cycles. Things go from bad to worse until they reach a climax in the progressive decrease in length of life, when men are old at the age of fourteen. Then things improve, returning to their former state through the same cycle in reverse order, until the ideal state is again attained, only to be lost through subsequent successive stages of degeneration such as characterized earlier days.

Early Hebrew speculation is set forth in the first eleven chapters of Genesis, and further theories of the social evolution of the Hebrews are contained in subsequent chapters of that book and elsewhere in the Old Testament. Genesis pictures a golden age in which all was well with the world, when man lived in happy idleness and in daily intercourse with God. By disobedience he fell and was driven from the Garden of Eden and set a-hoeing for his living under the curse of earning it by the sweat of his brow. Later came murder, specialization in labor, division into separate social units, and a variety of languages which made those speaking them mutually unintelligible, prevented coöperation, and caused continued separation and dissension.

2. GREEK SOCIAL THEORY

A philosophy of social degeneration is expressed in the works of Hesiod, a Greek from the Ægean area who wrote about 800 B.C. Hesiod speaks of a golden age — it was he who originated the phrase — in the beginning of human history when men lived to a ripe age and then passed, still young in all but years, tranquilly and without suffering, to the realm of the dead. Through successive ages there was degeneration. Life grew shorter and the period of old age proportionally longer, and death was preceded by pain and suffering. Now men use the metals of which in earlier periods they were ignorant, but these have not been an unmitigated blessing. They have made warfare more deadly, claiming victims as well as making heroes, creating misery along with victory. Hesiod, like the Hebrews, believed that man had fallen from high estate upon evil days.

Herodotus was primarily a historian and an anthropologist, but he was also a geographer and a social philosopher. More than any one prior to his time he envisaged Hellenic civilization as a unity and attempted to

grasp the nature and significance of surrounding cultures. He pointed to the existence of common language, religion, customs, and ideals as bonds which made the Hellenes essentially one people. He perceived the importance of geographical forces in history, describing Egypt as the gift of the Nile. He developed a new sense of perspective in Greek history by considering it from the point of view of an Egyptian, to whom the Greeks were but as children. His point of view is, however, essentially and thoroughly Greek. When he goes to other lands he sees their civilizations through the eyes of a Greek. He describes customs and beliefs which distinguish other peoples from his countrymen, seldom making note of traits which are duplicated in the homeland. His analogs are the ethnologists of our own day who approach their task in much the same manner, though their equipment, to be sure, is much superior to that of the Greeks of the fifth century B.C.

Another historian who turns attention to social theory, particularly with regard to the social condition of early Hellas, is Thucydides, whom some students of history have called the greatest of historians. Before beginning his account of the Peloponnesian War, a struggle between Athens and the Peloponnesus in the fifth century B.C. carried on during his lifetime, he describes the presumed evolution of Hellenic civilization. Much of the country, he says, was not settled in ancient times. The people were migratory and left their homes when overpowered. They could not safely hold intercourse with one another, either by land or by sea, and there was no commerce. There was some cultivation of the soil, but only enough to obtain a subsistence, and an agricultural society had not yet come into existence. The method by which Thucydides inferred the past is of interest in view of similar contemporary attempts, for he utilized two principles which have been rediscovered during the last half-century, namely, distribution of a culture trait as an index to its age, and survival as indicative of great age.

In Plato's *Republic* we first find an attempt to give a consistent account of social development, to explain and not merely describe it. Plato is convinced that social life developed according to a logical scheme and that it was compelled or at least self-impelled, so that its progress was essentially reasonable rather than haphazard. The foundation of his theory is the individuality of men. Human beings are not exact duplicates of one another, but each possesses distinctive traits, no two having the same capacities or abilities. One excels along one line, another in some other respect. As each develops his innate ability he becomes a skilled artisan in his chosen pursuit. Accordingly each tends

to devote himself to the task which he can best perform, so that he can utilize his distinctive equipment.

Thus arises specialization in labor, each man making the thing which he can make better than can anyone else. One is a shoemaker, another a maker of musical instruments, another a tiller of the soil. But man can not live on shoe leather, or nourish his body with heavenly music, or even be content with the products of his labor upon the soil. Hence one man exchanges his products for those of others, and thus each acquires the things which he needs. The demand for exchange of articles calls for a place where the exchange can be made, and thus arises the market, which becomes a center of industrial activity about which the city develops. With the appearance of the city-state the demand for foreign markets necessitates ambassadors to negotiate in matters of trade. This, Plato believes, is the origin of international relations and of the Hellenic political world in which he lived. That world, according to him, arose out of individual differences, subsequent economic specialization, markets, trade interests, and economic enterprises.

But all this is only by way of introduction to the *Republic*. Plato's primary task in that work is to plan an ideal State which shall be the best for all time. He wishes to make it conform with the essential nature of men and with the needs of the larger social world: hence his interest in psychology and in social evolution. He is an outspoken advocate of the complete equality of women, affirming that there is no reason to make a distinction along lines of sex in work which one sex can perform as well as the other, and declaring a discrimination to be rational only when one sex possesses peculiar qualifications. In this respect he is still ahead of the world of Western civilization. To education he attaches preëminent importance, declaring that it is essential to all good citizenship. He is also an earnest advocate of eugenics, asserting that only the physically fit should be reared.

Attention is paid to the proper defense of the city, for lacking defense its very existence is threatened. The ruler must be carefully selected on the basis of character and education. Society is communistic, for property creates inequalities and jealousies lead to strife and prevent co-operation. Individual marriage is abolished and children are not permitted to know their parents, for nepotism and favoritism result from desire to serve one's relatives. Ideal citizenship eliminates desire to snatch advantages from a fellow-citizen. Reason reigns and life is rationally regimented, but there is complete subordination of the individual to the State. Education aims to prepare the citizen for the special

function which he can perform, but it does not aim at development of personality for its own sake. Communism is advocated for only one purpose, namely, to break down individual antipathies and solidify the group. Everything is made subservient to the smooth working of group life. Plato does not raise, much less answer, the problem of the duties of the State to the individual. Moreover, he leaves the dynamic of social life out of the reckoning, for the society which he plans is static. He acknowledges the historical importance of social development, but he does not take the next logical step and consider the potentiality for further development. A student of modern society is conscious also of Plato's omission of the larger social world; he provides for it only in the sense that he provides protection against it, for his thought is bounded by the walls of Athens.

Fifty years after writing the *Republic* Plato composed the *Laws*. He was then an older and a wiser man, retaining faith in his earlier ideas but possessed of a riper wisdom which told him that others did not share his faith. The *Republic*, he said in essence, would be the best of societies, if only men knew it and accepted it. Since, however, they do not know it and will not attempt the experiment, let us give a sop to their fears; let us take account of their short-sightedness and offer them the best they are willing to accept. The *Laws*, accordingly, is an attempt to reconcile idealism with the short-sightedness of human nature.

The title of the work indicates the central theme. Laws and institutions emanate from God and are essential to human welfare. Plato accepts the Cretan assumption that war is a natural condition of States; hence the State must be planned primarily with a view to defense. Communism is offered in a milder form than that advocated in the *Republic*. Since men, like States, are naturally hostile one toward the other, laws are necessary to hold them in check, for of all wars civil war is most to be dreaded.

The *Laws* recognizes that no constitution can be perfect but insists that we must strive for the best. The State will interfere in many matters which Plato's contemporaries deem outside its province. It will see that proper music is provided; insist that everyone learn the elements of physical science; regulate the use of wine; induce men to marry between the ages of thirty and thirty-five. The State will prohibit types of amusement which induce laziness or bad habits, permitting only those which are wholesome. Respect must be shown the gods, and the boundaries must be held sacred. Appropriate punishments for various of-

fenses are specified. There is to be no loaning of money or paying of interest, for this weakens the solidarity of the group.

The citizens, that is, the heads of families, are to be 5040 in number. Houses and lots are apportioned, and the land is tilled in common; there is no wealthy class. Tradition must be respected, for only the good can be happy and only those are good who comply with the demands of the State. The ideal city pictured in the *Laws* is described as free, at unity with itself, working harmoniously, and displaying wisdom.

Plato's social philosophy is carried further by Aristotle, a pupil of that great idealist. Aristotle is less inclined to trust ideas and more prone to experiment, to consult history and make induction from a comparative study of institutions. This may be, in part, because he feels that the times call for action and for practical measures rather than for speculation. Athens had lost its independence under the conquest of Philip of Macedon and there were no signs that it would likely be regained. But this same conquest of the old Greek city-states must have brought into relief the forms of government prevailing in them and must have revealed social life in its various contemporary phases. It was amid these events that Aristotle wrote the *Politics*.

He criticizes Plato's communism on the ground that the property of all is not that of each, insisting rather that no one possesses what all possess in common. The abolition of individual marriage would not accomplish the result sought by Plato, for no law of man can abolish the law of nature which makes children resemble their parents. Hence parents would know their children, and the possibility of favoritism to relatives would exist as at present. Yet, in the main, Aristotle's plan of the ideal state is merely a modification of that proposed by Plato, differing from it in many details but in no fundamental respect save in the refusal to include communism. Aristotle, like Plato, realizes that ethics, politics, and economics must not be torn apart and treated as unrelated. His treatise on the State, therefore, considers all the needs of man in their inter-relations, rather than as separate entities.

The interests of these Greek writers were inspired by the times in which they lived, though the influences which touched them can be only suggested here. Hesiod had come from the Ægean region to the mainland at a time when new cultures were filtering from Asia Minor and the Ægean islands into the Greek mainland, and when old standards were being challenged by the new ideas. He lived also in a time when iron was displacing bronze and the new metal was making as important changes in warfare as did the steel armor of the Middle Ages or the weapons of

the last century. Herodotus knew that Greek civilization was related to other cultures and that the Mediterranean shores did not comprise all of the civilized world. Interest in the cultures impinging upon Hellenic civilization induced him to visit foreign lands and study strange customs. Thucydides, as he himself says, lived in crucial times when the supremacy of Athenian civilization was being challenged. It was a portentous fact that it was now being challenged, not by Persians, but by other Greek civilizations. At such times men's thoughts turn to the problem of why such hazards exist, and for Thucydides this meant why Hellenic civilization was confronted with such dangers.

Plato lived in the days following the Peloponnesian War. Having witnessed the military power of Sparta he attributed it to her fine military system, to her selection of the best physical types through exposure of the unfit, and to the communism and simple life which flourished in the Lacedæmonian city. He knew, too, that Athens' greatest enemy had been within the city, in the rivalries and feuds of citizens, and in the lack of a wise policy on the part of rulers who possessed the authority but not the ability to direct affairs of state. He wished to conserve the civilization which remained. Aristotle witnessed the subjection of Athens to Philip — to be followed by subjection to Alexander, whose tutor he had been. The widening world turned his attention to other forms of government and led him to a comparative study of institutions. His method was destined to play an important part in social science two thousand years later in the hands of Bodin and Montesquieu.

3. THE STOICS

About this time the school of Stoicism was founded by Zeno, a Phœnician born at Citium, who came to Athens in 320 B.C. to teach. Assuredly the times had changed if proud Athenians were to be instructed in their own city by a Semite born in an obscure little island of which, doubtless, many of the Athenians had never heard. The backgrounds of Stoicism lay in the teachings of the Cynics, a sect of thinkers who affected to find surcease of sorrow in despising the things of the contemporary world, professing a lofty indifference to current customs and prevailing ethics. The time was ripe for a larger view than the old self-centered Athenian one. Socrates had spoken of himself as "an inhabitant of Athens but a citizen of the world," and intimations of this view are found in Plato and in Aristotle.

But it remained for Zeno and his followers to develop this idea to its

logical conclusion. Impressed by the ability of the men of various cultures around them to absorb Hellenic civilization once the opportunity was given them, they declared that men everywhere were essentially equal. They centered attention upon the common humanity in men rather than upon the differences between men, and they gave currency to the above-quoted phrase of Socrates, proclaiming themselves cosmopolites.

Marcus Aurelius could say, "As Emperor, I am a Roman, but as a man, I am a citizen of the world." But the Stoics went further than this, for they, first in human history, conceived of mankind as a coherent unity rather than as merely a dispersion of peoples over the surface of the globe. Humanity was not a mere collection of men but a collective life of mankind in which each individual, irrespective of nationality, had a definite place and function. The worth of each life contributed to the worth of the whole, and the value of the whole enhanced individual life. Diodorus thus expressed the Stoic view: "All men living, or who once lived, belong to the common Human Family, though divided from one another by time and space."

It would be a mistake, however, to suppose that this social philosophy was merely a reflex of social conditions. It is one of many historical instances of the integration of social philosophy with the psychology and metaphysics of the day. The Stoics elaborated a theory of religion which saw God everywhere and in all things. It was not so much God in men as men in God, for God and Nature were almost identical. Nature was not mere inert matter; it was vibrant with life and incessantly changing. Their sorites and paradoxes were noteworthy contributions to the problems of logic, and their work in physics represented the highest attainment of antiquity in natural science. The conception of the unity of nature paved the way to cosmopolitanism, and the appreciation of natural law was the bulwark of both their physics and their sociology.

The concept of prevalent law applied to man gave rise to the doctrine of the natural rights of man. The idea was revived in the eighteenth century with momentous political consequences, and it still lives in the phrase, "All men are born equal." But out of Stoic doctrine grew an attitude different from that which inspired revolutions in the Old World and in the New. Since Nature is all-embracing, is in fact God, it is our duty to conform with Nature. Whatever is, is, and whatever will be, will be. The wise man, therefore, is concerned solely to determine what Nature is and submits to her dictates. It is futile to kick against the

pricks. It is worse than futile; it is small, belittling, positively evil, since thus a man corrupts the only portion of himself which really belongs to him, namely, his will.

Since, then, the inevitable must happen, let us reap the benefits by willing it. The wise man brings his will into conformity with Nature and a willing conformity takes the sting out of misfortune. Calamities are not calamities to those who refuse to accept them as such. The calamity consists in refusing to conform the will to the world about one. As Sir Thomas Browne says, "the Stoics had a notable doctrine to take away fear; that is, in such extremities to desire that which is not to be avoided, and wish what might be feared; and so made evils voluntary, and to suit with their own desires, which took off the terror of them." The Stoics, moreover, conceived of the world as moving through a series of cycles, a view reminiscent of Hindu fatalism. When the gamut has been run, human history starts again from the beginning and is carried out in every detail until it again ends in a conflagration in which all things are consumed, ever to start out anew. So literal and complete is the cycle of changes that there will be another Socrates exactly like the historical Socrates teaching identical doctrines in an Athens which will be an exact duplicate of the historical Athens. Such doctrines may be favorable soil for philosophic calm, since it is palpably futile to become disturbed over matters which lie beyond our control. Obviously, however, they do not inspire social reform, since desire to reform presupposes that things can be changed; and the inadequacy of Stoicism lies in its failure and inability clearly to mark off the realm of the inevitable from that which can be changed.

4. THE EPICUREANS

The school in apposition to the Stoics was that of the Epicureans. It turned from a theory of cycles to one of indefinite development and from a God identical with Nature to a god, or gods, who dwelt apart from the world and did not interfere with mundane affairs. The clearest expression of its doctrines is contained in the writings of Lucretius, the first and last successful attempt to express philosophy and science in verse. Lucretius discards the theory of a golden age. Men started out no better than the beasts, unclothed and unprotected, untaught and ignorant of the arts of life.

The first weapon was a limb broken from the trees, a stone picked up from the ground. Later man learned to fashion these into implements

to supplement hands, teeth, fists, and claws. By observing Nature and profiting from her teachings man makes headway. In the main he does little more than improve on what lies ready to his hand, except that he conserves what he has acquired and thus gradually attains civilization. In two thousand years we have made no better guess as to the manner in which human culture began and proceeded, by modification and accumulation, from a stone age culture to the historical civilizations. The account of social evolution contained in Book V of Lucretius' *On the Nature of Things* remains unexcelled.

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CHAPTER VI

SOCIAL THEORY IN CHRISTIAN COUNTRIES BEFORE THE FRENCH REVOLUTION

I. EARLY CHRISTIAN THEORY

Christianity started in Hebrew soil and partook largely of its environment. The interval between the writing of the books of the Old Testament and those of the New was bridged by a continuous development of religious and social theory, with emphasis upon rewards in the next world. The Christian ideal expressed in the New Testament carries this doctrine to its logical conclusion. There was a fine disregard of mundane things and an insistence upon the transitoriness of life on earth, with corresponding emphasis upon the value of things eternal. The primitive Christian community in Jerusalem described in Acts was communistic. Possibly these early Christians were influenced by the Jewish sect of the Essenes, a communistic monastic order which flourished in Palestine during the first century A.D. There was insistence upon simple living and upon freedom from worldly cares.

The early Christian Church was opposed to warfare. Clement of Alexandria, Tertullian, Origen, and Lactantius regarded all warfare as unlawful for Christians, although Domitian had meted out execution for Christians, those early pacifists, who refused to fight. St. Augustine, a Church Father who wrote early in the fifth century, after the fall of Rome, was much disturbed by the overthrow of that civilization which he believed had been caused by following false gods. As the successor of Rome he proposed a City of God in which all men would be citizens of a heavenly kingdom.

2. MEDIEVAL THEORY

The Stoic conception of the unity of mankind, the views of St. Augustine, and the Roman legal theory which recognized the guild as a corporation capable of holding property as an individual, paved the way to the doctrine of social personality. The corporate unit, the *civitas*, possessed a personality comparable with that of an individual, a theory

which English and American courts have long held as far as civil liability is concerned, though only recently have some of them asserted that a corporation has criminal responsibility as well. Dante considered peace the proper condition of man, necessary for carrying out higher schemes because they require tranquillity. Thomas Aquinas identified progress with an increasing complexity of life, a view upheld centuries later by Herbert Spencer and exploited in post-Darwinian thought. With Thomas Aquinas as with Spencer the thought was doubtless a result of reflection upon the changes taking place on every side—a tendency which, as history testified, had characterized civilization throughout the centuries.

The Renaissance was a great intellectual stimulus. During most of medieval times Christian thought was merely a reworking of pagan theory in the light of the new religion and in response to new needs.

3. JEAN BODIN

The first compendious social theory since Aristotle is found in the work of Jean Bodin, who wrote in the latter half of the sixteenth century. Bodin is much influenced by Aristotle, whom in the main he follows. The *Republic*, published in 1578, is modeled after Aristotle's *Politics* rather than after Plato's *Republic*. Like Aristotle, Bodin considers the family the fundamental unit in the State; in fact, as the State in miniature. Communism is rejected.

Four types of authority are inherent in the nature of things and hence must be a feature of every State: the authority of husband over wife, of father over children, of master over slaves, of employer over laborers.

Since slavery is a feature of the earliest family life it must be countenanced. It originated in war, but the motive which induced captors to spare some captives and make slaves of them was not pity nor sympathy but egoistic interest. A citizen is one who participates in the government, and in many cities, therefore, a large proportion of the burghers are not citizens. There is no plea for democracy, but sovereignty resides wholly in the will of the sovereign. Bodin is much impressed by the phenomena of the rise and fall of States and civilizations. His comprehensive knowledge of history convinces him that all civilizations pass through stages of growth, deterioration, and death. A superficial view finds in their rise and fall a demonstration of the impossibility of indefinite progress; but Bodin draws no such induction. The fall of

civilization shows merely that each is destined to reach a climax in development and then pass off the stage. This, however, does not disprove progress. There is an oscillation, a rise and fall, but the base line is moving upward. Each successive civilization starts on a higher plane than that on which its predecessor started, and the climax of its development is represented by a higher peak, while at its fall it is not so low in the scale. But he does not give the data on which he bases his inference that the successive climaxes represent ascending stages.

4. JAMES HARRINGTON

About the middle of the following century, in 1659, during the reign of Cromwell, Harrington published his *Oceana*, a description of an ideal commonwealth. It was not a favorable time for the doctrines which he proclaimed. Of all forms of government, he asserts, aristocracy is the best, though all have their defects. Aristocracy would be a perfect form but for the fact that the abilities of the few who are most able to govern are directed toward the interests which they have closest at heart, and consequently they do not always serve the interests of the many. Men must not become entangled in a network of legislation and they must know the precise nature of the laws which they are obligated to obey, for otherwise the laws become handicaps rather than means of securing liberty. The *Oceana* was read and admired in America even more than in England. "The Constitutions of Carolina, New Jersey, and Pennsylvania reflected his thought, and a century later his authority was freely quoted in the discussions which preceded and followed the elaboration of the American Constitution. His words formed the political bible of Otis and John Adams, and Jefferson's copy is preserved in the Library of Congress. Translated into French during the Revolution, they supplied Sieyès with many of his ideas."¹

5. FONTENELLE

In the early part of the following century Fontenelle revived the views of Bodin regarding progress. He found proof of progress in the fact that the ancients were not superior to the moderns, a view which he based on the asserted fact that the brains of the Greeks were not more capacious than those of modern men. Nature is not inconstant but

¹ G. P. Gooch, *Political Thought in England from Bacon to Halifax*, pp. 120-121, New York, 1914.

produces the same types in successive centuries. Already the achievements of the moderns are beginning to rival those of the Greeks and in some respects to surpass them. Opportunity rather than superior innate endowment enabled the Greeks to reach their high achievements in civilization. Fontenelle is the first to assert that there is no limit to progress. Man can proceed indefinitely on an upward path.

The first English writer to advocate the ideas of Fontenelle is the historian Gibbon, who stresses the unity of European interests and European civilization. Advance is a fact and there is assurance for the future. The problem of progress is brought to the attention of the historian by a consideration of the rise and fall of Roman civilization and by a comparison of the ancient world with the modern European world.

6. MONTESQUIEU AND VOLTAIRE

Montesquieu turns for guidance to the comparative and inductive method of Aristotle. The thesis of his *Spirit of the Laws* is that conclusions must be based on facts rather than on presuppositions, for observation teaches more than does reason. The treatise opens with a consideration of the nature of law, by which Montesquieu means the necessary relations existing between things. Such relations hold throughout the realm of nature and of life.

Blind fate does not order the affairs of men, but everywhere intelligence is the directing force. Human beings have intelligence but they do not always follow its promptings, and their waywardness brings despair to reformers.

The original nature of man is the basis of the natural law which applies to men. In his original nature, that is, before he is subjected to the influences of civilization, man lives in fear of the forces about him, but is at peace with his fellow-men. The desire to live in society is innate in men, and conventional laws spring from social life. In society man loses his inborn sense of weakness and develops self-assertion. With its appearance there is an end of equality and war intrudes. All social groups are subject to three kinds of conventional law: political law, which concerns government; civil law, which concerns relations between members of the group; and international law, which concerns relations between groups and between members of different groups. Montesquieu recognizes three forms of government: the republic, in which the people, or a portion of them, rule; the monarchy, in which an

individual is the ruler, though there are established laws which restrain his autonomy; and the despotism, in which the people are subject to the caprices of a ruler unrestrained by laws. The nature of government, therefore, is determined by its structure, though its character rests in the human motives and impulses which keep it in action and constitute its dynamic as distinct from its institutional or static aspect. There is a fundamental opposition between the freedom of the individual and that of the group. Complete freedom of the group negatives that of the individual, and conversely if the individual is entirely free the group can not be free.

A group can have unlimited freedom of action only when the citizenry have no guaranteed freedom. The problem to which Montesquieu refers, that of apportioning freedom between the group and the component individuals, remains one of the most perplexing of the problems with which the social and the political philosopher must deal.

Voltaire voices many of the sentiments prevalent in France in the middle of the eighteenth century among the classes discontented with the prevailing order and disgusted with contemporary French civilization and its social régime. He flings defiance at the times, his biting satire and sarcasm sparing nothing. He scorns the follies of his countrymen and refuses to identify his interests with theirs. Indeed he declares himself a cosmopolite and feels himself a member of one portion of humanity almost as much as of any other. Montesquieu, on the other hand, was devoted to the interests of his native land and sought a rational system of social and political life which would improve the lot of the common man in France.

7. ROUSSEAU

Not the most profound thinker but certainly the most stirring writer of the latter half of the eighteenth century was Rousseau, by birth a Swiss, proud to call himself a "citizen of Geneva," a provincial rather than a patriot, and certainly not a cosmopolite. He wrote with show of strong conviction, preaching with oratorical zeal new doctrines which commanded much attention in his day. Even now his words are vibrant and moving. A reader does not grow drowsy over the *Social Contract*, the *Émile*, or the *Essay on the Causes of the Inequalities among Men*. The last-mentioned work opens with the paradox, "Wheat and iron have civilized man and have ruined him." Primitive man, unspoiled by civilization, lived like the beasts, hale and happy. The harsh conditions

of natural life eliminated the weak — a view antedating Darwin's doctrine by a century. Though primitive man was of strong physique and required no medicines, he was full of fear rather than of fight — a view emphatically expressed by Montesquieu. Inequalities existed, but they were due to such conditions as age, health, strength, or intelligence, in which men are by nature unequal. Civilization disregards these natural inequalities, introducing conventional or social inequalities not based on reason, inequalities which fling defiance at natural man. Wheat and iron have given rise to them; wheat, with the control over the land and over the products of the soil and the ensuing ability to store and hoard food and to make others pay for it; iron, with the power which it gives the stronger to conquer and subdue the weaker and to establish an industrial order in which the many serve the few. The *Social Contract* revives the problem of Locke (1632-1704) and Hobbes (1588-1679) regarding the relation of the individual to society. Men made society, they insist, by contracting among themselves that they would live together. Hence a man owes society only as much as he has given it by contract, expressed or implied. But the fallacy lies in the assumption that men could make contracts before there was a society.

Rousseau insists that man has natural rights. The fact is, however, that rights are not natural but social, and the important thing is not what rights a man has by nature, or whether they enter into the world with him, but what rights are secured to him by the society in which he lives. Nevertheless the theories of Rousseau played an important part in the events which led to the French Revolution and some of them were embodied in the French Bill of Rights.

Since the famous French socio-political doctrine of 1793 is seldom given in English, we reproduce below the words of the Constitutional Assembly of that year:

"The Representatives of the French people constituted in a National Assembly, considering that ignorance, forgetfulness, or contempt for the Rights of Man are the sole causes of public evils and of the corruption of governments, have resolved to set forth in a solemn declaration the natural, inalienable, and sacred rights of man, in order that this Declaration, constantly before the eyes of all the members of the social body, shall unceasingly remind them of their rights and their duties; that the acts of the legislature and executive, by being compared at every moment with the object of all political institutions, may be

more respected; and in order that the demands of the citizens, henceforth based on simple and incontestable principles, may always be directed to the maintenance of the Constitution and happiness of all. In consequence the National Assembly recognizes and declares in presence and under the auspices of the Supreme Being, the following Rights of Man and the Citizen.

“ 1. Men are born and remain free and equal in rights. Social distinctions can only be based on expediency.

“ 2. The object of every political association is the maintenance of the natural and imprescriptible rights of man. These rights are liberty, property, security, and resistance to oppression.

“ 3. The principle of all sovereignty resides in the nation. No corporation and no individual can exercise authority which does not expressly emanate from it.

“ 4. Liberty consists in the power to do whatever does not injure another. Thus the exercise of the natural rights of each has no limits but those which assure to others the enjoyment of the same rights. These limits can only be determined by the law.

“ 5. The law may only forbid actions injurious to society. What is not forbidden by law cannot be prevented, and no one can be compelled to do what it does not command.

“ 6. Law is the expression of the general will. All citizens have the right to share personally or through their representatives in its formation. It must be the same for all, both in protection and in punishment. All citizens being equal in its eyes are equally eligible to all dignities and public posts according to their capacities and their virtues.

“ 7. None can be accused, arrested, or detained except as prescribed by the law.

“ 8. None can be punished except in virtue of a law promulgated before the offence and legally applied.

“ 9. Every one being presumed innocent till he is declared guilty, if it is deemed essential to arrest him any violence beyond what is necessary to secure his person must be avoided.

“ 10. None may be molested for his opinions, even on religion, provided that their expression does not threaten public order.

“ 11. Free communication of thoughts and opinions is one of the most precious of the rights of man. Therefore every citizen can speak, write, and print freely, subject to responsibility for the abuse of such liberty in cases determined by the law.

“ 12. The guarantee of the rights of man and of citizens necessi-

tates a public force. This force is instituted for the advantage of all, not for that of those who command it.

"13. The expenses of the public force should be equally distributed among all citizens according to their capacity to pay.

"14. Citizens have the right to confirm for themselves or through their representatives the necessity of taxation, to grant it, to supervise its expenditure, to determine its amount, its character, and its duration.

"15. Society has the right to demand from every public servant an account of his stewardship.

"16. A society without the guarantee of rights and the separation of powers has no Constitution.

"17. Property being a sacred and inviolable right, none can be deprived of it unless public necessity, legally determined, clearly demands it, and on payment of fair compensation."

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The New Testament.

CHAPTER VII

SOCIAL THEORY AFTER THE POLITICAL AND INDUSTRIAL REVOLUTIONS

I. THE POLITICAL REVOLUTIONS

The guns of Lexington, "heard around the world," would not have been fired in 1775 had the colonists been steeped in any tradition other than that of Englishmen. If firearms conquered England, English political doctrines afforded the ammunition.

The logical consequences of these doctrines were being worked out by Englishmen in the New World more rapidly than in England, but they were none the less English doctrines. By this time, however, no important national movement could be confined to the country of its origin. The American Revolution, and especially the ideas of liberty and representative government which fostered it and were embodied in the Declaration of Independence and in the Constitution of the United States, stirred other peoples. Most of all they influenced the French, who borrowed many political doctrines from America. These ideas and the Declaration of Independence of 1776 helped to overthrow the monarchy in France and to bring the old régime to a long-delayed end. On the eve of the French Revolution Jefferson wrote from Paris to Washington: "The French nation has been awakened by our Revolution." American aid to the progress of democracy in France was only a partial payment of the debt to her. The ideas of Montesquieu and Rousseau had done much to ground the leaders of thought in the New World in the political doctrines which they incorporated in the Declaration of Independence and in the Constitution.

2. THE INDUSTRIAL REVOLUTION

During these days of ferment in social and political ideas another revolution was under way which was destined to have momentous consequences, the so-called Industrial Revolution. Machinery was beginning to occupy a predominant place in the life of Western Europe, and the Industrial Revolution had begun — or, rather, was greatly accel-

erated. The political and the industrial revolutions were, however, not supplementary but rather antagonistic. The problems arising from their joint influence were mainly those of reconciling economic with political and social demands. The political reforms tended to make men equal by giving them the ballot and equal rights, whereas the industrial system tended to increase the inequalities by dividing them into two classes, the capitalists and the workers. Machinery made capital mobile by bringing to the industrial centers the varied products of the world. In Manchester, Liverpool, or London the resources of the world could be exploited.

To a certain extent, however, the very revolution in industry which tended to thwart the aims of the revolution in socio-political life gave a stimulus to the political revolution, both in France and in America. The mobility of capital gave rise to a bourgeois class which was largely responsible for the political revolutions. It was primarily this class in France which rose in effective protest against the landed estate and in America against interference with its interests.

Increasing specialization was an inevitable feature of the machine age. The increase in the number of occupations had a far-reaching influence upon the workers. It permitted one class to exploit another in a new manner, and it made labor dependent upon capital in a novel way. So great were the handicaps imposed in many realms of industry that political freedom seemed vain unless industrial freedom accompanied the franchise. Economic doctrines were modified to meet the demands of the day, to explain and in large part to justify the existing industrial order.

3. THE SOCIALISTS

Though it is arbitrary to select one individual as responsible for a new order or a new school of thought, it is sometimes useful to do so. With regard to the social theory of the period which followed the industrial and political changes of the last half of the eighteenth century, perhaps no name is more worthy of consideration than that of Saint-Simon. Saint-Simon, who wrote in the early part of the last century, regards the human race as a unity, and considers human problems in their universal aspects. The sweep of his thought is as wide as that of the Stoics, and his analysis of contemporary life is more searching and more penetrating than that of Rousseau.

Taking mankind as a unit Saint-Simon finds that it is composed of successive and, in part, contemporary civilizations, which pass through

the stages of youth, manhood, and old age, as does an individual. The age of contemporary civilization corresponds to that of a man of forty or forty-five. It has reached full maturity and is now in possession of its amplest powers, which it will enjoy for decades or centuries; then it will deteriorate, as must all civilizations. But, Saint-Simon continues, civilizations differ as much as do individuals, and each excels in some particular thing. The Egyptians were builders, the Greeks, artists, and the Romans, warriors; the Middle Ages were merely a continuation of the warring state of mankind, a condition suggesting a revival of an earlier civilization.

Saint-Simon does not reject the social contract, but he interprets it in different spirit from Rousseau. Its purpose, he says, is to give men not liberty but happiness. The lower classes are not interested in liberty, for they know too well that they lack the power to secure it. Society is based on individual property and can not exist without it; but property must be regulated by law, and law should change in conformity with institutional developments and social needs.

The State, therefore, owes the individual an opportunity to work — a doctrine which became popular during the Revolution of 1848 and, thanks to Louis Blanc, for a while was accepted by the State though in form rather than in spirit. It is mainly this doctrine which leads some people to consider Saint-Simon the founder of socialism.

In the world order which Saint-Simon advocates there will be a system of spiritual rather than political control. Authority is to reside in priests who are scientists rather than mere religious functionaries, for the new world order is to be actuated by the modern and not by the ancient spirit.

Every human capacity demands social life for its development, and Saint-Simon attributes preëminent importance to society, alleging that society makes the individual and that great men are merely the product of their time. This doctrine, elaborated by Macaulay and Hegel, was revived by Mill and Durkheim.

Another Frenchman, Charles Fourier, author of a work called *The Social Destiny of Man*, like Saint-Simon is world-wide in the scope of his thought. Both lived at a time when local problems were regarded as essentially human problems, their specific nature being due to the contingencies of time and place. Fourier is perhaps the last modern exponent of the virtue of numbers. For him, as for the Pythagoreans and Plato, the universe is a vast mathematical system, and man must adapt himself to the law of numbers as to that of gravitation or any

other pervading principle. The fundamental phase of man is his emotional tendency, which is present in individuals in varying relations.

The combinations of the fundamental emotional tendencies are about eighteen hundred. Hence the ideal social unit, the association, or phalanx, as Fourier calls it — a word suggestive of the source of his inspiration — comprises about 1800 individuals, that is, about 300 families. Each phalanx is to be a complete social world, for it will contain all the various combinations of the elements of human nature. These social units, to one of which every individual would belong, are to be organized into a world state with Constantinople the capital of the phalanxed world. In each phalanx will be found the various orders of crafts, each individual doing the thing for which he is peculiarly fitted.

Within the phalanx an organization of common kitchens will permit three women to do the work which now requires the labor of thirty in individual households. The stage of advance reached by a people depends upon the status of its women; hence they are to be on a par with men. Talent of every sort is to be fostered, and is to be remunerated by a vote of merit based on the estimated value of the contribution. Since each phalanx contributes to the worth of the world, the cumulation of these contributions will be immense, for each will share the advance made by any other.

A system of knight-errantry will make it possible for artists of various kinds from any part of the world to visit all other parts at no expense to themselves, being entertained during their visit to other phalanxes by the local order of knights. Thus the talent of a community will be available to the entire world.

In similar fashion an industrial organization will make possible the borrowing of labor, when needed, from neighboring phalanxes, through the Industrial Commissioner. Labor will be made attractive by feasts at the end of the day, participated in by women as well as by men.

Fourier does not worship the past. The science, philosophy, and political economy of former times he pronounces useless, because those who lived in by-gone ages neglected the fundamental problems of their fields. With the development of trade came the extolling of commerce and political economy. Trade, which should be servant, has become master. Free competition is the harbinger of bankruptcy, which is practised with fraud and to the spoliation of the innocent. A monopoly of goods is often a great disadvantage to society. The destruction of goods to raise prices is reprehensible and should be prohibited.

Speculators live by despoiling the public. They displace trust with distrust, and engender a false credit. "The fault is attributable exclusively to Civilization, which engenders so many branches of parasitic and pernicious industry, and to the philosophic sciences, which would persuade us that this infamous Civilization is the social destiny of Man, and that God has invented nothing better for the organization of human relations." Society eventually pays the price of free competition.

"In an age so mean and parsimonious, how is it that no one has remarked that the chief economy should be *economy of hands*, economy of intermediate agents (middlemen), who might be dispensed with, but who are so abundant in unproductive departments like that of commerce?" The antidote to the present system of individual competition lies in a system of collective competition. Collective competition would:

(1) Lead to large association, the basis of all economy;

(2) Make the commercial body responsible to the community for all its operations;

(3) Restore to productive industry the capital now employed in commerce. The social body being fully insured against malpractices on the part of merchants, full confidence would everywhere be accorded them. There would then be no occasion to employ large sums of money in their business, and the entire capital of the country would be invested in agriculture and in manufactures. (Fourier regards commerce as essentially non-productive);

(4) Restore to productive industry three-fourths of the hands now employed in the unproductive functions of commerce;

(5) Compel the commercial body, by a system of equitable taxation, to support its share of public expenses, which now it cunningly evades;

(6) Establish in commercial relations a degree of probity and good faith which, though less than will exist in the Combined Order (of phalanxes advocated by Fourier), would still be immense as compared with the frauds and spoliations of the present system. In the "Epilogue on the Social Chaos of the Globe," with which Fourier closes his "Social Destiny of Man," he insists on the essential unity of the human race, and upon the necessity for taking into consideration the needs and interests of savages and barbarians, who constitute the larger part of mankind. The human race is one great family. Civilization has lacked stability because it has not provided for the fundamental needs of man, in particular for the comfort and prosperity of the workers, and has not given them a motive for developing interest in their work.

Francis Place (1771-1854) started life as a leather-breeches maker and was long a shopkeeper. He was active in the Chartist Movement and in the campaigns for the reform in franchise which resulted in the Reform Act of 1832, one of the landmarks in English political history. He advocated schools for all children, and believed that the problem of education could be partly solved by a system in which the older pupils would teach the younger — a possibility which has never been fully exploited.

His labors were practical, directed toward securing specific benefits through definite individuals and agencies, and his work was carried on in serene patience. He sought most of all an understanding of the working classes and an amelioration of their condition. Realizing the extent to which large families made it impossible for the workers to accumulate savings, he saw that an increasing population tended to encroach upon the available supplies of goods unless machines kept ahead of the population. Utilitarianism, he said, is equivalent to self-approbation; and he derived little comfort from the formula, "the greatest good to the greatest number."

Robert Owen (1771-1858) embodied some of the characteristics of Fourier and a great deal of the practical bent of Francis Place. He was the first capitalist to adopt industrial schemes which contemporaries regarded as wildly utopian. The plan which went into effect in his factory at New Lanarck, Scotland, is deservedly the most famous experiment in social engineering. The hours of work were considerably decreased; the age of employment for children was raised; a store for the sale of supplies was established in the workers' village, the profits from its sales going to the purchasers; the streets were kept clean and the houses tidy and in good repair. From his own workers Owen's interest extended to those of Great Britain, for whom he endeavored to secure the benefits which he had given his own employees.

He deplored the prevailing attitude of employers toward workers, and agitated for factory legislation in behalf of children. In 1818 he made a determined effort to secure international action to ameliorate the conditions of the workers, believing that the problem could not be solved at home until it had been solved in all the nations with which Great Britain was competing industrially.

A New View of Society, which Owen published in 1813, expounds the social philosophy which underlay his program of reform. He declares that men are primarily gregarious, hence dependent upon society, and that the character of a man is determined by his environment;

provide the proper environment for men and their characters are assured. He includes interesting observations on education, which he says should be based on personal stimulus and should not be a mere learning by rote. He deprecates the use of rewards and punishments, for they distract attention from the real purpose of education and transfer effort and motive to unprofitable ends. Here, too, he was ahead of his day, and of our own day as well.

In the New World considerable attention was given to the ideas of Owen and Fourier, and in several places attempts were made to put them into effect. The Owenites flourished especially in New York State, which harbored also communities of Fouriens. Some of these still function, though most of the settlements were unable to maintain themselves in a world in which economic and social principles rested on a different foundation.

4. THE ECONOMISTS

The year of the Declaration of Independence in the New World witnessed in England the publication of Adam Smith's *The Wealth of Nations*, a book destined to exert a far-reaching influence upon economic thought and upon the attitude of political scientists toward the control of economic institutions. Smith points to the advantages of the division of labor in production, but he falsely infers that this necessarily redounds to the advantage of worker as well as employer. Division of labor, he points out, creates exchange, mutual interdependence, and profits. A man is rich in proportion to his ability to command goods, services, and leisure. The economic order is self-sufficient, following its own laws of development, and legislation must not interfere with them. This *laissez faire* doctrine dominated economic and political thought for a century, countering every industrial reform, and its effect may be seen in the condition described by John Bascom:

"Not every portion of the working-class has kept pace with the general improvement. Some have come under a sweating process which has forced them down to the lowest wages consistent with life. The most specific form of this evil arises under a contractor who gathers into his service, in any employment, the most dependent workmen, and gradually makes this dependence complete. All branches of needlework have been peculiarly open to sweating. A shrewd operator, for example, collects under his direction tailors who have been irregularly employed, and who have lost a secure standing in the trade. He pays them low

wages, and exacts the largest service. He is thus able to undersell those who are carrying on the business under a more generous method. The fall of prices increases the dependent class, and makes those in the employment of the sweater more absolutely subject to him. This process, once initiated, repeats itself under competition with ever worse results. All are pushing wages down as a means of self-defense. The burden of the position is assiduously transferred from the dealer to the wage-earner, till nothing is left him but the most extreme toil for the most inadequate returns. The sweating process is a complete breakdown of purely economic forces in connection with the public welfare."¹

Another basis for economic theory was proposed by Ricardo, a contemporary of Owen. Ricardo regards the possession of land as of fundamental importance. His starting-point is the dictum that "the interest of the landlord is opposed to every other interest in the community." Here, of course, he is in fundamental opposition to the position taken by Smith. The question of the proper distribution of profits is that of the proper share for labor, capital, and land, respectively. Value must not be confused with utility. Thus gold has high value but little utility, as compared with iron, which has high utility but low value. The followers of Ricardo realized that the workers would improve their status by securing higher wages — and the workers have found this doctrine useful.

5. PROUDHON AND ANARCHISM

In the camps of political theorists and economists rose the strident voice of Proudhon, who in 1840 published a work called *What Is Property?* which answered its own question by asserting that property was social robbery as slavery was social death. The origin of property is not historically ascertainable; hence the diverse theories regarding the matter. One of these maintains that originally all property, at least in land, was group property; hence the communism which Plato and others suggested on the presumption that it was a return to the original social order. But the fact is, says Proudhon, that "the earth belongs to all mankind," and that property in any portion of it is merely misappropriation.

The only "efficient" explanation of property is labor, which alone makes property valuable. Even so, labor has no right to appropriate natural wealth, but only that which it creates; and only inequality of labor creates inequality of property. In an order of justice, as distinct

¹ Bascom, *Social Theory*, p. 265, New York, 1895.

from the actual order, past and present labor destroys natural inequalities of property, that is, destroys advantages arising out of mere possession.

For communism Proudhon has no sympathy. It is but the tyranny of the group, as property is the tyranny of individuals, and he would not welcome a transfer from the one order to the other. The solution of our difficulties lies in liberty, that is, in an order in which the individual is free from external compulsion.

Proudhon was the first of the modern anarchists; he did not advocate the disruption of life, but rather the fulfilment of its potentialities. This, he thought, could be realized only by freeing the individual from external restraints and allowing him full development in an order to which he would subscribe willingly because of its reasonableness and freedom. He advocated liberty but not license. How his scheme would work is another matter. It implies a higher faith in the nobility of individuals than most of us can share; for men are not compounded solely of sweet reasonableness, and they are not always disposed to entertain for the liberty of others as much concern as they entertain for their own. If men were perfect, it would be difficult to explain how the evils of which Proudhon complains could have arisen. The very facts against which he rails seem to belie his simple solution; but his ideas appealed to many, and had much influence upon would-be social reformers of the next half century, particularly, though by no means exclusively, in Russia.

6. THE UTILITARIANS

A school of the first half of the nineteenth century was that of the Utilitarians, founded by Jeremy Bentham and supported by James Mill and his son, John Stuart Mill. The backgrounds of the theory are the exhortations of the moralists of the preceding century, particularly Bishop Butler and Shaftesbury, but the incentive is in the times.

Political conditions in England at the beginning of the nineteenth century were far different from what they are today. The British Constitution was a historical rather than a social doctrine, a precedent for authority and power rather than a protection or guarantee of the rights of citizens. A privileged class, whose prerogatives came by inheritance and were based on property, dominated the government. Class privilege honeycombed legislative and administrative departments, army and navy, Church and university. The manufacturers were creating new

social problems, and the agriculturists were suffering distress because of the prosperity of the manufacturers. Social problems were rife: pauperism was increasing; the police were corrupt; education was for the few and woefully inadequate for them; the slave trade still flourished. Into this scene were injected the ideas brought to the fore by the French Revolution, as well as the individualism which was in part its cause and in part its effect. The law, more especially the criminal law, was in many respects a travesty upon justice, punishing debt with imprisonment and many petty crimes with death.

Bentham is concerned with these problems and seeks a solution of them. He, too, starts with the individual, whose nature, he feels, must be satisfied. The basic thing is pain and pleasure. All men seek to avoid pain as an evil, as something to be shunned, and all desire pleasure, acknowledging it as a good. To avoid pain and to secure pleasure is, therefore, the end of life. But if some pleasure is good, more is better, and best of all is the maximum of pleasure. Therefore the greatest pleasure is the greatest good, but the pleasure of the many is a greater pleasure and a greater good than that of the few. Thus we arrive at the doctrine of the "greatest good to the greatest number," which means merely the greatest pleasure of the greatest number. The conception reminds one of the doctrine of Fourier, both in the insistence upon the importance of the emotional nature of man and in the mathematical scheme for satisfying it.

In his method for securing the greatest good for the greatest number Bentham is again mathematical, insisting that each man must count as one and only one. There must be no preferences, privileges, or advantages given to one which are not available to all.

As a logical or ethical doctrine there are many shortcomings in Bentham's scheme, but it did much to influence legislation to good purpose, to secure a fuller and freer life to non-privileged Englishmen, and to turn attention more than ever before in "Christian" Europe to ethical considerations as of foremost importance. It challenged the *laissez faire* doctrine of the economists, and the constitutional privileges of classes who could appeal to little else than history and their own presumption as justification for the exercise of hereditary prerogatives.

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CHAPTER VIII

RECENT SOCIAL THEORY

I. COMTE AND HERDER

August Comte is usually considered the founder of modern sociology, though one might select Saint-Simon, Herbert Spencer, or Émile Durkheim as of equal or even greater importance.

Comte represents society as including all mankind. Recapitulation applies to the social world, and the human race has passed through the stages of infancy, youth, and adolescence, and is now in the vigor of manhood. Society is to be reorganized and placed on a rational basis, the scientists being the priests of the new world order. The sciences are arranged in a hierarchy, with sociology at the top.

Contemporary with Comte were men who thought in terms of humanity. This is shown in the philosophies of history written in the last half of the eighteenth and the first half of the nineteenth centuries. Kant, the greatest of the philosophers of that period, played with the idea of a universal history and with that of a federation of the States of Europe.

He insisted that the historian must rise above mere circumstantiality and preoccupy himself with events which have most influence upon the spiritual nature of man. This anthropocentric view is represented by Herder, who, however, goes further and describes the orientation of man the species and man the individual in the universe. In order to envisage the stage on which the scene of human life is set, and to appreciate the rôle assigned to him, man must know his place in nature. The orientation of man, culturally, spatially, and temporally, in his world, is the leading contribution of Herder.

2. PHILOSOPHIES OF HISTORY

Hegel, heir to Kant and Herder, elaborates their ideas in his *Philosophy of History*, a work written during the Napoleonic régime, when the German states were under the heel of the conqueror. Hegel is concerned with the purpose underlying historical development and with

the ends achieved through historical processes. He distinguishes three kinds of historical writing: original or descriptive, reflective, and philosophical. As exponents of original history he cites Thucydides and Herodotus, whom he considers merely recorders of events. The reflective historian rises above particular events to a contemplation of the people, the country, or the world. He indulges in abstractions, characterizing events and not merely reciting their occurrence. He is pragmatic, bringing knowledge of the past to bear upon the present, and is critical, carefully weighing the value of the historical narrative on which he depends. In particular he searches for the spirit which animates events. The philosophical historian presents a thoughtful consideration of history. He discovers that reason is the dominant element in the world, and is embodied in nations as well as in individuals. He searches for man's ultimate purpose in the world, which he finds is spirit or reason realizing its potentialities. History is an unbroken continuity because it is an unfolding of unlimited potentialities. As the seed has the potentiality of a tree, so the beginnings of history contain the germ of all history. The formula which best expresses the meaning of all human history is: the history of the world is the record of the progress achieved in the consciousness of freedom. Great men are those who recognize the drift of events and promote them by making actual the potentialities of the day.

The State is the divine idea embodied in social institutions. From it men derive their freedom, for only under law is man free. Man's "natural" freedom consists merely in freedom to determine his ultimate destination, that is, it is potential rather than actual freedom. Thus, to apply Hegel's thought, man is now potentially free to develop an international organization; but he is not actually free, for he is entangled in political organizations, customs, and traditions from which he must first extricate himself. But no freedom is conceivable which is not incorporated in law and morality. Hegel regards nations as individualities, that is, as entities. There is a spirit of the people and a spirit of the times — an adumbration of modern social psychology.

To study the course of world history is to discover that in the blind forces of nature there is nothing new. Only man is always striving toward something better. Nor need we be discouraged by the fact that civilizations come to an end. Nations die, but their spirit lives on. As death is the issue of life, so life is the issue of death. The meaning of existence must be expressed in terms of the human spirit. In an inclusive classification of the data of history, the Far East is the birth of civili-

zation, the Near East the adolescence, and German culture the manhood and maturity.

History has a geographical basis, the north temperate zone being best suited to the human spirit. Aboriginal America has not developed far and Africa south of the Mediterranean fringe does not belong within the realm of universal history. Hegel explains the characteristics of Western civilization in the United States by the greater opportunities which the country offers, predicting that the problems which confront European nationals eventually will confront their descendants in America.

Fichte exalted the German ideal. While Berlin was patrolled by French troops he delivered his impassioned *Addresses to the German People*, in which he extolled German nationalism. The Germans would save themselves only by being patriots first and foremost.

The English historian, Buckle, turned to the problem of civilizations, and proposed to solve it by objective and scientific principles and procedures. In his *History of Civilization in England* he seeks inclusive formulas and laws which apply to all mankind throughout the centuries. Only in this way can one understand why the several nations have become their peculiar selves. He first calls attention to the regularity observable in human actions, for though some are capricious, some are obedient to law. He rules out the capricious as useless for instruction, since their effects are not cumulative. In the main, however, the actions of men are not capricious but are determined by their antecedents, else there would be no continuity in human behavior and we could not anticipate it. The antecedents of men's conduct are embodied in their circumstances. History is the result of the interaction between men and their environment. The science of statistics confirms this principle. The statistics on murder, suicide, marriage, the number of unaddressed letters left in the postoffice, etc., show that the behavior of men in the aggregate can be predicted.

Since the physical environment continually impinges upon man the first task of the historian is to discover the influence of physical conditions. This is most marked in regions in which there is accumulated wealth. Nature influences the imagination, sometimes stimulating, sometimes overawing man. Earthquakes and volcanic eruptions foster superstitions. The tropics and the frigid zones sap man's energy and the temperate zones stimulate it. Buckle echoes Montesquieu.

But history detects mental laws also. In European civilization man is triumphant over nature; by his greater wisdom he has turned the

trick and conquered his conqueror. His power is seen in his ability to change the features of the country and to utilize available natural resources. Living in cities he escapes many of the direct influences of physical environment which daily come more completely under human control.

3. HERBERT SPENCER

The middle of the century marks the advent of two writers destined to influence the thought of the next two generations: the writings of Charles Darwin dominated biology, and those of Herbert Spencer gave a new impetus to the social sciences.

Spencer's writings have a wide range; he is the Francis Bacon of the nineteenth century. The opening thesis of his *Study of Sociology* is the need for such a study. In view of men's ignorance the assurance with which they regard social affairs is astounding, and the presuppositions underlying their assurance are no less amazing. Men proceed blindly with social measures, oblivious of the fact that special knowledge is needed here as much as in any other field. Social phenomena are not simple, but complex, and difficult to grasp in their ramifications; therefore the social measures dealing with them should be based on knowledge. So long as he is ignorant of what he is doing, inaction is a better guide for the legislator than action. Until he has adequate knowledge, the ever-ready reformer must resist the impulse to do something. The average man, however, proceeds by no social science, attributing social causation to Providence and explaining social changes by the great man theory. Yet human action is generally consistent with identifiable basic human motives. Thanks to this fact we can foresee, and prevision means science.

In physical nature the character of the aggregate is determined by the character of the units which compose it. This holds likewise of human beings, but we can not write a man's biography until we can preface the account with his obituary. The story of a life can not be foretold; it can only be recorded. Nevertheless, in individual behavior there are tendencies, and behavior can be foreseen if the tendencies are known. Growth of individual or of group structure comes by use and fosters further differentiation. Genuine growth implies, in addition, un-building and re-building.

The attainment of objectivity is the greatest need of the social sciences. The judgment of witnesses is warped by their special interests, and there is a tendency to confuse inference with observation. Thus the

assertion that the longevity of married men is greater than that of bachelors leaves out of the reckoning many factors which may determine the difference in longevity in the two groups. The statement that East Indian students are inferior in ability to English students is based on an inference derived from results in examinations in which the students of the respective nationalities have different interests and for which they have no comparable preparation. It is difficult properly to estimate the proximate, because failure to see it in perspective distorts its true proportions. Man is conservative; he preserves old forms, and, acting in response to the law of familiarity, values most highly the things which he has had longest. Hence social changes must be viewed in large perspective if they are to be estimated properly. To see them comprehensively is to discover that in the realm of social science only general tendencies and not details conform with social law.

The subjective difficulties are not less disturbing. In this class Spencer places intellectual difficulties, such as that of comprehending the importance to civilization of the printing-press. There is also a lack of plasticity in our conceptions of facts, as, for example, with regard to regulating marriage, where we see no further than our conventions.

Emotional difficulties are even more upsetting. To call economics the "dismal science" is merely an emotional outburst of the "old dyspeptic" (Carlyle). Men's interpretations of cause are unreasonable if they are in sympathy with a thing, and no less unreasonable if they are opposed. Thus certain political philosophers harp upon the blood shed during the French Revolution but are unconcerned about that shed in the Napoleonic Wars.

There is an almost innate disposition to resist new methods, no matter what improvement they offer over the old. It is so in the army, in the navy, and in departments of government. Everywhere old views survive in spite of the judgments of common sense and of wisdom. To make a bad situation worse, we assume that the majority is always right — though one wonders how it ever could be right, and one can show that usually it is wrong.

Bias runs through every phase of life. We are educated under two inconsistent principles: under a religion of amity and one of enmity. The bias in our patriotism is not less iniquitous. Our estimate of the social or the ethical value of an action depends upon the nation concerned. Civilization, because it is our civilization, is regarded as superior to savagery in all traits, and we are blind to the merits of the latter. The English have no true conception of England, nor have the French

of France, or the Germans of Germany. Opposition to things within the nation generates prejudice no less than does over-fondness of them. An example is Matthew Arnold, who exalts all things foreign, as though culture could be determined by geographical considerations. Everywhere, therefore, inclusion in a culture makes a proper estimate of it difficult. Class bias is reflected in the extent to which social theory depends upon class status. The upper and the lower classes have their respective social theories, the bias of workingmen being equaled only by that of employers. Political nature persists in spite of changes in constitutions, for constitutions do not alter the character of a people. Indeed forms of government are of value only insofar as national character gives life to them — a view later made familiar by Walter Bagehot and James Bryce. Government must interfere only in fundamental issues, else it cripples rather than benefits society. Theological zeal prevents a proper estimate of social forces, and anti-theological bias is no less distorting.

The sociologist needs most of all a training in scientific methods, particularly in those of biology. Social law must not contravene the biological law of the selection of the best; hence we must first know what is biologically best. For a similar reason the sociologist needs psychology. Mental attitude must be converted into action. A comparative psychology of the sexes is needed. The laws of psychology underlie those of sociology, and these must be ascertained by the sociologist if he would build on solid foundations. Vast results are achieved by the cumulative effect of minute actions, and nothing which bears on social life is unimportant.

Spencer's larger work, *The Principles of Sociology*, is an attempt to treat society in a comprehensive manner, but chiefly in its evolutionary aspects. The most important thesis advanced by him is that there is a super-organic evolution, that is, an evolution which proceeds through organisms but does not involve an evolution of the organisms themselves. An example is language, which evolves without any corresponding evolution upon the part of tongue, larynx, teeth, lips, palate, vocal cords, or lungs. The general trend of social evolution is from simple to complex, accomplished by utilization of the environment. Then follows command of the environment by the enlarging social unit, and, finally, differentiation of the social structure.

Spencer puts sociology upon an independent basis. Society is an entity, distinguished by the permanence of relations maintaining between its parts. Though not biological, society is analogous to a biological be-

ing, and may be called an organism. The social organism exhibits growth and structure as unmistakably as does a biological individual.

Perhaps the nearest to a successor to Spencer among contemporaries is Hobhouse, who has approached the field of sociology from the evolutionary point of view, although he has been influenced little if at all by Spencer. Hobhouse's early work was in the field of animal psychology, where he made excellent observations upon the behavior of animals in a day when speculation was more rife than experiment or observation. He subsequently turned his attention to primitive ethics and then to the problem of purposive action.

Hobhouse considers custom and a blind following of tradition as marking the early stages of social and intellectual advance, subsequent to which came objectification and control of custom and to some extent of tradition as well. His later studies are attempts to formulate a rational program along which society should develop, and which would take full account of human needs, both those of the group and those of its constituent individuals.

4. MILL AND DURKHEIM

While Buckle and Spencer were describing the fundamental elements in human life, a student of political economy and political science, John Stuart Mill, was analyzing the logical procedures in the natural and social sciences which were then rapidly developing. A portion of Mill's work on *Logic* is devoted to what he calls a *Logic of the Moral Sciences*, or, as we now say, the social sciences. Mill points out that at least in one respect the social sciences are clearly marked off from certain other disciplines, namely, in that no *a priori* method can be applied to them. We can not hope to discover — as we do in mathematics, for example — a few axioms from which the remainder of the science can be derived. The social sciences are empirical, and their laws must be ascertained by a study of the data. Their methods can not be formulated in advance of the facts with which the respective sciences deal. But is a science of human conduct possible, or is the term "science," applied to the data of social life, in reality a misnomer? This is equivalent to asking: Are human actions reducible to invariable laws?

Social life is a compromise between liberty and necessity. Some human actions are predictable, while others are not. Everywhere, however, some order and some habitual sequence are observable; hence a science of human nature is possible. There are laws of mind and of con-

duct, as we acknowledge when we attribute a certain character to a man.

Social science is the study of the collective masses of men. To a limited extent we can apply to individuals observations of the kind which the chemist applies to atoms; but a deductive method, such as is employed in geometry, is not applicable. Instead, one must use what Mill calls the inverse deductive or historical method. By their deeds we know men for what they are. There is, indeed, a science as well as an art of history, for the fates of nations unroll as a logical sequence of events, each series giving rise to its successor.

In recent years new impetus has been given the development of social theory by the work of Émile Durkheim, who emphasizes the solidarity and self-sufficiency of group life. Instead of conceiving society as a mere aggregation of individuals, he sees it as a self-complete reality, and the only complete reality, the individual being but a carrier of social tradition, a cell in the social body. To understand what is fundamental in religion, ideas, or institutions one must study the group. The individual as such does not exist, for he is merely a link in the chain of social causation and a reflection of social mind. The group functions with self-sufficiency in a world of groups and according to ascertainable laws. Language, for example, is an instrument by means of which group concepts are handed on, and religion is embodied in standardized and ritualized group attitudes.

5. THE REVIVAL OF BIOLOGICAL SOCIOLOGY

Then, too, there has been a revival of Spencer's evolutionism. Kidd, Keller, and Chatterton-Hill, in particular, emphasize this view. In the main they follow the lines laid down in Darwinian and post-Darwinian biology. Thus Chatterton-Hill dwells at length on the biological effects of suicide, insanity, syphilis, alcoholism, and social selection. Social progress is not identical with biological progress, and many features of our social life have untoward effects when regarded from the biological point of view. The prevailing ethics, for example, tends to preserve the weak and the sickly and to permit them to propagate. The less desirable elements in our population breed more rapidly than the better elements. War is an instrument of counter-selection, for the nations select as fighters the biologically best, with the result that the best exterminate one another.

The tendency for each country to increase and expand is a primary

cause of international conflict. We are still in doubt as to whether reason will be able to check the desire for expansion which characterizes the more powerful peoples. Since this proceeds within the group as well as between larger groups, there must be a limitation of offspring in the lower classes. No problems of modern life are more important than those which arise from the conditions under which social selection proceeds.

There has, of course, been a reaction against the Darwinian sociology, a reaction best typified in Kropotkin's insistence upon the part played in evolution by coöperation, and by Drummond's assertion that mutual aid is a factor which has enabled some species to outstrip others.

Practically all of the theories summarized in this chapter are part of the thought of modern times. In subsequent chapters we shall see their bearing on certain phases of modern life—the family, population, poverty, mental deficiency, education. The theories as well as the institutions of the past are insistently with us.

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PART III

EXTERNAL FACTORS INFLUENCING
SOCIAL LIFE

INTRODUCTORY

Social development is conditioned by external factors from which man can not escape. Social life must carry on in some geographical environment and must submit to the limitations inherent in it. The climate and surface conditions of the portion of the earth on which a given group lives have a pronounced influence upon it. Not only must man have somewhere to stand; he must have somewhat to eat. Life is not maintained without exertion, and food not given ready-made must be provided from the materials furnished by nature. Man can not escape the requirements of the economic régime.

The human race constitutes a biological species. Man is endowed with the peculiar attributes of his species and possessed of its vices as well as its virtues. Biological endowments are fundamental in his structure, and his body with its specific tendencies toward certain action and reaction under varying stimuli is not chosen by him. It is the physiological medium in which individual development takes place. If the recapitulation theory is correct, individual development passes rapidly through the stages passed through by the genus or phylum in the course of a long evolutionary history. Thus each individual is reminded that he is but a link in the unbroken chain of evolution. Race is a biological variety of mankind, and of necessity the individual inherits the racial qualities of ancestors. He inherits from parents and ancestors a limited ancestral strain, receiving the characters, or some of the characters, carried by their germ plasm. Thus man lives in a world which has been provided for him in advance, and to it he must conform. Because external forces fashion him before he becomes aware of their existence, their tyranny is the more insidious. Before practical utility spiritual utility must retreat, but by his inventiveness man has been able to "smooth down the rough creation which Nature flings to us." The world in which the individual lives reflects the world within him, and this reflects the world in which he lives.

CHAPTER IX

PHYSICAL ENVIRONMENT

"Of what avail are all the impulses proffered by nature if man himself is not a fit agent? If he be too stupid, indolent, or idle, they rebound from off him without effect." Rudolph von Ihering, *The Evolution of the Aryan*.

"Evolution implies becoming more advantageously sensitive to the environment, making more of its influences, shutting out profitless stimuli, and opening more gateways to knowledge." J. Arthur Thomson, *The Outline of Science*, I, 76.

"Man, who begins by acquiring just enough force to compel Nature to supply his bare needs, himself becomes the greatest force of Nature."

Physical environment consists of the natural objects and forces which help or hinder mankind. So far as it has cultural significance the environment is limited to forces which impinge upon man, and which he can utilize or must combat. Above the equator, for example, there is a layer of air colder than that about the Poles. This cold air does not, however, constitute a part of the environment of the inhabitants of the earth, for it does not affect them; they neither profit by nor suffer from its presence.

Myriads of stars known to the astronomer are no part of the physical environment of those who do not know that these stellar bodies exist. But the constellations and the stars which they see, as well as the sun, the moon, and the visible planets, constitute a part of their environment. Only those things which influence an individual, directly or indirectly, are a portion of his environment and have social significance.

I. THE LIMITATIONS IMPOSED BY THE ENVIRONMENT ARE RELATIVE

Many parts of the earth are unsuited to human habitation. Man can not live in the Far North or in the Far South, on the peaks of the Himalayas or in the rocky clefts of the Grand Canyon; nor does he have habitations in the oceans or on the rims of active volcanoes. Many por-

tions of the earth no individual possesses because no one can utilize them.

But the transition from uninhabitable to habitable regions is neither an abrupt nor an absolute one. The borders of the Sahara Desert along the Nile River are now uninhabitable, now habitable, as the waters recede from or move toward that great expanse of inhospitable sands. Holland reclaims hundreds of thousands of acres from the Zuyder Zee. The Imperial Valley of Southern California was uninhabitable for a million years; now the irrigated portion of it is one of the richest agricultural areas in the world. The Campagna, near Rome, was a hazard to the health of its inhabitants until its marshes were drained. The Panama Canal region was filled with yellow fever until means were found to get rid of the mosquito which carried the disease. In many cases, therefore, the limitations are only relative. Man can not live in a given region until he finds a way to combat its untoward influences; but when he does this the uninhabitable area becomes habitable.

2. THE RELATION BETWEEN ENVIRONMENT AND CULTURE

The extent to which man is master of his fate is shown in the correlation between environment and culture. The Eskimos build houses of snow and by ingenious devices capture game in the sea and on land; natives in lake districts or in marshy lands build houses on piles; to escape the dangerous animals which live on the ground man constructs houses in trees; in order to live in the desert he resorts to irrigation. The manner in which man adapts himself to environment by overcoming initial handicaps shows the extent to which he is free from its compulsions. In some cases the adaptation is woefully inadequate; in others it is so satisfactory that little maladjustment is experienced. To some extent man's advance is measured by his success in utilizing his environment instead of being held in subjection to it.

Every important advance in culture, particularly on the scientific side, marks a step in the control of environment. Thus when man domesticates animals he is no longer dependent solely upon the environment of wild game; similarly the cultivation of wild cereals leads to agriculture. With each step man attains relative freedom from the old environment, though he becomes dependent upon the new; but the significant fact is that he makes a new environment.

Knowledge enables him to do this. That is why the environment of the New World is so different today from what it was in pre-Columbian

times. The Imperial Valley was a desert because the Indians did not know how to irrigate it and to plant it with products adapted to soil and climate. The iron mines of Minnesota yield immense wealth annually; but they yielded nothing to aboriginal civilization because it had no knowledge of the arts of smelting ore. Knowledge remakes the environment and endows man with virtually new materials.

3. ENVIRONMENT DOES NOT EXPLAIN CULTURE

There have been many attempts to show the influence of environment upon social life. It has been alleged that nomadic peoples lack the virtues of those with settled abodes, since among the former there is no permanence of social relations. But environment does not give the group its ethics. The wandering Hebrews had a different ethics from that of other wandering peoples who lived in similar environments. Not all peoples in northern lands are fierce and cold-blooded, and not all who live in balmy climates have sunny dispositions and warm natures.

Environment is not an explanation of culture, for there is no constant correlation between the two. In similar environments diverse cultures flourish. The environment of the Nile Valley remains unchanged through millennia; meanwhile, throughout the long period of Egyptian history there is incessant change in the culture. The same is true of any portion of the world.

Moreover, in diverse environments far removed from one another there are similar fundamental elements in the culture. Contemporary American civilization is spread over a region of diverse environments, but the culture is essentially similar throughout. The civilization of the British Empire does not vary more between Canada and Australia—one on one side of the world, one on the other, one in the Northern Hemisphere, one in the Southern—than it varies within the island of Great Britain itself.

Conversely, in similar environments there are diverse cultures, which would not be the case if environment were the explanation of the cultures. The desert environment of Central Australia is much like that of many other desert regions of the globe, but nowhere else is there a similar culture. Arabian culture in Asia and in Africa is nowhere duplicated, although there are other similar environments. Indeed within a continuous area of similar environment there are sometimes important cultural differences. There are many contrasts between the culture of the Zuñi and that of the Hopi of the Pueblo region of the Upper Colo-

rado River region and likewise many between the various culture groups on the Northwest Coast of North America. The differences between the Irish and the English can not be explained by environmental differences, nor can those which separate the Poles and Germans who dwell side by side in identical geographical environments. One can not explain in terms of environment the differences in the various cultures in the Balkan Peninsula.

4. ENVIRONMENT CAN BE INTERPRETED ONLY IN TERMS OF CULTURE

The rôle of environment in social life varies with the culture of the locality, and not until we know the culture do we know the environment. Precious metals which lie undiscovered, or which, discovered, lie unutilized, constitute no portion of the environment as the sociologist must use the word, for they do not affect the culture. Captain Kidd's treasure buried at my doorstep does not constitute a part of my environment while I am ignorant that it is there. Knowledge of its presence alters my environment, and tools with which to unearth it introduce further changes.

What the environment is depends upon what a people see in it and upon the uses which they make of it. Opportunities are not opportunities to those who fail to perceive them, and handicaps are slight to those who find means for overcoming them. Man can neither excuse nor commend himself in terms of environment. The environment of the oyster and that of man are much the same, if only they knew it; but knowing it or not knowing it makes all the difference in the long run, if not in the immediate future. Man must start with the environment as it is; he gains power only when he looks nature squarely in the face. It is important to remember also that man must start as he is as well as where he is, and that he does not so much overpower nature as bend her to his needs. It is not only hard but futile to fight against nature; man must make alliance with her.

Much of the argument advanced in support of the influence of geographical environment upon culture is in a class with the observation of the old Swiss guide-book which commended the beneficence of Providence in directing the dreaded avalanches "into the desolate and uninhabited valley of the Trumleten Thal and in sheltering from them the beautiful, fertile, and inhabited valley of Lauterbrunnen." The sequence of cause and effect is inverted.

"In the reproof of chance lies the true proof of men." Those who have no obstacles to overcome do not overcome any, and those who do not utilize faculties do not develop them. Men must recognize the obstacles and discover ways to circumvent them. When men translate nature into a world it is no longer mere nature.

"Let us look at the physical environment, say, of the people of the United States. There is not a factor of it that has any importance or any meaning whatsoever for a study of government, or for that matter for any study of social activity, save as it is a part and parcel of men's activities. In other words, it is not the environment we have to use, but certain special activities of men, which can only be stated, environment and all. That is our raw material. Our national domain, the fertile land ready for immediate use, which was available until recently for our expanding population, is a good illustration. Given no increasing population, no improving transportation, that land would have had little meaning for our country. Given a population of different activities, it would have a different meaning. By taking the land plus the knowledge of its use we can get a half-way statement good enough for some purposes. But the knowledge factor is full of pitfalls as we have to use it; and no combination of part statements gives us anything more, or indeed nearly so much, as a definite statement of our actual doings and tendencies of doing. Gold in the ground is a cipher for a study of society so long as we are doing nothing and not tending to do anything in connection with it. Gold that does not exist is an important factor when we are in a turmoil of chasing for it. Mountains have various meanings, according as we are fighting, railroad-building, food-hunting, cattle-raising, or health-seeking. It is not the mountains at all, but the 'meanings,' the practical, actual, uses that form our material of social study. The silver mines, as such, had nothing to do with the campaigns of 1896, but certain silver-mining men did. Bad weather for crops abstractly stated is negligible, but men with changed activities according as granaries are full or empty are never negligible."¹

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CHAPTER X

RACE

The term "race" properly refers to a group marked off from the remainder of mankind by reason of the possession of certain physical traits, anatomical, physiological, or morphological. The basis of classification is zoölogical, a race being a variety or sub-variety of mankind.

I. THE RACES OF MANKIND

The classification of the human races is one of the most unsatisfactory undertakings of physical anthropology. The reason is twofold: there are no satisfactory criteria for race classification, and there is insufficient knowledge of the physical characteristics of the various groups of mankind. In the earlier classifications color was the basis of the division into races; but color seldom has zoölogical significance. The same variety of animal often has a diversity of colors, and probably color has no zoölogical significance in the case of mankind. Breadth of head in proportion to length, or this together with other characteristics, such as proportion of length of face to width, proportion of height of head to width or to length, the facial angle, and other proportions, have been used as race criteria, but not to everyone's satisfaction. The difficulty arises from the fact that these traits seem not to be causally linked together, save those which have a functional inter-relation, such as length of head and of face, the latter being causally associated with facial projection. But within a group these characteristics change with age and differ with sex, so that their response to function and to changes in interdependent portions of the skull seems to rob them partially if not entirely of zoölogical significance. Furthermore, whatever basis for division we may choose, the respective physical characteristics overlap. There is a wide range of color of skin and of amount of pigmentation in the various divisions of the white race and also among the black and the yellow races. The head form of the negro varies greatly and has analogs among many Caucasoid individuals.

Nevertheless, there are such marked differences in appearance among peoples that even a superficial examination suffices to recognize

them. One does not confuse a North European with a South African, a negrito with a Scotchman, an Australian with an American Indian, a Chinaman with a Fijian. It should be possible, then, to classify mankind into races in a manner possessing at least some validity as a means of distinguishing members of one from those of another. Anthropologists now recognize three large divisions of mankind comprising well over ninety per cent of the human race: Caucasoid, Mongoloid, Negroid.

In the Caucasoid division are the peoples of Europe, those in the north of Africa along the Mediterranean, and those in western Asia approximately to a line running north and south from the eastern borders of India. To the Mongoloid division belong the inhabitants of Asia east of the Caucasoids, and the aborigines of the New World. The Negroid division includes the peoples of Africa south of the Caucasoid belt, the Australians, Papuasians, Melanesians, and probably a portion of the Polynesians. Here belong also the various negrito peoples found in the Andaman Islands, New Guinea, Malaysia, the Philippines, and Africa.

The distinguishing characteristics of a race are an ensemble of traits rather than one trait, but pigmentation and texture of hair differentiate these three groups. Mongoloids have coarse, straight, dark-brown or yellowish-brown hair; Negroids have dark-brown or yellowish hair which is short, curly, and scant; Caucasoids have brown, red or light hair, in texture intermediate between that of the Mongoloid and that of the Negroid. It is wavy, and never straight like that of the Mongoloid, or kinky like that of the Negroid.

2. THE CULTURE SIGNIFICANCE OF RACE

Does the possession of any or all of the physical traits regarded as significant in classifying the races determine the culture accomplishment of a people? Is the negro handicapped by reason of his biological make-up? Is the Mongoloid similarly handicapped, or at an advantage? And what advantage or handicap is given the Caucasoid by reason of the possession of those physical traits which constitute his race? The question is not whether the civilization of the Negroid differs from that of the Caucasoid, but whether the difference is due to a difference in physical traits; not whether the accomplishments in culture of Caucasoid and Mongoloid are different, but whether the difference is due to physical constitution. Failure to recognize the nature of the problem

leads to much confusion of thought and to the drawing of deductions which are beside the point.

It is frequently stated that the negro possesses more anthropoid characteristics than does the European; that he has a longer and lower head, a more protruding face, greater forward projection of teeth, a feeble chin, longer heel, longer forearm, and a more ape-like complexion. The fact that he lives in climates in which anthropoid apes flourish strengthens the supposition that his type is more nearly that of the ape. It is true that in the traits enumerated above the negro is nearer the ape than is the Caucasoid; but the greater hairiness of the Caucasoid, and the shorter lower limbs in proportion to stature, are two traits, among others, in which the European is closer to the ape than is the negro. Nor would an addition of the points of likeness and those of difference help much, for the whole argument is irrelevant. The issue is not whether one race possesses more or less anthropoid characteristics, but whether the possession of such traits has culture significance, that is, whether the possession of them is correlated with anthropoid mental qualities. Would the Caucasoid be further removed from the apes culturally if he possessed less hair? Would the negro have less in common culturally with the apes if the shape of his head were different?

As a matter of fact, from infancy to adulthood the traits acquired by the Caucasoid are, with few exceptions, from less anthropoid to more anthropoid, as reflected emphatically in the change in proportions of head and face. Also in most outstanding traits the European male resembles the ape more than does the female, but we are loath to draw the deduction here that we draw with considerable alacrity when comparing Negroids with the lowly ape. Yet what is sauce for ~~the~~ the goose is sauce for the gander. The resemblances which demonstrate the inferiority of the Negroid to the Caucasoid demonstrate the inferiority of the Caucasoid adult to the Caucasoid infant, and that of the Caucasoid male to the Caucasoid female. Either let us use the argument or let us abandon it, and not adduce it only when it suits our purposes.

Again, it is pointed out that only certain races are the carriers of a high civilization, and so demonstrate their superiority over those which are less developed. But until the present time it has only been assumed, not demonstrated, nor even shown with probability, that the biological differences inherent in race are the cause of differences in civilization. The physical differences may be only accidentally, rather than causally, associated with differences in civilization. It is not certain that European civilization would go to pieces if the hair of Europeans became

short and kinky, or that an increase in pigmentation would lead to degeneration of civilization in peoples who now pride themselves on being its exponents, or even that a lengthening of the forearm would lead to a lower position in the scale of human culture.

There is also the argument from history. If we take civilization by centuries, or by millennia, we find that the respective superiorities of the different groups of mankind have not remained relatively the same. Caucasoid civilization is high in the scale in one millennium, low in another. No race maintains the same relative position century after century in the scale of human civilization, but it should do so if its culture is attributable to its biological traits.

A quarter of a century ago attempts were made to discover to what extent the different races had specific psychological endowments. Tests were made upon natives in the Torres Straits, in New Guinea, in parts of India, and at the International Exposition at St. Louis, in 1904, upon representatives of several other groups of mankind. The results were largely negative. Only slight differences were found in any of the senses or sensitivities, and most if not all of these were attributable to differences in interest, or in previous experience and training.

More recently other tests have been applied, the so-called "intelligence tests." These are of various kinds, but all aim to discover the innate ability of the subject by leaving out of account or by neutralizing differences in training, opportunity, and interest. These show, in almost every instance where a large number of individuals have been examined, a higher rating for the Caucasoid peoples, more particularly for the peoples of northern and western Europe. The peoples of central, southern, and eastern Europe do not rate as high as do Englishmen, Germans, and Scandinavians; and all other peoples, with the exception of the Chinese and Japanese, rate low in the scale. In the United States the negroes make a poorer showing than do their white neighbors.

These differences persist in numerous tests, irrespective of who conducts them, and they call for interpretation, for it is not clear that race is responsible for the differences among these various groups. On the contrary, the data seem to indicate that race is an independent variable, a factor incidental to the result. The differences found among European peoples are not correlated with race, or at least have not been shown to be so correlated, but, on the other hand, are highly correlated with culture divisions. Thus the results of the tests tend to disprove the cultural importance of race traits.

But though national culture will account for the differences between nationality groups in this country, it will not account for the differences between whites and negroes. The tests made during the World War show in each group a lower level of intelligence among negroes than among whites. The differences, however, are not constant, but vary considerably from one locality to another, and the degree of difference varies with the state of origin of the subject examined. Indeed, the intelligence level of the whites is not the same the country over, but shows marked local differences. There is a high correlation of intelligence difference between negro and white with difference in social environment. In the southern states, in which the social environment of the two groups differs most, the intelligence differences are greatest; in the middle-western and northern states, and particularly in the Pacific Northwest, the differences in rating are much less, though here, too, they exist. In those localities in which social opportunities are most nearly alike the difference in the mental ability of the two groups is least.

Some explain this fact as due to the migration of the more intelligent negroes from the South, the result being that the negroes in the northern and western states constitute a selected class. No doubt such a selection is partly responsible for the result, but it does not explain the higher rating of Caucasoids in the northern and western states, nor the fact that in those states negro intelligence is nearly equal to the white intelligence of the South.

Most of those who have interpreted the tests have attempted no correlations of scores save with race, and have confused race with nationality. Only when other correlations have been made which the facts seem to warrant, will it be possible to say that there has been an honest attempt to discover the significance of the correlation of biological traits with culture. The biological traits which are correlated with intelligence have not been isolated from the social traits.

Neither has it been demonstrated that the tests show, or can show, the differences in innate intelligence between the respective racial groups. They do not take into account the fact that there may be specific differences in qualities of intelligence from group to group. One group may have high æsthetic abilities; another may have high practical (that is, technological) abilities; another may excel in moral excellence or in social virtues. No one test, therefore, is suited equally to all racial groups. As a matter of fact, the tests which have been used were devised on the basis of Anglo-Saxon experience and values, and they

therefore measure little more than the deviation from conventional Anglo-Saxon standards. That is all the words "inferiority" and "superiority" mean as determined by the psychological tests, and they mean this only to complacent Anglo-Saxons. As Haddon says, "a race type exists mainly in our own minds" and, "there is no such thing as racial culture."

The time perspective of the anthropologist comprises at least a hundred thousand years of human activity. Through most of this period — fully nine-tenths of it — the ancestors of all living peoples were in a stone-age culture, ignorant of the working of metals and without any of the important economic and industrial activities which distinguish modern times. Indeed, it was only about ten thousand years ago that men learned to grind and polish stones instead of merely chipping or flaking them, while the working of metals does not antedate 5,000 B.C. Once started in metallurgy, however, men require only two thousand years in which to learn to smelt copper and tin and to make bronze, and in another thousand years they are working iron. The use of metals is improved in the next few centuries, although no further considerable developments come until the nineteenth century A.D. After the nineteenth century there is a rapid speeding-up, with the result that the material civilization of today differs from that of the time of George Washington more than colonial civilization differed from that of Egypt in the time of Moses. In the perspective of human development, therefore, our modern civilization is a thing of this moment. This may not be equally true of all phases of civilization, but it holds for the economic and industrial phases where we can plot the course by utilizing concrete materials and definite information. Throughout this long period we know nothing of race types beyond the skeletal remains which have come to light. These show a certain type in Europe from about 50,000 B.C. to about 20,000 B.C., Neanderthal man, who was succeeded by another type, Cro-Magnon man, who flourished until about 12,000 B.C. or later. Then comes a short-headed people, or a people with a certain proportion of short-heads, who in some areas, in turn, are succeeded by long-heads. Was their racial type responsible for the progress which they made? There is, of course, no way to answer this except by inference. Since, however, there is in human culture, so far as it is revealed to us, an unbroken continuity from the earliest paleolithic times, going back to at least 100,000 B.C., to the appearance of the historical civilizations a few thousand years ago, and even to the present day; and since this continuity has been carried by different racial types, the inference is

that race was at least not an essential factor, though it certainly does not demonstrate that race was not an important one. We can, however, say with assurance that none of the races now found in Europe had anything to do with this great era of human development which laid the foundations of all subsequent civilizations, for no contemporary European types are found in those distant horizons. Indeed none of the existing European types had anything to do with the creation of the more important fundamental bases of modern civilization, for they did not develop any of the activities which ushered in the neolithic industry, namely, agriculture, domestication, weaving, pottery, etc., and they had nothing to do with the invention and early development of metallurgy in copper, bronze, or iron. Even the wheel, a device probably invented but once in all human history, and so indispensable to modern life that our civilization may be said to move on wheels, was not invented by any of the racial groups represented by European peoples. The early civilizations, those of China, India, Persia, Egypt, Babylonia, made headway while the ancestors of modern Europeans roamed the wilds as savages.

In the period of recorded history there seems likewise to be little relation between racial type and advance in civilization. The Greek and Roman civilizations which we have revived and made our own were the products not of Nordics but of Mediterraneans.

Nordics became civilized only after they had come into the area of Mediterranean influence and had borrowed liberally from other civilizations, but nothing which is fundamental in human civilization was created by them. They have borrowed important devices and ideas from others and have elaborated and developed these, bringing to greater perfection the things which they had not the ingenuity to create. They have made good investments, and many poor ones, but they have operated with borrowed capital and have made little acknowledgment of the indebtedness. If racial make-up were the cause of their spurt in civilization it would be a puzzle to comprehend why their racial type had not long before this produced a high civilization, especially since the race type was more pure and undefiled in earlier millennia than it is today.

Conversely, if the biological type is responsible for the present-day backwardness of certain other peoples we are left without an explanation of the fact that a similar type produced high civilizations when our pure-blooded ancestors were wandering savages. One searches in vain for an attempt upon the part of race advocates to solve this problem.

If, now, we turn to the New World a more striking situation is pre-

sented. Here development was going on entirely out of touch with the Old World and similar culture stages were being passed through. The high civilizations flourishing in Central America and in Peru were working metal, smelting copper, and mixing molten copper and tin into the amalgam, bronze. They were practising an intensive agriculture involving irrigation, were building roads, bridges, temples, and pyramids, and had evolved a high type of political and social structure, not to mention respectable intellectual attainments, such as their calendar. What the outcome would have been had they remained undisturbed by Europeans for another five thousand years, no one can say; but there is nothing in the situation to suggest that they would not have developed civilization to practically as high a point as it would have been carried in the Old World had the Old World not come into contact with the New.

But the New World has a more pertinent bearing upon the question of the causal relation between physical type and culture. Throughout the New World practically the same physical type existed, with only minor variations — certainly a more homogeneous type than is represented by the peoples of Europe. The physical type is practically the same from Hudson Bay to Cape Horn, but the cultures differ immensely — as much as our civilization differs from that of an African tribe or from that of the Chinese. One type of civilization flourished only in the Plains area of North America, another only in the southwest, another only in the central woodland area, and so on through the stretches of a continent. The culture of the New York Iroquois was markedly different from that of their Algonkin neighbors to the north, west, and east, but one finds no demarcation in the physical type. If, however, physical type were the explanation of the culture there could not be this culture diversity permeating a racial homogeneity. In the New World, where we have checks upon scores of test cases, no distinctive physical type is correlated with a characteristic culture, but the physical type, it appears, can carry any kind of culture. After nearly a century of ethnological work in the New World it remains as impossible to infer culture from physical type as was the case when Columbus landed in the West Indies.

The foregoing considerations do not suggest that there are no race differences, or that race differentiae are not frequently correlated with culture differentiae. They do suggest, however, that the relation between them may be casual and not causal. There are race differences; the problem is whether the biological type is the cause of the differences in culture or is merely a chance concomitant. It has not been shown beyond

dispute that biological make-up is not responsible for the culture differences found between certain divisions of mankind, and probably this will never be once and for all demonstrated. But considering all the facts and taking a long-range view, it appears probable that race is a chance carrier and not a causal factor of culture.

Biological make-up has not been isolated from the other factors which operate, and hence it is not clear that culture differences are attributable to physical type. Perhaps, indeed, the prevalent race arrogance is only an inferiority complex, a veiled sense of shame at the little which one's race has contributed to the fundamental elements in human culture, and a diffused regret over the tardiness with which it became civilized; and this consciousness of inferiority now parades under the protective device of a blatant acclamation of superiority.

3. RACE TRAITS ARE NOT RESPONSIBLE FOR CULTURE

A review of the evidence leaves us skeptical as to the value of race traits in culture development. It has not been shown that variation within a given group, in any one of the physical traits which are taken as constituting race, has any correlation with intelligence or with culture achievement. For example, in a given group, say the English or the English-Americans, it has not been shown that intelligence increases or diminishes with shades of complexion — which are of wide range — or with length of forearm, or with length of heel, or with breadth of nose or elevation of nasal bridge, or with width of malar bones, or with slant of eyes, or with curliness of hair, or with size of hair follicle, or even with cranial capacity. The probability is, therefore, that none of these, nor all of them together, influence the intelligence of the individual.

So far as present evidence merits inference, race is but a chance carrier of culture, and the culture potentialities of the various races of mankind appear to be essentially equal so far as biological equipment is concerned.

“The explanation of the intellectual and moral outlook of every individual and community is to be sought mainly in his or its history, and not in some blind mechanically working force of evolution. Throughout the course of human history Man's attitude has been determined, not by the alteration of the structure of the mind, but by the intellectual and moral influences which have been impressed upon each individual's mind by the community in which he lived.”¹

¹ G. Elliot Smith, *Essays On The Evolution Of Man*, p. 133, Oxford, 1924.

4. THE BASIS OF BELIEF IN RACE SUPERIORITY AND RACE INFERIORITY

The basis for the belief in racial superiority rests on the fact that the test is made from the point of view of a certain civilization, and the results ensue from the application of its standards. Given peoples consider inferior those who differ from them in aims, values, and ideas. Those who aim at comfort are regarded as inferior by a people who aim at accomplishment, and the former, in turn, look down on the latter. Those who aim at social equality regard as inferior those who aim at the cultivation of individualism, and the latter regard as low and degraded the peoples of social equality. Only when a people sees that another is aiming at the same things by the same means, and is using the means with closer approximation to attainment of the aims, is superiority acknowledged — and probably not then.

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CHAPTER XI

HEREDITY AND PHYSICAL TYPE

I. PHYSICAL TYPES WITHIN THE RACES

Within a race there are many different physical types. Thus among the American Indians and among the Nordics there are different types which we conceive as varying from a norm or ancestral type from which all others are derived. We are not acquainted with the norm in any empirical sense, but we merely infer it as a convenient means of explaining the presence of various similar types—much as the zoölogist posits an ancestral type from which two similar varieties or even two similar species of animals are supposed to be descended.

The norm is the link which binds together, at least in our imagination, a number of types, but the posited physical tie which binds the types together is a missing link. The various physical types or sub-types are, however, not isolated, and the ancestry of an individual is a web of lines including, possibly, all of the sub-types in a given race group. Probably all the races of mankind are derived from a common ancestor; certainly a pure race does not exist. Yet some sociologists, and even some biologists, believe that the ancestral strain determines the mental and moral qualities of the individual.

The eugenist describes families like the Edwards which have achieved much in culture, and others like the Jukes and Kallikaks which have contributed mainly crime, poverty, feeble-mindedness, and demoralization. A family of Edwards produces college professors, judges, lawyers, journalists, and authors, while the Jukes and Kallikaks fill our asylums, poor-houses, and jails, costing the state in which they are domiciled millions of dollars. It is still an open question, however, whether such variations in family achievement are attributable to physical strain or to culture environment. Had the descendants of Richard Edwards been raised on a remote island out of contact with European culture, they would not have achieved the éminence in letters and politics which they attained in New England society. Had the environment of the Jukes been as favorable as that of the Edwards certainly not so many of them would have been in asylums, jails, or poor-houses, and they might have been doing missionary work among the uncivilized Edwards.

The Jukes were not so well favored as the Edwards and there is really no evidence that the difference in the achievements of the two families is attributable to germ plasm. We do not know how the respective germ plasms would behave under different social influences. Only when the social stimuli are comparable for two groups can there be evidence that physical heritage is responsible for social accomplishment.

Elizabeth Tuthill, who was the ancestress of these Edwards, illustrates the difficulty. The books on eugenics which exploit this family usually confine themselves to telling us that she was a wonderful woman with great intellectual powers, but forget to tell us that she was divorced "on the grounds of adultery and other immoralities," and that "the evil trait was in the blood, for one of her sisters murdered her own son, and a brother murdered his own sister," Elizabeth Tuthill herself being afflicted "with an extraordinary deficiency in moral sense."¹ Yet she was the progenitress of this wonderful family of the Edwards, and Jonathan Edwards was her grandson.

The plain fact is that most of the eugenists have been interested in the perpetuation of their social class or culture, assuming that their so-called "race" is the Chosen One. In the main, therefore, they have upheld a thesis and spread propaganda rather than advanced the cause of truth and unbiased investigation.

2. THE EUGENIC IDEAL

The eugenic ideal is based on the supposition that some physical types are more desirable than are others, and on the further assumption that social measures should be taken to decrease and ultimately eliminate the undesirables.

With this broad ideal there must be complete accord. It is obvious that the maimed, the blind, and the halt are not desirable physical types. So far as eugenics implies the elimination of the type of the physically unfit it offers a program to which all would agree who wish to see a better and a more efficient society. Those who can not carry their share of the burdens of life, who can not participate in the social program, must be carried by society. They are not merely of no help but are actually a hindrance, a drag on social progress. Such are the feeble-minded, the vicious, the indolent, the physically incompetent.

When, however, eugenics turns attention to selection of type among

¹ Langdon-Davies, *The New Age of Faith*, p. 149, New York, 1925.

the physically fit its course is not clear. What kind of physical type do we want? Doubtless modern man is physically inferior to prehistoric man. Cro-Magnon man, even Neanderthal man, surpassed the average European of today in physical hardihood. Do we want that type? Many whom eugenists would pronounce physically unfit have made notable contributions to civilization. If eugenics would do away with such individuals, would it not rob us of elements which make physical stamina of value? In other words, if we aim at physical type do we thereby achieve more than physical type? And do we not rather desire, first and foremost, culture and cultural things?

Some feel that even if we knew the desired matings, the program of the eugenists would be unworkable because it is contrary to human nature. This may be so; but human nature changes with the times, and a generally accepted program which appeals to men as desirable will in time influence choice in marriage. The conditions which influence this choice have changed greatly during the last few hundred years, primarily because social ideals and social relations have changed. There is reason to suppose, then, that a generally accepted eugenic program would eventually influence choice in marriage, becoming perhaps as effective an influence as, in some quarters, economic and political considerations have been, or as in some places racial considerations are.

Heredity can do no more than perpetuate desirable physical traits, if it can do even that. The ideals on which our civilization is founded must be handed on by social heritage. A good physical strain is not the goal of social endeavor; but it is a means to an end, and the end must be social if a desirable physical type is to survive.

That the physical make-up of the individual is determined by inheritance has long been recognized. At first the only reaction to that recognition was repugnance or sympathy if the inheritance was regarded as a misfortune, envy or laudation if it was regarded as a good fortune. The character of one's physical inheritance was a matter for congratulation or reproach. Finally we awoke to the fact that to be free a man must be able to choose his ancestors. It is difficult for a generation to choose its physical ancestors — that is one portion of the past which seems unchangeable — but it can choose the ancestors of future generations. Through wise choice of ancestors of future generations the stock can be improved and society brought to fuller recognition of possibilities inherent in human life. Man who has been the product of an unregulated inheritance now proposes to determine the heritage of human life as he has determined the heritage of property and of social

opportunity. Is not human life as important as economic enterprise, and were not Campanella's inhabitants of the *City of the Sun* justified in laughing at us who give much attention to improving breeds of animals and none to improving the physical stamina of the human race?

The ideal of elevating social life by improving the physical type is not new. It is found in less intelligent form among savage folk who murder twins or the malformed, though usually for superstitious rather than scientific reasons.

The Spartans were inspired by a eugenic ideal, the goal being an improvement of the morale of the city-state. Since their characteristic virtues were military the Spartans turned their attention to the military type and by selecting the strong and exposing the weak they bred, they believed, a race of hardy warriors and handed on a superior military type. The aim of their eugenic program was protection of the sociopolitical organization. With the Spartan scheme in mind Plato, in the *Republic*, suggested elimination of malformed infants, allowing only the hardy types to survive, so that physical life and social life might be woven into the proper texture. In the closing years of the past century and in the present century the ideas of the Spartans and those of Plato were revived by biologists and evolutionists, anxious to determine the future as well as to interpret the past, assured that the latter makes possible the former. Darwin's and Spencer's suggestion that in the struggle for existence the fitter types prevailed was interpreted to mean types ethically fitter. Only gradually did people awaken to the fact that this survival of the fittest meant only the fittest to survive. Huxley directed attention to the fact that deliberately we attempt to save many, the weak and unfit, who but for our intervention would perish; that life is largely a struggle to preserve types which a nature "red in tooth and claw" would ruthlessly destroy were there no humane intervention. The possession of this altruistic quality makes man human and distinguishes him from the brutes.

New interest attached to evolution when it became known that certain characteristics were inherited in definite ways from a parent possessing them or from a parent whose parent possessed them, and were handed down unimpaired to future generations, these qualities persisting, so it was once thought, as unit characters in the offspring.

The principles of Mendelian inheritance are illustrated by Mendel's experiments with tall and dwarf peas. By crossing a tall pea with a

dwarf pea he secured in the first generation tall peas instead of the intermediate or the mixed types which we might expect. When the tall peas of the first generation, called hybrids, were fertilized among themselves, the result was tall peas and dwarf peas. These appeared in the proportion of approximately three tall to one dwarf.

When plants of this second generation were fertilized with their own kind, dwarf always gave rise to dwarf, one of three tall gave rise to tall, two of three tall gave rise to tall and to dwarfs in the proportion represented in the second generation, breeding always in the proportion of three tall to one dwarf; pure tall in this generation always bred tall. Out of four peas of the second generation one breeds true to tallness, one to dwarfness, and two are "impures," giving rise to true tall, to true dwarfs, and to "impures" which produce tall, dwarf, and "impure," respectively.

Since tallness represents the characteristic of the first generation of the cross, this quality is called *dominant*. Dwarfness goes back to the parental form of the original crossing and is spoken of as *recessive*, since it obtains its characteristic by skipping a generation in the line of inheritance. Whereas Darwinism represents inheritance as a gradual modification of the organism, Mendelism accounts for jumps in inheritance.

Mendelian inheritance is explained as due to the presence in the germ plasm of unit characters, and is sometimes called the "presence and absence" theory. Either tallness is present or it is absent and dwarfness is present. There is not an average or even a modification of parental characteristics; they do not fuse. Since unit traits are inherited in definite proportions, by controlling inheritance we can cultivate or can eliminate traits by preventing the birth of offspring from parents who would hand them on. In man the following traits, among others, when crossed have been found to be of Mendelian character, being either dominant or recessive:

HUMAN TRAITS INHERITED ACCORDING TO MENDELIAN LAW

	<i>Dominant</i>	<i>Recessive</i>
Hair		
Curly		Straight
Dark		Light to red
Eye color		
Brown		Blue

Skin color

Dark	Light
Normal pigmentation	Albinism

Countenance

Hapsburg Type (Thick lower lip and prominent chin)	Normal
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Fingers

Brachdactyly	Normal
Syndactyly	Normal
Polydactyly	Normal

This is part of a more extensive list which in its entirety comprises for the most part abnormal characters and some whose true Mendelian nature is matter of dispute.

"The principles of heredity established by Mendel are almost as important for biology as the atomic theory of Dalton for chemistry. By means of these principles particular dissociations and recombinations of characters can be made with almost the same certainty as particular dissociations and recombinations of atoms can be made in chemical reactions. By means of these principles the hereditary constitution of organisms can be analyzed and the real resemblances and differences of various organisms determined. Before the establishment of Mendel's principles, heredity was, as Balzac said, 'a maze in which science loses itself.' Much still remains to be discovered about inheritance, but the principles of Mendel have served as an Ariadne thread to guide science through this maze of apparent contradictions and exceptions in which it was formerly lost."

But we now know that the Mendelian unit characters of which the early twentieth-century eugenists used to speak do not exist. Such a characteristic as red hair, for example, may be due to the collocation of some hundreds of genes, a change in any one of which may result in the disappearance of the characteristic. Since the number of different combinations of genes that may form the offspring is for all practical purposes infinite, there is no way of making sure that an offspring will have any particular set of desired characteristics.

Man, who has dared to experiment more and more with nature and natural law, at last has dared to tamper with the conditions of human life. Offspring are no longer regarded as inevitable, nor potential human life as a force not to be interfered with. Man is determining the number of individuals of the next generation rather than leaving it to chance or

to processes of elimination to be worked out in the next generation, and is proposing to determine the character of that generation. Yet man's control of organism is rather narrowly limited to certain morphological characters.

He can breed a race of short-fingered individuals or one of six-fingered peoples, though these abnormal types among themselves seem to be sterile, that is, breed only outside of their group; he can make twins more common; can determine the color of hair or of eyes; but can not so select as to provide Newtons or Platos, Abraham Lincolns or Shakespeares. Traits of character seem not to be inherited, and these, including mind as well as morals, are of foremost importance to society. Even were it possible to secure traits of mind and of body by selective breeding, this would be merely a by-product of social evolution. The selection must be determined by social ideals which are not the product of biological selection, being rather the cause or motive of selection.

The ideals which guide the selection of physical type must be socially self-perpetuating; they can not be perpetuated by sheer virtue of the physical types which they select for survival. The social ideals to which all selective breeding must be subordinate can not be perpetuated by any inherent quality in the physical types which these social ideals bring into existence.

Unless the social ideal remains dominant, it is useless to select physical type, since such selection can make of man a good animal but can not make of him a good human being, save insofar as healthy physical type is a substratum of moral worth. It can, however, weed out feeble-mindedness and thus remove the drag upon social life which feebleness of mind causes through dependency and delinquency.

But social development is not highly correlated with physical development. By that test savages have the day, and civilization is weak and corrupt. Neither is superior physical development highly correlated with superior mind or morals. Such men as Newton, Darwin, and Spinoza, physically weak, were giants intellectually, yet society profits more from their contributions than from the physical prowess of an equal number of men — or of any number.

Darwin, though weak in body, left a group of sons worth more to society than those which any other father in a hundred million contributes. The bachelor, Sir Francis Galton, has more worthy spiritual representatives in the eugenic movement than the most prolific male can claim. Such spiritual descendants are more important for society than are physical offspring.

Epictetus, the Stoic, presented the problem of eugenics squarely when he asked: "Are those men greater benefactors to mankind who introduce into the world to occupy their own places two or three grunting children, or those who superintend as far as they can all mankind? Did Priamus who begat fifty [physically perfect] worthless sons contribute more to the community than did [blind] Homer?" There is no eugenic basis for Saint-Simon's assurance when he proposed marriage to Madame de Staël in the words: "Madame, you are the most remarkable woman in the world, as I am the most remarkable man; and doubtless our child will be still more wonderful."

If the program of the eugenicist would eliminate geniuses who are physically weak, would it not deprive society of one of its most powerful stimuli and breed us down to fine savages? If the alternative is weak civilized men or physically perfect savages, shall we not prefer the former? The task of the eugenicist must accord with that of the social philosopher; he must ascertain what types of human beings are desirable and not merely what constitutes good physique. Perhaps his method of selection would give us many Spinozas instead of one, and healthy long-lived ones to boot. If a weak physique did not deter Spinoza from becoming a great philosopher, it is probable that a strong physique would have been an added asset; the question is whether there would have been a physically strong Spinoza in lieu of a physically weak one. Physical weakness is a handicap which may be overcome, but it is a handicap nevertheless. It is unwarrantable to allege that we would not have had our geniuses had eugenics been at work; for who knows that we would not have had them more abundantly, and healthy instead of sickly ones, even though they were not these particular geniuses? Does not the possibility justify the experiment?

In a negative way, at least, the eugenicist can render valuable help. He has shown that certain untoward characteristics are frequently inherited, and that selective breeding will diminish if not eliminate them. In regard to the acquisition of desirable characteristics, though his suggestions have been meager, we must not despair of helpful solution.

Social development can proceed without selective breeding, but it can proceed faster with it. We do not share the conviction that since at different stages of history we have valued different things, therefore the eugenists have no right to impose a given type, inasmuch as this may not be the type which future generations will want. That we may not thus secure the most desirable types is true; but selection is a risk to which we are constantly subjected; and this will be the case as long as

man exercises control over his life either individually or collectively. We are now, if only by default, continually making choice of social and physical types and assigning them respective values. Eugenics is but one of the choices we make, and we should reject its products whenever these seem less desirable than the results of our present indiscriminate methods. There is much need for proper social control of physical type. Man's kindness in the present will be cruelty for the future if it is an indiscriminating kindness.

"Those who base upon germinal change their hopes for the physical condition of the human race in the future are building upon sound foundations. However much our power to control and regulate the vital processes may increase—and it is clearly upon the verge of a very great increase—in the end a satisfactory physical condition can only be the product of a certain germinal constitution. On the other hand, those who think that germinal change in mental characters will effect the evolution of society and mould the course of history are upon the whole mistaken. The course of history is in the main dependent upon changes in tradition which are for the most part independent of germinal change. Just as the outstanding happenings in the last century—the turning of thought and conduct in Germany, for example, along certain lines, which ended in so great a catastrophe—were due to changes in tradition and not to changes in germinal constitution, so whether the problems now pressing upon European society are to be solved or whether some greater catastrophe, reaching a climax in a long course of years or bursting suddenly upon us, is to be the outcome, will depend upon changes in tradition and not upon germinal change. The reason for this lies in the fact that the vast accumulation of tradition overlays the outward expression of mental character, determines the direction of intellectual activity and moulds the expression of the instinctive faculties. But as far as tradition is equalized, so far do innate mental differences manifest themselves as between man and man, and since tradition is more or less equalized, if not within races, at least within classes in the same race, to that degree is mental endowment of pre-eminent importance to the individual." ²

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CHAPTER XII

ECONOMIC FORCES

The forces rooted in geography, race, and heredity are largely independent of society and the individual. Economic forces, on the other hand, are created by men in society and are the product of social evolution; yet they attain a comparative independence of social life.

I. THE COMPARATIVE INDEPENDENCE OF ECONOMIC FORCES

Men are often dependent upon what they themselves have created, for these things sometimes lead lives of independence and have a large measure of self-determination. Whether man sows wheat or only thorns and thistles, the seeds take root, grow, and maintain a career of their own. So it has been with the economic forces which man has brought into existence, and on which he has become dependent.

Everywhere the economic forces are largely independent of any, though not of all, individuals in the group. As any cell in the body may die and the organism continue to live much as before, so any individual in the group may become economically defunct and the economic life go on much as if he continued to exist or had never existed. The economic life has acquired an independence of any given individual, a momentum of its own, a certain freedom from social control. Challenging the economic forces is in most cases comparable with challenging the tides or the phases of the moon. Let the individual say and do what he will, the economic order sweeps on its way in a manner determined by something more powerful than the will or effort of any one person.

Not only is the economic order largely independent of any given individual, but it is also largely independent of any number of given individuals, or even of the entire group. If an Australian tribe legislates hunting and fishing out of existence, it legislates itself out of existence. If we legislate against production by machinery, the result is our own extinction; for our economic servant is also our master. Man made machines to serve him and his descendants; now man serves them and their descendants.

The main course of economic and industrial evolution appears to have been inevitable. Man must start with wood and stone, and in time must develop metallurgy. With metal culture it appears inevitable that he will invent and perfect machines to do his work, will cultivate plants, domesticate animals, and discover means to obtain products from remote parts of the world. The enhanced power which comes with the development of trade, money, and the handicrafts facilitates such economic enterprises as those which have characterized modern capitalism. An uncontrolled capitalism implies workers and a class of the poor. If people are wealthy they will have leisure and even idleness, and there must be a counterbalance in the overworked poor who seem equally essential to the economic order. It appears, therefore, that the history of economic development could not have been essentially different from what it has been. It might have come more slowly or more rapidly, have been less elaborated at one point and more developed at another; but despite minor differences it would have been much the same. It does not seem mere accident that England had an Industrial Revolution, followed by France, Germany, and Italy, and, in our own day, by Japan and China. Thus the economic régime seems to carry within itself the seeds of further development. It strews the path of progress with flowers and with weeds, and we reap the blessing and the curse, gathering thorns and thistles along with the staff of life. We may grumble and complain, but we comply with its demands; for though we may temporarily divert the stream from its channel, it finds its way back to the old bed.

2. THE INFLUENCE OF ECONOMIC FORCES

Economic development does not proceed independently of social development, or vice versa, but they are inter-related. In the simpler economic stages, in which hunting and fishing are the main activities in securing a livelihood, social development does not proceed far. An analysis of some hundreds of tribes shows that if we know the economic organization we can predict with some probability the stage of social development. In the lower, that is, the simpler, stages we find that chieftainship is seldom highly developed and political structure is usually simple. The methods of administering justice are of the cruder sort, consisting of individual revenge and group responsibility. There is some justification for Plato's picture of early society as an undifferentiated economic life, with specialization in later stages.

The new economic order which began in Europe during and after the Crusades was accompanied by many social changes which can not be understood independently of the economic changes, for the latter helped to induce the former, and the former reacted on the latter. Trade and money, travel and adventure, sale and purchase of franchises and of town liberties, are closely bound up as cause and effect. Nor is it accidental that the industrial changes concurrent with the Industrial Revolution were accompanied by changes in the social and political order.

At the present time economic changes claim much attention. In Russia socialistic and communistic ideals have changed social and political conditions more than has any other one thing in the history of that country. No contemporary problems trouble the social order of Western Europe and that of the New World more than do those which hover about economic organization, for men perceive that fundamental changes in the economic order necessitate far-reaching changes in the social and political order.

The perception of these inter-relations led to the doctrine of economic determinism, the theory that social development is conditioned and determined by economic development, and that men are always actuated by economic motives, which in the last analysis are the guide to social policies. On the eve of the French Revolution Turgot had shown the course of economic development in Europe and had indicated its influence upon social development; but it remained for Karl Marx, about the middle of the last century, to carry the theory to its logical, or illogical, conclusion, and describe social development as merely a reflection of economic. His acclamation of economic determinism carried a propaganda as well as a prophecy, and his doctrines became the rallying-point for communists.

Undoubtedly economic motives have played a large part in social development. "The privileged classes in the Colonies," for example, "generally speaking, never really desired separation from Great Britain. . . . Left to themselves the governing classes in America would never have carried the contest to the point of rebellion, would never have created an independent state. . . ."

"At least one-third of the people (this is the estimate of John Adams) were indifferent or actively opposed to the American cause. These were the Loyalists—Americans who remained loyal to Great Britain. They were not only numerous, but they included many of the ablest and most influential men in the Colonies, being largely recruited

from the upper classes — landowners, merchants, clergymen, and officials, who had hitherto constituted the governing class, and who opposed the Revolution quite as much because of their fear of democracy as on account of any strong attachment to Great Britain. This division within their ranks greatly weakened the colonists and gave to the struggle something of the character of a civil war.”¹

Once under way, however, the struggle lost its economic aspect, for the conscious motive was no longer economic freedom but political and individual freedom. The revolutionists were fighting, or thought they were, for principles rather than for policies. In its beginning the conflict was a dispute about economic issues and little else; but in the course of time it became transfigured (in the minds of the patriots) into a struggle for the rights of man. “American patriots came to think of themselves as hazarding their lives and their fortunes for the sake of a new social order, the ideal society founded upon the enduring principles of liberty, equality, and fraternity.”² Our generation has witnessed a similar transformation in the minds of the leading contestants in the World War. The World War began “as a conflict for land and trade, but speedily took on, in the minds of the peoples concerned, the aspect of a titanic struggle between the powers of light and of darkness, a struggle which men fondly, if vainly, hoped would bring in a new international order based upon the principles of justice and humanity. So it was with the American Revolution.”²

Economic motives were prominent in the factions and often uppermost in the persons and groups which participated in the making of the Constitution of the United States, the vote on ratification having been largely along economic lines. Official sanction of economic doctrine seems to have been given by a recent decision of the Supreme Court of the United States declaring that rights of property are prior to and superior to rights to life and liberty, and that the purpose of the Constitution is primarily to make property and property rights secure. This is not an inference from that decision, but is the expressed declaration of the Supreme Court under Chief Justice Taft. The parliamentary struggle in England since 1908 has directly or indirectly centered in rights of property, and the constitutions adopted in European countries since 1918 have paid much heed to such matters; nor is there any present indication of a change in emphasis.

Economic motives play a major part in many important social and political policies — in imperialism, international relations, national an-

¹ Becker, *The United States*, pp. 47-48, New York, 1920.

² *Op. cit.*, p. 170.

tipathies, and war. The making of the British Empire was in large part a response to the need for new markets, or in satisfaction of an economic demand to exploit new territories; and the same is true of other empires. Economic questions lie at the basis of much of the after-war antipathy toward Germany, and economic clashes have demoralized the Allies who fought against Germany and who could not agree on the distribution of German payments or even on the payments of inter-Allied debts. Some students of international affairs regard the failure, when the political boundaries were drawn, to take into consideration the natural economic boundaries as one of the most serious shortcomings of the Versailles Treaty of 1919 and a fruitful source of future wars.

So large a part have economic motives played in war that some writers declare all wars to be at bottom economic in origin. Though such a statement is too sweeping, it is true that many wars have had their origin in or have involved economic issues. It was so with our Revolutionary War, with the War of 1812, with the Mexican War, the Civil War, the Spanish-American War, the World War. Economic considerations played a large part in the Napoleonic Wars, particularly in the case of England when her commercial supremacy on the Continent was being threatened. But the play of economic motives is not equivalent to economic determinism. Economic motives do not always induce war, and individuals do not always act in accordance with economic advantage. Wars are fought when no economic gain can be hoped for and in response to other than economic demands, such as vindication of national honor or thirst for revenge. The part which economic motives play must be determined by an examination of each case, for no formula is universally applicable. Often we underrate, often overrate, the economic motive. It is one but not the sole determinant of social action, and it does not operate as an isolated factor.

That is why "the revolt of the oppressed, although instigated by the crude facts of self-interest, is never viewed by them for long under that aspect alone. . . . It is a psychological law that the cause, the principle, the claim, the war-cry, which at first was adopted at the suggestion of an interested motive, comes in time to claim devotion for its own sake. The force of the interested motive vanishes more and more, that of the principle, the abstract claim, increases until it completely fills the mental field. Exactly the same thing happens in the case of unjust and oppressive power; by dint of repeating the theoretical justifications of injustice, the oppressor comes firmly to believe them; and the tyranny which began with barefaced cupidity and rapacity, ends by

dying a blessed martyr to those sacred and divine rights which it invented. That is how clashing interests become moral principles.”³

“And since it is impossible for the utterly crushed and oppressed to revolt at all effectively, when they have done so it has usually been in alliance with other classes whose motives were frankly venal and interested. And thus that sordid element has played a conspicuous part in many of the most important emancipating movements.”⁴ Moreover, “the socialists are right in insisting upon attention to economic conditions: we must, however, insist that economic conditions are important, not because they are economic, but because economic conditions turn into spiritual conditions. The politician needs to get a new sense of the passing over of material conditions into psychic. The tariff has enormously stimulated industrial development: but industrial development has completely transformed the soul of the worker, and set new problems for both politics and education.”⁵

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³ Briffault, *The Making of Humanity*, pp. 286–287, London, 1919.

⁴ *Op. cit.*, p. 283.

⁵ Edward O. Sisson. *Educating for Freedom*, p. 41, New York, 1925.

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PART IV

CULTURAL AND PSYCHOLOGICAL
FACTORS INFLUENCING
GROUP LIFE

INTRODUCTORY

Psychology, the science of mind and of the mental aspects of bodily activity, is fundamental to an understanding of social life. Man's mind, more than his body, sets him apart from the remainder of the animal kingdom and makes him undisputed master of the beasts, the microscopic organisms being now his only formidable foes. Without mind there could be no society, and for answers to many problems the sociologist must turn to the psychologist.

Whether mind has brought society into existence or society has evolved mind, in either case the character of group life is dependent upon individual mind, for mental qualities impose limitations upon social advance. The social potentialities of the insane and the feeble-minded are as limited as their intellectual potentialities, for social advance implies the possession of intelligence, though perhaps intelligence of a special order. A considerable amount of social advance is possible with a relatively low order of intelligence, and sometimes a high order of intelligence is found where there is little social advance. Ants, for example, have one of the most highly evolved social structures outside of the human species, yet measured by other standards the intelligence of the individual ant is possibly not greater than that of animals which have little social organization, such as the dog, the seal, the rat, the elephant, the horse, or the cat. Nor, to take another example, is the general intelligence of the wasp or that of the bee of a high order, though the social organizations of these insects are highly evolved as compared with those of mammals. There are times and regions in which the intelligence of individuals appears to be of a high order though organization and social activities are on a low level. Conversely, a highly developed social order is not always associated with a high development of individual intelligence. Since, however, psychic qualities enter into the making of social life a knowledge of them is essential to sociology.

Out of man's innate psychic equipment society is made, as truly as a building is made of the material with which it is constructed. But as out of brick and mortar one can build various types of structures and these can be utilized in various ways, so with the same sort of innate psychic qualities very different kinds of social structure are possible.

Important for the social sciences are the findings of psychology in regard to the instincts. If man is a bundle of instincts, innately disposed to go this way or that, then a knowledge of them furnishes an important insight into basic human traits. Granted the existence of the instincts, development will proceed in pre-determined manner, whatever the social environment or the education of the individual may be. On them, if they really exist, the social sciences must build. The existence of most of these alleged instincts is, however, being widely questioned, and much social theory must be abandoned if psychology discards the instincts. For if these so-called innate tendencies are due to imitation, suggestion, or other conditions present in learning, then men act as they do, not because of innate disposition, but because of experience. If men possess no instinct of pugnacity, it is not necessary for the political scientist to proceed on the assumption that they will always be disposed to fight unless held in check by artificial restraints. If there is no religious instinct, then explanation of religious tendencies must be found elsewhere, namely, in the culture world which encompasses the individual.

Psychology must join hands with the social sciences in solving these border-line problems, and study man in society; for man in isolation is not available. How many of his characteristics the individual owes to innate disposition can not be determined by reliance on mere analyses of the individual, since the individual continually absorbs portions of the social world. The social sciences, therefore, can serve psychology as usefully as it can serve them; for mind does not develop in a vacuum but only in the interplay of mind and environment — a fact which some psychologists seem to disregard. If we are interested in the specific character of intelligence, it is as important to know the environment as to know the mind.

Every social group lives in a cultural and psychological environment the influences of which impinge upon it from every side. Traits of group life, therefore, should be considered from the twofold aspect which makes them significant, namely, the cultural and the psychological, which in the last analysis are phases of one entity. The culture of the group can not be understood apart from the psychological influences; neither, on the other hand, is it possible to understand actual psychological influences without an analysis of the culture. Whatever the laws of social psychology may be, they apply in different manner in different culture groups, and the specific psychological influences are never identical in two cultures.

CHAPTER XIII

SOCIETY AND THE INDIVIDUAL

I. SOCIETY

By society we shall understand a group of individuals held together by a common dominant purpose and functioning as an entity.

Society has, however, been variously defined. Thus for Stuckenberg the essential element is the mental interaction of individuals; for Small it consists of inevitable action and reaction between many individuals; to Dealy it means a human group held together by common interests and common elements; Giddings and Cornejo define it as a group of organisms held together by consciousness of kind; Tarde finds imitation the cementing tie; and Ellwood believes society created whenever men pass from isolation to a "relation of coöperation, or antagonism, of mutuality and reciprocity, whenever they affect each other as stimuli."¹

Tarde's definition is not acceptable. A group of insane with abnormal tendency toward imitation satisfy the definition, yet they do not constitute a society.

To define society as a group of psychically interacting individuals is to say that where two or three are gathered together and are stimuli for one another, there we have all that is essential to society. But between the insane there may be ample mental interaction, each stimulating the other to his favorite aberration. Between the murderer and his victim there is acute mental interaction, each eliciting in the other intensified mental states. These situations, however, illustrate not society but its antithesis. The interacting individuals constitute a society only when the psychic interactions are of a certain kind, that is, when the interdependence is the result of a common dominant purpose shared by all.

Psychic interaction within a group increases with the intensity of the antagonism, but a group divided against itself is not a society. Nor is that group a society which represents merely a chaos of intentions, whose only bond is an eddy of cross-purposes. The function of society

¹ Ellwood, *Sociology in Its Psychological Aspects*, Chap. I, New York, 1914.

is coördination of purposes and the preservation of its life. This calls, not for psychic interaction as such, but for psychic interaction of a particular kind. Society may rid itself of certain types of psychic interaction and be the richer with what remains, the diminution leaving ampler fund for the future, thanks to riddance of untoward tendencies.

In the lower as in the higher cultures the struggle for self-preservation is one of the most dramatic and persistent of social purposes. When in danger of its life the tribe acts as a unit against the common foe, while in time of peace it punishes offenses committed by an outsider against one of its members in different spirit and with more zeal than when the offender is within the tribe and the wronged man without it. Witness civilized nations. The group punishes more severely those offenses which aim at the root of social order and threaten social solidarity than those, however heinous, which do not weaken the social organization, be these the violation of tabus, the murder of the sovereign, or departure from customs and traditions affirmed because of their utility as sanctions. Unconsciously we coöperate in many ways which secure the fulfilment of a higher purpose than that for which we immediately and consciously strive. We enhance our social value through activities stimulated by sympathy and kindness. We serve society by learning the language of the group and by conforming with its etiquette and customs. Conformity with group standards means less friction and happier understanding as we come into contact with others. Society aims at the perpetuation of the various phases of its life, for its life is these phases working in coördination and securing, in spite of conflicts, harmony of ends and purposes. How else can society persist? Surely by no mere succession of innumerable happy accidents which in some mysterious manner always turn out alike.

A continuous purpose, embodied in society's many historical phases, gives continuity of effort, provides for change, makes progress possible, and prevents conflicts from resulting in disintegration, the social will to live realizing itself in new form and manner.

Conflicts within society do arise, in fact they are almost as numerous as the component individuals; but these antagonistic forces fail to destroy the social order because, not being focused in a common intention, they are easily overborne by the more inclusive social program.

Primitive society has been described as synnomic, sharing customs, and civilized society as syntelic, sharing purposes. But the distinction is only relative and refers to consciousness of purposes and of customs. Primitive society teems with purpose to persist as it is, and such a pur-

pose is sufficiently definite. Society, primitive or civilized, aims at self-preservation. If society is greatly concerned about the means, it is because the end which they subserve is vitally important. Community of custom, language, and religion is accepted as the medium through which society secures solidarity and existence. Existence and persistence constitute the supreme end, though not the only end, of society. There are, then, as many social units as there are groups of individuals subordinate to a common purpose; within the tribe, the state, or the nation there may be many smaller societies, the totem, the family, the club. The more inclusive social unit may be likened to a larger circle of dominant purpose containing many smaller ones which invade each other's territory, or remain apart, to the extent that they represent dependent and shared, or independent and unshared, purposes. The tribe may be part of a larger social unit, sharing with other tribes a common intention and purpose. Often the menace of attack is the only condition which gives a clue to the exact relation of social units, which in peace show friction at times amounting almost to open hostility and war. Frequently such factions unite in a common effort to repel a foe, though but one of them is directly threatened.

Maori tribes, or clans, for example, lived under separate chiefs; each held its own lands and ordinarily appeared to live in complete independence. As a rule there was little cohesion among them unless a common enemy threatened the tribe. Then they banded together, each clan under its own chief, and together faced the enemy. Often at other times the clans fought among themselves.

The Coppermine Indians, of western Canada, furnish a similar illustration. Faced by a common enemy, clans which at other times carried on intertribal murder and pillage became close and disinterested friends, property ceased to be private and was given up without scruple to the common stock, the warriors, ordinarily undisciplined and obedient to no commands, became of one mind and were ready to obey and follow their leader.

An ancient writer says that although the Cretans frequently were "at faction and feud" with one another, they became reconciled and united whenever a foreign foe attacked them. Plutarch expresses a similar sentiment in his essay on brotherly love, in which he declares that even brothers and friends who have quarreled prefer to associate with one another in face of a common danger rather than join the foe.

Among the Bakongo the family groups act as self-complete units when events run their usual course; but when the whole village is con-

cerned, the heads of the respective family groups confer with the chief of their settlement, the smaller social groups then losing their comparative independence. In time of war all the families unite under the chief to repel the common enemy, and are obedient to his commands. He alone can sue for peace and accept or refuse the terms offered. Uganda clans combine only when invasion of the district forces them to unite in resisting a common enemy.

The common danger shows the reality of the common bond; as in the case of an individual, danger evokes dormant possibilities of the existence of which the endangered one is scarcely aware. The several nations of Western civilization may be independent units while there appears no common danger, but a common foe — an on sweep of Asiatic hordes, for example — may weld them, if only for the occasion, into a unit held together by the dominant purpose to repulse the foe. "The spark that electrifies is danger."² All humanity might unite in resisting a common foe, though the foe were only their independent selves. Insofar as groups share a dominant purpose they are welded into a society. As regards some of the individuals in the group the social purpose is external and conditioning rather than imminent. They are in their society but not of it. Their presence in the social organism may be compared with the presence in the physiological structure of foreign substances which defy the metabolic processes and become no integral part of the functioning organism. The Jesuit Father, impressed with the simplicity of the social organization which he found among the natives on the shores of New France three centuries ago, perceived that some degree of organization was necessary and recognized that the simplest form was nevertheless a real one. "Now savages," he said, writing about them for the edification of those at home, "not having a great Commonwealth, either in number of people, since they are few; nor in ties and bonds of union, since they are scattered and wandering; can not have great polity. Yet they can not do without it since they are men and brethren." That society can be dispensed with has not been convincingly shown. A thoroughgoing anarchist aims at a defeat of his own expressed purpose. In order to succeed, the agreement to dispense with society must itself become the dominant purpose, more potently social than any traditional social force. Thus its failure would be the outcome of its success. To succeed the anarchist must develop a society which has this anti-social purpose dominant, and which then surrenders it and all dominating ones, thus ceasing to be a society. The perversity of

² Zangwill, *The Principle of Nationalities*, p. 54, New York, 1917.

human nature and the persistence of the social purpose may be the only obstacles, but they are powerful ones.

M. Cabaton professes to picture an anarchistic society. Writing of the tribes of Indo-China, he says: "They would rather live in poverty and wretchedness, always on the alert, than obey any authority — even among themselves. Quite unconsciously they realize the spirit of perfect anarchy." This is the spirit of that "perfect anarchy." "Their communism," continues M. Cabaton, "is equally striking, for a brotherly solidarity reigns among them. Great works are always undertaken in common, and, if a man's property keeps him, he always shares with his neighbors. In times of famine those who have rice divide their resources equally with those who have none. When one of their number kills a pig, a buffalo, or a goat, he divides it into as many parts as there are inhabitants in the village; his own share is no larger than his neighbor's, except in the case of an animal slain in the chase, when a little extra allowance is made to the hunters as compensation for their exertions.

"Even a hen is doled out among fifty persons to satisfy this instinct of brotherhood. So strong is this feeling, even among the children, that, when one catches an earth-crab, a lizard, or a mouse, he will not eat it until he has given all his comrades a share. By the same instinct of solidarity the whole village takes the part of any one of the inhabitants who complains of injury or loss at the hands of some member of a neighboring village. They will take vengeance for an insult dealt to a stranger who has once made friends with them."³ This "anarchy" savors strongly of society — its communism, its brotherhood, its readiness to avenge insults to one of its members. The individual is not free from the compulsions of the social order.

We can not accept T. H. Green's assurance that "except as between persons, each recognising the other as an end in himself and having the will to treat him as such, there can be no society."⁴ When each accepts society as an end in itself the social purpose is assured. Looking upon others as ends in themselves may be the result rather than the cause of membership in society. Community of purpose imparts to group action a solidarity and force which make it irresistible in the struggle with other groups not similarly unified. Yet Durkheim's definition of society as a group of individuals expressing permanence and solidarity is incomplete. These qualities are derivative rather than constitutive; they

³ Hastings' *Encyclopaedia of Religion and Ethics: Indo-China*.

⁴ Green, *Prolegomena to Ethics*, p. 218, Oxford, 1884.

express the formal aspect of society but not its meaning. The essence of social life is purpose embodied in function. Nor can we accept MacIver's definition of society in terms of interdependence. There is interdependence between man and the domesticated animals, slaves and masters, jailers and jailed, yet these do not represent societies. Interdependent groups often are at cross-purposes, and do not constitute a society. Hostility creates interdependence no less than does alliance, but enmity and friendship do not equally represent society, the one making against, the other for, social solidarity. The family is the outcome of the interdependence of the sexes, and the interdependence of the sexes is also the outcome of a common purpose, the result as well as the cause of family life. Interdependence may inspire a society which comprises the interdependent parts, but interdependence is not always society, being more often result than cause.

Our definition of society as a coördination of purposes is not arbitrary, but is in keeping with the conception which sociology is approximating. Ellwood's application of theory to fact shows that he is not concerned with psychically interacting individuals; neither does Giddings treat of the phenomena of consciousness of kind. Durkheim and the *L'Année Sociologique* school do not treat of individuals expressing permanence and solidarity — a situation created by antagonisms no less than by the coördination of wills. The latter is the type of situation chosen by these writers as the denotative reference of their concept. The concept of society as purpose embodied in function enables us to estimate society in terms of actual and potential development and achievement, and to comprehend the rationality or irrationality of the social order. To induct us into the higher purposes of the group is to orient us in the social order so that we can act with knowledge and advantage. This is the first long lesson of education. The next step is to impart a new and higher purpose to the group; this takes the individual life out of its little groove and makes it part of the larger order and progress embodied in social régime.

Society transcends the individual members who compose it. It has continuity and permanence, and lives in competition or coöperation with other societies. The social mind is expressed in concepts, customs, laws, and economic life, which are as continuous and coöperative as in the case of an individual component member. If these forces are more difficult to synthesize and grasp as a unity in the case of a social group than in that of an individual, this is because we are more familiar with and consciously more concerned with the individual than with the group.

By understanding the group mind we can understand more completely the action of given individuals than by searching for a meaning of their respective lives through a study of individual activities. A group mind is conditioning that activity at every turn, giving it its initial stimulus and its subsequent proddings. This is what a contemporary anthropologist meant when he remarked that the Frenchman takes France with him wherever he goes, and the Englishman England. The social group imposes its mentality upon a man, and he proclaims the group mind whether he will or not.

We may individualize society because it functions as a unit. In that sense it has reality over and above the individuals who compose it, as an individual is an entity over and above the parts of his organism whose functioning totality is himself. The characteristics which enable us to identify the group as a society, as an organized entity, may be summarized as follows:

(1) Each society embodies a unified social, intellectual, and emotional life. There are frictions and misfits, but there is a large measure of unification, enough to impart continuity to the culture. This unified cultural life has inertia and continuity.

(2) Each group constituting a society is characterized by a toughness and solidarity, and by the interrelation and interdependence of the parts.

(3) Since the component parts are mutually interdependent and supplementary there is articulation of the parts, which, much as in a living organism, function to mutual advantage.

(4) Self-sufficiency and self-completeness, self-containedness and ability to persist if other groups disappear, are traits of society. These qualities, like those mentioned above, are relative. They are relative likewise in the individual whom we commonly accept as an entity and as self-complete, for strictly speaking no individual is self-complete; none persists unchanged if all others disappear, and none exhibits a completely harmonious functioning of constituent parts.

Frequently we find a group which is a psychic entity, possessing a unity and self-completeness which make it a supra-individual thing. The psychic qualities of the group can not be determined by adding or by averaging the qualities of the individuals who compose it. Social psychology is a study of the behavior of groups which function as units. Each nation has a psychology peculiar to itself: the social psychology of the English is not that of the French, or that of the Germans, or that of the Italians. It is recorded in what the nation does, and in what the

constituent parts do. Social psychology describes the behavior of the component parts, or it may describe the functioning of the nation or group as a unit.

In most instances society ensures certain rhythms in the activities of individual members. The specific character of the group, therefore, depends upon the specific nature of the individual rhythms which it ensures. In this manner a dining-club, for example, differs from a nation, a fraternity, or an Eskimo community. The rhythm in the life of the dining-club is the coördinated individual rhythms of its members who go to dine together on the appointed night at the appointed place and together ingest their food and discuss things. When the club fails to ensure and coördinate these rhythms in its members, it ceases to exist.

An Eskimo community has no political organization and no recognized executive, no laws or legislative assembly. But breaches of custom are frowned upon, and the opinions of one's fellows are potent, sometimes driving a man to suicide. Each man hunts for himself and to him belong the products of the chase; but in time of want a man shares his catch with the needy. The community life, therefore, coördinates the rhythms of individuals so that food results though one's own efforts do not secure it, and a rhythm in conduct is ensured though one's tastes may favor a departure from prevailing standards.

2. THE INDIVIDUAL

Individuals are the component elements of group life. A man is an individual because he possesses a measure of self-sufficiency and self-direction. He could not continue as he is independently of the world in which he lives, but it is also important to note that he wills to exist and persist in it.

He shows at least an impulse to survive, and survival is intimately dependent upon others, upon those who supply food and shelter. The infant develops in group life, and its reactions are to group influences. If we view the individual from the angle of group life, we find that he merges with the group; otherwise the group will not tolerate him. He becomes a means of handing on, perhaps of amplifying, group influences. He speaks its language, else he fails to understand the group and it fails to understand him. He reacts in accordance with group aims and purposes, else there is friction and at every turn he is handicapped in the endeavor to live his life. Absorption into the group is a twofold process, a system of reciprocal influences, in which the individ-

ual is acted upon by the group and reacts toward it. There is not merely absorption of the individual into the group, but likewise absorption of the group by the individual.

The latter process is not less real or less important than the former. The result of this interplay is an interdependence of individual and group. Neither can persist as it is without the other; neither can be greatly affected without the other reflecting the change; each is dependent upon the other for status as well as for progress. To ask whether the individual or the group is more important is to posit a question impossible to answer in this alternative form. Each is part of the other, and both are important. "Let him who cuts individuals out of history but pay close attention and he will perceive that either he has not cut them out at all, as he imagined, or he has cut out with them history itself."⁵

The traditional method for obtaining an insight into the nature of the individual is introspection; for understanding the mind of another, introjection, that is, assuming the standpoint of the individual who, under ideal conditions, would do the introspecting. But introspection provides no assured method for attaining truth rather than mere conviction.

Introspection is fraught with the disturbing factors of interest and prejudice, of such turn and insistence as often to invalidate results. Not by looking within shall a man know himself for what he is, but by looking without. The behavior of the individual is a better guide; eventually objective standards must be used in determining the correctness of the findings of introspection. The experience of the individual, regarded as a unique experience, does not enable one to distinguish the trivial from the important. In order to test the validity of the inferences which he makes, a man must observe his behavior as another would observe it. To understand himself he must see himself as others see him.

There are times when a man does not know himself as others know him, and does not know himself aright. He fancies himself a saint, when all the world know him a sinner. In his humility he may account himself as one of no avail, whereas his generation rightly rates him among the most useful members of society. Too frequently a man does not know how he will act in a given situation, although his friends know well enough. Marshal Ney thought that his loyalty to Louis XVIII was greater than his loyalty to Napoleon, but circumstances demonstrated that he had misrated his attitude; and for this mistaken judgment

⁵ Briffault, *The Making of Humanity*, p. 94, London, 1919.

about himself he paid with his life. Failure to understand oneself is not a rare trait. The closer our characteristics stick to us the less we see them. The successful man seldom knows the reasons for his success. The judgment must be objective, and usually a man is not able to take an objective view of himself. Since each individual is a member of a group, and since he not only is influenced by it but also influences it, it is possible to estimate the individual from the point of view of his influence on the group. Every individual does influence the group, and through the reactions which he elicits leaves upon it in varying manner and to varying degree the impress of his individuality. As we determine the strength of the battery by the response of external bodies to its current and thus derive its potential, so we can determine the nature of the individual by the reactions of those with whom he comes into contact. Judged by their influence on the group, individuals differ widely and can be arranged in a hierarchy dependent upon the extent to which they modify group action, upon the nature of that action, and upon the character of the group. Those who modify markedly the behavior of a group are individuals of compelling personality. They impose their standards upon the group and attain an exalted place in the hierarchy of personalities. He who can command great things is great.⁶ Social environment furnishes the conditions under which individuals react, and their reactions enable us to say what the environment is as truly as the environment enables us to predict the nature of the individual reactions. Group and individual are two supplementary factors, both of which must be taken into consideration in an endeavor to determine the character of individual mind and that of social stimuli. Stimuli presuppose a mind reacting to them as surely as mind presupposes stimuli. Mind does not develop in a vacuum; neither does social milieu determine the character of minds which are incapable of reacting to or indisposed to heed the proffered stimuli. As Turgenev says, "Every one makes his own destiny, and destiny makes everyone."

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CHAPTER XIV

THE GROUP AS AN ENTITY

Social psychology describes (a) the behavior of groups, whether they are large and well organized, such as a state, a nation, or an alliance of nations, or are small and loosely organized, such as a lynching mob or an audience; and (b) the behavior of individuals insofar as they function as members of a group.

Two divergent views are found among students of social psychology. Those interested in the psychology of the individual point out that he behaves in different manner when in the presence of his fellows, especially when a member of a crowd, than when alone, but describe his action in terms of individual behavior. Others, viewing primarily the group rather than the component individuals, note its behavior and describe this as a reality of its own order instead of interpreting it as merely an aggregate of individual behaviors. Both of these approaches to social psychology are important in an analysis of individual and group conduct.

In a sentence each word has a distinctive meaning, else the sentence would have none. The sentence, however, is not the sum of the words but is a unit of meaning which reflects intellectual value upon each constituent word, so that each word is given specific meaning by reason of the context. So, too, individuals make the group, but the group has a meaning beyond that of the sum of component individuals; and, moreover, their specific character is partly determined by that of the group.

I. THE INSTINCTS

About the beginning of the present century Italian and French writers described the play of psychological influences in group life and the effect of these upon the individual. Bagehot had previously performed a like service in England, and German writers had drawn attention to the importance of folkways. It was not until 1908, however, that a book appeared which attempted to state in psychological terms the bases of group action and to give a psychological explanation of men's

actions in group life. This treatise was McDougall's *Social Psychology*, a book which has influenced much subsequent interpretation of group psychology. This influence is weakening, but meanwhile many of its doctrines have been incorporated in sociologies and in treatises on political science and human nature, so that in many quarters the social sciences still reflect McDougall's point of view. His thesis is that man is a bundle of instincts which determine behavior. He identifies the following instincts: flight, accompanied with the emotion of fear; repulsion, accompanied with the emotion of disgust; curiosity, accompanied with the emotion of wonder; pugnacity, accompanied with the emotion of anger; self-abasement, accompanied with the emotion of subjection, or negative self-feeling; self-assertion, or self-display, accompanied with the emotion of elation, or positive self-feeling; the parental instinct, accompanied with the tender emotion. These seven instincts with their appropriate emotional accompaniments are the basis of social life. They are the incentive, the springs of action, of all normal men. Remove them, and human society would be as inert as a steam engine with its fires drawn or as a watch with its mainspring removed.

McDougall has made an important contribution to the understanding of social life by describing tendencies manifested by men in all societies; and if we substitute for the word *instinct* used by him the word *disposition* or *tendency*, there is little objection to his thesis. The difference, however, is not merely the difference of a word, but goes much deeper. We find, for example, that in all groups men speak a language, have a folklore, have social organization, and engage in economic pursuits. We do not, however, attribute these universal tendencies to instinct, but we regard them as products rather than causes of group life. The instincts depicted by McDougall are susceptible of a similar interpretation. The fact that in all groups men are disposed to fight does not imply that pugnacity is an instinct, as the fact that in all groups men have a language does not imply that speech is an instinct. So, in turn, with each of the instincts which he describes.

Instinct refers to tendencies inherent in the make-up of the individual, as distinct from those acquired by experience. In a word, instinct is organic nature as contrasted with education. If, for example, an individual left to himself, no matter what his education or environment, should speak Chinese, the act would be instinctive. But we do not call it instinctive if he speaks Chinese only under certain conditions of experience and education.

The instincts posited by McDougall give us no enlightenment as to the particular form which pugnacity, sympathy, etc., take in a given group. The circumstances under which men fight vary; conditions which stimulate sympathy in one group fail to do so in another; the parental instinct is manifested differently in various groups and in successive centuries. We wish to know why there are these specific manifestations. The fact that certain kinds of individual disposition and behavior are limited to certain social groups leads us to attribute their existence to group influences, as we do in the case of specific language, political ideals, and social standards. Since certain specific tendencies in behavior, such as pugnacity and sympathy, which McDougall calls instincts, are found only in group life and, so far as we can determine, do not develop independently of group influences, they must be considered not the cause but the effect of group attitudes. Living with one's fellows, for example, generates sympathy, which is not the primary factor inducing association with others but is a response to group influences.

The tender emotion is not a primary factor which arouses in a parent responsibility for his child, but responsibility induces the tender emotion. In a communistic society like that proposed by Plato in the *Republic*, in which the parental attitude was eliminated, the tender emotion would fail to appear. Abundant illustrations in the life of primitive peoples and in civilization confirm this inference.

The instincts which McDougall offers are not only of doubtful validity but are superfluous in a scheme of social psychology. We do not need them to explain the actions of men in group life, for group life is the explanation of these so-called instincts. The primary incentives to specific forms of behavior lie outside of the individual and within the group.

The well-nigh universal prevalence of the tendencies which McDougall calls instincts has its explanation in conditions inherent in group life. Other things being equal, a group in which no one has sympathy for his fellows is destined to perish in competition with groups which manifest this tendency. One composed of individuals who will not fight, no matter what the occasion, soon leaves its territory to another whose members are pugnacious when occasion demands.

But *when occasion demands* is a relative matter and differs from group to group. In Australia the occasion seldom demands; though here, where individual disposition appears to be little disturbed by a

superimposed highly developed culture, we might expect instinct — as would befit the savage — to be revealed in all its nakedness.

In certain tribes in the southwestern part of the United States there was little pugnacity because these peoples surrounded by desert wastes had few contacts with neighbors. Among the wandering tribes of the Plains area whose territorial limits were ill-defined and whose semi-nomadic life involved clashes with surrounding tribes, warfare was an almost incessant feature of group life. Difference in the instinct of pugnacity is not the explanation of these tribal differences; they have their origin in the culture and not in the individual psyche.

That the character of the latter is the effect and not the cause of the culture differences, is suggested by the fact that the pugnacity of the individual changes when the culture changes, and further by the fact that individuals tend to manifest the pugnacity characteristic of their group no matter what their racial type may be. It is not likely that any innate physical or psychic characteristics distinguish Quakers and other pacifists from the rank and file of their pugnacious neighbors.

2. GROUP BEHAVIOR AS THE BASIS OF SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY

Many who reject McDougall's theory of the instincts reject likewise the theory of culture influences and interpret social psychology as merely individual psychology in the mass or aggregate. Every group, they say, is composed of individuals and receives its character from them, and there is no group psychology other than the psychology of the individuals who compose the group. This is the attitude of Dunlap, Allport, Lacombe, MacIver, and Ginsberg. They attempt to reduce social psychology to terms of individual psychology, asserting that the group is not a reality which transcends the component individuals but is only an aggregate of individuals.

The fact is, however, that individual psychology offers no explanation of the differences between group and group. The psychic equipment of the individual enables him to imitate his fellows, but this affords no inkling of why in one group men imitate warriors, in another, hunters. The mechanism of speech does not explain why one man speaks English and another speaks Eskimo.

The significant fact is that men do not merely utilize the mechanisms of speech but talk a language of a particular kind with specific phonetics different from those of a multitude of other individuals. Speech mechanisms, therefore, give no insight into the psychological

processes with which they are associated; they afford no insight into the psychology of the individual, but they merely tell us the medium in which it finds expression. An analysis of organic behavior gives no information regarding the specific nature of psychological realities. Hence individual psychology is not an adequate basis for social psychology because it provides no insight into the specific character of group life. No analysis of the individual in terms of innate individual psychic equipment explains the ideas or behavior which a Dakota Indian associates with the word *wakan*, a Micmac Indian with the word *keskamzit*, a Melanesian with the word *mana*.¹ Nor will any analysis of individual psychology predict the attitude of a Dakota toward a Cree, or of a German toward a Frenchman, or of anybody toward anything. In order to understand these specific attitudes, and even to discover them, one must analyze the culture of the group.

The psychology of the individual consists of his reactions to the various stimuli about him; but he would not react as he does were the culture of other complexion. In a word, the content of individual psychology is ascertainable only when we know the circumambient culture, no matter how familiar we may be with the psychological mechanisms. Individual psychology explains neither group behavior nor culture; on the other hand, the content of the mind of the individual is explainable in terms of culture and indeed can not be understood without a knowledge of it. The essence of the difficulty lies in the conception of group. If a group is merely the aggregate of the individuals composing it, then the psychology of the group is the aggregate of the psychologies of the component individuals. Before proceeding further with our task, therefore, it will be necessary to examine this initial problem.

In many cases a thing is not merely an addition of its parts. A table is not merely a flat board and four legs, but a flat board and four legs maintaining certain permanent relations with respect to one another. A house is not merely a sum of bricks and of boards, but consists of boards and bricks bearing a certain permanent relation to one another, held together in order and according to plan. A living organism is not merely head plus heart plus lungs, and so on, but all of these dynamically unified in a functioning interdependence of parts.

Moreover, the qualities manifested by these various things are not merely the sum of the qualities of the component elements. The qualities possessed by a table are not those of a flat board plus those of four

¹ See the chapter on *Magic* in the author's *Introduction to Anthropology*, pp. 269-277, New York, 1926.

straight sticks. The qualities of a house are not those of bricks plus those of boards. The qualities of a living organism are not the sum, the average, or the counterpart of those of its respective parts. Even if we could add the qualities of parts the sum would not be the quality possessed by the functioning combination. "There are atoms of silicon and of oxygen, there is a molecule of silicon dioxide, and a crystal unit of quartz containing three molecules of silicon dioxide. The separate atoms of silicon and oxygen are not silicon dioxide, of course: in the same way the molecule of silicon dioxide is not quartz; the crystal unit consisting of three molecules arranged in a particular way is quartz."²

A conjunction of things in certain fixed relations sometimes gives rise to a new entity possessing qualities not found in the component parts. For illustration consider a molecule of water. Hydrogen and oxygen are inflammable gases, but when two parts of hydrogen enter into chemical union with one part of oxygen the two gases constitute water. These gases, which when separate are inflammable, are, in chemical combination, a liquid which extinguishes fire. The temperatures at which hydrogen or oxygen liquefy are different from that at which water liquefies, and an average of the temperatures at which the gases liquefy is not the temperature at which water liquefies. Qualities, then, are sometimes manifested in a group though not in the component members; the constituent elements manifest in new combinations qualities which they do not possess as isolated elements, and the whole exhibits qualities not possessed by its parts.

To presuppose that in group life no qualities are manifested other than those possessed by individuals is as unjustifiable as to presuppose that they exist. The matter is an empirical issue: Does the group manifest qualities not shown by the component individuals? If the question is answered in the affirmative, then individual psychology is not adequate to explain the behavior of men insofar as they function as part of a group, and accordingly the psychology of individuals will not explain the characteristics of the group.

Let us define an entity as a group of constituent elements which function as a unit. An example is a human being, who, however complex he may be, functions as an entity in the world of nature. Can two personalities function as an entity? Observation shows us that per-

² Sir W. H. Bragg, *The Analysis of Crystal Structure by X-Rays*, Presidential Address, Section A., British Association for the Advancement of Science, pp. 34-35, Toronto, 1924, London, 1925.

sonalities do function in this manner. If two men go down the street together so that the pace of the one regulates that of the other and in turn is regulated by that of the other; if one stops when the other stops, responds to exclamations and questions, is influenced in behavior at turnings and crossings — then there is evidence that each is dependent upon the other in a functioning entity. Repetition of these situations day after day indicates a continuity in the interdependence, although the spatial relations may be greatly modified. As this applies to two individuals, so it applies to three or to any number which function in interdependence. If the individuals, instead of walking down the street, are members of a parliamentary assembly, the situation and the interdependencies are different; but if the latter exist there is here also an entity as real as the individuals, inasmuch as their behavior is determined by the situation. The group entity is their various selves functioning in this interdependence, but that is not equivalent to the sum of their respective selves, as a net is more than a sum of strings, though when we analyze and unravel it there is only a number of strings. For the fisherman the important fact is that the strings maintain certain relations of interdependence with respect to one another and that the result enables him to utilize them in this relation as an entity.

Suppose, again, we find a number of people in interdependence although there is no physical contact between them — say, a family whose members are scattered to the four parts of the world but who maintain at these distances much the same sort of psychic interdependence as obtained when they were in contiguity. Are they still an entity? They are, indeed, an entity if they function as such, though this will likely be a different kind of entity than it was when there was contact with one another directly through the sense organs. When the parts of an organism are removed from one another they usually become so distracted that the one does not influence the other, whereas human beings may influence one another at great distances. If, however, the amputated hand influenced the body and the body influenced the hand as had been the case before amputation, there would be good reason for continuing to describe them as parts of a functioning entity. Indeed when the interdependence permits the hand to distract the body too much we abstract it in order to preserve other elements of the organic entity.

A rowing crew is an example of a group which behaves as an entity. The crew functions as an entity else it is not really a crew. Its success depends as much upon the extent to which the parts, the individual oars-

men, function in relation to one another as upon the abilities of the individual oarsmen. The interdependent functioning which is demanded of the body of the individual oarsman is to some extent duplicated in the interdependence of the respective oarsmen, though this does not imply that the crew is merely a counterpart of its oarsmen. The elements which compose the crew are not what they are in the case of the individual oarsmen and the interdependence is different; but that does not make the crew less an entity than are the respective oarsmen who in their inter-relation are the crew.

Why, for example, should we speak of the atom as an entity? Viewed analytically, it is merely a group of electrons, a sort of miniature solar system in which bodies revolve around a nucleus. But because these respective electrons behave toward one another in a system of definite and constant inter-relationships, the behavior of the one influencing that of the other, we call the totality an entity. Viewed analytically, it is merely a series of separate entities; viewed as an interdependence of parts, it is a functioning entity.

But how about a thing which turns out, analytically, to be but a group of a dozen or more solar systems — that is, a molecule, which is but a grouping of groups of electrons revolving around nuclei? Even so complex a thing as a molecule may be called an entity, because these various systems in their totality function as an entity and can be treated as such. The molecule is no less real than the electron; it is only a matter of whether we are interested in the totality or in the component part. We are, of course, according to our purpose, interested primarily now in the one, now in the other. Likewise for the astronomer our solar system is as much an entity as is a grain of sand, and for him the solar system is the more important.

This means, to be sure, that the entity exists only because and insofar as the constituent elements, the individuals, manifest attitudes of interdependence toward one another. Let the two persons who are walking down the street dissolve their interdependence and the entity which made each a participant no longer exists. Let the members of the family surrender their systems of responses to one another and the family as a functioning entity no longer exists.

It has been said that the nation, for example, is only a myth, for if the citizens would only see that it is a myth and that there is nothing in the objective world corresponding to their idea of it, it would no longer exist. This would be true provided they also gave up the system of interactions which constitutes the entity which we call the nation

and reacted toward other nationals exactly as they react toward fellow-citizens. But that is equivalent to saying that if the electrons did not interact among themselves as they do there would be no atom. As a matter of fact, the atom breaks down when one of the electrons goes off on a career of its own to the disregard of its former associates in the system; and if all electrons did so all atoms would disappear. But one might as well say that if things were not as they are they would be different, and that if men did not constitute themselves into nations there would be no nations, exactly as there would be no crews if oarsmen would not constitute a crew.

When, therefore, we describe a group as supra-individual we mean merely that the individuals functioning in this system of interdependence constitute a totality which can not be described in terms of the component individuals or as the sum of their activities. We know no human being that is not a stomach, a brain, a system of nerves and blood vessels, a digestive system, a muscular system, and so on. But the personality can not be described as the sum of these. Human personality is its parts working together in interdependence, but the total functioning entity is far different from the sum of the parts, and the traits of the personality are not the sum of the traits of the parts. The entity, moreover, is as real as are any of the parts.

A similar observation applies to a group composed of individuals who are interdependent and function as a totality. A nation is real, therefore, if the constituent individuals function as a unit. Individuals are ambassadors, individuals do the fighting, individuals conduct political affairs; but the significance of their action as members of the nation consists, not in their individuality, but in their representative character, to whatever extent and in whatever manner their behavior affects that of other members of the nation. The important thing in international affairs is not that John Smith delivered a declaration of war, but that the American ambassador, who in this instance was John Smith, delivered a declaration of war. The pre-war activities of ambassadors and other persons may have brought about the World War of 1914-1918, but if so it was only because these individuals were functioning as members of their respective nations and could create situations to which members of their nations would respond. Otherwise their activities as individuals would have had no national significance and they would not have been able to influence international affairs. To reason otherwise is as far from the point as to say that only the hand of John Smith struck and not John Smith himself; for if the hand had

not been a part of John Smith it would not have struck. There is some justification for holding John Smith responsible for the acts of his hand, and there is some justification for holding a group responsible for the acts of a member insofar as the individual is functioning as a member of the group.

"Grant that the Great War would not have broken out in July, 1914, if the minds of half a dozen men had been other than they were — had been even temporarily swayed by other motives. Would this petty alteration have sensibly dissipated the vast cloud of distrust which overshadowed Europe? Conversely, would war once declared have become the horror that it was if the whole condition of Europe — historic memories, universal fears, credulities, pomposities, pathetic loyalties — had not maintained it against every chance of peace?"³

But not every group is a functioning entity. A group may be merely an aggregate of individuals, such as one sees during a walk through a crowded street. A company of soldiers on the march, however, is more than this; it is a group of men held together by obedience to a single command, and to that extent it functions as an entity as truly as if it were one body with a hundred feet, one head on a half-hundred shoulders. One eye, one brain, one body, two feet, would not make it more truly an entity than it now is, though in the former case it would be a simpler and more familiar one.

The test of the reality of the group as a self-sufficient thing is whether it functions as an entity. If psychological ties bind together the various members composing the group, and if these function as an entity, the aggregate is more than an arithmetical product; it is a functioning entity. Examples of such functioning entities are a family, a community, a state, a nation, a church, a club, a fraternal organization, a college.

As regards the component individuals, these various groups are not mutually exclusive. A man can participate in several social entities simultaneously or in succession. He may be a Methodist, a Republican, a Mason, a member of a corporation; only when he must choose among them as mutually exclusive alternatives is it obvious that he is more a member of one group than of another. Though the groups have antagonistic aims, this does not rule him out of any so long as the clash does not occur in such a way that he must forsake one of them. His party may declare itself against his religion, or his religion may denounce his party, but he can be a member of both organizations in fact as well

³ Hobhouse, *Social Development: Its Nature and Conditions*, p. 323, New York, 1924.

as in name so long as he is not forced to surrender allegiance to one of them. Inconsistency is possible in group as well as individual psychic life, and probably is as common in the one sphere as in the other.

The group is composed of individuals and without them there would be no group. Nevertheless in the case of certain relatively permanent groups there is comparative independence of any given individual. A living body can persist in its essential entity although every cell in it at some time drops out and gives place to another; accordingly we speak of the body as an entity relatively independent of any one of its constituent cells. In many instances the group has a similar relative independence from individuals, for it lives — that is, functions — from generation to generation with a permanence greater than that which any individual within it can claim. The British Empire, the Democratic Party, the Roman Church, the United States, the Masonic Order, are examples of groups of this kind. But the analogy between social group and biological organism is not thoroughgoing, and we fall into error if in speaking of a social organism we carry over the connotations which the term organism has in biology. Society is a being of another order, and it is only partly analogous to a living organism, from which it differs in many respects.

The behavior of the group, insofar as it functions as an entity, constitutes the data of social psychology. Within the larger group are smaller groups, each an entity and each an object for the investigations of the social psychologist. A group intent upon war acts as an entity if it acts efficiently, and especially in war the action of the group greatly influences the individual. Social psychology has as much independence as has individual psychology, for the group is as independent of the individual as the latter is of the former. The group, like the individual, has its historical development, its peculiar stimuli, its aims and methods.

The group is a synthetic entity, not an atomic indivisibility, but synthetic entities are as real as are atomic elements. A drop of water has as high degree of reality as has an atom of hydrogen. The essential difference is that the former is regarded as compound, that is, as reducible to simpler elements, whereas the latter — until we knew about electrons — was regarded as an irreducible element.

The individual, however, is a highly complex structure. He is composed of a multitude of cells, colonies of cells, communities of organs and arterial systems teeming with millions of population. His person-

ality, likewise, is extraordinarily diverse, differing from day to day and from hour to hour. In short, the individual is a world, nay, a universe, in himself, possessing no unity save as we discover this in treating him as if he were one. Herein lies the ease of dealing with the individual: the psychologist for the most part disregards the complexity, save when it suits his purpose to recognize it, and simply accepts the individual as an entity.

As the behavior of the individual is the index to his future behavior, so the behavior of the group is the index to its future behavior. By observing that the group goes to war in what is commonly called self-defense, or for revenge, or to maintain its honor, or for whatsoever reason, we anticipate that it will go to war for similar reasons, that is, under similar circumstances, in the future.

Is the group, then, a causative factor in influencing its future behavior? Inasmuch as there is a rhythmic repetition of its behavior which enables us to predict its future behavior, it seems justifiable to regard the group as a causative factor in its own conduct, since without its past it could not have its present, and its past is an indispensable factor in influencing conduct. This is not different from the procedure in the natural sciences. The only reason we know that the sun will rise is that we know it rises; until we know the latter we can not know the former. And so with the behavior of groups.

3. THE UTILITY OF SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY

Social psychology is a shorthand statement of many phases of individual psychology, a succinct expression of similar individual traits. For example, if in 1915 one inquired of Germans their attitude toward the English, the inquirer observed a great similarity in many of the individual reactions to the stimulus "English." Likewise, if one inquired that year regarding the attitude of the English toward the Germans, one observed in England great similarity of reaction to the stimulus "German." A shorthand method of expressing these multitudinous individual reactions in the respective countries is to give it in terms of social psychology.

Such an expression leaves out of account the variations in individual reactions in the respective countries. The Germans who sang a hymn of hate sang it to different tunes and with different emphases. Similarly, in the last analysis the reaction of no individual Englishman to "German" would be identical with that of any one of his fellow-

countrymen. For certain purposes these individual differences are important, though for others they can be disregarded. A man does not enter his car every day in exactly the same way, but for most purposes of description it is useful to disregard the daily differences. Similarly, if the group is our concern, the individual variations among Englishmen and among Germans are not important, or are not as important as the similarities within the respective nationality groups. It is enough to know that the German entertains enmity toward the Englishman, and that the latter replies in kind. Here the group attitude is primary, and the attitude of the individual is a reflection of it. The deeper reality is not found by an analysis and a frequency distribution of the varying individual attitudes in the respective countries. When the relations between the two groups change — as they did after the Armistice, and more especially after French occupation of the Ruhr — individual attitudes change. But the cause of the changes in individual attitudes is not to be found in the respective individuals — which would yield a multitude of motives — but in the change in group status, that is, in the new relations between the two groups. Insofar as change in group attitude brings a change in individual attitude the group is the cause of the attitude of the individual.

Because individual attitudes within a group are more often effect than cause, we can understand them only through a knowledge of the conditions under which the group lives and has lived. No analysis of individuals reveals why the man who lives south of the Potomac cleaves to the Democratic party, and, in national elections, why the one who dwells north of Mason and Dixon's Line adheres to the Republican party. Only a knowledge of sectional and group attitudes makes these differences intelligible. The man who thinks he is disposed to fight because he sees the issues and wants to, is harder to bring to a reasonable consideration of the circumstances than is one who understands that the group attitude is psychologically and historically responsible for his own. Once he perceives the historical and cultural genesis of his attitude and that of his neighbor, he can pass objective judgment on the attitude of individuals in the group, or at least he is much nearer to the possibility of an objective judgment. Even though the illusion persists that he feels as he does because of his reaction as an individual to the situation, the knowledge that it is an illusion is promise of escape from it. To see a mirage and not know that it is illusion is more deceptive than to see a mirage and recognize its nature. A knowledge of group psychology is a prerequisite to ability to control and direct it.

Lacking this knowledge we are likely to treat the symptom for the disease and confuse cause with effect.

4. THE GROUP AS A PURPOSIVE ENTITY

A society, then, is not merely an aggregate of individuals, but consists of individuals bound to one another in semi-permanent relations which make of the totality a functioning entity. How does this entity function? The answer must be found by observing the behavior of the group, for the group is what it does.

We attribute purpose to the group, though this does not imply that the purpose is consciously apprehended by any member of it. To act purposively and to be aware of the purpose are not synonymous, more than to have pneumonia and to know that one has pneumonia are synonymous. The rare rather than the common thing is to be aware of the purpose which one embodies.

A group of gregarious animals, such as a flock of migrating wild geese, is an example of a group which functions as an entity and functions purposively. The line follows the leader to lands where there is better food and where, therefore, life is more easily preserved. The flight of a covey of partridges at the danger signal given by a sentinel bird illustrates behavior of a group functioning as an entity, and the behavior is purposive, that is, of a type which for the most part tends to save the group and its members. In the response of a pack of wolves to the "call" which indicates prey, and the concerted action of the pack in surrounding and killing its victim, the group functions as an entity. Such behavior illustrates the tendency of the group to act in a way which promises — sometimes the promise is false — to secure its preservation. Self-preservation is a tendency in group action as truly as in individual action, though, to be sure, it operates in a characteristically peculiar manner.

A hive of bees, or a colony of ants, is a community which functions as an entity and acts purposively. The specialization in labor, the interdependence of the various members of the hive or colony, the provision of supplies for the future, illustrate group reality and group purpose. The purpose is the end served by the activity, though there is no reason, in these instances at least, to suppose that the members foresee the results of their action, and in any case their knowledge of it would be merely a discovery of the purpose, not a creation of it.

In human groups, too, there is unified action with purposive drift.

Every human group aims to persist, usually much as it is, and action which tends to secure survival of the group is self-preservative.

All of the self does not function as a part of the group, but some of it falls outside the sphere of group action and group purpose. Only that portion of the self is included within the group which functions as a part of it. When the group program conflicts with the individual program, and the individual conforms with the demands of the group, the group purpose is dominant.

The amount and pervasiveness of organization in the group, therefore, determine the extent to which group life interferes with individual freedom. So far as the interdependence of the classes in the hive imposes obligations upon the individual bee, the bee to that extent is robbed of its freedom. In human groups the freedom of the individual is limited by the claims which the group makes upon him. Superficially, at least, it appears that the more highly organized the group is, the less freedom does the individual have, the result being that increase in group efficiency means decrease in the possibilities of individual action.

Yet in some instances it is through group activity that the component individuals attain freedom. Thus the individual bees are better provided for, as regards food at least, than are most animals which forage for themselves and are under no obligation to a hive. The wolf which hunts with the pack must share its food with others, and, unlike the solitary animals, it does not appropriate the full proceeds of its catch; on the other hand, it shares in the prey taken by other members of the pack. The member of a Dakota band may be compelled to fight merely because his group is on the war path; but he has the protection of his group against attacks by others.

Incorporation in the group limits individual freedom in some directions but increases it in others. We are subtly impelled to speak the language of the group; the compensating advantage is that we can communicate with our fellows and they with us. We must obey its laws; but there is the compensating advantage of legal protection. Certainly in some cases the total freedom of the individual is increased in the group life in which he surrenders certain freedoms. From the point of view of realizing individual potentialities, incorporation in a group is not an unmitigated calamity, though whether the individual thereby gains more than he loses is a matter often difficult to determine.

The sacrifices which the group requires of the individual may be enormous. "In time of war patriotism demands the very life of any of

its citizens, and the demand is enforced by all kinds of sanctions. To the crowd all individuals are alike. The youthful Darwin and the youthful Bill Sikes are the same to it when war threatens existence. It draws them into the ranks side by side, drills them to a common obedience, and sends them to take an equal chance before the guns of the enemy. The crowd does not think much of the death of an individual. . . . What is death to a man is only a trifling wound to a crowd. The slaughter of many is still only a wound to the collective body, and if it possesses the potentiality of life and growth, that wound will heal within the lifetime of the next generation. From the crowd's point of view all its units must some day die while it abides; nor does their death matter. 'Who dies if England lives?' The crowd gilds the death of those who sacrifice themselves for it and calls the dead unrealized Darwin and the dead unmanifested Bill Sikes alike heroes. But the poor young man who would have set the world on fire is dead all the same. Common crowd-opinion is that his death has been worth while. But was it? Have there not in fact been individuals who were more precious than many a nation, though perhaps it might be argued never more precious than the nation that produced them? For the national crowd at any rate the death of any individual in its defense is worth while, but it is only actually and in very truth so on the assumption that crowd-life, crowd-survival, is worth more than the highest individual life.

"We readily assume that the life of a man is precious, that to live is worth while, that life means something and is a great and glorious reality, however mysterious and inexplicable it may be. Is crowd-life similarly valuable and in a higher degree? If the crowd were to break up, while all the individuals composing it lived on, would that necessarily be a catastrophe?"⁴

However we may decide specific cases — and they differ greatly in their merits — there seems no justification for the view that the individual owes everything to the group. Even if, as a matter of history, he owes everything to the group — as, for example, he owes his entire physical being to nature — it does not follow that ethically he owes everything to the group, that is, owes everything in the sense that its welfare is necessarily above individual welfare and its commands necessarily above his own demands. As a matter of fact, historically the individual does not owe everything to the immediate group of which he is a part. He is not more indebted to his group than it to its

⁴ Conway, *The Crowd in Peace and War*, pp. 79-80, New York, 1915.

past and to other groups. The group is not more self-sufficient than is the individual who is a part of it, for it, too, is a historical culture product.

To be sure, the group has power over the individual, but the might of the group is not equivalent to its right. At the most, the right of the group over the individual pertains only to spheres in which the individual is subject to group authority. This varies from one society to another, and from time to time even within a given society. Ordinarily the group can not call upon the individual to sacrifice life for its interests, and usually the interests of the group do not require the sacrifice of the life of the individual. When, however, the existence of the national group is endangered, plausibly it has the right as well as the might to say that the individual shall sacrifice his life for it. To say that the group has the right to make demands is, however, equivalent to saying that the individual is under an obligation to comply. For if the latter is under no obligation, the former has no rights. This is demanding, not that the individual surrender his individuality, but merely that his social self remain true to the social rôle. He may believe that the group is not acting ethically in the given situation and, if it has no ethical claim upon him he is under no obligation to obey its dictates. The intricacies of this problem are, however, matter for ethics rather than for social psychology, which can give only the setting of the ethical problems pertaining to the rights of society and those of the individual.

5. THE IMPORTANCE OF SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY

Since sociology is concerned primarily with groups and with the rôle of the individual in group life, social psychology is important to the sociologist. If there are laws of group behavior which transcend the laws of the behavior of the component individuals, as there is reason to believe is the case, then an analysis of component individuals will not explain the behavior of the group.

Moreover, if individuals function in group life in a two-fold capacity, as social and as individual personalities, then many phases of individual activity can be understood only through social psychology. The approach which analyzes individual mind and studies individual behavior as though these were not socially inspired gives rise to misunderstanding and perpetuates illusions which social psychology should dissipate. The handmaids to social psychology are history and culture, rather than physiology and individual psychology, for the former ap-

proaches are the best avenues to an understanding of how and why the group behaves as it does.

The psychological reality of the group lies in the fact that it functions as an entity. Whether this be called "personality," or by some other name, or by none at all, is a matter of minor importance. However that may be, "The citizens are not a mere collection or aggregate but an organized whole, performing a multitude of different functions which should, and more or less do, complement, and play into one another."⁵

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CHAPTER XV

CROWD PSYCHOLOGY

The word "crowd," as used in this chapter, refers to a functioning group each member of which is in contact with some other member, usually with several others, through one of the physical senses — sight, touch, or hearing. Physical presence at the scene of crowd activity is necessary to make one a member of the crowd. We thus distinguish the crowd and crowd psychology from the mass and mass psychology. The mass does not involve physical presence in a limited locality. A man may be a member of the masses and subject to the same psychological influences without being physically near those who carry out the mass program. The psychological influences which penetrate certain large groups and spread over large areas, such as a nation in time of war or during a national election, are examples of mass psychology. So, too, the psychological attitudes which permeate large groups of workers during an acute industrial dispute give rise to mass psychology among the workers but not necessarily to crowd psychology. Capitalists, too, often illustrate mass psychology, though there is little manifestation of crowd psychology among them. Le Bon and Conway include both crowd and mass psychology under the term "crowd," but the distinction drawn above is useful.¹

I. SOME TRAITS OF CROWD PSYCHOLOGY

Crowd behavior or crowd psychology is distinguished from prevalent mass psychology by its transient nature and by the limitation of the field of attention. In the typical crowd there is an intensification of the forces at work in the group during normal times, a shifting of emphasis and aim, a tendency to bring the prevailing sentiments to a focus in summary manner.

Crowd psychology is to ordinary mass psychology what an epi-

¹ Many of the phenomena of mass psychology are treated in subsequent chapters. The distinction made above between crowd and mass does not imply that the behavior of the two is always different. It is, as a matter of fact, often very much the same. Nevertheless, crowd and mass constitute two different orders of social phenomena.

demic is to an endemic disease. The epidemic is marked by a rapidity of contagion which spreads with unwonted violence through a group, possibly doing less damage than the persistent endemic diseases, but made conspicuous by the suddenness of its appearance and perhaps by the strangeness of the infection.

Usually the crowd has specific traits. When individuals are a part of a crowd which is functioning at high intensity and are not merely observers, that is, are not psychologically outside it though physically present, they undergo notable psychological changes, sinking into the crowd and losing initiative. The possibilities of individually determined action are lessened; the "strong-minded" man weakens, the "weak-minded" man is strengthened. The outstanding feature of the change in most individuals is an increase in docility. The will seems paralyzed in the strong-willed, though it may be strengthened in the spineless.

The key to the change lies in the increased suggestibility of members of the crowd. The speciously appropriate idea has only to be suggested to receive assent, though the range of suggestion is limited. An insinuation which would be resented at other times now gains assent, and the suggestions of constituent individuals are promptly acted upon. The phenomenon is one of crowd hypnotism. By a weird fascination which deprives them of the usual ability to think their own thoughts and go their own way, individuals are held in the crowd and made to conform with its program. They are impelled to think as the crowd thinks, to follow it, to assent to its pronouncements, to respond to its suggestions. Attention focuses on a few things, but the faculty of cool judgment is in abeyance. Critical faculties are weak, and discernment wanes as emotion waxes. The individual falls under the control of the crowd and ideas inconsistent with its suggestions are feeble or absent. The attention and interest of the individual respond to its suggestions. There are present many of the psychological conditions which can be observed when a subject passes under hypnotic influence and the control of the operator. The thought and aims of the individual who is in the crowd belong to it, and he is held in its control as by a fatal fascination.

Frequently the crowd-controlled individual shows a marked heightening of emotionalism. If angry he is very angry; if merry, inordinately merry; if sad, depressed to the point of tears; if elated, wildly exultant. His emotional manifestations are like those of the child, extreme and uncontrolled; or like those of the idiot, without adaptation to circum-

stances. Intellectual acumen is dulled. The man caught in the crowd psychology can not deliberate clearly, can not weigh motives or sift causes. His mind works not by logic but by impulse; not steadily, but by fits and starts. The characteristics of individuals become much the same while they are members of the same crowd. The attitude of the individual may change, but it does not change independently of the attitudes of those around him. He changes when and as other members of the crowd change. When they are merry, he is merry; when they are sad, so is he. The crowd tends to reduce the component individuals to a type, so that to know one is almost to know all; for psychologically each becomes a reflection of all. This, of course, applies only when the crowd is functioning at high intensity, for crowd psychology is always a matter of degree. In some crowds the component individuals maintain most of their distinctive individuality.

2. THE CROWD AS AN ENTITY

We speak of the crowd as if it were a thing and as if it did something to component individuals, for by the tests suggested in the preceding chapter it answers to the definition of a thing, since it functions as an entity. It has its genesis in certain types of situations favorable to the formation of crowds, and it becomes an enveloping social reality which tends to absorb the individual. The individual starts as an observer and becomes a member, functioning as a participant in the crowd activities, sharing its sentiments and purposes. He is drawn into it like a man caught in a current; resistance becomes more difficult; finally he submits to its impulsions and is carried away by it.

Observe the incipient crowd when a speaker at a street corner begins his harangue: "At first he is like a fallen cab-horse; a few folk stop out of idle curiosity rather to look at him than to listen. He says something that catches their attention, and they lose the listless attitude of the mere loafer. Others are thereby attracted to join them. The speaker begins to take hold of them. He makes them laugh; he draws forth their applause. They become the center of a continually widening assembly. At first the speaker's ideas are nothing to them. Presently they become interested; before long they are taken captive. The orator mesmerises them rather than convinces them. They shout applause and their enthusiasm is kindled. They become a group with an idea, and in the heat of that emotion they may be led to act in a remarkable manner, as the individuals composing the group could never have been

brought to act had they been reasoned with, one by one, by ever so many separate archangels.”²

The tendency to be drawn into the crowd is illustrated in Dickens’ account of the shouting crowd which accompanied Pickwick to the magistrate, seeing which Sam Weller “stepped aside to see the crowd pass, and finding that they were cheering away, very much to their own satisfaction, forthwith began to cheer too, with all his might and main,” happily unaware that his master’s predicament was the cause of the hilarity, and satisfied to be one of the crowd.

The crowd is not a disorganized mass. It is seldom a body without a head, but usually has a leader. It may form in indeterminate manner and for no clearly defined purpose. Sooner or later, however, an individual comes to the fore, or is thrust forward, who thenceforth acts as leader. Usually his prestige is great, his authority unquestioned, so that, once he is exalted, his leadership remains unchallenged as long as the crowd functions. Frequently a man becomes the leader without intending to do so, having found, rather than made, himself such. He may be unaware of how or why he attained his unsought eminence. He has had no program but one takes shape as he follows the suggestions of those about him, one which subsequent reflection is inclined to represent as prearranged, but which in many cases, so far as he is aware, is spontaneous and unpremeditated.

3. THE FORMATION OF CROWDS

The mental states induced by crowds also foster them. Excitement, anger, common purpose, common agreement, are among the conditions which favor the formation of crowds. Crowds are more frequent among excitable, angry people than among cool, happy people; but the phenomenon of crowds is a matter of culture environment as well as one of individual predisposition.

In some cultures crowds form readily and to some extent independently of individual characteristics. The innate individual disposition of the Parisian immediately before 1789 was probably not very different from what it was between 1789 and 1801; but crowds were far more numerous in the latter period. Again, in some primitive tribes the crowd is an almost daily occurrence, while in others it is scarcely an annual event. A like observation applies to civilization. In every country there are local differences in the disposition to form crowds, though there is

² Conway, *The Crowd in Peace and War*, pp. 10-11.

robably no corresponding innate difference in the individuals in the various sections of the country.

The phenomenon of crowds is, therefore, primarily a matter of culture environment rather than one of innate individual characteristics.

4. SOME TYPES OF CROWDS

As individuals differ in character, so do crowds. The qualities manifested by one may be absent in another or present there in different degree. Assertions that all crowds are hysterical, or that all are on evil bent, are not justified by the facts. There are good as well as bad crowds, merry as well as militant ones. Indeed the mirthful crowd is one of the most familiar and certainly the most popular. One finds along with its good humor, and in part because of it, a lack of acute discernment. The joke which excites little merriment in ordinary conversation is received hilariously by a sympathetic audience. The crowd may be holiday bent and a ready creator of fun. Such gatherings give rise to frolickings and pleasantries which the participants, far fallen from the customary grace of dignity, look back upon with surprise bordering upon incredulity. Things which then seemed distractingly funny appear vapid and senseless when seen in the calm of subsequent reflection. The acts would have appeared ridiculous at the time had they not been performed in the protective atmosphere of abetting sympathizers.

At the other end of the gamut is the crowd with hostile intent. It is welded together most effectively by holding up before it something which incites hostility. Antony's speech in Shakespeare's *Julius Cæsar* is not designed to secure sympathy for Cæsar, but, by artful device, to rouse the populace to hatred of Brutus and his co-conspirators. When the irony begins to work, the welding process is under way, and the crowd turns in wrath upon those who slew Cæsar. Wrath, more effectively than sympathy, welds the auditors into a functioning crowd.

Everett Dean Martin, who has had much experience in talking to large audiences at Cooper Union, in New York City, says that it is difficult to sway the audience unless their sentiments can be brought to a focus on something which they regard with hostility. The speaker holds them by rousing enmity against a wrong method rather than through exaltation of a right one, securing championship of one cause by berating another.

Political orators are well aware of this phase of the behavior of crowds. Their speeches seldom dwell on the principles or personalities supported by the party, but are directed against those of the rival party. It would be logical to defend one's own party and its leaders, but the psychological move is to attack the opposing party. Opposition unifies sentiment and makes the way easy for the orator. Perhaps because unification of sentiment is simpler than unification of ideas and judgment the former is commonly resorted to when dealing with crowds. One can unify the crowd more easily with a motto like "Can the Kaiser!" than with one like "Support the Fourteen Points and the League of Nations." "Remember the Maine, To hell with Spain," is a more successful rallying cry than "Remove the economic and political burden of the oppressed Cubans." This may be in part because fighting is simpler than coöperating, but the readiness with which the crowd reacts to the one rather than the other shows an attribute common to crowds as well as to individuals.

Throughout history crowds have played an important part in revolutions. This was the case in Rome, particularly in the latter days of the Empire when the State was falling into disorganization and political disruption. Repeatedly a crowd unseated one emperor and established another in his place.

In the American colonies orderly but active crowds had much to do with inciting and keeping alive opposition to Great Britain. Only after the Revolution was well under way did the dominance of crowds give place to the more highly organized opposition of a Congress of delegates. In the areas in which crowds played the largest part the opposition to British rule was strongest and most effective. Isolated individuals contributed comparatively little toward carrying on the Revolution. This is one reason, though not the only one, why the opposition centered in the New England more than in the Middle Atlantic or the Southern colonies. In the latter there were fewer centers of population and fewer opportunities for the formation of crowds. In New England where the town-meeting was an established institution, the crowd psychology focused to more effective purpose.

In the French Revolution of 1789 the crowd played a leading part. Indeed, one might date the uprising from the march of the Paris crowd to Versailles. From that time until the arrival of Napoleon the crowd played the leading rôle in national politics. In the Revolutions of 1848 and 1870 it was again in the ascendant. Appreciation of the part which crowds had played in French history led to the constitutional provision

that for certain purposes, such as the election of the President, the National Houses should meet in joint session in Versailles — and was responsible for Haussmann's arrangement of radiating streets in Paris to facilitate the control of crowds by the militia.

Affairs in the Russian Revolution of 1917 ran a similar course. National politics were determined by the dwellers in the capital city, and primarily by crowds. The crowd supported the *coups d'état*, gave confidence to the revolutionists, implanted fear in the government, terrorized populace as well as officials, and held in the hollow of its hand the fate of an Empire and the welfare of millions of citizens. Right or wrong in its aims, it won, not because of the appeal of its principles and the justice of its cause, but through threat and violence.

There is no comprehensive account, though one is much needed, of the part which crowds played in the overthrow and setting up of governments in Europe after 1917. We know, however, that they exerted a tremendous influence in many important post-war political movements. Such was the case in the socialist revolutions in Berlin, the industrial troubles in Halle, and the disturbances in many other German cities. Crowds played a large part in Greek politics from 1917 to 1921.

Another form of crowd manifestation is a product almost peculiar to American civilization, namely, the lynching mob. How or when lynching started,³ we do not know; but once under way it persisted as a feature of the culture of the locality in question. It has been directed particularly against negroes, though not restricted to them. Lynchings have been more frequent in the Southern states than in any other part of the country, and much more frequent in some of them than in others. Recently they have been resorted to in certain states of the Middle West, as notably in Missouri, Illinois, and Ohio in attacks upon negroes. The lynching mob is an illustration of culture persistence and culture diffusion. America furnishes more instances yearly than all the rest of the world, savagery and civilization combined. In the period 1885-1921 no less than 3,038 negroes were lynched in the United States.⁴ The total number of lynchings of whites and negroes combined was sixty-one in the year 1922, twenty-eight in the year

³ Presumably in Reconstruction days in the South, but the trait was possibly borrowed from the "lawless" frontier, where men were accustomed to take the punishment of crime into their own hands.

⁴ From 1895 to 1926 there were over 4,000 lynchings in the country, only four states (Massachusetts, New Hampshire, Vermont, and Rhode Island, all of them in New England) having had a clean record.

1923, and sixteen in the year 1924. In 1925 there were eighteen lynchings, and during the first eight months of 1926 there were twenty, two of the victims being whites, the total for that year having been thirty-four. The repetition of the phenomenon of lynching in a given community establishes its reality as a phase of group life, though this, of course, does not mean that it has not had an origin or that it will not have an end. Neither does it mean that we have exhausted the significance of the phenomenon by recognizing it as a phase of culture. Lynchings are carried out by certain individuals and not by the entire community. In each specific instance the appeal is different and some individuals are more open to the appeal than are others, and all are more open to the appeal under certain circumstances than under others.

It means, however, that the phenomenon of lynching can not be understood without taking the cultural factor into consideration, since in certain other cultures individuals do not react in this manner to similar stimuli. The culture is part of the environment to which they react and which they thereby help to continue. The situation is not essentially different from, say, the utterance of a certain sentence. One must know the immediate situation to understand why the sentence was uttered by a given individual at a given time, but the character of the sentence, the language in which it was spoken, and the intonation can be understood only by reference to a larger world of culture influences. The stimuli are effective only when and insofar as individuals react to them; but the significant thing for students of culture is that individuals do react to them, and that there is a specific pattern of reaction in each culture group.

5. THE UTILITY OF AN UNDERSTANDING OF CROWD PSYCHOLOGY

We have dwelt at some length upon the unfavorable side of crowd behavior because an understanding of this aspect is more important than an understanding of its innocuous nature. In many instances crowds are a menace to sound social order, working subtly and as a rule irrationally. Individuals are caught in their currents and infected with their contagion, which is the more dangerous because insidious.

We shall not possess safeguards against the untoward infection of crowd psychology until we understand in some detail its workings. A sane and thorough diagnosis of it, therefore, is one of the needs of sociology; for individual psychology does not provide sufficient insight into the behavior of crowds or even into that of individuals in crowds. The behavior of crowds is primarily a phenomenon of culture.

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CHAPTER XVI

LANGUAGE AND CUSTOM

Language and custom are cementing forces in group life and without them its coherence would be weakened. Though they are a product of social evolution they acquire a momentum of their own, influencing the group which has given rise to them and also subsequent groups. Language and custom, therefore, are both product and cause of group life. They are the offspring of the group and are nourished in its atmosphere; but they achieve relative independence and acquire influence in the group councils.

I. THE IMPORTANCE OF LANGUAGE

"Language makes possible the influence of mind upon mind, and is the basis of all human and social development. It fixes the mind of the thinker upon his own ideas, and, when in communication with another person it fixes the mind of the hearer upon the ideally represented objects present in the mind of the speaker. . . . The fact that the mouth and the throat, usually otherwise unoccupied, were ready at hand as convenient instruments of communication enabled speech to be developed without occupying other organs, such as the hands, which could be profitably employed at the same time for other purposes. . . . With the origin of language arises the first sign of the power to grasp the data of experience in accordance with their affinities and so to build up conceptions of individuals, groups, and classes as the subject of rough and ready generalizations. . . . Ideas may be stored up in language, customs, folk-lore, institutions, tools, and so on, using tools in the narrow sense of material implements. In one sense language is in itself a great storehouse of ideas quite apart from its function as a means of transmitting ideas regarding specific customs and rights. Slowly and painfully concepts have been elaborated, distinguished, clarified; and as a child learns his native language, in a few years he acquires the product of the thinking of untold generations from whom he is descended. It is difficult to exaggerate the immense importance of this method of storing ideas."¹

¹ Carr-Saunders, *The Population Problem*, pp. 408-412, Oxford, 1922.

2. THE ANTIQUITY OF LANGUAGE

Usually by the word "language" we mean the use of speech to convey meanings. Language so defined is universal among men, and is distinctively human characteristic. The calls and cries of some animals, designed to impart information to the herd or flock, may contain the elements of language; but these are so limited that they bear no comparison with the complicated and numerous signs which human beings use in communication. Language is an instrument which man has employed for a long time, certainly for many millennia antedating the earliest historical records. It flourishes in every culture group in a highly developed form, adequate to the needs of speakers. There are special developments in vocabulary and in structure which differentiate the language of one group from that of another, to such an extent that those who speak one language are unintelligible to those who speak another. In some cases, as in the Indo-European languages in Europe, Asia Minor, and India, one can trace relationship; but in many cases none is discoverable. Bushman, it appears, is not related to Chinese, and neither of these shows relationship to English.

The high development of each language and the large number of divergencies within a given family of languages, such as the numerous tongues in the Indo-European family — English, German, Armenian, Hindustani, and others — those comprising the Algonkin stock in North America, or the Bantu stock in Africa, indicate a considerable antiquity for language. It must have required a long time for these stocks to attain their present development and to diverge so completely from an ancestral type; for it is not probable that human language had more than one origin.

3. LANGUAGE AS A SOCIAL TOOL

Whatever the origin of language, whether in imitation of sounds, or in a philosophic reaction to surrounding things, or in spontaneous utterances under emotional stress, and whatever the measure of its antiquity, it plays an important part in group life. It is one of the most serviceable of social tools, being indeed indispensable to a high development of social life. Without the ability to exchange ideas the social bonds would not hold. Since language is the means by which individuals in a group express ideas it is not the speech of one but that of all. To be under-

stood a man must use the symbols current in the group; he must learn the language of other men if his own is to be intelligible.

4. LANGUAGE AND CULTURE

A few minutes' conversation with a man discloses a great deal, for his language reveals more than it states. Two or three spoken sentences may unwittingly declare the man's social status and his educational attainments. Language is so intimately related to social grouping that one ethnologist has suggested defining a tribe, at least in aboriginal Australia, as a group of people speaking the same dialect, that is, held together by the tie of a common language. In a given tribe only one language is spoken and usually a specific dialect is spoken in only one tribe. Thus tribe and dialect are almost coterminous. In the highest civilizations likewise there is a high correlation between language and social grouping. In the early Mediterranean civilizations a common language was the basis of political unity. To the Hebrews the tie of language connoted a common religion; those who did not speak Hebrew were equivalent to those who did not worship Jahwe — they were Gentiles. The Greek term for all non-Greeks, *barbaroi* (whence our "barbarians"), merely meant those who could not speak Greek, whose language was but babble and stutterings, meaningless syllables like *bar, bar, bar*. The *shibboleth* of Hebrew tactics in Old Testament times is an example of discrimination between friend and foe by testing the tongue.² There is some point to the rhetorical question: "What does it matter? We all speak French." With political expansion groups speaking different tongues were included in the nation or empire. With few exceptions, notably Switzerland, those political units in which the diversity of tongues was greatest have had most difficulty in holding together. Linguistic diversification was one of the main sources of political friction in the former Austro-Hungarian Empire, in the Balkan States, in Germany, and in the union of Great Britain and Ireland. Appreciation of the value of language as a cementing tie explains the attempts to foster linguistic uniformity. Interest in ancient Greek civilization and an attempt to revive classical Greek enabled the modern Greeks in their struggle for independence a century ago to secure the moral support of Western Europe and so to win their freedom in the unequal contest with Turkey. Austria felt that the solution of her domestic troubles lay in the adoption of German as the common lan-

² See *Judges*, 12: 5-6.

language. For political purposes Germany forced her language upon both Poles and French within her borders irrespective of the desires of local groups. After the entrance of America into the World War vigorous Americanization campaigns included the teaching of English to our foreign-born. Many states prohibited the teaching of German in the secondary schools, some in private schools as well, and the national government compelled the foreign press of the country to print in English all news concerning the war. In vain did some protest that we were fighting a nation and not a language, and nothing was gained by pointing out that we did not stop speaking English after two wars with England.

Language, especially in its vocabulary, reflects the culture of which it is a part. A complete vocabulary of the Eskimo language introduces one to Eskimo material culture, games, economic activities, technical devices, and social ideas. Often there is no equivalent in one language for the things or concepts that exist in another. When the missionaries translated the Bible into Eskimo they were puzzled for an equivalent to the metaphor "Lamb of God," and finally decided upon "Little Seal of God," since "lamb" was meaningless to an Eskimo. It is said — probably with some exaggeration — that before the German Revolution of 1918 it was difficult to find in German an adequate account of many phases of English political life, since nothing comparable existed in German experience and the difficulties of translation were almost insuperable. There seems to be some ground for the assertion that "we are conscious of thoughts that we cannot put into language because our mother tongue does not serve for an adequate vehicle."³ We refer to certain types of unconstitutional procedure as *coups d'état*; there is no equivalent in the English language, for there is no equivalent in English culture. We speak of the *Samurai* and the *harikari* of Japan, for no English words convey their meanings. French and German have borrowed the English word "sport" together with many of the terms for various sports and much of the "sporting" vocabulary. Thus both languages use the English word "football,"⁴ while in French tennis scores are counted in "love," as in English, though the older form of tennis, "court tennis," was a French game. Such words as *tobacco*, *hammock*, *bungalow*, *potato*, *tomato*, *kyak*, indicate culture contacts and borrowings from exotic cultures.

The source of many fabrics is revealed in their names: sarcenets

³ Hobhouse, *Social Development: Its Nature and Conditions*, p. 177, New York, 1924.

⁴ Or did use them before the World War.

from the Saracenic world; taffetas from Persia; damasks from Damascus; baudekin from Bagdad; muslin from Mosul; gauzes from Gaza; grenadines from Grenada; chiffons from Tripolitan *chiff*. The Arabian *kamis* becomes chemise, and the *jubba* the jupe or jupon. Papyrus is from the Egyptian word for paper, and book from the Greek *biblos*; while *ream*, from Arabic *razma*, a parcel, shows the influence of Arabian trade in the silk and linen paper which it introduced.

An interesting illustration of the record in language of culture contacts is the word *adobe*, the name for the sun-dried brick used in house construction in the southwestern part of the United States and along the Mexican border. *Adobe* is from the ancient Egyptian, one of the few ancient Egyptian words in the English language. It was used for the sun-dried brick which they made — the same, no doubt, for which the Hebrews sought straw in vain. When the Arabs conquered Egypt they adopted the word still in use among the *fellahin*, and later when the Moors conquered Spain they introduced the word into the Iberian peninsula. The Spaniards borrowed it from them and brought it to the New World.

A visit to our Mexican border would reveal many illustrations in language of the culture contact which has been marked in this part of the country. In California numerous place names record the earlier and still persistent Mexican-Spanish influences; indeed the name of the state and that of almost every important city in it is of Spanish origin. Names of places in southern Arizona, southern New Mexico, and southern Texas tell a similar story of Mexican-Spanish contacts.

Language is also an important medium for culture diffusion. When the Greek language penetrated the Mediterranean area Greek cultural influences followed and took root in foreign lands — at Baalbek, Palmyra, Antioch, Alexandria, Rome, and elsewhere. The spread of the Latin tongue brought Roman civilization in its wake from Rumania to the shores of Britain. The interest in Greek fostered the Renaissance and conveyed to Europe the old Greek culture. The non-European English-speaking peoples are influenced most by English civilization primarily because of the medium of a common language.

An awakening nationalism almost invariably attempts to "purify" the language, to revive old forms and eliminate foreign introductions. The modern Greeks introduced Homer and Herodotus into the schools and applied words from Xenophon and Thucydides to streets, railway stations, and theaters. So thoroughly has the ancient tongue been revived that if Homer, with eye-sight restored — if there was a blind

Homer — should stroll into a modern Athenian restaurant, he could order his dinner from the menu card without much hesitation over script or vocabulary. The present Russian government (that of the Bolsheviki) has paid much attention to the revival of Slavic and the elimination of French, German, and English. That it gave Petrograd a Slavic Bolshevik name, Leningrad, is symbolical. The present attempts to revive elements of old Swedish and Norwegian civilizations are marked by similar attention to language and by a revival of many old Swedish and Norwegian nomenclatures — even to the extent, in Norway, of changing the name of the capital.

The prevalence of Greek in the ancient world after the conquests of Alexander, when every learned man knew that language, gave a unity to Mediterranean civilization. Later a similar unification was effected by Latin, lasting well through the Middle Ages, during the centuries when it was the language of scholars. Its influence is still strong in those phases of culture such as law, government, and education, in which Roman civilization excelled. When French became the language of courts and of men of travel and culture, French civilization made itself felt in those things in which it had excelled: etiquette and the arts of life and conversation. Those, therefore, who insist that something would be gained in the modern world if there were a universal language, have much evidence on which to support their position. In international affairs this is virtually accomplished by the use of French, which remains the medium of diplomatic intercourse between nations speaking different tongues. The interest in a universal language, such as Esperanto, is strongest among those who are interested in the unification of men in modern civilization. But the difficulty of introducing a universal language comes from the fact that no nation is willing to forego its language for another; on the contrary, there are persistent attempts to revive national languages, and if a universal language is adopted, it will probably be one which supplements rather than supplants the respective national languages.

5. CUSTOM AS SOCIAL HABIT

Custom is the doing of something because others habitually do it, and because, therefore, it is the thing to do.

When a habit common to individuals in a group, or to a great many of them, is approved by the group or by a considerable or influential portion of it, we may refer to this as custom, and may consider it an

attribute of the life in the group. In the term "custom" we do not include common habits which do not have social sanction, so that all prevalent habits are not customs. But the wearing of a collar, for example, is not merely a habit of an individual but is a custom of the group; for individuals do not wear collars because they have acquired the habit, but have acquired the habit because the wearing of a collar is the custom. The same applies to all conventional dress. Most phases of etiquette and ceremony are matters of custom, and compliance with them is but the response of the individual to group suggestion. The group does not approve them because individuals do them, but individuals do them because the group approves them. Customs had their origin in individual activities, but the matter of origin is another problem. Once under way customs are perpetuated because individuals comply with them, and it is of course their compliance which constitutes the custom.

The genesis of custom is an interesting problem, but one can study the operation of custom without inquiring into matters of origin, as one can study the function of a language without inquiring into its origins. After all, "origin" is only relative, for we know no absolute beginnings in nature, human nature, or society.

6. THE PREVALENCE OF CUSTOM

Custom doubtless is of hoary antiquity, since it characterizes all human groups. It is in full swing at the earliest periods of which history gives us a glimpse, and appears to have played an important part then as it assuredly does in subsequent civilizations.

Primitive society is the favorite playground for those who wish to show the prevalence and absurdity of custom in human society. The savage has long served as the exemplar of all that is untoward and most compelling in custom. His customs are regarded as a burden, as an incubus fastened to him by invisible but powerful cords from whose meshes he can not escape. But this view is the result of false emphasis and is largely misunderstanding. The civilized observer fails to grasp the meaning of custom in savagery and is equally blind to the part which it plays in civilization. The Australian aborigine coming into our midst as an observer would be impressed by the numberless customs which grip us in every walk of life, and probably would fail to detect the utility of most of them. If turn-about is fair play, his misinterpretations would be deserved.

Custom, in fact, plays a dominant rôle in our culture. In dress, etiquette, social intercourse, politics, religion, education, custom holds at every point. We are wedded to certain customary modes of behavior, and we differ notably from savages only in our ability to invent more ingenious reasons or excuses for their existence. But the real reason is not the one we proffer; the real and sufficient reason is custom.

7. THE UTILITY OF CUSTOM

If custom is ubiquitous probably it serves a useful purpose, else it would long since have disappeared, or at least we should be making more strenuous efforts to abolish it than seems to be the case. Customs, in fact, do serve many useful purposes. They make group action uniform and unified. Thanks to custom, men know what to expect and can interpret the behavior of individuals within the group. When individuals act according to custom we have a guide to their intention; when they defy custom we are at a loss to understand them.

Thus custom prevents the development of numerous misunderstandings and frictions within the group which otherwise would be inevitable. Consider so simple a custom as that of turning to the right on highways. In some countries the custom is to turn to the left. There is little virtue in having one rather than the other, but there is much virtue in having one rule as the custom. So useful are many customs that the law recognizes them as binding and enforces them. Custom gave rise to law, as well as law to custom.

The early collection of Welsh laws known as the legal triads of Moelmuir refers to three kinds of customs which must be maintained: The custom which sets the law aside, that which excels the law by its justice though its authority is limited to the place where usage confirms it, and that which excels the law by natural events — "it stops a complaint and prosecution and transfers it to the verdict of the elders of the tribe."⁵

When there is no law covering the matter in dispute, the court takes custom into consideration, as, for example, in the interpretation of contracts, to determine whether the spirit of the agreement has been carried out and to decide many other rights. The law accepts as custom actions which have been practised in the group so long that "the memory of man runneth not to the contrary." By common law, a recent custom is not legally enforceable. Graham Wallas has asserted that "in a

⁵ Petrie, *Some Sources of Human History*, pp. 88-95, London, 1922.

settled and traditional society custom is of such overwhelming weight that a law can only act in accordance with it; a sudden change in the machinery of government would break down of itself — nay, in such a society laws can hardly be passed save those that the development of tradition demands.”⁶

8. THE UNTOWARD FEATURES IN CUSTOM

Usually habit is serviceable to the individual since it hands over to facile and nearly automatic action many details which would be distracting if not thus taken care of. By thrusting such matters below the threshold of consciousness custom, like habit, leaves a man free to devote attention to other matters. But custom may become a tyrant as well as a servant to our needs. It is tyrannical when it enforces conformity irrespective of the benefits or disadvantages to be derived. It is tyrannical when it exacts more energy than it conserves and when it absorbs abilities rather than releases them, shackling us rather than removing our encumbrances. There is often reason for the discouragement expressed by a reformer described in an Armenian story who concluded that “against the customs of the land you can do nothing.” The untowardness of custom too frequently is a fact. The law enforces it irrespective of its utility, for a sanction attaches to custom merely by reason of its antiquity. The resort to precedent is as much a search for custom in legal procedure as for sound reasons on which to base a decision. Even ethics, if we are to trust etymology, arose out of custom and, whatever its origin, is closely bound up with custom. A certain degree of rightness attaches to an act simply because it is customary. Thus ethics tends to sink into a mere determination of what people do and to assume that if many conform the custom thereby possesses superior sanction. This procedure, however, is the substitution of quantitative for qualitative considerations. Repetition of a bad act does not make it a good one, though it may dull the appreciation of its unethical nature.

Herodotus’ statement that “custom is king” is too nearly true. It were better if one could say that custom is servant. Custom may thwart our more intelligent purposes and blind us to the ends which it should serve. A wise society changes its customs from time to time, but does not dispense with them. We can not legislate custom out of existence, for it is almost as indispensable as language and serves a similar purpose.

⁶ Wallas, *The Great Society*, p. 80, London, 1914.

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CHAPTER XVII

HISTORY, TRADITION, AND OPINION

Tradition has to do with the past and is commonly conceived as the influence of the past upon the present. Insofar as this is true it falls within the class of historical influences, and its operation is essentially a matter for the historian. Let us, therefore, briefly consider the task of the historian and his manner of recording those influences of the past which constitute the larger background of all our traditions.

I. HISTORY

History, as the word indicates, grew out of the story. Any tale told was a history, or, as we now say, a story. An event which aroused sufficient interest to inspire a story was, therefore, history, thus giving some justification for the old couplet:

What is hit is history,
What is miss'd is mystery.

History brought into the arena of consciousness and knowledge events which had lain beyond the ken of an interested audience. It has been popular among all peoples. Men like to hear in detail the story of their land and people and the development of their civilization.

At first history dealt almost exclusively with the civilization in which its auditors lived. But as men learned more about the past and about the development of civilization, in order to understand the history of their own culture they found it necessary to become acquainted with contiguous and formerly contiguous cultures. Thus history came to include an account of neighboring and sometimes of distant peoples with whom one's culture directly or indirectly had come into contact. The main concern of history, however, is the civilization in which the historian lives.

If our history tells us much about Greece, Rome, Egypt, Babylonia, Persia, and India, this is not because interest centers in these civilizations for their own sake but because of the influence they have had

upon our culture. When we discovered that Western European history had its roots in the Mediterranean cultures an account of the latter was included in the history of Western lands. When we became aware of prior contacts with China we included an account of that country in our history. When European civilization invaded distant lands our interest in them was aroused. The compass of history has increased because we have fuller knowledge of the ties which bind us to other peoples.

The older definitions of history as a record of the past are now in the discard. History is not a record of the past but an interpretation of it. Records of the past pertain to the past and history is a contemporary enterprise, the main purpose of which is not to record the past but to interpret present records. History works only with documents which have survived the gnawing tooth of time, and the reconstruction of the past is therefore an interpretation of present testimony. History is not concerned with the past in its entirety but with only certain portions of it. An attempt to recount all that has happened would not enlighten but confuse us. History selects and its selection implies evaluation — the recognition that some things are worth more than others, that some kinds of knowledge are more important than others. History, therefore, reflects social ideals, and it reveals the social standards as well as the scholarship of the times in which it is written. It follows, then, that the content of history changes as social ideals change. The increasingly larger place given in contemporary history to social and economic conditions, literature and political science, reflects a change in values. Since the present drags the past with it, the master mind has a keen appreciation of historical development: witness Lyell in geology, and Osler in medicine. Yet the social sciences need history more than do the natural and biological sciences, for they are less free from the past. The physician when treating his patient need not have regard for eighteenth-century theories of medicine; but when dealing with political problems a man must reckon with eighteenth-century political philosophy, and with the tenets of medieval theology when dealing with religion. We abandon George Washington's wig, saddle, and stagecoach, but we cling tenaciously to his doctrines of political philosophy. We abandon Lincoln's methods of making a living and of traveling from place to place, but his constitutional doctrines — perhaps even his unconstitutional ones — are still dear to us. We abandon without remorse his ideas of physical science, but our patriotism is called into question when we profess scepticism about his political doctrines. We may say what we like about Monroe's ideas concerning medicine,

astronomy, physics, or chemistry, but aspersions on what we now call the Monroe Doctrine are near-heresy. The past is always with us and our ancestors influence us more than do our contemporaries. Hence we can understand the America of today only by an appreciation of its historical background.

"Had America been settled by Laplanders, equatorial Negroes, Spaniards, Venetians, or Greeks, our civilization would have developed differently. We cannot understand the problems of today, nor foresee the solutions of tomorrow, without knowing something of the minds of the middle-class Englishmen who came to Massachusetts in the seventeenth century. . . . The roots of these men's characters ran deep into the soil of dead centuries. The Pilgrim Fathers imported traditions formed millenniums before by Angles and Saxons in the Baltic dunes. The history of England from the Heptarchy to James the First, was part of their intellectual equipment. In their beliefs and prejudices might be traced the slow political and legal development of England, the stiffness and harshness of the common law, the tenacious middle-class traditions of the towns, the democratizing, individualizing effects of Reformation and Dissent. The early spirit, strong, narrow, pious, became diluted as the Puritan stream flowed into the ocean of English America. Even in dilution, however, it preserved, and to this day preserves, much of its individualistic uncompromising, reforming quality."¹

"History," says Fuller, "maketh a young man to be old, without either wrinkles or grey hairs; privileging him with the experience of age, without either the infirmities or inconveniences thereof. Yea, it not onely maketh things past present, but inableth one to make a rationall conjecture of things to come."

In a sense history is an account of unique happenings, but this phase of it is the beginning and not the end of its value. It is useful only when it carries us beyond the unique event to an insight into underlying causes. If events are mere happenings our social philosophy is not enhanced by a knowledge of them. One event must be linked with another so that continuity is observable, the one following the other causally as well as chronologically. In a word, history searches for cause and effect, and only insofar as it succeeds in finding them is it valuable. If events might have happened in reverse order no lesson can be learned from history, and romance is as good or better than record of sober fact. Certain laws underlie historical development. Greece did not

¹ Weyl, *The New Democracy*, pp. 36-37, New York, 1912.

merely happen to be civilized; Rome did not merely happen to become great and then to fall; the American colonists did not merely happen to revolt. In other times and places, with a different setting to the story, with different characters on the stage, events would have been different. There is an interdependence about historical events which weaves them into a causal nexus. To history we must go for an exposition of cause and effect in human society and for an account of the connecting threads which reveal the continuity and consistency in the successive happenings in a given place and civilization. Within a given culture all important historical events are related to all others. "To disengage the permanent, the fundamental . . . from the transitory and variable embodiments . . . to note what characteristics . . . are fashioned by historical accident . . . and what characteristics on the contrary are rooted in the deep subsoil of humanity, is perhaps the greatest function which the historian is called upon to perform."

From history alone we can learn the important happenings which have made life and civilization what they are. From history we learn, likewise, the events which have given us our present problems. Hence to be contemporary-minded is to be historically-minded. The man who thinks intelligently in present-day terms thinks also in those of bygone decades and centuries, else he fails to think clearly. If we wish to live in the contemporary world we must know what that world is, and this knowledge we can not acquire unless we are prepared to drink deeply from the fount of history.

2. TRADITION AS SELECTION OF THE PAST

Custom pertains to the realm of action and tradition to that of thought. The rôle of tradition in social life, like that of heredity in physiological life, is to hand down a portion of the past, to wit, the stream of impelling tendencies which carry over from one generation to another. As heredity establishes continuity between successive generations in a given biological species, so tradition perpetuates within the respective social groups the characteristic ideas and standards. Like heredity, tradition does not hand down all the traits of predecessors. Each is a selective influence, in the main perpetuating only fundamental characteristics. No social group which is also a culture group is, therefore, without tradition; indeed it is frequently said that savages have no other guide. If one asks them why they do a certain thing they reply, "this is what our fathers told us," or, "so it was in the long ago."

But this aspect of savage life has been exaggerated. Everywhere savages are guided by tradition, but also everywhere they show an ability to escape certain portions of the past. All tribes have accounts of the past representing phases which they neither embody nor seek to embody in actual régime. In short, savages are perhaps no more bound to the past than are civilized peoples. We tend to rationalize present action and to give logical reasons for our behavior, whereas repeatedly the real reason is not the one we proffer, but is merely our disposition to adhere to the past. Savages, on the other hand, admit that they do things because their ancestors did them; indeed they proclaim the fact.

Tradition plays a dominant rôle in all important civilizations; in fact the extent to which a civilization has advanced is correlated with the degree to which its traditions have advanced. Greece and Rome attained their highest achievements at a time when tradition had a strong hold. The low ebb of civilization from the third century A.D. to the twelfth, or thereabouts, was synchronous with the low ebb of tradition. Only when the tradition of Western Europe attached itself to Greek and Roman civilization was there a renaissance. Tradition gave stability to the Church, making it the great power of the Middle Ages. French civilization did not develop characteristic traits until the peoples of France shared a common tradition.

In England tradition has had a firm hold upon the national culture. The continuity of English culture and English national development is insured less by institutions and government as such than by traditions. The deeper the roots of tradition, the greater its permanence, and the greater the possibilities of orderly continuous development. France, less obedient to tradition, passes from revolution to revolution while effecting important social and political changes, whereas England, a country in which tradition holds sway, follows its leading strings from evolution to evolution. No country of Western Europe has shown such stability as has England, none has shown such logical and continuous development, none has been such a stronghold of tradition. When revolutionary changes are brought into line with tradition they become evolutionary; social stability is not threatened, but accommodation to tradition facilitates transition to a new order. In large part this is due to the fact that tradition makes possible the utilization of the past. In doing so it plays in social life a part analogous to that played in individual life by memory, which is the function whereby a mental state is influenced by a past act or experience.

Though we speak of tradition as a force of the past influencing the present, in reality the present has hold of the past, controlling group activity in the light of that portion of the past which we call tradition. For the past as such has no influence, and only when the present preserves phases of it do the latter persist as influences. Portions of the past which the group forgets or disregards form no part of its traditions.

The selection implied by tradition is one of its outstanding characteristics. If it handed down all of the past it would not be a guide; and its wisdom is shown by the nature of the selection. Without tradition the group could not profit from its past, but would drift from circumstance to circumstance, from program to program, and without profiting from experience.

Tradition, therefore, is a steadying influence in group action, and thanks to it group life has continuity and aim. It holds the group to a consistent course of action, giving it purpose and direction. The tradition of the Monroe Doctrine, for example, whether wise or not, imparts consistency to American international policy, as does the tradition established in Washington's *Farewell Address*. So long as a group follows traditions it has a definite aim. This, of course, does not mean that every tradition is a good one, or that any tradition is so good that it could not be better. From time to time, therefore, a progressive society realizes the inadequacy of its traditions and remakes them.

During the World War every country involved remade its traditions, elaborating some, pruning others, dispensing with a number previously in vogue. In this country we remade the tradition that the Revolutionary War was attributable to the obstinacy and tyranny of the English, and set up in place of it the tradition that it was due to the obstinacy and tyranny of an irresponsible sovereign — and he a German! The English people were exonerated from responsibility on the grounds that they did not favor the war. At the same time we emphasized the assistance given the Colonists by France — and even suggested that it was inspired by benevolent and altruistic motives, forgetting to thank Louis XVI. The participation of Lafayette was called to mind anew, and when General Pershing landed with Expeditionary Forces on French soil he utilized the opportunity — according to popular tradition — to revive American gratitude to France with the words: "Lafayette, we are here!"² We simultaneously absolved the

² The fact that this saying attributed to Pershing is as mythical as George Washington's exploit with the hatchet and the cherry-tree does not mitigate the appeal of the supposed speech.

English from the crime of oppression and thanked the French for liberating us from the coercion of a British sovereign. England was equally busy in refashioning her traditions, as were also France, Germany, and every country engaged in the conflict.

Nothing is more serviceable than good traditions. England's greatness is not due to a merit inherent in tradition as such, but rather to the value of her particular traditions. Other peoples, too, have traditions — China, Japan, Russia — but these have not yielded so large a measure of social and political profit. Also, with few exceptions, no nation has shown so much ability as has England in refashioning national traditions and in making them conform with the needs of a new day. Good traditions are as necessary to social life as is good inheritance to physiological life, and in social life we can remake the influences of the past which are to be effective in the present. We can not choose our physiological ancestors, but we can choose our social traditions; for we can select the influences of the past whose social descendants we wish to be. Tradition is Janus-faced: we can open the doors of the temple at will, and can orient it as we wish.

When we appeal to the words of George Washington (or those attributed to him) as guides for action in political affairs, we show our disposition to follow tradition, for our selection of him as a guide is a means of creating a national tradition. Similarly the references to Lincoln show that we wish to establish him and his counsels as part of the national tradition.

3. THE UTILITY OF TRADITION

Tradition is indispensable to intelligent group life. Without it the group could not profit from the past, there would be no continuity of policies from one decade to another, and individuals would not know what to expect from the group in which they live. Tradition is the handing on of the past to the present. To hand on the less valuable elements of the past is to weaken the group; to hand on the nobler elements, the fitter guides to action, is to elevate the group, or at least to give it levers by means of which it can elevate itself. In perpetuating certain traditions rather than others the group in effect decides that those specific ones shall be the incentives to group action. Yet, though each group should decide its own affairs, not infrequently these are decided for it by preceding generations whose dictates on certain things the group does not question. If it did question them these same tradi-

tions would lose the control which the venerable past bestows upon them; for only that past is venerable which the group chooses to venerate, and only that portion of the past holds sway as tradition which the present recognizes as potent.

The motives which govern the group in making the selection from the past which we call tradition vary from time to time and from group to group. A powerful impulse at work in the group brings traditions into line. Thus if religion is a leading stimulus, there is a bulwark of religious tradition; if a form of government has strong grip — an “unlimited” monarchy, for example — the monarchical tradition is strongly entrenched. There is a tendency for a culture to bring tradition into line with its drives, for tradition is merely one phase of the culture.

Sufficient attention has not been paid to the genesis of tradition or to analysis of the kinds of traditions operative in various social groups. The realm of tradition is a Promised Land little exploited by historian, social psychologist, or ethnologist. Only when we have the history, social psychology, and ethnology of tradition will we be in a fair way to understand its circumstantiality, its varying nature, and the social situations which create or transform it.

4. OPINION AS A SOCIAL INFLUENCE

Since a social group is localized, a certain similarity of reaction to similar stimuli is a necessary precondition to group life. But the physical environment in which man lives is only a portion of the stimuli to action. In many respects the more important portion is the social environment, the world of social influences which encompasses him. A portion of his social environment consists of the opinions of his fellows. These are not stimuli while they remain locked up in the heads of his fellows, but as soon as those who harbor opinions make them known in such manner that they force themselves upon the attention of an individual they become part of his environment.

Opinion could not influence men if they did not allow it to do so. Yet they do react to the opinions of others, and few things play so large a part in the lives of men living in social groups as do the opinions of their fellows. Indeed, in many cases one is more influenced by the opinions of others than by one's own. They constitute the portion of the individual's environment to which he reacts with most care and caution. The reaction of individuals to the opinions of others is evidence that these opinions have efficacy. Even when no opinion is given in words,

there may be marked reaction to personal attitude, for vocal utterance is not the only means of expressing opinion.

He speaketh not; and yet there lies
A conversation in his eyes.

A facial or a bodily movement, a smile, a frown, a shake of the head, a pained expression, may reveal one's feeling and be more effective than uttered words. "Bodily gestures and facial expressions reflect hidden psychic activities so that men and women interpret each other's motives by sympathetic and antipathetic responses." Since in effect these attitudes constitute language, being current in the group and conveying meaning to those able to "read" them, they are expressions of opinions which influence conduct. There are prevalent views, standards, and judgments of value, of right and wrong, of expediency and in expediency, which are accepted by most members of the group. Such opinions are efficacious in influencing conduct, and in bringing it into conformity with the attitude of the group.

A common means, and usually an effective one, for making the recalcitrant individual conform with group opinion is ridicule. Few people can withstand ridicule, least of all when it is voiced by those whose opinions they value. Our conventional expressions, "enjoying the approbation of his fellows," and "withstanding the ridicule of the crowd," show the manner in which we typically react to these respective attitudes. Seldom do men "enjoy ridicule" or "withstand approbation."

Closely allied to ridicule as a social force is laughter. Few people enjoy being laughed at; some, in fact, are resentful if others do not laugh with them, for refusal to laugh at a man's pleasantries is a silent rebuff. Men wish others to agree with them not merely in their serious pursuits but in their lightness and humor as well. "He who laughs last laughs best," means that he who in the end has the best of the argument is in the most enviable position. Laughter is a jolly policeman, keeping social traffic moving in the approved channels, and is none the less efficient because jolly. It is one of the most effective forces making for social conformity and social solidarity. "More terrible than their rage is the peoples' laughter, and if it rends tyrants, with equal zest it pursues the saint and the wise man." Those who can laugh at the same thing have something in common; those who can not, little or nothing. A man's laughter is the measure of his genius, and laughter is sometimes a terrible weapon.

But opinion is not merely a restraining and a constraining force, which keeps people from flouting the customs, traditions, and standards of the group; it acts directly and positively in initiating action, impelling the individual to conform with group standards. Encouragement is one of the means by which the opinions of others influence an individual. We resort to it to good effect in order to improve the behavior of children; we use it commonly, if not always consciously and deliberately, in bringing the behavior of adults up to par and keeping it there.

Only recently has the ethnologist described the play of opinion in primitive society. Everywhere in savagery it is potent. The Eskimo can not withstand the ridicule of his fellows. No more can the manly Plains Indian, who can face without flinching the arrows of the enemy but not the ridicule of fellow-tribesmen. Among the Comanche "public opinion, the sentiment of the camp, elevates those specially distinguished in war to the highest position of power." Among the Winnebago the only restrictive measures which the chief or the community could adopt were disapproval, jeers, and temporary loss of social standing and prestige, but these were usually sufficient to hold the recalcitrant in check. So it is among primitive peoples in Africa, Australia, and the islands of the Pacific. Public insult will drive a Trobriand Islander to suicide, for neither man nor woman can stand accusation in the hearing of the entire community. Public opinion, by insults or ostracism, drives a guilty individual to suicide. Malinowski cites a case in which a girl, insulted in public, put on festive dress and ornamentation, wailed from the top of a palm tree, and jumped to her death. An almost identical case of suicide by a lad is cited by the same author.

The conditions of every-day life in savagery give greater force to opinion there than in civilization because all live a common life in which each knows the thoughts of his fellows and privacy is almost impossible. All think aloud. In civilization there is more individual isolation and a man may follow his ideas with greater freedom from intrusion. Even so, the individual seldom is free from the opinions of his fellows, for they jostle his thought in disturbing manner. If he is a weakling he solves the problem by giving up the conflict and accepting the voice of the people as the voice of God. "The contempt of one's class is often a stronger force than many a legal punishment."

5. PUBLIC OPINION

Some opinions are not as efficacious as others; indeed some are countered by others which carry the day. There is a conflict among opinions, though this is not synonymous with a conflict among men, since those who are unified in social aim may have contradictory opinions on means and on many other issues. Sometimes the conflict seems to go on interminably; sometimes one opinion gives way to another. The opinion which carries the day we shall call public opinion. It has a two-fold character: it is public, in the sense that it is available to all members of the group, though it is not necessarily shared by all; and it is efficacious. Public opinion, therefore, is the opinion which gains acceptance in the group. It is the dominant opinion only in the sense that it is the opinion which carries the day in case of conflict, for it is not necessarily, and sometimes not in fact, the opinion shared by the majority of the people, nor is it always the majority opinion. There is such a thing as submitting to an opinion even when those who submit do not agree; as is often illustrated in small groups where the majority of the group may accede to suggestions vigorously advocated by only a minority of their number.

We do, however, often refer to public opinion as that opinion which should be heeded, meaning that we would like it to be the efficient opinion.

The behavior of groups shows that public opinion is not a mere metaphor but is a pervading force, often more efficient in securing results than are physical forces. It determines the attitude and the behavior of individuals functioning in group life, brings conformity out of confusion, and imparts purpose where previously there was none, focusing divergent opinions upon a posited accomplishment. This and that individual may have divergent views about the advisability of the group's resenting an affront and declaring war, but once a given opinion gains assent war is inevitable, or, as the case may be, peace is assured. Sometimes an opinion becomes a driving force before which other opinions bend. The opinion that the Holy Sepulchre had to be rescued from the infidels swept through medieval Europe and initiated the Crusades. "War fever" is well named, for opinions on war issues induce fever heat which spreads like contagion. There is some truth in John Adams' statement that "the Revolution was effected before the war commenced. The Revolution was in the minds and hearts of the people." And later, Freneau, "the poet of the Revolution," wrote:

"public opinion sets the bounds to every government, and is the real sovereign of every free one."

Civilization differs from savagery in the extensiveness of public opinion, the group in which it acts in savagery being small. In civilization the sphere of public opinion is constantly enlarging because of books, magazines, newspapers, telephone, telegraph, and radio. Larger groups than ever before are subject to the play of an idea and are susceptible to a given opinion.

Even before the invention of printing there was international opinion — if the peoples of medieval Europe can be called nations. When the dissemination of books made possible the spread of opinion in exact form to many lands a more vigorous international opinion developed. Today no nation can say that the opinion common to other nations does not concern it. All are influenced by prevalent opinions about the propriety of international dealings, and no one nation is able utterly to defy them.

The reaction of people to the opinions of others is doubtless due to the fact that opinion is identified with attitude, and so it resolves into a reaction to the attitudes of others. Opinion then is an index to future behavior or potential behavior and so a reaction to opinion is a reaction in advance to the policies of others. Therein lies its utility in group life and its contribution to social solidarity.

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CHAPTER XVIII

NATIONALISM

The State is the political group which claims the supreme political allegiance of its citizens. If its commands conflict with those of constituent state, county, or municipality, the individual if whole-heartedly a member of the State, that is, if psychologically and functionally a part of it, obeys State law and disregards the inconsistent commands of smaller political units. He who does not make this choice may be in the State but is not predominantly of it; he is physically present but is not psychologically and socially a member of it primarily. Examples of States are the United States, Germany, France, and other political units which we commonly speak of as the countries or nations of the world. They are not the same in composition or in character, for the characteristics and characters of nations vary as widely as do those of individuals. Some nationalities, however, are not States, though except for the possession of political sovereignty they may have the attributes of States. The Armenians and, before 1919, the Poles and the Jugo-Slavs were nationalities but not nations.

I. THE CHARACTERISTICS OF NATIONALITY

A highly developed nationality is characterized by the tenacity with which its parts hold together, and by the allegiance of constituent individuals. The tenacity of purpose to function as a nation is of pre-eminent importance. If there is adherence of parts and supreme allegiance from component individuals, the group is a nationality and psychologically a strong one, though it may be weak politically or in other ways. "A nation is a soul, a spiritual principle. Two things which are, in truth, at bottom only one, constitute this soul, this spiritual principle. One is in the past, the other in the present. The one is the possession in common of a rich legacy of memories; the other is actual consent, the desire to live together, the will to continue to make the best use of the indivisible heritage received. . . . A nation is a great solidarity, constituted by the sentiment of the sacrifices men have made

and of those they are willing to make in the future. It supposes a past; it is summed up in the present by a tangible fact: the consent, the desire clearly expressed to continue the common life."¹

In an efficient nationality there is organization and authority over component groups and constituent individuals. The United States is a nation to the extent that the states recognize national authority and the citizens yield obedience to the national government as paramount to state government when the two conflict. Its organization consists of its government, institutions, and laws. The strength of a nation is not always proportionate to the thoroughness or efficiency of its organization, for organization is not authority but the means by which authority is regulated. Even so, organization is almost indispensable to an efficiently functioning nationality, and certainly it is indispensable to a nation which must compete for rights and existence in a world of nations.

Homogeneity of political structure in the smaller constituent units of the nation doubtless strengthens nationalism. Those parts of the British Empire hold together most tenaciously which have practically the same political system. The similar forms of government in the various original colonies on the Atlantic coast of North America facilitated the formation of the Union, and similarity in state government is today a factor which gives solidarity to the nation.

Homogeneity of social structure performs a similar useful function in solidifying the nation. Whatever the economic issues involved, the social differences between North and South led to a different feeling in the two sections regarding slavery, and this social-ethical difference widened the breach. The slave-owners of the South came to realize that they could not continue a political union with a people who, as Becker says, "regarded them as unworthy of a decent man's respect." Consequently, "The Southern States seceded because the election of Lincoln demonstrated that Northern sentiment condemned slavery, and in condemning slavery it had placed a stigma upon the Southern people. To admit that slavery must not be extended was to admit that it ought not to exist. If the Southern people remained in the Union, they must either abolish slavery or be content with the position of a morally discredited minority whose social customs were temporarily tolerated for the sake of peace. They refused to do either. For the sake of slavery, and justifying their action on the ground that any state had a constitutional right to withdraw from the federal Union, they fought

¹ Renan, *Discours et Conférences*, pp. 306-307, Paris, 1890.

a desperate war for independence and the right of self-determination.”² The lack of homogeneity in social structure introduces many discordant notes, and frequently the national activities fall almost exclusively into the hands of one class.

A common religion, though not indispensable, assists nationality. The United States was the first great country in which there was no established religion. At the present time many of the most democratic countries, such as England, Belgium, Holland, and the Scandinavian countries, still maintain a national Church. Freedom of religion is permitted, but every individual directly or indirectly helps to support a national Church.

Since untrammelled interchange of ideas within a nation is to be desired, a common language is a great bulwark, but community of language is not indispensable to nationality. In Switzerland there are three official languages, but there is comparatively little friction among the language groups. In Great Britain the Welsh-speaking and the English-speaking peoples have lived for several centuries in a smoothly working nationality. Nevertheless the confusion of tongues in certain Balkan countries, and notably in the old Austro-Hungarian Empire, shows that multiplicity of languages is fertile soil for political confusion, and increases the difficulty of fusing peoples into a smoothly working political unit. The zeal in teaching English to foreigners in this country as part of the Americanization movement has the support of European precedent. By the use of a common tongue Germany was welding her diverse linguistic groups into a homogeneous whole, though the process was resisted by groups which resented the compulsion of acquiring and using what was, to them, a foreign tongue.

When a common language is reinforced by a common education the forces making for homogeneity are strengthened. It is reported that a French Minister of Education conversing with an Englishman, looked at his watch and remarked that at that moment the children all over France were studying a specific topic. A German Minister of Education might have made a similar statement regarding his country.³ Realizing the extent to which education in Germany had made possible the victory of 1870, the French introduced a national and a nationalistic system of instruction which has borne fruit in the uniformity of French nationalistic sentiment throughout the country. Whatever other motives may have been present in the movement, the agitation for a cabinet repre-

² Becker, *The United States*, p. 200, New York, 1920.

³ A similar statement has been attributed to a former German Minister of Education.

sentative of a national Bureau of Education was synchronous with the wave of nationalism which swept over the United States after 1917. Where nationalism is weak in the political unit, as in Canada, there is usually a lack of uniformity in the underlying educational methods and ideals. Indeed, in Canada the problem of education has been one of the main stumbling-blocks between the French-Catholic and the British Protestant populations of Ontario and Quebec. Educational lines have followed nationalistic sentiment, and educational policy has helped to shape it. After the drive for Americanization in this country, following our entry into the World War, laws — later declared unconstitutional — were passed in several states prohibiting the teaching of German in the schools, or specifying that only English might be taught. Education, language, and nationalism have been intimately related.

Another welding force in nationalism is a common tradition. Tradition and little else held together the precarious Holy Roman Empire. Tradition united the German peoples and formed the main inspiration in budding Greek and Italian nationalisms. It is perhaps the most effective cementing force in the British Empire. A common tradition draws us more closely to Canada and the other English-speaking countries than to any others. Prior to the Revolutionary War the English tradition was also the American tradition; indeed, so slight was the divergence between the two that English historians are justified in speaking of the conflict as a civil war. But the revolt succeeded and escaped the opprobrium of "rebellion."

A common literature is another cementing tie. It is in part because they read much the same books, particularly for the period of early literature, that the English-speaking peoples have much in common. A like statement is true for the German-speaking peoples of Europe, who have a common literature whether they live in Germany, Austria, Russia, Switzerland, Greece, or Turkey. Those who read a common literature have a bond of mutual interest.

Prevalence of the same customs is likewise a bond of nationality. Sharing of customs makes easier the sharing of ideas and ideals. Though in themselves trivial, they are an important medium for human contacts, facilitating the amenities of social life. The difference in customs and language between the higher and the lower classes, more marked in European countries than in North America, tends to maintain the gap between them. We seldom feel ourselves much removed from those who speak as we do, share our customs, read our literature, and have our educational background.

If the results of the surveys of physical type in various portions of the world were familiar to the student of social science, there would be no need to refer to the matter of race in connection with nationality. But race and nationality have been confused so long, and the tendency to confuse them is still so marked, that a word on this matter is necessary.

Race is not synonymous with nation and probably never has been. We in the United States, living in a country composed of peoples from all over the globe, should be well aware that nation is not equivalent to race. In Europe the divergences in physical type are not so marked, yet in no European country is there a homogeneous physical type. Indeed, in practically every European country there are the same physical types, though they occur with different frequency. The three general types are known as Mediterranean, Alpine, and Nordic. All of them exist in Germany, though varying in frequency in different sections of the country; one finds all of them in Austria, with similar local variations; all three are found in France and in England. Scandinavia is not without representatives of the Mediterranean type, and Sicily has Nordics. We think of Germany as predominantly Nordic, yet parts of France are more Nordic than parts of Germany, and parts of Germany are more Alpine than parts of France.

Race is independent of nationality. A given racial division may contain many different nationalities, and a nationality may contain many different races. Racial types overlap geographically to such an extent that one could not draw the lines of nationality to correspond to those of race. Nor, perhaps, would anything of value be achieved if this could be done. Nationality is a socio-political function; race is a physical trait. There is no more inherent connection between the two than between stature and nationality or between color of hair and nationality. Similarity in physical type does not connote similarity in social or political function.

Neither are natural geographical boundaries necessary to State or nation. The boundary between Canada and the United States, except for the Great Lakes and a part of the St. Lawrence River, is an artificial one marked by no natural features and to the eye indiscernible. It is no more natural than the boundary between Maryland and Pennsylvania, or that between North and South Dakota. Much more natural as a boundary is the Appalachian chain in the east and the Rocky mountains in the west, though neither these nor the Mississippi River are national boundaries. The demand for natural features as a national

boundary, such as the rivers Rhine and Danube, is not based on any inherent need, but is merely the expression of an ambition to extend territorial limits. Swiss nationality, broken up geographically into many diverse portions, is politically and in large part culturally a unified, though not a uniform, group.

Economic unity is much more important than geographical unity. Where there are interdependent economic activities, and where there is virtual economic self-sufficiency, nationality is more feasible. Hence most Canadians have distrusted reciprocity with the United States, suspecting that it would lead to separation from Great Britain and to political alliance with this country. Canadians defeated the reciprocity measure in 1911 not upon economic but upon nationalistic grounds, and at least showed the falsity of the position of those who find in economic motives the sole guides to social and political action.

One should distinguish between imperialistic phases of nationalism and those welding forces which draw the nation together. There are movements which are intent upon extending the national boundaries and perhaps upon carrying the nationalistic culture to other regions. The ambition of Germany to dominate the Continent, of Britain to dominate Europe, of France to control policies in the Little Entente, of America to dominate New World policies, are examples of imperialistic trends.

The solidifying of sentiment within the nation illustrates the working of another force which is important in nationalistic movements. In America it was illustrated in the Americanization programs which were rife during and after the World War and in the insistence upon one-hundred-per-cent Americanism, whatever meaning the phrase might have to those who used it. The Nationalist movements in Germany and in France had a similar ideal of bringing unity within the nation.

Heroes and symbols are important means of solidifying national sentiment. The symbol of Washington as the Father of his Country, the exploiting of the cherry-tree episode, and the attempt to suppress information which would detract from his personal character illustrate this tendency. Lincoln becomes a romantic figure who moves through the pages of history and literature in a halo of unreality. Flags, monuments, Memorial Day, Armistice Day, Columbus Day consolidate national sentiment.

Oppression has been a frequent stimulus to nationality and has created an atmosphere in which nationalistic sentiment thrives. Irish nationality was stimulated by British rule and misrule. The American

colonies would not have revolted except under oppression. Turkish oppression was the stimulus to the Greek movement for independence and has long prodded the Armenians into national self-consciousness.

2. THE RISE OF NATIONALISM

Nationality is a historical development. There were few nationalities in the ancient world compared with the number in the world today, and even in medieval times national lines were indistinct. Not only is the nation a comparatively recent product, but also the sentiments of nationality and patriotism in their present form are recent. Since nationality has come to play an important part in modern life and directly or indirectly influences many of our social relations, giving the orientation to numerous social strivings, we may review briefly the development of nationality in a few selected groups.

Even in ancient times there was nationalistic sentiment. One of the best instances is the Hebrews, whose development is pictured, explicitly and implicitly, in the books of the *Old Testament*. In the days of the Patriarchs, of Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob, the Hebrews were pastoral and nomadic, living in small wandering bands and having no nationalistic interests. The family was the self-sufficient economic unit.

The Exodus from Egypt was the making of the Hebrew nation. The people had a common plaint against Egyptian oppression and found a leader in Moses, who united them by inculcating a common religion and establishing a common priesthood with obligations to common laws. The next important step was entry into and possession of a common territory which became the seat of settled abode and fostered the sentiment of patriotism. With acceptance of a king in place of a prophet, and submission to a common authority in lieu of that condition in which there was "no king in Israel, but every man did that which was right in his own eyes," the nationalistic sentiment centered around a single personage. Contests with surrounding peoples further solidified the Hebrews, and the sense of nationality was again strengthened when a capital was established at Jerusalem, a city which became the focus of the religious as well as the political life of the tribes of Judah.

The Babylonian captivity wrought less havoc than some of the *Old Testament* writers would have us believe, for only a small portion of the Jews were carried off into captivity. The results of the captivity, however, were momentous for Jewish nationality. By the waters of Babylon the Jewish seers viewed their land from afar in new perspec-

tive. They reflected in another environment upon the characteristics of their countrymen, and evolved some novel conclusions. The prophets poured out invective upon the erring nation — invective interspersed with hope of national reconstruction and a picture of national grandeur. Oppression, as often happens, intensified the national zeal and welded the people into a more efficiently united nation.

The story of the ancient Greeks has many points in common with that of the Hebrews. In their semi-nomadism, in the age of heroes and demi-gods, there was little approach to nationality. The nationalistic sentiment came to the fore with life in the city-state and with the unification of the population in restricted territory dominated by an acropolis and surrounded, for defensive purposes, by a wall. Here the religious and the political life centered. Each Greek city-state was independent of every other, and in fact was usually at war with some of its linguistic kin. Not until a foe from Asia in the form of Persian hosts appeared upon the scene did the city-states unite, and even then the union was imperfect and temporary. Sparta was not averse to making alliance with Persia against Athens, just as in recent times one Germanic group allied itself with an Asiatic group against a neighboring Germanic group — when England welcomed alliance with Japan and Germany with Turkey. Nor were the people in Athens solidly aligned against the foreigner, for there were traitors at home as well as in the court of Persia. A fellow-Greek betrayed the secret path at Thermopylæ. So weak was nationality that in almost all military contests Greeks were in greater danger from foes within than from those without.

A sentiment of nationality comprising all the Greeks was growing stronger, but before it had fully developed Philip and Alexander had conquered the respective city-states.

In Rome nationality was stronger, since from the first the people were united. The Roman was proud of his place of birth and of his tribe or city-nation. When he went abroad he took with him his Roman attitude and his nationalistic sentiment. But inhabitants of outlying cities and provinces, which later were included in the Roman Empire, did not at first share the privileges given the man born in Rome. The Empire was not pervaded by a genuine sentiment of nationality, but was held together by external compulsions rather than by the free assent of the incorporated peoples. The conquest was one of force.

The rise of modern nations is of more interest and importance. Practically all of them have their roots in the distant past, though as politically unified nations they are recent products.

Most continuous in its development is English nationality. Welded of Celts, Danes, Angles, Saxons, upon a background of Roman conquest, a small nation took root in the southern part of Britain. Here Alfred united the peoples into a political unit which his successors expanded. The Norman Conquest brought new ideas and institutions, which amalgamated with those of the Saxons. From that time to the present there has been no break in national development. Nationalism was fostered by literature, law, political institutions, conquest abroad, and extension of borders in the British Isles and beyond the seas.

The ideals and institutions of feudalism were more persistent in France where the peoples amalgamated slowly. Finally France was united under a king whose authority was recognized throughout the land, but a common literature and common political institutions did not permeate France as they did England. A revolution turned the attention of French citizens to new problems and generated in all Frenchmen, except the privileged few, hopes of a new order embodied in a new national régime. The conquests of Napoleon stimulated patriotism and pride in country, and France became a united nation. From that day to this there has been a strong sentiment of French nationality.

The modern German political nation dates from 1870. It grew out of the conquest of France by the German States under the leadership of Prussia, a political unit of the German peoples which had been extending its political boundaries and strengthening its influence. To a large extent Germany owed her national existence to France, for it was because of the Napoleonic conquests of a half-century previous that in 1870 the German States united willingly against another Napoleon.

Early in the nineteenth century the Greeks revived the traditions of ancient Greece and struggled to throw off the yoke of Turkey. Thanks to the exploitation of the tradition that modern Greeks were physically and culturally the descendants of the ancient Greeks — a tradition with little foundation in fact — England regarded their efforts with favor and Greek nationality triumphed.

The World War stimulated nationalistic sentiments, some of which had long been smoldering. Poland was resuscitated, and the Jugoslavs became a nation. Ireland, long vigorous though fitful and chafing at the restraints of British rule, became a State within the Empire. Egypt achieved partial independence and nationalism there waxes strong. India is partially united against Great Britain though torn internally. Turkey shows new vigor and is now more truly a nation in

psychological attitude and in power than she has been for centuries. The aspirations of the Jews to see a Jewish nation again established in Palestine are at last partly realized, though the Armenians, in sentiment a nation, fail to secure the political independence which they have long craved. Nor has the nationalism inspired by the World War spared this country. In the United States there has been since 1917 a revival, or perhaps a creation, of nationalism unexampled in our history. At the close of the Revolution we were not a nation but a group of loosely federated colonies with little in common except a desire for freedom from Great Britain, and probably the majority of the people did not want that. The Civil War did not so much make us a nation as prevent our becoming two nations, and nationality received little impetus in subsequent decades. Not until the Spanish-American War did the severed portions of North and South and the little united portions of East and West and Middle West develop a sense of national unity. Nationalism was intensified by our participation in the World War, which called for coöperative service. Indeed, not until we saw the response to the demands made by the War was it clear that we were psychologically a nation, that is, a unified functioning group. "A common memory and a common ideal — these, more than a common blood — make a nation." ⁴

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CHAPTER XIX

INTERNATIONALISM

Since the State claims ultimate sovereignty over constituent individuals, if they consider their respective States as the only units to which they owe obligation they may be under a duty to fight against States other than their own, but they are never under an obligation to co-operate with them save insofar as their own State imposes this obligation. Nevertheless, if the respective States maintain social attitudes toward one another, then to that extent there is internationalism.

As a matter of fact, no State proceeds far in its development without discovering that some degree of international coöperation is imperative if it is to carry out its cherished projects. Another State can disconcert it at any moment if there is no recognition of common interests or common principles of action. These principles play a part similar to that played by common ideas within a group, and they ensure an international morality which is closely related to custom, out of which in many instances it has arisen.

The development of international law may place the individual in the dilemma of obeying national commands and disobeying international ones, or contrariwise. But a possible conflict of authority threatens if an individual belongs to two social groups. Allegiance to a political party may conflict with his obligations to a religious denomination, or the latter may conflict with the claims of the municipality.

I. THE GENESIS OF INTERNATIONALISM

Economic interests make amicable relations between nations desirable. Seldom does a nation have within its territory all the economic goods and activities which it wishes to utilize, and in order to profit from the presence of goods and activities within the borders of another nation it must cultivate amicable relations with it, at least so far as to ensure the interchange of commodities. Plato is not far wrong when he assigns the beginnings of internationalism to the need for establishing and maintaining trade relations between national groups. In tribal so-

society the desire for trade often is an effective force in establishing internationalism. Tribes which are hostile afford protection to enemy traders. In West Africa if a tribe interferes with traders passing through its territory all the tribes concerned make common cause against the offending tribe. On the Northwest Coast of North America tribes which are hostile meet seasonally at an appointed place where they trade amicably. In some instances tribes stop fighting until the trading between the two groups has been completed, whereupon they resume the conflict. The trade party which journeys afar through aboriginal Australia flaunts evidence of its mission and peaceful intention, and no tribe, however hostile ordinarily, interferes with it. Tribes which trust one another for no other enterprise show unbounded confidence in matters of trade.

Traders from one tribe journey to the territory of another, leave their goods, and depart. The men of the visited tribe appear on the scene and place their goods beside those of the visitors as a token of what they are willing to give in exchange. They then go away, so that the visitors may return and make their choice. Trade was one of the earliest and has remained one of the most persistent forces making for international coöperation. In the ancient world the Phœnician traders journeyed throughout the Mediterranean area without fear of attack from tribes or nations which were hostile to everyone else. At a later date the Aramæan trader traversed Asia Minor and penetrated distant regions of Mesopotamia without danger.

In the Greek city-states internationalism was well under way before they fell beneath the power of Philip and that of Alexander. An Achæan League and a Peloponnesian League united some of them, though mainly for defensive purposes. The most influential of the leagues was the Delphian amphictyony, a league of twelve Greek city-states which met twice a year, in spring and in autumn. This organization united certain city-states for religious purposes, and also made and enforced rules of international law. An equal number of votes in the assembly was given to each member State, irrespective of its size or power. It tended to establish, on the basis of a common Hellenism, a system of international law with courts to enforce it, and toward this end much was accomplished. Eventually, however, the amphictyony was disrupted by the greater power of rival States not members of it and by the hegemony of some one member State which, because of superior power, could override or overrule the amphictyony and so make of the league a tool for its own ends.

Internationalism had long existed in Europe, but not until the time of Louis XIV was there a definite attempt to federate the nations in a working plan. Sully, the minister of Louis XIV, proposed a scheme for international coöperation, but the proposal was never put into effect. In the year 1713 the Abbé St. Pierre published his *Project of a Plan for Securing Perpetual Peace*, which contains the following provisions:

“1. The Sovereigns are to contract a perpetual and irrevocable alliance, and to name plenipotentiaries to hold, in a determined spirit, a permanent diet or congress, in which all differences between the contracting parties are to be settled by arbitration or judicial decision.

“2. The number of the Sovereigns sending plenipotentiaries to the congress is to be specified, together with those who are to be invited to accede to the treaty. The presidency of the congress is to be exercised by the Sovereigns in turn at stated intervals, the order of rotation and term of office being carefully defined. In like manner the quota to be contributed by each to the common fund, and its method of collection, are to be carefully defined.

“3. The Confederation thus formed is to guarantee to each of its members the sovereignty of the territories it actually possesses, as well as the succession, whether hereditary or elective, according to the fundamental laws of each country. To avoid disputes, actual possession and the latest treaties are to be taken as the basis of the mutual rights of the contracting Powers, while all future disputes are to be settled by arbitration of the Diet.

“4. The Congress is to define the cases which would involve offending States being put under the ban of Europe.

“5. The Powers are to agree to arm and take the offensive in common and at the common expense, against any State thus banned, until it shall have submitted to the common will.

“6. The plenipotentiaries in congress, on instructions from their Sovereigns, shall have power to make such rules as they shall judge important with a view to securing for the European Republic and each of its members all possible advantages.”

St. Pierre's scheme received the partial endorsement of Rousseau, who in a penetrating essay pointed out that already the nations of Europe, with the exception of Turkey, were in active coöperation, and that the only measure needed to make the plan an effective organization was a body of representatives from the respective nations. Later in the century Kant, probably inspired by Rousseau, proposed a plan for a federation of the nations of Europe, which, in practical suggestions,

reasoning, and plausibility has the ring of modernity. But the end of the eighteenth century witnessed also an intensification of nationalism which persisted for more than a century, and there was correspondingly little interest in internationalism. Nationalism was carried to its logical, or illogical, limit before men once more turned serious attention to internationalism.

2. THE DEVELOPMENT OF INTERNATIONALISM

Yet internationalism has never been completely in abeyance. It has been waxing strong for several centuries, though the rising forces of nationalism have received more attention. If the following account of some of the forces making for internationalism is of the briefest, this is not because these forces are of slight importance.

International law developed among Greeks and Romans, particularly under the influence of Stoic thought, and Græco-Roman international law was the foundation of that which took root in Western Europe. Not until the time of Grotius, however, in the seventeenth century (1625), was there an attempt to embody the principles of international law in a comprehensive treatise, expounding not merely the practices but their rational foundation as well; and the treatise of Grotius had much influence in shaping the subsequent course of international law.

From early times, also, and particularly throughout the Middle Ages, the Roman Church was a potent international influence. It was the only organization which could claim authority in every Christian land, and the only one intent upon establishing common principles of individual and State action.

A common language fosters internationalism. It facilitated the unification of the Greek city-states, and Latin performed a similar function in Europe in medieval times. So later did French, which is still the language of diplomacy. A large proportion of those interested in the development of an international language such as Esperanto are interested also in encouraging harmonious international relations.

Since Roman times the higher learning and the scholastic or academic tradition have been cementing ties between nations. This influence is still strong, perhaps as strong as it was in the Middle Ages. Closely allied with this tradition is the practice which grew up in the last century, and has become firmly established in the present one, of international congresses or associations of scholars. An international con-

gress of mathematicians, for example, brings contacts between scholars of various countries who discover that they have more in common than an interest in mathematics. The amities do not evaporate with the meetings but are carried over into the daily lives of the men at home. The international interchange of teachers which started early in the present century achieves similar results. To help people of other countries to understand the British point of view Cecil Rhodes founded at Oxford scholarships which would permit students from the English-speaking countries and from Germany to mingle with British students. The Guggenheim Fund established in 1925 to provide scholarships for Americans aspiring to study in foreign institutions will contribute to international understanding. Plans for an international interchange of students have a similar object.

The trade which proved so effective as a bond between nations in tribal society and in the ancient civilizations has its counterpart in the international commerce of today. That it tends to strengthen international relations, as well as often to stimulate international rivalry, there can be no doubt. Through commerce there has grown up between the various nations concerned a complex system of credits and debits involving a financial interdependence which reflects the industrial interdependence. Out of it have come numerous international expositions, such as the London Exposition of 1882 (the first of the notable ones), the Paris Exposition of 1900, and such expositions in this country as those at Chicago, Seattle, St. Louis, Portland, San Francisco, and Philadelphia. In these expositions the various nations participate. Labor, too, has developed international coöperation, principally through congresses and councils which unite the workers of the various countries. The *Internationale* is the outstanding example of the attempt by Socialists to break down national boundaries. Thus socialism tends to become international in character, though this element is not inherent in the socialist program. The Socialist parties have, nevertheless, been more closely united internationally than have any others.

The movements above referred to have seldom been political in the more restricted sense of the term, that is, have not emanated from constituted governments in their official capacities. In the closing years of the last century, however, governments began to adopt political expedients looking toward a more efficient internationalism, and in the present century great impetus has been given governmental participation.

Treaties have long been a device for defining the relations between

contracting powers, especially for securing certain privileges and rights. In recent years peace treaties, economic treaties, and treaties for various other purposes, have been negotiated, which settle many problems not referred to in earlier treaties.

A new departure in international relations is typified by the Hague Tribunal, which grew out of an international conference called by the Czar of Russia in 1899 to establish new rules for warfare between nations and to stabilize peace. In the past quarter-century it has been instrumental in preventing some impending wars and in settling peacefully numerous disputes between nations which, if left unsettled, would rankle if they did not eventuate in armed conflict.

The League of Nations, established after the World War, and created by the Treaty of Versailles, is the most powerful body for international control which the world has seen. It is technically a league of governments, but its proponents hope that eventually it will become a league of peoples working impartially for international justice and world peace. Among the many important bodies which the League of Nations has brought into existence is the World Court, its jurisdiction covering controversies involving international relations.

3. THE BASIS OF INTERNATIONALISM

Internationalism has a rational basis, having grown in response to needs inherent in national life. Nations need internationalism as much as individuals need society. The movement making for closer bonds between nations, which has been in progress throughout the last two thousand years, was inevitable; and that it has come to no satisfactory culmination shows not so much its inherent weakness as the strength of the forces which it must counter.

The reality of internationalism in the world of today, and the need for a proper cultivation of it, are grounded in the interdependence of nations: "The Englishman eats the oranges grown by Spaniards, the Frenchman drinks coffee from Brazil or Java; but neither thinks of the foreign peoples whose labor has produced the food he uses, for the commodities of the world are more truly international than are the minds of men. Our clothing, our food and our houses, our railways and our telephones are all international, because the material necessary for making them is contributed by men speaking many different languages and living under many different forms of government; and the internationalism of modern life is not merely material, for the structure of

our telephones and even the cut of our clothes is partly due to ideas which have come from abroad. Our medicine and our surgery are the results of an interchange of ideas between many nations and no art is so national as to be untouched by foreign influence. The religious, political, and social habits we have acquired are due in part to the influence of foreigners; and indeed there is no section of life which is isolated from the action of international exchange."¹

This was written by an Englishman, but the accuracy of the statement would not be impaired if it were made by a citizen of any other country of Western civilization, whether in the Old World or the New. "In the glories of our common civilization, each nation has its own particular share." But, "how marked the debt of all to each. How disastrous would have been the gap if European history had missed the cosmopolitan radiation of ideas from France; or the poetry, art, science of Italy; or the science, philosophy, music of Germany; or the grave heroic types, the humor, the literary force of Spain; the creation of grand worlds in thought, wisdom, knowledge, — the poetic beauty, civil life, humane pity, — immortally associated with the past of England in the western world's illuminated scroll. It is not one tributary, but the coöperation of all, that has fed the waters and guided the currents of the main stream. . . . No nation nor nationality counts alone or paramount among the forces that have shaped the world's elect, and shared in diffusing central light and warmth among the children of mankind."²

All of the Western nations are under obligation to a common tradition. No one of them has a background of civilization or of culture, scientific, literary, or political, which does not go back to a common source. Not only so, but the outstanding accomplishments of one nation are soon known to and copied by the others, for they make common appeal. This is evident in the case of military and naval devices, and is true also of political, social, and literary ideals, while the field of science is almost unreservedly international. It was the observations of a Dane, Tycho Brahé, which made possible the formulation of the German Kepler's laws, and these in turn constituted a necessary step in the demonstration of Newton's law of gravitation.

Our methods of keeping time illustrate the extent to which various cultures have made contributions toward a given feature of our civilization. The duodecimal system used on our watches and clocks comes

¹ Burns, *International Politics*, pp. 1-2, London, 1920.

² Morley, *Politics and History*, pp. 119-121, London, 1914.

from Babylonia, as does also the hour-glass. The custom of beginning the day with midnight we have taken from the Egyptians, as also our solar calendar with its division into twelve months. The Romans likewise made contributions to chronology which we have inherited. Our sundial comes from Greece.

The first weight-driven clock was probably the invention of an Englishman, Peter Lightfoot, who installed this instrument in Glastonbury Abbey in 1336. A German, Peter Henlein, of Nuremburg, invented the coiled spring which took the place of weights in driving the machinery. Thomas Tompion, an Englishman, perfected the hairspring, which greatly improved the accuracy of the watch. Jewels, adding further to the accuracy of the timepiece, were the invention of a Swiss, Facio. An Englishman invented the balance-wheel, and another Englishman, Mudge, invented the lever escapement. It remained for a Frenchman, Adrian Phillippe, in 1843, to invent the stem wind and the stem set. Thus our watch is "a highly pedigreed object which has a mixture of the finest English, French, German, Swiss, and American genius coursing through its spring and gears." And similarly with regard to the automobile, the steam engine, the *aéroplane*, or any other device which has been highly perfected.

In Western civilization a common literary tradition goes back to the works of Homer, Virgil, and other classical writers, which are cultivated as much in Western European lands and in the New World as in the areas about the Mediterranean in which the literature originated. The religion of the Hebrews speaks through the pages of the Old Testament, the book most widely read by Christian nations — except, perhaps, that Greek-Hebrew book, the New Testament. The work of Dante is read by non-Italians almost as much as by Italians, and Shakespeare has long been more popular among German-speaking than among English-speaking peoples. The writings of Leibnitz, Descartes, Hobbes, and others are read by cultured people irrespective of nationality. Bacon is inspiration to all nations, and all of them recognize obligations to Newton, Laplace, Darwin, Burbank, Edison, Einstein.

"The true student is a citizen of the world, the allegiance of whose soul, at any rate, is too precious to be restricted to a single country. The great minds, the great works transcend all limitations of time, of language, and of race, and the scholar can never feel initiated into the company of the elect until he can approach all of life's problems from the cosmopolitan standpoint. I care not in what subject he may work, the full knowledge cannot be reached without drawing on supplies from

lands other than his own — French, English, German, American, Japanese, Russian, Italian — there must be no discrimination by the loyal student, who should willingly draw from any and every source with an open mind and a stern resolve to render unto all their dues. I care not on what stream of knowledge he may embark, follow up its course, and the rivulets that feed it flow from many lands. If the work is to be effective, he must keep in touch with scholars in other countries.”³

There is need for a consciousness of our common historical background. If histories were written to show primarily the common obligations of the nations, rather than designed, as they always have been, to show the peculiar obligations of the citizen to the country in which he happens to live, there would be a more vital recognition of our common heritage and of our indebtedness to a past which is shared by all civilized peoples. The common obligations of France, England, and Germany are much greater than the obligations to their respective national backgrounds. The civilization which they have in common is more important than the differences between them. Indeed, the currents of civilization have been international to such an extent that frequently it is impossible to say what is distinctly English, French, or German. England would not have become what it is save for infiltrations of ideas and devices from the Continent; neither could Continental nations have developed as they have without the numerous fructifying influences which have emanated from Britain and the New World.

“We may have our local difficulties and our local solutions, but our civilization is genuinely one, whether we live in London, Berlin, Paris, or New York. The conception we have of civilized life is almost the same, and we are certainly moved by the same inheritance. Even if our fathers were different, our teachers were the same. The thought of all European countries, even since the development of different national literatures, has travelled in the same channel. The distinction of languages, indeed, has never obliterated the identity of political terms or even the names for ideals. Thus it is well to regard the larger political issues as ‘international.’”⁴

³ Sir William Osler, *Aequanimitas*, p. 420, 2d ed., Philadelphia, 1925.

⁴ C. Delisle Burns, *Political Ideals: Their Nature and Development*, p. 26, Oxford, 1915.

4. THE NEED FOR INTERNATIONALISM

These interdependences point not merely toward the past but even more commandingly toward the future. If any lesson is to be learned from history, and if any inference is to be drawn from an observation of the trend of contemporary events, it is this: that in the world of tomorrow a common fate awaits the nations. Even now, "our daily life is a trip around the world, yet the wonder of it gives us not a single thrill. It is so familiar, we are not even contemptuous; we are oblivious." We are participants, whether we would or not, in the life of the world. The interests of all nations are ours also. We are partners with them and the things which affect mankind are of necessity our affair. We are dependent upon neighboring nations, and they upon us. Our fates are so interwoven that what is the concern of one is the concern of all, and what affects one eventually affects all. The earlier disparate world of nations has become an interdependent world of closely related nations, the political boundaries of which are in some cases the only significant ones. Internationalism calls for an intelligent appreciation of the nature of the actual world in which we live, and to it we must accommodate our social and political philosophy. Our sphere of interests is no longer a hemisphere but the world of civilized nations, and we can no longer disregard their interdependence.

"The average man no more thinks of the source of his coffee or his medicine or his shirt than he thinks of his digestion — until it goes wrong. When the oranges and the coffee cease to come or when fares on the railways go up because boiler-tubes no longer are produced abroad, then the average man shows an interest in international affairs; but the character of his interest is like that of his interest in digestion. He feels aggrieved. He is offended that the medicine does not work: and he is easily led to the suspicion and hatred of what he cannot understand. Therefore the most common attitude towards international affairs is apathy when the machine works and a sort of political dyspepsia when it does not. The superior person meantime, despising the average man, is often more hopelessly savage, since his passions, being based upon arguments, survive even an acquaintance with the facts. The superior person has a theory about foreigners; either they are deluding us into buying their coffee or their boiler-tubes for their own interest or they are undermining our character by strewing our path with their orange peel. There is, indeed, another type of superior person who regards the foreigner with a benign condescension: but both

types agree in thinking of international affairs as a conflict of interests, while the average man does not think of them at all. The facts of international interchange, however, are of increasing importance to the average man; and the chief elements in the present international situation are so recent in origin that our inherited ideas are inadequate to describe the complexity of modern life. An analysis of the facts, therefore, is necessary. The first requisite for a knowledge of these facts is the attainment of a point of view from which they can be seen. It is only by moving out from his cave that the savage can distinguish a beast from a boulder; and when he has come out of his cave, he will find it convenient not to lie behind one rock all the time nor climb only one tree. But — what happens at meetings of the representatives of different nations? Each sits behind his own rock or each ascends his own tree and argues violently from his own point of view. The representative of France argues for the Rhine frontier, the representative of the United States argues for the Monroe Doctrine, the representative of Great Britain for freedom to blockade: and the result is either confusion or an agreement which covers with meaningless words irreconcilable opposites. . . . At a Congress of diplomatists or at a Peace Conference, each representative looks at a separate interest and the international point of view is commonly regarded as either unpatriotic or out of place. The chief problems of international politics, therefore, arise from an absence of the international mind in the conduct of practical life: and it is not likely that we shall solve any of those problems until we can think habitually of international affairs as we do, in our different towns or counties, of the common interests of the whole nation. The defect is universal. There is no country or people which is now able to take a world-view and consequently no representatives, even if they wished, would dare to take action based upon anything but a more or less enlightened selfishness.”⁵

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CHAPTER XX

WAR

I. WARFARE IN SAVAGERY

Warfare had its inception in the dim vistas of an unrecorded past. Its beginnings may be as remote as those of social, religious, political, or even human life, but there is little evidence to indicate to what extent prehistoric man indulged in warfare. That it was not a predominating interest of Late Paleolithic man may be inferred from the Magdalenian cave paintings, which frequently picture the cave-man in pursuit of game but never as a hunter of men. Among some, but not all, primitive peoples interest in warfare finds expression in decorative art and in story. Warfare is generally absent among savages of a low stage of culture. As instances may be mentioned the Australians (though some warfare is found among them), the Tasmanians, the Veddás, the Todas. In the islands of the South Seas advance in culture is correlated with prevalence of warfare. In Melanesia warfare is not so prevalent as in the more highly developed cultures of Polynesia. In the highly evolved culture of the Maori, the aborigines of New Zealand, warfare had reached a higher stage of perfection and was more frequent than in any other area of that part of the world. Warfare characterizes the Malayan area, at least the regions of comparatively highly evolved cultures. The prevalence of warfare in Dahomey, Ashantee, and South Africa indicates a correlation with the development of culture. In Africa, with few exceptions, the warlike tribes are progressive, the peaceful tribes are backward. In North America warfare was widespread, and to say that the most advanced tribes were warlike means little for so perhaps were as large a proportion of the less advanced. Among Eastern tribes the Northern Iroquois were the most warlike and the most advanced. In the Plains area, on the other hand, the warring Sioux and the Apaches did not possess as high a culture as that of the near-by Pueblo tribes, little intent upon warfare and enjoying among their neighbors a poor reputation as fighters. Warfare dominated the highly evolved cultures of Central and South America, the Aztec, Maya, Inca, as it did the Sioux, the Iroquois, and the Apaches. On the Northwest Coast, an area

of highly developed culture, warfare played an important rôle. Among the Eskimos it was rare and purely defensive, and was little developed even for defense.

But this does not tell the whole story, nor, perhaps, the significant part of it. There are specific causes of war, the principal ones among primitive peoples being migration, plunder, economic clashes, jealousy or rivalry, and inherited antipathies. These seldom operate singly, though often one of them seems predominant. As people wander from place to place they are likely to trespass upon the territory of neighbors. Familiar instances are the Plains tribes of North America whose boundaries are ill-defined, neighborhood meaning not neighborliness but occasion for strife; yet tribes speaking the same language and having a common culture — for example, the Dakotas — were not inclined to fight among themselves. In the Southwest area the nomadic tribes living near the settled and agricultural Pueblo peoples frequently attacked their more prosperous neighbors. When the economic interests of tribes conflict disputes occasion war, as was commonly the case among the Maori. Most frequent among the causes of war among primitive peoples, perhaps, are mutual jealousy and rivalry. These motives are prevalent among practically all of the Plains tribes and among the Algonkin tribes of the Northeast. To inherited antipathies one of the most common and persistent causes of war can be traced — the warfare between the Algonkin and the Iroquois, the Dakota and the Cree. Persistent antipathies were common causes of war in New Zealand. Antipathy has been responsible for many wars, European and non-European, though war, of course, often is a cause of the antipathy which in turn fomented war.

In savagery warfare is highly correlated with chieftainship and kingship. In Tasmania and Australia and among the Veddas, Adamanese, and Todas chieftainship is feebly developed, and there is little war. In Malaysia, where chieftainship is highly developed, warfare is prevalent, and the same is true of Polynesia. In Africa the tribes ruled by powerful chieftains are the areas of armies and warlike expeditions.

Warfare is found in all stages of culture, but is most characteristic of tribes in which there is political organization and a hierarchy of authority. War unites factions and solidifies the group, making definite authority a necessity. Conversely, where chieftainship is well developed and the various social units are integrated into a group solidarity, the way to warfare is paved. The selfish interests of the ruler or of a ruling class can control the social machine. The feeling of power which en-

sues from organization releases the pent-up energy of the group. Especially is this the case when a similar condition in an adjoining tribe stimulates rivalry. With advance in culture, conflicts between tribal groups become more common. Industrial evolution involves an extension of the field of effort, and as geographical horizons enlarge they overlap. The overlapping occasions a struggle for advantages which, so the peoples involved believe, can not be shared by both groups.

2. WAR IN CIVILIZATION

Civilization has not surrendered the principle of irresponsible nationality, conflicts have not disappeared and the old method of settling them has not been abolished. If a powerful nation resorts to warfare it can force war upon another, however much the other nation may dislike it. If nations adequately perceived war as a common danger they would provide adequate means of defense against it. Until the present, though enmity is the arch-enemy against which defense is most needed, they have fought enemies rather than the enmity which creates enemies. Civilization now possesses the means for ending war. Whether it will use them is a matter pertaining to prophecy; yet in its ability to end war it possesses a new social power, the utilization of which would mark an epoch in social evolution. Perhaps a time will come when future historians will refer to our time as, "In the days when wars were fought." Eventually men may employ their intelligence to improve national and social welfare.

3. THE INFLUENCE OF WAR UPON CULTURE

Some wars considerably affect social life and some have little influence upon it. Among primitive peoples war seldom leaves evidence of fundamental changes. It may elicit tribal dances or religious ceremonies prior to the leave-taking of the warriors or after their return victorious. New songs may be composed for the occasion, but these are ephemeral; they pass and the social life moves again in the old grooves. In some instances however war is interwoven into practically all phases of culture. "War was one of the most important elements in the life of the Winnebago. The life of the warrior was the ideal toward which all men strove; it not only satisfied certain emotional needs, but it was so inextricably interwoven with social standing in the community and with individual prestige that Winnebago life is unthinkable

without it. It is not surprising, then, that the prayer for success on the warpath was the most important prayer that men offered up to the spirits and that it was reëchoed in almost all the ceremonies.”¹ A similar statement is applicable to most tribes in the Plains area. The Dakotas, for example, regard the dream of the leader of the war party as the cause of its organization, but the dream is more effect than cause — the result of a deep-lying and almost unintermittent will to fight. In many respects warfare affects the culture of the Dakotas: it is accountable for much of their ceremonial organization; it determines social rank; it furnishes a fund of anecdotes for entertainment. Practically all of their stories, save those which relate animal adventures, tell of a contest with the enemy. That, perhaps, is transforming power, for it involves an orientation of Dakota psychology. Such influences, however, are hypnotic rather than intellectually stimulating, a blinding to all else rather than an opening of the eyes to new visions. In savagery war seldom means more than this.

In civilization, on the other hand, though some wars have left social life unchanged, some have given new trend to social development or greatly stimulated forces already at work. Examples are the early campaigns waged by the Egyptians, as a result of which they came into contact with the civilizations about them and brought home many new things and ideas. Of the welding as well as the transforming power of war, Judaism is a good example. Prospects of dispossessing another people and of possessing that people's heritage inspired the Hebrews with religious, social, political, and military zeal. In their defeat, during the Babylonian captivity, they learned inspiring lessons, and returned to their land saddened but with a patriotic aspiration more profound than that of those who had remained at home. This period was the beginning of Judah's long attempt at a politico-religious reconstruction — an attempt which lasted until Roman days and is echoed in Zionism.

Whether Greece profited because of wars, or in spite of them, may be difficult to say, but certainly the period of war activity was followed by the greatest era of intellectual and artistic creation. The Periclean Age followed the most violent conflict, the most desperate and long-drawn-out contest which Athens had undergone. Rome was an isolated community until war brought her into contact with surrounding peoples. When she invaded distant lands she brought back culture as well as captives, wisdom as well as wealth. Civilization filtered into the Eternal

¹ Radin, *The Winnebago*, 37th Annual Report of the American Bureau of Ethnology, p. 156, Washington, 1923.

City through the arteries of trade created by new conquests; along every road of conquest traversed by a conquering army some culture contribution traveled back to Rome. She became cosmopolitan; and when most cosmopolitan, in the Augustan Age, an age of peace, left the richest heritage of her long history.

In the period between Roman days and the twentieth century the Crusades stand out as of predominant importance, for they brought Europeans into contact with a civilization at many points richer than their own. One of the results of the Crusades, or at least a sequence, was revival in poetry, religious zeal, science, art, commerce, growth of towns, breaking down of feudalism, reconstruction of an Old World and discovery of a New. The Crusades stimulated movements which were rousing Europe to new life.

4. THE INFLUENCE OF THE WORLD WAR UPON WESTERN CULTURE

No war since the Crusades has been so pregnant with momentous and far-reaching results as the World War of 1914-1918.² The wars of savage tribes touch only the fringe of their life; the preceding wars of Europe affected the populace only remotely. The World War differed from others in the immense numbers involved in the conflict and, perhaps to an even greater extent, in the subtle and intricate ways in which it affected whole populations. Previous wars had been contests between armies; this was a contest between nations, and like a huge hydra-headed monster it passed over the earth, blighting or scotching practically every civilized nation of the globe. Every individual was involved, for each could contribute toward the prosecution of the war. There developed a feeling of national responsibility and solidarity previously unknown. In proportion as men were nationalistic and patriotic, so much greater was the calamity.

The World War was the outcome of conditions inherent in the

² That Thucydides regarded the Peloponnesian War in much the same manner as contemporaries regarded the recent World War is indicated in the opening paragraph of his history: "Thucydides, an Athenian, wrote the history of the war in which the Peloponnesians and the Athenians fought against one another. He began to write when they first took up arms, believing that it would be great and memorable above any previous war. For he argued that both states were then at the full height of their military power, and he saw the rest of the Hellenes either siding or intending to side with one or other of them. No movement ever stirred Hellas more deeply than this; it was shared by many of the Barbarians, and might be said even to affect the world at large. The character of the events which preceded, whether immediately or in more remote antiquity, owing to the lapse of time cannot be made out with certainty. But, judging from the evidence which I am able to trust after most careful inquiry, I should imagine that former ages were not great either in their wars or in anything else." Jowett's Translation. Oxford, 1889.

nationalisms of Western civilization, and was the price the nations paid for their follies.

All the nations were responsible for countenancing conditions which led to the World War, whichever one may have precipitated the conflict. As Israel Zangwill said during the war, "It is with the consent and connivance of us men that millions of educated Europeans are at this moment burrowing underground, side by side with Asiatics and Africans, in some instances recent converts from cannibalism, and that the era which prated of the Superman has produced the Super-rabbit."³

The war tested the strength of all phases of national life. It brought potentialities to a focus and entailed a re-direction of the resources of the nations. Lives were offered by the million and money by the billion. The total cost of the war in money has been estimated at one hundred and seventy-six billion dollars, but this does not cover the destruction of goods which can be replaced only by the efforts of generations of workers. For the luxury of the World War we paid dearly, and shall long continue to pay. The distraction caused by the war was not the least of its evils. Independent intellectual work was impossible, for the attention of men was centered upon the war.

Following the war came important political changes in many of the countries which had been involved. In Russia an autocratic régime gave place to a democratic one, and this, in turn, to Bolshevik rule. In Germany despotism was replaced by a republic. But this is only the beginning of the story.

Social changes, also, followed in the wake of the war, as is illustrated in the new political status given to women in Russia, Germany, Denmark, Turkey, the United States, England, and Canada, with active suffrage campaigns in France and Belgium. Already women sit in the national legislative bodies, notably in England and in the United States, and in 1924 two states (Wyoming and Texas) elected women as governors. In 1914 men could not have imagined that this extension of the franchise would come in a decade. The close of the war left women better off also in the economic and industrial order and in possession of more legal privileges.

War places a new estimate upon personal qualities, developing a type molded to military influences and reacting to them in invariant manner. Obedience to arbitrary commands is a necessity in time of war, but none the less it has an untoward influence upon character. In the army acquiescence is the way of happiness, protest the way of woe.

³ Zangwill, *The War for the World*, p. 33, New York, 1917.

The code of the "good" soldier is the autocratic order of his commanding officer. Army discipline, consequently, tends to develop a type. "The highest in the scale sink, the lowest rise."⁴ The coöperation of large masses of men involves a check upon individual initiative, a nullification of personal freedom. The creases of individuality are smoothed out, and the result is not altogether happy:

. . . Obedience,
Bane of all genius, virtue, freedom, truth,
Makes slaves of men, and of the human frame
A mechanized automaton.

War calls for concentration of energies, and with this goes an appeal to the emotions. We speak of cold-blooded war, but there is no such thing. War is fought with heated blood, bated breath, and tense emotions. If the emotions do not come spontaneously, it is necessary to "work them up," to engender them by the use of "propaganda."

Wars involving national crises affect religious life. Religion when functioning socially is intimately bound up with social life, so that what vitally affects the one affects the other. The World War was an immediate stimulus to religious zeal, a development in accord with the psychology of certain types of religion. "Some of the causes which have recently roused herd emotion in Europe are just the causes on which religious emotion is often said to be based. Man has been made to feel the presence of terrific forces over which he has no control. He has been taught crudely and violently, his dependence on the unknown."⁵ In time of war the Deity is conceived as having human traits which reflect the national characteristics. "The ministers and priests of each power pray to the same God for help against each other, and earmark the Almighty as infallibly on their side."⁶ The Germans, among whom the principle of nationality was pronounced, carried the identification of religious and national aims to a high pitch. This happened not only among the "Junkers," the ignorant, and the irresponsible, but also among the poets, prose writers, politicians, theologians, and university professors. God became a German God and the purposes of the German nation were identified, or confused, with His purposes. The tendency to nationalize religion was not restricted to Germany, but was present in all the countries at war. "Rasputin maintained that Christ was a Russian and a member of the Greek Church, and Dostoievsky's doc-

⁴ Locke, *The Rough Road*, p. 158, London, 1917.

⁵ Murray, *Faith, War, and Policy*, p. 60, Boston, 1917.

⁶ Zangwill, *op. cit.*, p. 125.

trine of 'the Russian God' is not essentially different."⁷ In all countries there was increased interest in religious problems, and a re-evaluation of religion and its claims.

But like many another calamity, the World War was not devoid of good results along with the evil ones. It gave us a renewed sense of the interdependence of nations and a realization of the dangers inherent in a world of anarchistic nationalisms. The interest in responsibility for the war may eventually bear fruit, for it may bring home to us the fact that all the nations were responsible for the international anarchy which made war possible.

And perhaps "war will ultimately be abolished, not because it is an atrocious crime, but because it is an intolerable nuisance."⁸ Once men see the absurdity of it and of many of its heroes, and can laugh at its silliness rather than sing pæans to nationalism, it will pass into the discard along with duelling and other obsolete practices.

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PART V

PHASES AND PROBLEMS OF MODERN
SOCIETY

INTRODUCTORY

The social sciences are interdependent. Since all of them study phases of social life and group activities, no one of them functions in a field apart to itself. The methods and knowledge pertaining to these special fields have developed almost simultaneously and in close touch with one another. Political theory has helped to shape social theory, which in turn has reacted on political theory. History gives a new basis for social, political, and economic theory, and sociology, politics, and economics assist history. If we follow the development of the social sciences century by century, or even decade by decade, we find that when one lags the others lag, when one advances the others advance, though perhaps not simultaneously or to the same extent; but in the long run no social science is uninfluenced by the others.

A thorough mastery of the various phases of social life involves a mastery of several specialized fields, and each of the social sciences contributes something toward that goal. But a knowledge of the several social sciences does not constitute social diagnosis, more than a knowledge of chemistry, anatomy, and other supplementary fields constitutes medicine. The physician must bring to bear on his problems the knowledge acquired through these various disciplines, and only when he does this is he competent. A similar statement applies to the sociologist. His task involves an understanding of the contributions and methods of the respective social sciences. He must reconcile their various claims when they conflict and must weigh them when he investigates a given problem. When he analyzes a social situation he must utilize the various items of specialized knowledge which they contribute.

It is true that "the science of any subject is not at its center but at its periphery, where it impinges upon all other sciences"; and it is true also that "the living organism of human society as a subject of inquiry has been torn apart and parcelled out among specialists."

We must view society from the different angles used in the approaches of the respective social sciences, though eventually we must see it as a unity, for society is a living, functioning whole and not merely a political, economic, or psychological activity.

Although in a detailed account of the phases and problems of modern society no two sociologists would be in complete accord, all would agree that considerable importance attaches to the family, to religion, and to education. Most would include the press; all would include industrial organization, poverty, and mental deficiency. The problems of delinquency are among the most troublesome, while those arising from racial antagonisms and from pressure of population threaten the social structure on a large scale. In the United States the problem of immigration is not so insistent now as formerly, but it is still important.

Contemporary problems have grown out of previous ones; present conditions are mainly those of the past projected into the twentieth century. Yet new problems arise from time to time, due to the appearance of new social, political, economic, educational, and scientific forces. Contemporary problems arise also as a result of the social theory inherited by this century from its predecessors. Theory and speculation, ethics and moral standards, create problems no less than do conditions inherent in the industrial and political order.

The following chapters will review the conditions mainly responsible for our social problems and some of the remedies suggested for existing ills.

CHAPTER XXI

THE FAMILY¹

The institution of the family is found throughout savagery and is well established in all of the historical civilizations. In Orient and Occident new social movements affect it. In China the integrity which the family has enjoyed for millennia is threatened in a manner disturbing to those who have the welfare of that country at heart. Japan, likewise, is experiencing the pains of adjustment to new conditions which threaten to disrupt the family.

In ancient Rome the family suffered when new ideals were adopted and new duties were imposed upon citizens. The effect upon that institution is seen in the mitigation of the arbitrary power of the father, the *patria potestas* which he had enjoyed from earlier days, in the waywardness of children, in the more elastic morals of women, and in the prevalence of divorce from the time of the first Cæsars to that of Diocletian.

I. SOCIAL CHANGES AFFECTING THE FAMILY

The failure of family life to adjust itself to the changing needs and standards of the present day is the cause of many social problems. That family life, at least in the old sense, is disintegrating, is shown by statistics of divorce, juvenile delinquency, desertion, and failure to support. The disintegration may be due primarily, not to a weakening of family bonds, but to the fact that the problems with which the family must cope become increasingly difficult; but whatever the cause of the situation certainly there is less stability in family life than formerly. Many phases of family maladjustment we but partially understand and many we are only now beginning to investigate. Undoubtedly an intimate knowledge of the conditions of family life is more urgently needed than statistical surveys which reveal the extent of well-known evils.

The removal of the arbitrary power of the father has tended to

¹ See also Part I.

weaken the solidarity of the family. Despotism has passed out of family life and is not more likely to be re-introduced into it than into the political order. With it has gone the family responsibility which once attached to the acts of its members. Here, also, the change is welcome, but it has been followed by confusion in many phases of family and social life.

The change in the status of women has likewise influenced family life. During the past fifty years woman has been almost entirely emancipated from male control and now is able to live her life as an individual comparatively untrammelled by entanglements and prohibitions which handicapped her during previous centuries. With larger social independence she has acquired freedom from the control of the males of the family, and larger social freedom and responsibility have made many women dissatisfied with the old restraints of family life. Many of them no longer feel that their duties are first and last to their family, and wife and mother are challenging the assertion that woman's place is in the home. They seek careers in a larger world and are insisting that obligations to family shall not interfere.

In many cases the "career" consists of running a typewriter, selling goods behind a counter, or assisting in routine clerical work; yet many women find such work more satisfying than the narrow "drudgery" of the home. Housework is relatively uninteresting to the unintelligent because they see only the monotony of domestic tasks and fail to perceive the possibilities in homemaking. Yet homemaking is a career which requires much knowledge, tact, skill, and art, and as a rule presents a more varied task than that usually undertaken by the woman who works outside of the home. Women of imagination are discovering this fact, but to many the possibilities in homemaking are a sealed book. The social world has such varied duties and opportunities that helpful accommodation of family life and child life to it challenges the resourcefulness of the homemaker. Perhaps the time will come when homemaking will be regarded as a career and one of the most interesting of occupations. Making it voluntary will enhance its attractiveness.

One of the difficulties in meeting the problems of the home arises from the fact that people are not interested until engulfed in them, and then it is too late to learn with profit, because those concerned are too old to re-adapt themselves, and being unable to see their problems objectively they do not understand them.

The industrial revolution has changed the economic status of

woman and indirectly has effected important social changes. In the old agricultural order and in the handicrafts stage she could engage in few activities outside of the home and its precincts. With the introduction of machinery and the ensuing specialization bringing in its train numerous light tasks, woman has been able to participate to a larger extent in the industrial order.

The extension of machine industry absolves the housewife from many tasks or makes them easier. Electric washing-machines, irons, vacuum cleaners, fireless cookers, toasters, and many other devices give her a considerable amount of leisure and allow her to engage in outside activities. The benefits coming from these devices are to some extent offset by the more complex household and the difficulty of securing servants, but even so the average housewife is probably not so hard worked as she was formerly.

In some places coöperative housekeeping lightens the load. In certain communities the food for several families is prepared in common kitchens, the meals being served in the respective households, with much saving of labor. A common heating plant for a block or for several houses saves fuel and labor. These features, at present limited in their distribution, may come to play a much larger part in family economy than is now the case. Such changes necessitate changes in family life and sometimes produce at least temporary maladjustments.

Outside employment takes the wife away from the home and out of the family circle. If she wishes to earn her expenses or to have more money to spend, she may allow her husband to shift entirely or in part for himself. The mother who is ambitious to swell the family resources often leaves her young children at home without supervision or in charge of an older child, or places them under the care of an incompetent person, frequently with disastrous results to the children. Much of the participation by women in the industrial order has been made possible by the approximately equal educational opportunities which in every civilized land they share with men. They can now read and write, attend business, secretarial, and most of the professional schools; but the more significant influence of education lies in the fact that it lifts individuals out of the old circumscribing home atmosphere and introduces them to a larger community, national, and cultural life. Previously influences came largely through family contacts, or through contacts within the immediate locality; now an individual may know more about events in the larger social world than about those within his home.

Education invades the family circle by virtue of the claims which

it makes upon the children. Compulsory education is now the rule in civilized countries, and to a large extent the child is removed from the control of parents and is placed under that of teachers not chosen by the parents, the latter having little option as to what the child shall learn and none as to whether it shall learn. Parental authority is to that extent abrogated, nor would one wish it otherwise, for parental tyranny, involving a larger measure of ignorance than of wisdom, has had sway long enough. But education undermines parental authority in subtle ways. The child learns things not known by the parent, and often becomes better informed in many fields. This seldom increases the child's respect for the parent, and may diminish the respect for parental knowledge in fields in which the parent is superior if only because of greater experience, in many cases leading to a wider separation between parent and child. The child becomes imbued with ideas and ideals not shared by its parents and goes off on a tangent which carries it farther from their sympathies and concerns. This may be the lesser of evils, but it introduces problems of family adjustment that were no concern of an earlier generation which made children mere copies of parents and considered the family a success to the extent that it accomplished this stereotyping. With higher education the rift becomes greater, for the activities of parent and child are often in entirely different fields.

In many respects society interferes with the old unrestricted family and parental control, the control and the influences now lying without rather than, or at least as well as, within the family, which must be reconstructed if it is to persist as a vigorous and healthy social unit.

The need for reconstruction arises also from the tendency to substitute larger social for narrower family ideals. In many quarters there is a reversal of the old order and a tendency to make family life conform to the demands of social life. Family ideals give way to more inclusive social ones, as in time of war when welfare of the family is sacrificed to that of the nation. The duties which one owes to community, state, and nation are stressed more than those which one owes to family. Instead of regarding the family as the primary unit in social life, there is a tendency to regard its claims as of subordinate importance.

The acceptance of the prevailing standards of living is an effective force in bringing about the substitution of a new social ideal for the older one of absolute adherence to family standards. There is an increasing tendency to pay regard to the *mode*, the style, the prevailing

taste and popular dictate. People want to behave and dress in conformity with others. They measure their earnings, not by what other members of the family earn, but by what their neighbors or associates earn. They look for amusement in the fields which their fellows elect and read the books which are read in the community.

The decadence of religion has resulted in a weakening of the solidarity of family life. When all worshipped the same ancestral spirits at the same household hearth, there was no divergence in religion and religion reinforced family integrity. But now that religious obligations are weakening and children are less inclined to follow the "God of their fathers," religion becomes a problem rather than a bulwark for the family. Not uncommonly parents and children, or husband and wife, are of different religious persuasion, and the tie of religion is much less efficacious in holding the members of the family together and in enforcing mutual obligations and respect.

The growing strength of individualism is a further challenge to the authority of the family. Individuals think and act independently, and are not inclined to accept responsibility for the acts of husband, wife, parent, or child. The wife is legally emancipated, can make contracts in her own name, sue and be sued, and has moral and social as well as legal responsibility. The child, too, seeks freedom at an earlier age and demands a greater degree of it — moral, religious, economic, and educational. The young wish to develop their own personalities and live their own lives.

The social control of children which is displacing unrestricted parental control has a reflex action upon family life. In many states laws regulate the work of children, the hours at which they may be out alone at night, the time during which they must be in school, and provide for vaccination, examination of physical condition, and treatment for disease. In nursery schools and kindergartens the child has extra-parental supervision, and juvenile courts exercise jurisdiction over children who are without proper supervision or control at home.

The desire to maintain a certain standard of living encourages the childless marriage and the small family, but it is only one of many things which contribute to this result. The increasing facilities for education, the greater opportunities open to women, the increasing sense of responsibility for the care, education, and support of children, are among the forces which work toward this end. But whatever the causes, childless marriages are more frequent now than they were formerly and the small family is a modern institution. This occa-

sions distress to many observers of social life, but it is rather a cause for rejoicing, and should be welcomed as a healthy indication that eventually family life will rest upon an intelligent basis. Men and women will not surrender the freedoms they have won. The social order which prescribed that they must marry whether they wished to or not has gone never to return. So, too, the time will soon be gone when, if married, they must have children whether they wish to or not. A future generation will accommodate itself to this standard, and, when it has done so, will regard with pity or loathing a generation which upheld the opposite. A change in moral standards seems immoral to conservatives in the generation which experiences the rupture.

Limitation of population has long been practised in various areas and is a phase of many primitive cultures. In Polynesia the peoples realized that there was a definite limit to the population which could be supported on a given island, and foeticide and infanticide provided the checks upon numbers. In Australia in time of famine the youngest children served as food for elders, and if it was decided that a new-born child increased too much the burden of the community the little one was killed. In the Torres Straits it was considered a disgrace to have more than five children and a parent who exceeded this number was derided and abused. It was a disgrace likewise for old people to have a child and the moral disapproval was sometimes more than they could countenance. The result was foeticide or infanticide. Some tribes in Africa practised contraceptive methods, apparently successfully. Elsewhere, war, famine, or the hazards of securing food, effectually kept down numbers. All peoples, of necessity, have solved the problem of population in some fashion. Birth control, therefore, is not new in the sense that there was previously no limitation of population.

2. PERSONAL RELATIONS WITHIN THE FAMILY

Marriage has been a matter of social concern at every stage of culture and at every period in history. Savages show an appreciation of the importance of marriage by the ceremonies, feasts, and giving of presents which accompany its celebration, all members of the group participating in the event.

In the early historical civilizations, those of the Hebrew, Roman, and Germanic peoples, little or no option in marriage was exercised by the woman. She was purchased by the husband, or was given by the father to the groom. Our modern ceremony of "giving away the bride"

is a relic of the time when the giving away was a fact and not a fiction. But in Western civilization such customs are gone forever. Woman is now a responsible person and one of the factors in the making of the contract, her consent being essential to the celebration of a valid marriage.

In many states social reformers advocate changes in the marriage laws. In particular they advocate the abolition of common law marriage, which is merely the public recognition by man and woman that they are living together as husband and wife. In half of the states (twenty-six in 1919) such marriages are recognized, though in England they have been forbidden by statute for more than one hundred and fifty years. They protect neither the parties themselves nor the children, and the possibility of making such a marriage encourages immorality. There is also insistence that in many states the age at which marriage is legal is not sufficiently high. The common law marriage age is fourteen years for males and twelve years for females. Where statute prescribes the age it usually places it at eighteen for males and sixteen for females. Some recommend the age of majority as the legal age of marriage for both men and women. Certainly those in their later 'teens are of the minimum age when marriage should be permitted.

It has been recommended also that only a person of recognized standing, a minister of the gospel, a justice of the peace, or other official, should be permitted to perform the marriage ceremony. In several states any person may solemnize marriage. In New York this authority is given to aldermen and to police justices, in Tennessee to the Speaker of the House or the President of Senate, and in Mississippi to county supervisors. Perhaps more attention given to marriage would enable some of the attention now paid to divorce to be turned into other channels. Central registration of marriages, now required by some twenty states, is a means of protection to the individuals concerned.

The increase in divorce, especially in the United States, has been rapid during the last few decades. With the exception of Japan, and perhaps of Russia, the United States leads the world in the number of divorces in proportion to marriages or to population. In the year 1924-1925 there were 1,129,045 marriages in the United States and 148,815 divorces, or 13.2 divorces to every 100 marriages. Since some individuals are more given to divorce than are others, having the divorce habit, as it were, this does not mean that 13 per cent of every two hundred people who marry are divorced. There is considerable variation among the states. Arranged in the order of the frequency of divorce

to marriage there are the following percentages of divorces to marriages in the respective states for the year 1924-1925:

<i>Rank — State</i>	<i>Per cent of Divorces</i>	<i>Rank — State</i>	<i>Per cent of Divorces</i>
1 South Carolina		26 Rhode Island	14.4
2 Dist. of Columbia	2.8	27 Illinois	14.7
3 New York	4.2	28 Florida	14.9
4 Georgia	5.1	29 Kentucky	15.0
5 North Carolina	5.9	30 Arkansas	15.1
6 Maryland	6.2	31 Delaware	15.4
7 New Jersey	7.7	32 Iowa	17.0
8 Louisiana	8.0	33 Maine	17.2
9 Connecticut	8.5	34 Kansas	17.4
10 West Virginia	8.6	34 Michigan	17.4
11 North Dakota	8.8	36 Colorado	18.1
12 Mississippi	8.9	37 Nebraska	18.3
13 Pennsylvania	9.8	38 Indiana	18.9
14 Massachusetts	9.9	39 Ohio	19.1
15 South Dakota	10.1	40 California	19.4
16 Alabama	10.3	41 Texas	20.3
17 Virginia	10.5	42 Idaho	20.4
18 Minnesota	10.7	43 Missouri	21.1
19 New Mexico	11.5	44 Arizona	21.2
19 Utah	11.5	45 Oklahoma	22.2
21 Wisconsin	11.8	46 Montana	23.1
22 Tennessee	11.9	47 Wyoming	25.4
23 Vermont	12.2	48 Oregon	38.5
24 Washington	13.3	49 Nevada	110.0
25 New Hampshire	13.4		
Total for the	<i>Marriages</i>	<i>Divorces</i>	<i>% of divorces to marriages</i>
United States:	1,129,045	148,815	<i>for the United States</i>
			13.2

Since 1878 divorce has not been permitted in South Carolina. The District of Columbia and New York state have the smallest percentages of divorce of those states in which it is permitted. There is a low rate in the South, six of the Southern states being among the lowest ten, namely, the Carolinas, Maryland, Louisiana, Georgia, and West Virginia. Of the ten having the highest ratio all but two are Rocky Mountain or Pacific Coast states, the Middle West states constituting the next highest ratio, the New England states ranging from percentages as low as those found in the South to some as high as are found in the Middle West.

Similar ratios between these sections of the country have long main-

tained. The South, more conservative than any other section, has long had a lower rate of divorce, the Middle West has had a higher rate, and the "progressive," experimental Far West has had the highest. Other factors, however, enter. Thus in Nevada most of the divorces were granted to people who had come to that state as temporary residents in order to take advantage of the lenient divorce laws. The high ratio in Oregon is attributable in part to the fact that many Oregonians, unwilling to take the physical examination which state law prescribes for those who apply for a marriage license, are married in Washington, where there is no such requirement. This lessens the number of recorded marriages in Oregon and raises the percentage of divorces estimated on the basis of the number of marriages. Also the fact that a great many married people go to western states to live increases the ratio of divorces in those states and lessens the ratio in the states from which they come. Even so, the ratios probably represent sectional differences, although they exaggerate them.

The increase in divorce does not signify that marriage is less successful than formerly or that family relations are less happy. It means primarily that people are more easily dissatisfied with the marriage bond and that the law provides a more ready release than it did a century ago. Probably the marriages made in California and in Oregon are as happy on the average as those made in the Carolinas. The divorce rate among the upper economic classes is much higher than among those with small earnings. This is due to the less conservative character of the former and to their greater financial ability to carry on a divorce suit. The rate is higher in families in which there are no children, since they constitute a bond for the continuance of the married state. Religion likewise enters. Divorce is much more frequent among Protestant communicants than among Roman Catholics, this being true of Europe as well as of the United States. Newer countries such as Australia and Canada have a higher divorce rate than the older countries of Europe, due to such factors as the greater freedom from convention, the greater individualism, and the movements of population.

The problem of divorce has not been solved. Some advocate a tightening of the restrictions placed upon divorce, others believe that it is now too difficult even in those states which are most lenient. Especially when children are concerned there is a perplexing problem as to what amount of maladjustment between husband and wife justifies separation. Children live in an unwholesome atmosphere when there

is constant friction between parents and entire lack of compatibility, but, on the other hand, they undoubtedly lose much if they are not raised in a healthy family atmosphere. That a facilitation of divorce would encourage immorality or undermine the family is not probable. Enlightened peoples tend to make divorce easier; for the desirability of establishing healthy personal relations is much more important than the need of maintaining an institution when it does not serve its purpose.

Psycho-analysis has directed attention to the importance of personal relations within the family. At times rivalry and jealousy operate unconsciously within the family circle and cause friction. Perhaps nothing is such an important aid to healthy personal relations as a relative independence upon the part of each member of the family. When each has his own money — and the careful spending of money can be taught to young children, who can learn responsibility early as readily as in later life — and when each has a room of his own where he can be alone, friction is less frequent than when these conditions do not exist. Domestic frictions usually arise from trivialities, seldom from important issues. The more each member of the family is left to go his own way the less likelihood there is of unpleasantness. If the family would set out to solve its problems in a rational manner, as a business concern does, and would try to see them objectively, domestic infelicity would largely disappear or be greatly diminished. But this is asking people to be rational and reasonable, and it is asking a great deal of mere men and women.

Illegitimacy is one of the most troublesome problems of social life, though one which is not of great frequency. The child of an unmarried mother is practically a social outcast. As this is in no sense the responsibility of the child it seems unreasonable to make him pay the penalty.

Illegitimacy, as at present defined by the law, the birth of a child out of wedlock, raises the question of the right of a woman to have a child without entering into the marriage relation. Some women, who would probably make excellent mothers, and who would like to raise a child, do not care for the bonds or ties of a wife and the head of a household. If we recognize that the child is the important consideration, as it seems clear we should do, this brings us back to the desirability of a family circle as the place in which the child should be reared, and the desirability of close contact with the father as well as with the mother. Most of us would feel that this contact with a father

and life in a family circle is almost a prerequisite to happy and wholesome childhood. But as most of us look back to this as the kind of world in which we were raised, this may be a case in which we rationalize, unconsciously and unjustifiably assuming that the things which had value for us must have some inherent, almost irreplaceable value for all normal individuals.

3. THE IMPORTANCE OF FAMILY LIFE

It is not likely that family life will go into the discard. It is having its difficulties and in many quarters it is not weathering the storm, but there are indications that the family will be reconstructed. The pains of readjustment are considerable and many of the makeshifts are poor excuses for remedies, but the family is reaching a higher plane, and human life is capable of more happiness and healthful realization in the proper family circle than formerly was possible. If it is to function harmoniously family life must be adjusted to the new education, the new religious demands, or lack of them, the new industrial order, the new freedom of women and children, the new and hopeful, if also dangerous, individualism. Women are not yet on a basis of legal and political equality with men. In fifty specific respects the laws of various states discriminate against them. "There is not a single state in the Union in which men and women live under equal protection of the law. In most states, the residence of the husband is the residence of the wife. There is no state in which a wife may collect for services performed in her own home. She is entitled to support by her husband but the extent of that support is entirely in his hands. In most states, when a married woman is injured, her husband recovers damages for loss of her services; and in six states — Arizona, California, Georgia, Louisiana, New Mexico and Washington — the earnings of the wife outside of the home belong to the husband. Thirty states still deny mothers equal rights to the earnings and services of the children. In Georgia and Maryland the father can will away the custody of the child, born or unborn, from the mother. In five states fathers are preferred to mothers in inheriting from a deceased child. In less than fifteen states is prostitution a crime for the male as well as the female. More than half the states do not permit women to serve on juries.

"In certain states the laws discriminate against women as students in universities, deny the right of contract, or control of property, or conduct of business in or out of the home. Laws concerning the admin-

istration of estates discriminate against women, as does the apprentice law. A married woman can not always sue in her own right, and occasionally a widow's share in community property is less than a widower's share.

"Although the law gives the father greater rights than the mother over the legitimate child, it places the responsibility for the illegitimate child upon the mother. In Idaho, Virginia and Texas there are no laws by which the unmarried mother may demand aid from the father for the support of the child. In some states the wife has not the same rights to the chastity of the husband as he has to the chastity of his wife.

"Women teachers are paid less than men for the same work in some states, and marriage debars a woman from many schools. In Iowa, male citizens only may be members of the legislature. An American woman loses her citizenship when married to a foreigner after 2 to 5 years residence abroad; or if married to an alien ineligible for citizenship, she loses her citizenship, whereas a married man does not.

"To sum up, there are fifty ways in which the laws hold women to be inferior — in which women are discriminated against solely on account of sex."²

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² William Floyd, Editor, *Social Progress, A Handbook of the Liberal Movement*, New York, 1925.

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CHAPTER XXII

RELIGION

I. RELIGION REFLECTS CHANGES IN SOCIAL AND INTELLECTUAL LIFE

Until recently the view prevailed that society was composed of disparate portions which in some mysterious manner managed to get along together. We are now disposed to see it as a unity and a coöperation of component parts. The individuals who compose the group are not separated from one another by watertight compartments, nor can the concepts and systems of ideas in the group be insulated. The concepts of economics spill over into every other social science, and the ideas of science permeate the fields of education and morals. A new influence radiates throughout the group as surely as a ripple in a pond disturbs all of it. Religion is part of this inter-related whole, and only when it retires into a monastic retreat and cuts itself off from the remainder of the world can it remain uninfluenced by the ideas which circulate in other realms of thought and activity. Conservatism is one of its outstanding traits, but however much a faith or a dogma may resent outside influences it can never be entirely free from them. Religion can not strangle innovations in other spheres and it can not inhibit in its own realm a reaction to extraneous influences. In primitive culture where there are comparatively few social changes the tenor of religious life is little disturbed, but with advance in civilization innovations are more frequent and more annoying. Of necessity religious conceptions and religious attitudes differ from age to age in the life of mankind.

In Central Australia, for example, the food supply is largely seasonal and after a fall of rain dearth of animal and vegetable life is quickly followed by an abundance of game and a luxuriance of vegetation heralding new sources of food supply. The seasonal resuscitation of nature is ensured by rites of a ceremonial semi-religious nature, designed to bring about the reappearance of animals needed for subsistence. The ceremonies are performed and the food supply follows. When irrigation renders these conditions fundamentally different, so that the rehabilitation of animal and vegetable life obviously depends

upon the efforts of men and not upon occult forces, the religious ceremonies must conform with the changed conditions. Among the peasantry of Europe it was the custom to renew the spirit of vegetation by ceremonies and rites which have lingered on for centuries, but knowledge of scientific agriculture has affected the meaning of the rites, though they persist as survivals.

Among practically all peoples, drought, floods, or other catastrophes call for special relations with the gods deemed responsible therefor or at least able to prevent them. Similarly, an unusually good crop calls for thanksgiving. The religious pendulum swings with knowledge, and when these occurrences are re-interpreted by science and assigned to purely natural causes the religious interpretation changes, though tardily. When natural phenomena are re-interpreted by science they lose the significance which they once had for religion. Primitive thought is inclined to regard certain psychic states, such as passion, intense emotion, dreams, hallucinations, as under the control of gods or spirits. Through the dream the god conveys his message to mortals. A new psychology weakens the hold of religion upon aspects of human experience previously adjudged outside the realm of human control and obedient to no laws. Kings were once hedged with a divinity which shaped their ends. The monarch was the representative on earth of the god, to whom he traced his ancestry and whose protégé he was. The word of the king was the word of the god; his person was sacred and could impart virtue by mere contact, and his touch was efficacious in the cure of physical and mental diseases.

Even now, in a few lands, the king is still the head of the national Church, though the position is little more than form and can scarcely outlast the present century. Kingship is re-interpreted as history becomes better informed, the religious sanctions of kingship making little appeal to an enlightened people.

Where the struggle for existence between groups is severe, religion must be of utility to the group; and to have survival value it must be adapted to tribal demands, strengthen social solidarity, and contribute to the continuance of group life. Well organized nations have realized this and have sought unity in religion. The Egyptians enhanced social solidarity through a common religious appeal, and the Greeks secured it for the respective city-states, but less successfully for the Greek peoples as a whole, among whom there was little political cohesion. In time of war the national consciousness is deeply stirred and attention is focussed on religion as an ally.

An international religion does not develop among a people who have the national consciousness uppermost. Jahwe was a national god, acknowledged in times of national stress; no note of internationalism penetrated the religion of the Hebrews while they were forced to fight for national existence.

In Palestine only the group which felt domestic oppression more than external oppression, conscious of class rather than of nation, welcomed the doctrines of Jesus. Though in its early development Christianity did not emphasize national interests, its spread and growth are due largely to the fact that it became a national religion and received official sanction.

Ideas of right and wrong change from time to time. Religious devotees assume that the god is on the side of right, hence with change in ideas of right and wrong a new interpretation is given the characteristics of the god and his acts and judgments. In this sense the god is re-interpreted and re-made for man makes his god in his own image. Christian theology and practice, therefore, furnish many examples of the social evolution of religion. Christianity is not now what it was immediately after the time of Jesus, and during no two centuries between that time and the present has it been the same. In the main its evolution has been unintended by those mainly responsible for it, but nevertheless it has undergone an endless process of unmaking and re-making. If religion did not respond to social stimuli it would lose contact with life and sink into a senseless conservatism; this tendency it must resist if it is to survive as a vital force. Ready response to external forces is the measure of its vitality and rationality. The social forces which shape religion are external to it until it responds and accepts them. On the other hand, forces operating within the sphere of religion are sometimes capable of shaping the religious life. A priesthood with authority and prestige develops doctrine and dogma and through contact with the larger world influences social currents within other spheres. Its power is not limited to the field of religion but invades social, economic, and scientific realms also. Mohammed not only inspired religious faith in his devotees but set up kingdoms on earth as well as in heaven. His heavenly mission overflowed into the political world and achieved mastery there. Many sacred men have made use of partnership with the god to ensure kingdoms on earth, not limiting their treasures to those which "moth and rust do not corrupt."

Where only peaceful influences are employed that religion suc-

ceeds best which speaks the language of the culture and the age. Christianity could speak the language of prodigies and portents to a world expectant of these and intellectually prepared for them, but it loses in convincingness when in a message to the twentieth century it employs the language of the first century. The fate of religion is inseparable from that of social life, for with the latter it is inextricably entwined, any considerable progress in the one sphere being reflected in the other. The interference by religious denominations, or some of their adherents with the progress of science shows a curious failure to understand history. In every contest with science the Church has lost. Less than a century ago the Scotch Church barred from its ranks members who used fanning-mills in the winnowing of grain, declaring the practice contrary to the text, "The wind bloweth where it listeth." At about the same time Churchmen were attempting to prevent the use of anesthetics in obstetrical cases, basing their attitude on the declaration in Genesis that women would suffer in childbirth. When in 1846 Morton had demonstrated that ether could eliminate pain during a surgical operation a great deal of opposition to the use of the drug came from the clergy. "Pain was the direct consequence of original sin and therefore must be endured. Morton was threatened with prosecution and there was general condemnation of this terrible drug that set aside the laws of God and man. Dire pictures were painted of the use of this drug by criminals and all the hysterical fire of misguided religious zeal was brought to bear upon the matter."¹ In Scotland the case for anesthetics was won only when Dr. Simpson pointed out that Adam was caused to fall into a deep sleep before a rib was taken from his side and that Scripture, therefore, justified the use of chloroform. But Jesus' teachings do not run counter to the acceptance of scientific observation and knowledge. On the contrary there is abundant evidence that He accepted the scientific beliefs current in His day.

The Roman Church solves the problem similarly and in some places it is the defender of science against the attacks of narrow-minded Protestant evangelicals. It learned something from its experience with Galileo, Bruno, and Copernicus.

Modern science does not breed irreverence. Perhaps "in future generations the Christian will . . . regard the present contentions of the fundamentalists with the same amused incredulity as that with

¹ C. A. H. Smith, *The Discovery of Anaesthesia*, Scientific Monthly, 24: p. 68, Jan., 1927. One clergyman described ether as "a decoy in the hands of Satan, apparently offering itself to bless Woman, but in the end it will harden society and rob God of the deep earnest cries that rise in time of trouble for help." *Ib.*

which today we regard speculations of medieval scholasticism as to how many angels could stand on the point of a needle." ²

The boundaries between religion, ethics, and magic have been vague and fluctuating. Religion may be defined as belief in and dependence upon a supernatural being or power which is regarded as able to benefit or injure those who believe in it, whereas ethics has to do with the relations between man and man, and magic is outworn science. Sometimes religion partakes largely of one or both of these other elements, sometimes it partakes very little of either. There is no necessary relation between them, and often little in fact, while in some instances religion is shot through with ethical, or, as the case may be, with magical motivation. ³

2. RELIGION AND LABOR

The Christianity which took root among the common laborers of Palestine was despised by the well-to-do; today it is the religion of the prosperous. To understand the change we must turn to history.

Early Christianity in the Roman Empire was the religion of the despised working classes and slaves, and because of their passivism and their indisposition to recognize the demands of the State as superior to those of religion its adherents were particularly obnoxious to their patriotic contemporaries. Their enemies held them responsible for the fall of Rome, since they had shown no willingness to go to its defense against the invading barbarians. Far from being patriots — so at least their contemporaries thought — they were slackers and traitors. But these early Christians were tenacious of the faith and persistent under persecution, and in the fourth century Christianity became the State religion. Thereupon religious sanction was given the acts of the State and its officials. At the same time ecclesiasticism began to suppress individual initiative in matters of belief and conduct, the individual being lost in the churchly hierarchy.

The organized Church, however, maintained much actual independence from political control. It was, moreover, a thousand years after the days of the disciples before the Church became to any important extent the owner of property.

During the last thousand years it has controlled considerable prop-

² From a letter signed "A New York Lawyer," *The Nation*, 121: pp. 94-95, July 15, 1925, *à propos* of the Scopes trial in Dayton, Tennessee.

³ An account of religion, ethics, and magic among primitive peoples will be found in the author's *Introduction to Anthropology*, New York, 1926.

erty and has been interested in material possessions and in the support derived from them. In order to maintain itself in an industrial order in which property and money are the preconditions to existence and influence, the organized Church now depends mainly upon contributions from the propertied classes. Thus its interests are to an extent identified with those of property, the wealth of parishioners being the weal of the Church. The economic motive is let in by an open door, and some ministers have been known to preach one economic doctrine while practising another.

This, of course, does not hold of all churches, nor does it hold of any one denomination everywhere. It may be much more the exception than the rule, but whether rare or common it has influenced the attitude of the laboring man toward the Church. The average laboring man of the present day does not turn to the Church as his natural protector and sympathizer. Labor scouts organized religion as essentially on the side of capital and a supporter of the existing economic order. It has soft words for labor, the laborer says, but it more willingly shakes the hand of capital, for there is more likely to be money in it.

This interpretation may be a travesty upon the churches, or upon most of them, but it is none the less a significant fact that many laboring men take this attitude. Consequently little service is rendered by the churches to the class amid which Christianity arose and for which, primarily — so its doctrines would indicate — it has a message. Something can be learned from the fact that the Bolsheviki in Russia are anti-Church, and that a large element in the labor movement is anti-Church, not to say anti-religious.

“The Church which is to save the people — if ever again there is to be one — will be not only *for* the people, but *of* the people. The Church of today certainly cannot be accused of any neglect of the people: it seeks out the poor, it multiplies institutions on their behalf, it lavishes benefits upon them — spiritual when they will, and when they will not spiritual, then material. And for all this the best of the people hold aloof and are entirely uninterested. But it is surely no ignoble trait that participation in benefits should fail to arouse the interest which naturally follows upon participation in work. The Churches which really have some hold upon the people are those which make some claim upon them, in which they are called upon to be not merely passive recipients but active co-operators. I have in mind one parish in East London where there was a large and empty church, and the whole Church machinery of vicar, curates, and lay visitors, work-

ing in *vacuo*, wholly out of touch with the parishioners except for those who looked for alms. There was also a very poor little Mission, I forget of what denomination, presided over by a zealous harness-maker, and consisting entirely of working-class members — hard-working men and women who spent their evenings in actual mission work among the poorest and the worst. They *were* the Church and did the work of it, and so it was a reality to them. The great spiritual leaders have always been those who made great demands upon their followers; who knew that they could not give except to those who were strenuously exerting themselves to partake; and who knew also that the less you ask of human nature the deeper it falls into apathy and indifference.”⁴

There has been keen appreciation of the lack of sympathy between the churches and labor, and not a few ministers and laymen have turned attention to the matter. In many denominations there has been official recognition of the importance of labor problems and an attempt to link the church with the labor movement. Classes have been organized for the study of labor conditions and the ideals and demands of the labor movement.

Many churchmen, not a few of them clergymen, write boldly in defense of the claims of labor, and some of them cautiously insert warnings against the dangers of “socialism.” Thus a churchman writes in 1920:

“The war has forced the problems of industry upon the Church. Chaplains and other preachers have had a baptism of light on the battlefield from men who never darkened a church door. They believe they have discovered why men discount organized religion. The Church has become roused; she acknowledges that she has been negligent, and there is a need for repentance and a new birth. The Church sees the people of the world at loggerheads, and she is now standing by wringing her hands and lamenting her past indifference, powerless to help.

“The Church now recognizes, when too late, that the workers have been under-valued, under-paid, under-housed and overworked. She sees that labor has now the power to secure, without the Church’s help, what it considers fair pay, in hours, and in conditions of work. The Church sees a conflict proceeding between labor and capital and the Government, in which it appears that labor can dictate its own terms. The Church sees, further, the possibility of great national loss, if a party or class government with ignorance and power becomes autocratic as in Russia today.”

⁴ Bosanquet, *The Strength of the People*, pp. 325-326, London, 1902.

At last, however, "the Church believes it knows the rules of the game in Industry and in the disputes arising therefrom. She is anxious to tell them to the contending parties. Labor says it ought to have done that years ago when the employers had the upper hand. The Church admits that her attitude to the economic and social problems has never been properly defined, and that there has been a want of faith in her own principles, and in the principles of Christ's teaching."⁵ It is better to make the admission than to deny facts patent to all who care to inquire, but it is a sorry admission to be forced to make. What will the Church do about it?

3. RELIGION AND CAPITALISM

Under its present organization it is difficult for the Church to do anything about it, for it is too intimately bound up with wealth and business to consider cutting away from them.

The large city churches are expensive to build and maintain.⁶ To secure the best preachers congregations must pay for them, and one of the good qualities of a pastor is ability to raise money. He does not accomplish this end by offending parishioners and there is more than one instance of a pastor's being compelled to find other fields of activity because his economic doctrines were not pleasing to wealthy supporters of the church. A successor who followed his example would soon follow in his footsteps of emigration; so why offend sensitive members of the congregation when it means merely leaving a good pastorate to some one else who will cheerfully fulfil the requisite conditions?

4. RELIGION AND THE POLITICAL ORDER

It is incumbent upon the churches to uphold the established political order. That is one reason why the Revolutionists in Russia were intent upon overthrowing the Church. It is one of the reasons why in many countries the head of the Church is the sovereign. There is, moreover, in many churches the feeling that the pastor should remain aloof from political parties and political issues. The liability to make mistakes is perhaps one of the justifications for this attitude of non-interference in political matters, as also for the willingness to "render unto

⁵ David Carnegie, *Can Church and Industry Unite?*, pp. 92-94, London, 1920.

⁶ "When one sees the glorious buildings erected in the Old World to the glory of God or for the housing of his elect on earth — the nobility — one cannot doubt the essential grandeur of the human mind." (Extract from a student's theme.)

Cæsar the things which are Cæsar's." But the difficulty is in determining what things are Cæsar's and what things are unjustifiably claimed by Cæsar.

5. RELIGION AND THE CHURCHES

There is a Persian story to the effect that a cock miraculously crowed in the garden of a missionary in Teheran, saying in a human voice that Christianity was the true religion. So impressed were the wise men of Persia that they held a consultation to decide what action to take as a result of this message from heaven. In their deliberations they came to the unanimous decision to do nothing until the cock crowed again to say what particular form of Christianity was meant. Presumably this was not indicated, for Christianity has not yet been widely accepted there.

This may be myth, but it is related as fact that about a half-century ago, when Japan was vigorously adopting Western civilization, the Japanese government sent a deputation to the United States to determine what form of religion was best adapted to the needs of the Japanese people. On board the vessel on which this delegation traveled to the United States were several missionaries, of whom the Japanese made inquiries. Some of the missionaries were of Protestant persuasion and some were Romanists. As a result of consulting with all of them and of studying Christianity in Western countries, the Japanese returned with the recommendation that the schisms of Christianity be avoided and that Shintoism, the old Japanese religion, be retained as the national religion of Japan. The motives which induced them to avoid Christianity should be of interest to "Christian" nations.

A few years ago some one pertinently asked, "*Can Christianity Tolerate the Churches?*" Christianity and the Churches are not synonymous; they are, in fact, sometimes widely divergent. It has been said that our age can not be fitted into a comfortable Church establishment, since the function of the Christian is to struggle and suffer, so that in every great crisis the real Christian is found not in the Church but outside it — "they are the eternal protestants of humanity and must in every age be crucified for its salvation."

As we have said, Christianity is not the same today as it was yesterday and it will be different on the morrow. If the New Testament were a recently discovered document and not one which we have been viewing with peculiar prepossessions, it could not mean to us what it

now means. Divested of ecclesiastical prejudice we should see it as a life-giving document, the herald of a new religion. We should see that a portion of the story of Jesus' mission is adaptation of the message to the times and that He viewed the faith as dynamic rather than static, as something for mankind rather than mankind as something for it. So far, indeed, as Christianity has been vital it has been an example of creative evolution in which the energy of a new spiritual life adapts, assimilates, and utilizes as well as unfolds. Either Christianity is a living, vital thing, constantly adapting itself to new needs and occasions, or it is a past issue interesting to the historian and to the evangelist but powerless to give the salvation which a new age craves. Religion is for man, not man for religion. To force an age into a Procrustean bed of conformity to the ideals of previous centuries is to nullify life-giving virtues inherent in old ideals. A minister of the gospel has said that in most of our city churches if Jesus came in and occupied a pew there would be many disapproving glances and whispers of, "Who is that Carpenter?" If men doubt whether Christianity can tolerate the Churches it is because they believe, rightly or wrongly, that the Churches are not tolerating Christianity. If the Churches can not merge denominational differences in a common creed, a minimum belief and practice, the thinking man is inclined in all humility to withdraw and allow them to fight out their differences in an all too un-Christian spirit.

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CHAPTER XXIII ✓

EDUCATION

“There is scarcely anything in common between that which at the present day goes by the name of education, and the actual conquests and achievements of the human mind. It seems, on the contrary, to be the deliberate aim of our pedagogy to wipe out, to conceal, bury, and render inaccessible all that the human mind has acquired of power and knowledge since the fourteenth century, and to secure its victims against any danger of acquiring it. Amid all surviving anachronisms it would be difficult to point to one which has remained so completely primitive and rudimentary as our so-called education, or to a subject concerning which even our more advanced conceptions and ideals have so generally failed to rise above the level of our rudimentary practice.” — Robert Briffault, *The Making of Humanity*, p. 367. London, 1919.

Education is the development of personality and intelligence. Personality is the orderly and harmonious functioning of the various abilities of the individual, and intelligence is adaptation of means to end and the discovery of more desirable ends. The problem of modern education is two-fold: What are the ends to be achieved, and what are the best means to achieve them? About one or both of these problems hover most of the educational queries of the present day.

While men advance they will have these problems, and while they can achieve no final solution of them they should arrive at better solutions. An educational system which does not change is soon out of harmony with the times and becomes a vestigial remainder. Here as in other phases of social life experiment and observation should play a large part.

By their fruits we know educational systems for what they are. There is no virtue in the recent as such, but more hope is to be placed in the ambitious, even if crude, than in the complacently “finished” product. An educational system which does not change is already dead at the core even if it shows superficial signs of life, and one which is accepted as good for all time is probably not much good for any particular time.

I. PRIMARY AND SECONDARY EDUCATION

To what extent the education of the child before the present school age should be left to the home exclusively is a matter on which opinions differ. In some quarters there is insistence that schools for "pre school" children are needed and that most children would be better off in them than under the care or lack of care of the mother. In these schools they learn to play with associates and to live with others, and there is much the average parent can not teach which can be taught by the skilled teacher. Possibly such schools will become a feature of our educational system. We shall know more about them when their possibilities have been further exploited and the results have been carefully observed. As regards the education of the young child we know our objectives with more confidence than we know the ways and means of achieving them.

The object of primary education is to fit the child for adult life. This involves certain fundamental things common to all members of the community. The special training which the child needs in order that it may develop its capacities is not an easy matter to determine, but we know that it should live intelligently and happily in its social world. Our elementary schools inculcate habits of order, discipline, and application, but they should also impart positive interests and the habit of acquiring them. A habit of doing what one is told to do may degenerate into a habit of doing nothing which one is not told to do, and habits of being orderly in school can coëxist with habits of being disorderly out of school. By failing to develop definite interests in the child the school paves the way to the street-loafer and the ruffian. From the social point of view one test of a good education is the extent to which it trains people to take the initiative, observe situations carefully, and then act with an intelligent object in view. The school should engage youthful interests in such a way that energies flow into creative channels. Though a school can not really educate, for the child himself must do this, it can stimulate and nourish enthusiasms for exploring, manipulating, and learning. Youthful curiosity should be encouraged, and this is not done by giving children mere facts.

The high school has developed rapidly during the past few decades in keeping with the progress made in the primary grades. High schools have enlarged the curriculum until now they teach more subjects than were taught in colleges half a century ago and sometimes more than are taught in many liberal arts colleges of the present day. Higher

standards of scholarship raise the qualifications of teachers and there has been a response to the demand. The vocational training provided in high schools and technical schools is a recent development in education. It fits for the skilled trades those who must begin their life work as soon as the four years' course following the primary grades has been completed.

Vocational work may rob the young of many of the benefits of a liberal education, but it provides the technical training which makes the youth a more efficient worker early in his career. Broader interests should be introduced into some of these vocational courses, but as long as they meet an urgent need it is not likely that they will be abolished.

2. HIGHER EDUCATION

College education is more popular today than ever before. Since the World War there has been a migration to the colleges in unprecedented numbers, though there has not been a proportionate enrolment in the various professional schools.

The tendency toward a socialization of education is indicated by the fact that in recent years many of the professional schools have introduced courses designed to give the student a social orientation. Students of architecture take courses which deal with housing conditions, health, and sanitation; in medical schools there are courses in public health, hygiene, and the prevention of disease. The college of liberal arts also is reforming its curriculum. More elaborate laboratories are provided and science is supported with increasing liberality. Less attention is paid to the classics and more to economics, sociology, education, psychology, history, and the sciences.

The graduate school has developed in America in the last half-century, after the founding of the Johns Hopkins University. Previously graduates from college who wished to pursue the higher learning went to Europe to study, but now a very small percentage of them go abroad. Graduate schools are growing but not with the rapidity with which the colleges grow. In part this is because many go to professional schools, in part because many fail in college, and in part because the financial resources of many are exhausted by the time the college course is finished.

Probably in the future graduate schools will be proportionately larger than they are at the present time. The raising of the qualifications for teaching in high school will in itself bring this about. At the present

time one state, California, requires a year of post-graduate work of those who teach in high school unless they have taught successfully in another state.

3. SOME RECENT TRENDS IN HIGHER EDUCATION

The period of complacency over the collegiate educational system has been followed by one of concern. A half-century ago there were few subjects and these were prescribed, everyone taking the same courses. This was followed by the elective system, introduced by the late President Eliot at Harvard, in which a large number of courses were offered and the student did a great deal of selecting, or at least "electing," the requirements being reduced to a minimum. The result of the elective system, in the extreme form to which it was carried in many institutions, has been a great diversity in courses, a dissipation of the mental efforts of the student and a lack of thoroughness in all lines. The student acquired facility in thinking incorrectly and superficially on every conceivable subject. Having no grasp of any one, he was precluded from the realization that he was ignorant of all. It mattered not whether he *knew* French, that is, could read it, or whether he knew anything; he was smug in the assurance that he had "taken" French, German, chemistry, geology, mathematics, history, physics, and twenty-four other unrelated subjects. And the combinations of courses were sometimes marvelous.

This cafeteria system is giving place to groupings of subjects and to limitations in choice of fields. In particular there is an effort to unify the curriculum in such a way that the student's work will fall mainly into one or two fields. Human knowledge is diverse and ramified, and economy must be effected by bringing effort to a focus on related things. In the ideal curriculum each subject is an auxiliary to every other and not merely a subject taken simultaneously with some other, or after some other. Thus students can be grouped according to whether their major interests are in the field of the social sciences or in that of the natural sciences. If it is in the field of the social sciences they should understand the elements of these and specialize in some one of them.

To bring this about there is need for integration of courses. While the student is taking a course in history, for example, he should take courses in politics, economics, and social institutions which are related to the history course, that is, deal with the same periods or problems. Literature can be linked with all of these, so that while the student is

studying the history — political, social, and economic — of Greece, he is also reading the literature of that civilization. So also with each successive period which constitutes a part of the history course. The study of a foreign language should not be an isolated activity, but the readings in French or German should supplement the work done in other subjects, for it should be a means to an end and not merely the learning of strange words and constructions.

Before completing the work in college there should be a conspectus and a perspective of the fields studied during the four years. The student should consider the bearing and significance of his college career, and in the senior year he should gather up the loose threads and integrate his knowledge. He should think out his problems toward solutions. The curriculum should provide time for reflection upon the inter-related problems of knowledge and life, so that each graduate could carry away a helpful philosophy of nature, human nature, and social life.

Real education implies getting into touch with the realities. The student should read source material and obtain direct acquaintance with the facts and theories of his subject. Instead of reading about Greece and Rome he should read their science, history, and literature and see their accomplishments as nearly as possible at first hand.

But these efforts will be sparing in returns unless the educational system places less stress on teaching as a virtue in itself and more upon learning. [Students are taught but are not taught to learn, the result being that the student merely learns and does not learn to learn.] He who not merely learns to know or to do, but learns in doing, has a tool which is useful, in fact indispensable, through life. This tool he must fashion for himself. One learns to drive a machine by driving it, and to speak a language by speaking it. The larger part of genuine education is ability to learn and to apply knowledge; and such ability is developed only by the use of it — as is every other. One of the greatest teachers of this country, Sir William Osler, has said: "We try to teach the students too much and we expect too much of them. Give them good methods and a proper point of view, and all other things will be added." The important thing is not what the faculty do with the students but what use the students make of the faculty . . . and "with small men no really great thing can be accomplished."

Genuine education involves placing more responsibility upon students than is now the case. It means giving them greater freedom and the

responsibility which goes with it, especially responsibility for the use of their time. If the art of utilizing one's opportunities is not learned in college it is likely never to be acquired, and if it is not learned the college years are misspent. The years spent in college are not merely preparation for life but are a part of life, yet if they do not lead to more abundant life they are to that extent a failure and the proffered "learning" is a sham. The first step toward securing this fuller, freer, more responsible, and more profitable life for students is to abolish the system of giving credits for courses and adding them up in order to warn the student that he has learned enough — that is, has taken enough courses. Such procedure is not only absurd but holds the student responsible to the demands of each instructor and subject to the instructor's system of values, insidiously establishing a barrier between them. Student and instructor should be collaborators in a common task, whereas the credit system tends to make their relation rather that of taskmaster and servant. This does not mean that neither examinations nor grades should be given, but it implies that grades made in courses should not graduate the student. The justification for an institution to confer a degree upon a student rests in the fact that he has certain qualifications. Adequate examinations, oral and written, given at the end of his four years would be a proper test of these.

At the present time a student graduates because some one in the registrar's office adds up the grades which the student has made. The day seems slow in coming when a faculty will be concerned, not with what a student has had — whether measles, arithmetic, or "A's" — but rather with what he does have when he appears as a candidate for a degree. We seek doctors, dentists, lawyers, mechanics, whose qualifications are not that they have taken certain courses or *have* known something about their field, but that they now know something about the matter on which we consult them. The faculty can not be held entirely responsible for the post-collegiate career of a graduate, but it ought to be, and in fact it is, responsible for the qualifications of the graduate at the time he is ushered out into the world with commencement exercises.

Dean Woodbridge, of Columbia University, goes to the heart of the matter: "We are told that we are under an obligation to educate the students. The obligation of the university is, however, not to educate them but to force intellectual independence upon them. We are told that we must prepare students for degrees. A university, however, does not prepare students for degrees. It gives them, rather, the opportunity to

do something which may be worthy of a degree.”¹ It should determine this in a worthy manner, by the qualifications of the student rather than by the registrar’s arithmetic. It is a sad travesty upon the present prevailing method of “credits” that the independent student is handicapped and penalized. There is something distressing in the fact that if a student wants an education he must pay a penalty for his ambition.

As a matter of fact, all education is self-education and implies intellectual independence. The college does not educate one and never will. It is, however, a place where a person may acquire an education if he wishes to, and to that end it should afford him all the facilities at its command.

The failure of the educational system to place responsibility upon the student and give him sufficient independence is partly responsible for the low quality of much of our graduate work. We proceed on the supposition that the handing out of a diploma produces a miraculous change in the recipient: previously he could not do “graduate” work or research, now he can. But either he could do “graduate” work before graduation, or he can not do it afterwards. He should be doing research work throughout his college career; that is, he should be studying source material and coming to grips with fundamental facts and problems. This and this alone is “research” and every college should stimulate it.

The criticisms which apply to the college are not so much in order in the case of the graduate school, but even in it there is much spoon-feeding, and as a rule too little responsibility is left to the student. We are getting away from the idea that the work for the Doctorate consists of a thesis on some topic into which no one has ever inquired except the candidate and no one else will ever want to inquire, yet this type of graduate work is not solely a thing of the past. In many institutions the candidate may take a Ph.D. degree and know practically nothing of the larger field in which he has done his special work; while as for related fields he may never have heard of them. The result is that he is about as well qualified to teach his subject as the man who fastens the nut on bolt number forty-five is qualified to run a Ford plant. Survivals of the unfittest are left to continue the system which is the only one their unimaginative minds conceive. This, of course, is graduate work at its worst — but such is still a phase of our educational system, lingering in many of our universities.

¹ *School and Society*, XX, p. 768. “I am acquainted with no country in which there reigns, in general, less independence of mind, and real freedom of discussion, than in America . . . the majority lives in perpetual adoration of itself.” Alexis de Tocqueville, *Democracy in America*, London, 1835.

4. TECHNIQUE AND METHOD

Instructors who know their subject teach it; those who can not teach it emphasize method, technique, details of procedure. The man who knows his goal, and is intent upon reaching it, proceeds to it by the most feasible methods, by ways direct or devious, but he gets there. He who does not know whither he is bound turns attention to the conveyance and centers interest on the wheels and the machinery.

The success of method in raising the accomplishments of beginners in the primary grades is one of the triumphs of modern education. Children now learn to read in the length of time it took their grandparents to learn the alphabet. All along the line there has been a speeding-up in educational procedure and desired results are accomplished in shorter time.

This improvement extends through the secondary schools and into college and graduate school. But in higher education mere method furnishes diminishing returns and is likely to prove a drag:

Technique! The very word is like a shriek
Of outraged art. It is the idiot name
Given to effort by those who are too weak,
Too weary, or too dull to play the game.

"Whatever tools of method we devise for the tasks that are to be done, they can only prove their value in the using." Technique is of little importance in higher education because in every field both knowledge itself and its aims change continually. We see the same stars and the same sun that our ancestors gazed upon, but how different our ideas about them and their motions! Even the Copernican system ceases to be a fact and becomes merely a way of viewing the motions of the planets. Darwinism is no longer the last word on evolution, but is merely one interpretation among many. The soul is no longer the main concern of psychology, which finds that it can get along very well without it. Primitive man is not primitive and the savage is not savage. The dates of Roman and of Greek civilization do not change much, but our knowledge of the character of these civilizations changes constantly.

"We do but learn today what our better and advanced judgments will unteach tomorrow," said Sir Thomas Browne; and what applied to the seventeenth century applies even more to the twentieth. If we insist upon reading the history of science as a sequence of mistakes, let us not forget that our contemporary sciences will be but history to-

morrow. A faculty of forgetting is as useful as a faculty of remembering. To teach with finality is to invite stupidity.

The student who learns the relativity of present-day knowledge, sees the issues and learns that conclusions must be tentative, has an ability to adapt himself to our changing world which mere factual knowledge can not generate. The attitude no less than the grasp on facts constitutes education which in the last resort is a spiritual process and a matter of morale. Nor is it likely that educational experts will solve the problems of higher education. The man who makes or interprets his science must be the guide in his field. Statistical studies of how much is learned by a given method do not solve the problem of what should be learned. Not the manner in which people learned a decade or twenty decades ago is important, but what they learned. And so it is in the fields of higher learning. What men teach, not how they teach, is the vital thing.

What should a college education do for one? Whatever else it accomplishes, it fails in its primary purpose if it does not make the student a more intelligent citizen of the world so that he can live in it more understandingly and more happily. He should be aware that one branch of knowledge does not compete with nor handicap another but supplements and assists all others.

The present arrangement of watertight departments in our institutions is an obstacle to education. It cripples the faculty and hampers helpful teaching and intelligent learning. If one is interested in immigration and wishes to consider the social angle of it, one must step over into the sociology department; if one wishes to consider the economic phases, one must walk over to the economic department — and may have to go to a different "college" within the university; if one wishes to consider the political phases, one must step over to the politics room; if one wants to know the historical angle, one must stray over to the history department. But immigration is an integral phenomenon which in fact is not divided by any such artificial lines and its various phases must be considered as a whole if they are to be comprehended. Learning flourishes best where people think in terms of fields and problems rather than in terms of departments.

Our institutions of higher learning have become department stores of knowledge under administrative business management, divided into colleges and departments, presided over by deans and heads. The department with the largest staff and the largest number of students conducts the biggest business and gains prestige.

The students, however, show signs of awakening. In the last two decades they have taken an interest in curricula and in the ends and means of education, and more recently they have sought participation in the making of curricula and in raising scholastic standards. This betokens an appreciation of responsibilities and privileges and a hopeful concern about what they are getting out of college. Yet they still enthuse over stadia in which a multitude of people watch a selected group contend with another selected group and are content to take their exercise and get their sport by yelling from the bleachers.

5. EDUCATION AS DEVELOPMENT OF PERSONALITY

An education which does not include the development of the entire personality is to that extent a failure. Man has not merely intellectual but also moral, esthetic, and emotional interests. The well-rounded man integrates his faculties, cultivating all of them in his house of clay. They should be developed, not at the expense of one another, but to the mutual enrichment of one another.

Education is not a matter solely for schools and colleges, but is a process which should last through life. One of the things which we need most is education among those who have left college or who have not gone to college. If their education is not continued they are soon out of touch with the times and ill-fitted to their environment. The test of the value of the college is not what the students learn while there but what it enables them to learn after they leave. For the undergraduate the greater part of life is still ahead; and so is the greater and better part of his education, if he profits from the opportunities which are his while he dwells within academic walls. Sir Walter Raleigh said: "There is nothing in any state so terrible as a powerful and authorized ignorance." And there is much truth in Ruskin's statement that, "Education does not mean teaching people to know what they do not know — it means teaching them to behave as they do not behave." We would profit by giving less attention to what is taught and more to what is caught. "The best education consists in actual participation; what a man does has far more influence, and far more lasting influence, upon him than what he only hears."

In Britain and on the Continent much more responsibility is thrown upon the student than is the case in our system. In a Continental university the student is his own master and is encouraged, indeed forced, to work out his own salvation from the very first. Oxford and Cam-

bridge combine a lecture and tutorial system with a scheme of comprehensive examinations which seem to give much better results than we can claim for any of our undergraduate work. The undergraduate is encouraged to develop his abilities rather than to conform to a schedule. No record is kept of attendance at lectures and no credit is given for completion of courses.

A study of the workings and results of other systems would be an aid in reforming our own. It would at least show us that routine and arithmetic do not constitute education and its criteria. "You do not educate a man by telling him what he knew not, but by making him what he was not. . . . The entire object of education is to make people not merely *do* the right things, but *enjoy* the right things: . . . not merely learned, but to love knowledge." ²

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² Ruskin, *Works*, XVII, p. 232, XVIII, p. 435.

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CHAPTER XXIV

THE PRESS

The newspaper has been called the Bible of democracy. No other form of literature reaches such a large number of people, and many read it to the exclusion of all else. It constitutes a portion of the daily environment in most homes in city or country. The news-sheet costs so little that poor as well as rich can have it, and it supplies so much reading material that no other form of amusement is so cheap as scanning the daily news columns. This is especially true of the Sunday edition, that monstrosity which an English journalist has called "a marvelous and indescribable product." The Sunday edition contains as much reading material as a book or the largest of the good magazines and as much trash as the poorest magazine, with enough pictures to fill an album. The Sunday editions which do not deserve this description are in the minority. There are also weekly periodicals containing critical comments on social and political questions, book reviews, and in some cases literary criticisms. Most of these maintain a creditably high standard. America has more magazines than any other country and better ones than most countries, but none of the weeklies or monthlies of the better class have the large circulation enjoyed by periodicals which carry stories.

I. THE MAKING OF THE NEWSPAPER

"The process of the production of a modern newspaper is one of the curiosities of industry. It is inconceivably complex. To begin with, for every single letter used in every word of the day's issue — there is an average of about six letters to each word, nine words to a line, two hundred lines in a column, seven columns in a page and ten or twelve pages and often more in a standard morning daily — a reproduction in metal has to be made and placed in its right position between two others. That is to say, about three-quarters of a million little individual metal stamps have to be made every day afresh in a certain order, never twice repeated; they are used once and then entirely destroyed. That is but the first miracle. Another is that in the output of a popular

morning issue from fifty to sixty miles of double-width paper — that is four times the width of the front page — representing the denudation of perhaps thirty or forty acres of forest land, will be devoured every day. The third and most amazing miracle of all is the pace at which these operations are done. All these little distinct metal stamps will be made in the right order in from six to eight hours by less than a hundred men. The miles of paper will be eaten up in perhaps from two to three hours, including intervals, at a rate of output representing the printing of something like fifteen thousand copies of the paper per minute or two hundred and fifty per second in the offices where the largest circulations are produced.”¹

The newspaper is an important phase of our industrial and social life. In 1909 it was estimated that some five billion copies of newspapers were sold in the United States annually. In 1923, 10,267 establishments in this country were engaged primarily in printing and publishing newspapers or periodicals. The total value of these concerns was more than one and a quarter billion dollars (\$1,268,501,566), an increase of 12.9 per cent over 1921. The business, therefore, not only is large but is growing. The large newspaper establishment is a concern of many specialists performing a multitude of tasks with a smoothness and efficiency which in view of the noise, hurry, confusion, and the multifarious activities involved is astounding. The newspaper is a marvelous production which we accept as a commonplace, not appreciating the ingenuity and labor which it represents.

When the plate has been prepared and put on the rollers big machines automatically take care of the printing, but the gathering, sorting, arranging, and rejecting of the news, as also the determination of the space and emphasis to be given the various items, must first be completed. Copy must be read and before it goes to press it must be approved by one of the sub-editors or supervisors. Reporters obtain the major portion of the news, though some comes in the form of voluntary contributions from individuals not employed by the newspaper. Usually, however, news coming in this way must be substantiated, since its genuineness must be vouched for. Reporters work in various portions of the city or even, as in time of war, in distant regions, sending by wire reports on the basis of which workers in the office write the account. Or the reporter may take notes on the spot, write his account there and deliver it ready to print. In any case securing news is an important matter. There is rivalry between reporters of different newspapers and

¹ Dibblee, *The Newspaper*, pp. 139-140, New York, n. d.

competition among those on the same newspaper. The personnel of the reporting staff largely determines the kind of news. In many cases the reporter can secure news only by subterfuge or by indirect agencies on which he must depend.

This is especially the case in important as distinct from formal affairs, for important proceedings seldom are public and in many cases no reporters are allowed to attend them. Usually, therefore, the reporter has little first-hand knowledge of events in which the public is greatly concerned. Few war correspondents in the World War had seen the men or the events which they described. They reported what they had been told or rather as much of it as they were allowed to report. Shreds of evidence gave the reporter the impression on which he based his account. "At the Peace Conference the reporters were allowed to meet periodically the four least important members of the Commission, men who themselves had considerable difficulty in keeping track of things, as any reporter who was present will testify. This was supplemented by spasmodic personal interviews with the Commissioners, their secretaries, their secretaries' secretaries, other newspaper men, and confidential representatives of the President, who stood between him and the impertinence of curiosity. This and the French press, than which there is nothing more censored and inspired, a local English trade-journal of the expatriots, the gossip of the Crillon lobby, the Majestic, and the other official hotels, constituted the source of the news upon which American editors and the American people have had to base one of the most difficult judgments of their history. I should perhaps add that there were a few correspondents occupying privileged positions with foreign governments. . . . They were in many ways the most useful correspondents because they always revealed to the trained reader just what it was that their governments wished America to believe." ²

"It is next to impossible for the man who is 'on the spot' — and that is where the newspaper correspondent is expected to be — even to *see* all the issues involved, especially when he has probably never been on just that spot before. He must get some one to show him round and explain matters, and that some one will be either master or man, Unionist or free labourer, landlord or tenant, as the case may be." ³

But the printed news is not simply the aggregate of the items sent in by the various reporters — as well suppose that the dinner is merely the assembling of the articles which the grocer has sent the housewife.

² Lippmann, *Liberty and the News*, pp. 42-45, New York, 1920.

³ Bosanquet, *The Strength of the People*, p. 317, London, 1902.

As the housewife must prepare, cook, properly arrange and serve the food, so the editor or his assistants must sort the news, eliminating some, keeping some and arranging that which is retained. The assignment of little space and an inconspicuous place to items gives them a subordinate importance. Other items are expanded so as to focus attention upon them and are assigned a prominent place where the reader will see them without searching through the paper. Thus the selection and the arrangement of the news is an important phase of newspaper making. When one considers these various combined factors — the predisposition of the reporter, the emphasis which he gives the various items, the elimination of some features and the stressing of others — and adds to these the part played by the editor in making a selection, it is apparent that news-getting and news-arranging is also in a sense news-making.

A newspaper can determine the quality of the news. For example, a newspaper published an account of the speeches made by candidates for a municipal office at a luncheon where they had been invited to state policies and qualifications. The names of the candidates were given, a statement was made of the sentiments voiced by certain ones, a paragraph was devoted to a quotation from one of them and then followed an account of the "forceful and stirring speech" of a certain gentleman who presumably was the candidate supported by this newspaper. Much of his speech was quoted, more space being allotted to it than to all the others. Had he been disregarded and that amount of space given to the speech of another candidate, the "news" would have been of different sort and its import of different complexion. This applies to the presentation of news by any newspaper.

Another example of special pleading in the presentation of the news is the following. — In the summer of 1925, during the Scopes trial, a paper appeared with a headline across the front page, *Bryan Champions Religion*. A perusal of the account disclosed the fact that the circumstance reported was really a controversy as to the interpretation of certain portions of the Bible, and that Bryan admitted he did not take literally the verse, "Ye are the salt of the earth." He was quoted as saying, "I would not insist that man was actually salt or that he had flesh of salt, but it is used in the sense of salt as saving God's people." The headline, therefore, instead of declaring *Bryan Champions Religion* might with equal truth have been *Bryan Says Bible Not Literal*, or *Bryan Interprets Bible*. Or, again, the headline might have referred to the event as *Darrow Counters Bryan*, or as *Bryan*

Ignorant of History. The caption which the journal used colored the news in a manner not justified by the content. If not misrepresentation it was at least a biased interpretation. Frequently, then, the press is an advocate. In presenting situations vividly to the public it is difficult to maintain a judicial attitude, and indeed some people would be perplexed and annoyed if a newspaper attempted to present information from different points of view, and its attempt to be fair they would misinterpret as hedging with sinister intent.

2. THE NEWSPAPER AND SOCIETY

Most newspapers are adherents and supporters of a political party, and in a political campaign they uphold one party to the exclusion of the other and aim to influence the reader's attitude toward policies and personalities rather than to inform him. Hence to comprehend both sides of an issue the reader must see more than one newspaper.

Even then he is likely not to see both sides but rather to read prejudiced statements of the respective party view-points rather than a fair statement or fair criticism of either. This effort to influence opinion is carried on by the editorial staff which advocates the cause of the party and supports its candidates. Editorials are quoted in whole or in part by smaller newspapers, so that the views of some editors have wide currency. But more important than the editorial page in influencing opinion is the news column. There was a time in journalism when the news was presented impartially, but impartiality is no longer characteristic of the average newspaper.

A little book on *English Journalism*, by Charles Pebody, published in London in 1882, could state of the English press, not without justification: "The Press errs, no doubt, now and then, but it is on the whole, honest, independent, and able; and as long as that is the case, the English Press, with all its faults, must remain what it is at present — one of the ornaments of our public men, and one of the bulwarks of public liberty." It is doubtful whether such a statement could be made today with regard to the press of any country. By including certain kinds of news and excluding others, newspapers exert a subtle influence which is as effective as it is dangerous. To cite an example: Soon after the close of the World War Bertrand Russell made a trip into Soviet Russia and English papers carried a story of his imprisonment and maltreatment there. As a matter of fact, Russell was not imprisoned or maltreated — at least not in Russia — and this fact he

made known upon his return to England. But — so he has asserted — not a single paper which carried the false report later corrected it, and if all the papers which had published the report had also published corrections the original impression produced by the account would not have been removed. Russell stated this fact a few years later in a large American city in a speech which contained criticisms of the press. The following day neither one of the two large dailies in that city referred to his address, though in the case of almost any other man of as much renown in the world of learning and of letters a great deal of prominence would have been given the fact that he had been in the city, and portions of the address would have been quoted. On each of two visits to the same city by another Britisher of different political complexion, Lord Birkenhead, the newspapers gave the visit much prominence, and on the mornings after his addresses devoted considerable space to a report of them. Thus in effect the newspapers said: "Russell is a man whose ideas should not be disseminated; Lord Birkenhead we wish to honor and introduce to the people. We will snub the former and sponsor the latter."

In recent years the advertising clientele has been an important factor in determining the character of the news. Subscriptions to the metropolitan newspaper do not pay a fifth of the cost of publication. It costs considerably more than two or three cents a copy to issue a sheet in which the number of printed words equals that of an ordinary book, and the cost must be met. Eventually, of course, the community in which the newspaper circulates pays the bills, but the immediate payers are the advertisers, without whose patronage the newspaper would be bankrupt.

Two evils follow from dependence of the newspaper upon advertisers, neither of which is likely to disappear while this financial dependence continues. One is the indirect control which it gives the advertisers over the policy of the newspaper.

As the business man knows that he must satisfy the customer, so the business manager of the newspaper knows that the newspaper must satisfy the advertisers, who are its immediate financial supporters. To offend advertisers to such an extent as to lose their patronage would be to commit financial suicide. The extent to which this dependence opens to business interests a back door to the editorial room is sometimes considerable and in any case it is a lurking source of insidious influence.

Fear of hurting business, that is, employers and capitalists, sometimes keeps important news out of the newspapers. Thus the news that

there was bubonic plague in San Francisco during the Exposition in 1915 was excluded from the newspapers from fear that it would keep visitors away from that city, injure trade, and decrease attendance at the Exposition, in which the city took great pride.

In other cities the newspapers have sometimes rigidly excluded information about the extent of an epidemic, fearing knowledge of the facts would keep people away from the city and customers from the stores, with loss to advertisers. Under such conditions only a determined health-officer is able to carry his point, for in some cases the newspapers flatly refuse to publish the facts. In one large city after the newspapers had refused to print the facts regarding an epidemic the health-officer placed posters at various points throughout the city stating the seriousness of the epidemic. The following day all of the city newspapers carried accounts of the epidemic. But such action by a determined official is usually paid for by loss of office as soon as the newspapers by methods direct or indirect can take their revenge. The number of journals which act from such motives it would be impossible to determine, but it is a serious matter that lives can be imperiled by a non-administrative agency sometimes exercising a stronger power than the police department itself. Through indirect ways unknown to the majority of the community the newspaper can effect purposes which it would not essay in the open and can accomplish ends which properly belong to legislative, executive, or police.

Another evil which results from financial dependence upon advertisers is the importance of a large circulation. An advertiser wishes to use the news-sheet which reaches the largest number of potential patrons and he can not afford to advertise in one which is seen by only a few people.

In order to secure advertisers, therefore, and to be able to charge a high rate for advertising, the newspaper must have a large number of readers. The drive for a large circulation often results in a lowering of the standards of the editorial and news columns, and in the insertion of catchy headlines and spicy news designed to sell the paper. When this occurs the newspaper loses all possibility of becoming an influential and uplifting force in the community and becomes merely a panderer to prevailing tastes. It offers the people what they want rather than what they should want, surrendering independence and becoming subservient to prevalent taste and demands. Instead of holding up a standard it lowers itself to the plane of the populace. If the community is prone to resort to lynching and to justify it, the newspaper follows suit. If the

community is anti-Japanese the newspaper prints anti-Japanese news and suppresses inconsistent items.

Many newspapers would in any case pander to local taste, but the tendency to do so is promoted by the fact that the policy is profitable since it increases the popularity of the journal and makes advertising space more valuable. "While the press in this country is more or less effective and to some degree free from external control, it is nevertheless rapidly becoming more and more servile to its advertisers. A large part of the revenues of most of our journals comes from this source, so that they have long competed with each other in lowering the price of their sheets in order to extend their circulation, according to which the price of their advertising is rated. It is no secret that very many concerns find it expedient to lavish vast amounts upon advertising which may or may not bring any great increase of customers but which is so effective in preventing editorial attack. The threat of withdrawing their patronage, by any large class of advertisers is often only too effective, and it is sometimes even necessary to know the chief sources of this income before we know whether a paper will print or decline even an outside communication that effectively attacks them. If we could only have here and there a well endowed journal which would take no advertisements at all and was conducted solely in the interest of public morale, with its columns open to all who intelligently sought to advance it, much could be accomplished here.

"As it is, the instincts that make for profiteering are almost inseparable from a commercial age, and if we analyze ourselves conscientiously and carefully, the best of us will probably find that we have not always lived up to the maxim of never accepting a dollar which does not represent a dollar's worth of real service."⁴

Thus the newspaper is often not far removed from the position of the lawyer who represents the interests of his client, but with the difference that the lawyer is frankly advocating the case of his client rather than passing judgment upon it. The attitude of the newspaper is that of passing judgment, whereas often it is merely advocating special interests.

Another change which makes the newspaper more insidiously injurious is the growth of irresponsible journalism. Formerly there was personal responsibility for opinions expressed on the editorial page or elsewhere in the columns of the newspaper. Now many contributions are

⁴ Hall, *Morale: The Supreme Standard of Life and Conduct*, pp. 242-243, New York, 1920.

unsigned and signed editorials have largely disappeared. Except in the case of the editor, and not always with regard to him, ordinarily one can not ascertain from the newspaper the names of those who contribute the editorials, or the character, qualifications, aims, or motives of the writers, though it is highly desirable that this information be accessible to readers. Reporting, likewise, is anonymous, even in the case of the most important news items. Knowledge as to who is reporting is important since the turn given the news often depends upon the bias of the reporter and his acquaintance with the facts. The personality and qualifications of the reporter are as important to readers of the newspaper as the personality and qualifications of the physician are to the patient.

The modern newspaper with a consistent policy acquires a personality and those who work for it become a part of its corporate life. The man who writes the editorials may have no personal interest in the issues which he discusses and may have convictions contrary to those which he voices. He may be a Democrat and write in support of Republican policies, or vice versa; he may believe in free trade and editorially advocate high tariff; he may believe in limitation of child labor and editorially support legislative non-interference. If he does not conform with the policy of the newspaper he must look elsewhere for a livelihood.

Nor, in the main, is the newspaper writer concerned about the policy of the journal for which he writes. There is no personal responsibility and giving up one position necessitates getting another with similar limitations.

Today the newspaper is primarily a business enterprise. Rarely does the editor control the business office, yet only when he does so can there be a presumption that the editorial policy is free. Men with alert and independent minds avoid the editorial room while the present policy maintains. The result is that the best talent of the community, which should be available through the newspaper, must find other channels for expression.

We need a subsidized press under the control of independent men who can give the news on public issues impartially. There would be difficulty in obtaining foreign news because it is now controlled by press bureaus, and to some extent the same is true of national and even local news. The experiment would be expensive but it would be worth the cost. Editorials should be signed and the sources of important news should be indicated. If intelligent people in the community would co-

operate the venture would succeed and its success would force other newspapers to raise their standards.

But if there is a sinister side to journalism there is also a bright side. Newspapers have done much constructive work. "The press has undoubtedly done good work in spreading the theories and practices of municipal reform, in promoting the fight for municipal ownership, for pure food, for clean streets, and all other forms of good municipal housekeeping; it has sometimes led campaigns for the purity of the ballot against the united forces of the 'machine'; it has itself many times initiated the prosecution of bribery, of land steals, insurance frauds, and the like. It is the press which has exerted itself in behalf of better poor laws, advocated good tenement laws, child-labor laws, and general protection of labor's interests. Both by the wide reach of their appeal and their own generous gifts newspapers have raised money for those whom earthquake, flood, or fire have made desolate. When Chicago, Baltimore, Galveston, San Francisco, and many other smaller cities suffered disaster from quake, flood, or fire, it was the newspapers that issued the first calls for aid and they themselves added to the large sums sent from all over the world to the needy. They have also started benefits for widows and orphans, sent children of the slums to the country, and given deserving students and teachers coveted trips to Europe. Whether because it adds to their reputation or because they are actuated by less selfish motives, newspapers are often found favoring good legislation and supporting competent men. Despite the frequent changes of front of the yellow journal, despite the fact that whenever its policy is attacked, whenever the interests of the owners of the paper are in question, the average newspaper will forsake the public weal for its own selfish benefit and power, the newspapers do frequently voice sound opinions regarding public law and order and the administration of justice."⁵

Recently there has been organized in this country an *Institute of Current World Affairs* which may greatly influence the future of journalism, particularly as regards international affairs. A preliminary statement issued by the Institute in January, 1926, describes its aims as, "(1) the gradual building up of a corps of twelve or fifteen men, each man to be an authority on the current affairs of a major area of the world, and the men, taken together, to include within their purview the entire world; and (2) the making of the fullest possible effectual use of their knowledge and personal services." It will be the task of each man

⁵ Rogers, *The American Newspaper*, pp. 140-142, Chicago, 1909.

to interpret a people, or a group, to itself and to others — a task requiring something “beyond the gleanings of a Cook’s tour, something beyond hard work and good intentions, something even beyond knowledge: sympathy, insight, the mellowness of time, the gift of expression are indispensable.” Accordingly the Institute proposes to take exceptional care in selecting personnel, and will make no one a regular member of the corps until he has demonstrated his fitness over a period of years. “Each man will be given every opportunity to acquire an understanding of the social, religious, racial, political, economic and other forces at work in the area to which he is assigned. Particularly will he be expected to come to know rather intimately the people holding key positions, exerting exceptional influence, or commanding special knowledge — in a word, the effectuals. Having acquired basic understanding of his area and essential personal contacts, he will then devote a part of his time and effort to putting to useful account his knowledge and his personal services. He will write articles and books, and prepare reports; and both when in his area and outside of it, he will discuss current affairs with influential people, will lecture at universities, address business groups, church organizations, women’s clubs, participate in conferences, etc.”

This is the most important experiment in journalism since the days of Benjamin Franklin, and its results will be awaited with keen interest.

“The public does not make the newspaper nor the cinema, but on the other hand the press and the cinemas do more and more make the public. They provide the social background for an increasing proportion of people, they determine the characteristics of the modern social atmosphere as nothing else now does. The pulpit and the home circle sink to relative insignificance. And if we men of large material influence propose, as I am proposing here, to accept our manifest responsibilities, and reconstruct the world as we can do, upon broader, finer, and happier lines, then it is in the world of the press and the show and the new methods of publicity that our first overt struggle must occur. If the conspiracy of circumstances that has put power into our hands is to be changed into an open creative conspiracy, it is to these things that we must first address our awakening intelligence.”⁶

⁶ H. G. Wells, *The World of William Clissold*, II, pp. 606–607, New York, 1926.

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CHAPTER XXV ✓

POLITICS AND LAW

POLITICS

A significant sentence in Aristotle's *Politics* is usually translated as, "Man is by nature a social animal." What Aristotle said, however, was, "Man is by nature a political animal."¹ Had he been questioned as to which he really meant, undoubtedly he would have replied that the two were inseparable, for as a matter of fact his "political" means "of the city-state," and in that city-state man was both political and social participant. The word "politics," therefore, is derived from the Greek word for "city-state," as the word "citizen" is derived from the Latin word *civis*, meaning "city." For the Greek and the Roman, political life and civilization inhered in community life, such as flourished in the city, especially in the type of cities with which they were acquainted. They were correct in identifying politics with group life and in insisting that political structure was a necessary phase of community life. Historically, at least, they were correct in identifying politics with sociology, for in the early history of civilization political and social relations were indistinguishable. In an Australian tribe the machinery of government is identical with the social organization and cannot be separated from it even in description. This is true in an Eskimo community, and in tribes of the North American Plains area. Social authority is tribal authority, and tribal authority is social. Both are embedded in an undifferentiated plasm, out of which a later specialization brings partial separation.

In an Eskimo community there is no chief, tribal assembly, legislative body, or executive authority, yet law and government exist in essence, for the people are obedient to custom, tradition, and the opinions of their fellows. These constitute the government, the king and the council; the individual can not disregard them with impunity more than he can violate law and oppose constituted authority without paying the penalty. There is a difference in the manner of administering the penalty; the recalcitrant Eskimo is not sent to jail, but he may be prac-

¹ Literally, a "city-state animal."

tically forced out of the community; he pays no fine, but he is subjected to social censure. These penalties are more effective in Eskimo society than are laws, policemen, and courts, in our culture, and they perform a similar function.

Only when civilization becomes more complex are political and social relations divorced. Only in the more highly evolved tribes of savagery, such as those in Polynesia, on the West Coast of Africa, or in the higher cultures of Central America, is a clear distinction made between political and social authority. In these more highly developed cultures political structure acquires a semi-independence from social forces and forges ahead by a momentum of its own. In the later stages of Roman civilization, as earlier in Egypt and in Babylonia, and subsequently in Western European civilization, the political structure became largely independent and self-supporting, and compelled society in a larger degree than society compelled it.

Even so the independence is more specious than real, for the one must take account of the other. However successfully political authority may defy social authority for a time, its independence from social demands is limited, and in Western European civilization the day of independence has passed. Politics now recognizes an obligation to satisfy social needs, though we are still uncertain as to what needs it should satisfy. The American and the French Revolution were attempts to hold government in check and make it accountable to social demands. Since that time there has been a tendency to fuse political and social demands and to make the political structure the servant rather than the master of society.

Political structure connotes authority, compulsion backed by force, and society is profoundly interested in political aims and methods, for on these depend the potentialities of group life. An inadequate or vicious political structure handicaps group and individual at every turn, whereas an adequate and responsive one increases their potentialities.

Political structure plays in social life a part almost as important as that of anatomical structure in organic life, determining the means, ends, and potentialities of group life. If, for example, freedom of thought and speech are essential to the realization of individual careers and to the potentialities of group life, political authority must recognize the fact, for political right must be consonant with social right. The latter can scarcely exist without the former, since political authority is merely the machinery for enforcing the demands of the group.

Again, if the needs of individuals are to be served the franchise must provide a means for registering them.

If minorities have rights there must be a political machinery to protect and enforce them, and if majorities are to count there must be a machinery to enforce their demands. Yet the matter is not solely one of machinery. In addition to structure there is function, and often similar structures function in a different manner and achieve different ends. A democratic form of government does not *per se* ensure democracy, nor are absolute monarchies ever really absolute. Tradition, custom, and public opinion must be reckoned with.

The significant thing is not so much the form of government as the manner in which the political structure functions — which in the last analysis depends upon the people themselves, who have as good a government as they deserve. If they deserved better they would not tolerate the existing form, though refusal to tolerate an existing political ill does not invariably bring improvement. The people must discover a substitute which is better, else they go from bad to worse.

The roots of the political structure lie within society, and the political scientist understands politics only when he understands society. His understanding is inadequate, not to say false, if he fails to penetrate beneath the surface of political structure and if he perceives only governmental machinery. The driving-power is or should be outside of the machinery and the political purpose as well lies outside of it. The ends of government can not be discovered by studying government alone, which is but a means to an end. Political ethics must conform with social ethics and political philosophy must rest on social philosophy. The statesman needs an understanding of social life in order to make effective the instrumentalities which he devises for carrying out political plans. The prejudices and caprices as well as the deeper needs of men and of groups must be taken into consideration by the agencies of government. Governments have sometimes failed, not because they were fundamentally wrong, but because they chose the means without intelligently consulting group and individual demands.

The sphere of politics is the sphere of government, but it is impossible to say where it begins; for government, of which law is a phase, reaches out into nearly all realms of human activity. It is concerned with traffic regulations, affairs abroad, education, freedom of speech, and in a negative or a positive way with all phases of human life, since theoretically though not actually government can prohibit or permit any kind of activity. Political structure, therefore, must have a rationale, an

excuse for existence. It should be a means to an end, an instrument for achieving results.

Do political institutions secure the ends for which they are designed? Are we satisfied with the ends for which they exist? It may be that our political institutions are adequate to the ends they serve but that the ends are not adequate to the larger social needs.

I. THE NEED FOR AN INTERNATIONAL ORIENTATION

The largest unit within which political institutions operate is commonly said to be the State or nation, which is usually regarded as the largest territory in which a common authority is recognized and a common political compulsion acknowledged. Hence love of country is given by many as the supreme ideal, since one's country is considered the largest unit of political life.

But one who surveys the civilized world discovers that neither of these propositions in unqualified form is true. Patriotism is not enough, for it does not solve all problems but in fact often creates serious ones. When the German makes the interests of the Fatherland the supreme ideal, the Frenchman the interests of France, the Englishman the interests of England, they do not meet on a common understanding, but live in different worlds made potentially if not actually antagonistic by reason of these respective disparate and diverging patriotisms.

Most of the reasons urged for making patriotism paramount bear evidence on their face that patriotism is not enough. The nation is not a self-sufficient unit, but its welfare is bound up inextricably with the fates of other peoples. Who can say how much of our economic organization is part and parcel of that of Western Europe? how much of our political structure is an American product? what portion of our social life and of our social ideals is American made and American grown? Here and there we can disentangle the native from the introduced products, but for the most part they are so intimately interwoven as to be almost indistinguishable.

Nationals live in a common world and must orient themselves intellectually, socially, and politically in it. Much that passes under the name of patriotism is only magnified local prejudice. We have not yet accommodated our political ideals to the enlarging world in which we now live, being still inclined to regard it with the eyes of a man of the Middle Ages. Our economic and intellectual development has enlarged the bounds of country and in many instances has made them compara-

tively unimportant, but our political horizon has not expanded proportionately. Because our geography remains the same we tend to think of political ideas and institutions as circumscribed by the old geographical limitations.

We need an international orientation as much today as the American colonies in the eighteenth century needed a larger orientation which would include them all. An international orientation does not imply giving up loyalty to country more than union in a federation implies surrendering loyalty to state. It is not a means of limiting the freedom of a country, but a means of increasing it, even as the union of the colonies increased the freedom of each.

2. CHANGING POLITICAL IDEALS

We live in a day of conflicting ideals and everywhere men are challenging the justice and adequacy of the political order. In the older despotisms the people have deposed the despot; in monarchies they have dispensed with monarchs and set up republics and in democracies the adequacy of democracy is being questioned: "Make the world safe for democracy," was met with the retort, "First make democracy safe for the world." There was a vigorous campaign to give the ballot to everyone; now there is the cry that most people can make no intelligent use of it and that the universal franchise ensures mediocrity in legislature and executive. Men demanded freedom of speech and press; having acquired it, they discovered that giving free reign to all tongues and all presses when the masses can not distinguish between false and true, upright and designing, results in confusion. There is agitation for protection of officials from the clamor of the crowd, while from another quarter comes insistence that the people do not have sufficient control of their elected representatives, whether these be legislators or executives. Some would have judges occupy an impregnable position where the plaudits of the crowd would make their position no stronger and the disapproval of the populace would in no wise endanger their tenure of office; some, of another mind, would have judges subject to the recall, responsible at every moment of their judicial career to the verdict of the people. Some think that the government interferes too much in private affairs, others that it does not interfere enough. Some think that there is too much local diversity in our laws, others that the diversity is not sufficient to meet the local needs of peoples in various states and communities.

These opposing movements possibly represent not merely conflict but also a general drift to a new order of things. One of the major tasks of the present age is to clarify the issues that confront the politician and evolve a working program which shall make clearer the ends which we really desire and the means of attaining them. Two preëminent purposes are served by political control. It protects individual, community, state, and nation by laws guaranteeing the rights of property and person. A second function, inseparable from the first, is the creation of new opportunities.

Thanks to the political structure the citizen who travels into foreign territory is while there under the protection of his government. He can move from one state into another whether that state wishes him to take up his abode in it or would have him go elsewhere. He can engage in economic enterprises with the assurance that the state will protect him, whatever his neighbors like to do about it. Political "rights" throw about him a magic mantle which enables him to travel, engage in enterprises, and speak his mind as he would not be able to do if political structure did not provide these freedoms. Thus political control offers the individual new fields of opportunity, and only where control exists is there freedom.

3. THE RÔLE OF THE POLITICIAN

But this is stating the problems of politics in their simplest form, detached from the world of men and things. As a matter of fact, political issues are the football of politicians. Indeed in this country the word "politics," properly referring to matters of government and citizenship, has been corrupted to mean the unscrupulous ways of petty party adherents, so that to speak of a man as a "politician" is almost to disparage him. This change in the flavor of a good classical word is a sad commentary upon our country and the times. A smaller percentage of our best citizens are actively interested in politics than used to be the case, and in this respect we compare unfavorably with European countries.

Party politics is a highly skilled game, the rules of which must be ascertained by participation in it. There are many dodges and turns which only the skilled politician knows. Some of the cruder methods of boss control have gone out of vogue and are not likely to be resumed on an extensive scale, but much remains which to a democracy is no cause for pride. After a man secures a backing in his immediate con-

stituency he must, if he is running for state or national office, appeal to a larger electorate, and this involves advertising, newspaper articles, and other forms of publicity. In the city the candidate must operate through a ward club of his party, and the candidate who is not a party man has little chance of election to an important office. Experience shows that irrespective of issues, personality, or qualifications, it is extremely difficult for an independent candidate to secure election. In the ward clubs are initiated the party movements which select the candidates and determine the issues. In cities of this country having a population of 50,000 or more there are probably two thousand of these clubs, with a total membership of more than a million. Being much alike in composition and in spirit, their combined influence is considerable. The dues are low, as a rule merely nominal, so that all who care to join may do so and no one is dropped for failure to pay them. The ward clubs are the small cogs of the great party machine.

The boss of the ward picks the candidate. Since many city governments are carried on by a council composed of one member from each ward, this means that the ward bosses select the council, or at least select the candidates from among whom the council is chosen by the electorate. A great many qualified voters do not take the trouble to vote or to join the ward club, and the power of the ward boss is to that extent enhanced. In the country districts the party machine operates in similar manner and with similar effectiveness. In ordinary times, therefore, the bosses have the determining influence, though an aroused electorate may temporarily overthrow them.

Without the support of the business men of the community and that of the newspapers it is difficult for bosses to operate and many have been brought low by the opposition of the press, though it is "better to be roasted than ignored." Indeed, "up to a certain point, the city machine leader thrives on hostile newspaper publicity, just as the Ku Klux Klan thrives on it, and the Anti-Saloon League. Nothing the newspapers say about the boss weakens him with his followers in the organization. On the contrary, it convinces them that he has the power, which most of the time he has not, and confirms them in the conviction that he is the man to tie to." But, "of course, there is a limit beyond which the boss cannot go in getting himself denounced helpfully. He must not get caught in crookedness. He must not be too brazen and flagrant in the plundering of the public. He must not be discovered in the act of 'double-crossing' party candidates, or throwing elections — but merely to be assailed as a corrupt and venal boss does not hurt him

either with the units of the machine on the one side, or with the big business interests, who find it convenient to use a boss's power, on the other. Personally, of course, nobody likes being publicly assailed as a crook in the newspapers, but any intelligent professional boss would much rather his local press shoot at him than take up some other man in the machine and denounce him as the real boss."²

Another feature of the game is the financing of the party campaign. In 1920 the National Committee of the Republican Party accounted for \$3,829,260 spent in the effort to elect Harding, while the Democratic Committee accounted for \$1,349,260 spent in the effort to elect Cox, but this is merely a portion of the expense of the campaign. Professor Merriam estimates that approximately twenty million dollars are spent by the two larger parties in a national campaign, an average of about five million dollars yearly if the sums were spread over the intervening years. No candidate can hope for election unless there are large sums of money to finance the campaign. The motives which induce the contributions are of various kinds, and in many instances the man who has given liberally to campaign funds expects returns.

This is only an indication of some phases of the game of politics, but we must pass on to other matters of greater theoretical interest though they are probably of no greater importance in practical politics. The evils in the game of politics are not so great as they once were, but they are sufficiently prevalent and iniquitous to cause considerable concern to a self-respecting democracy.

4. NEW POLITICAL IDEALS

In part our political institutions are faulty because we do not know what we want. We know that our present form of political life is not satisfying, but we do not know what form would be. We shall never discover the eternally satisfying form so long as men's ideals, ideas, and methods of life change, but we now possess the mechanism for making continual improvements in political institutions. Whether we shall run the mechanism or allow it to run us is another issue. "To the people we come sooner or later; it is upon their wisdom and self-restraint that the stability of the most cunningly devised scheme of government will in the last resort depend."³

The development of political institutions and ideals during the past

² Kent, *The Great Game of Politics*, pp. 93-94, New York, 1924.

³ Bryce, *The American Commonwealth*, I, p. 173, New York, 1919.

few centuries has brought some outstanding changes. In most countries men have done away with kings or have limited the royal power and have restrained the bureaucracies which surrounded the monarchs and sometimes virtually controlled them. More power has been placed in the hands of legislative assemblies, which are now more representative than they formerly were. The extension of the franchise has broken down the distinctions based on property-holding; poor as well as rich, women as well as men, can now vote, and each vote counts one. The Recall makes the elected representatives, and in many cases the elected administrative officials as well, subject to the control of the electorate, though the majority of democratic peoples have not adopted this device. The Initiative gives the people an opportunity to constitute themselves a legislative body and to enact laws, while the Referendum is likewise an extension of the legislative function to the entire electorate. Where the Recall extends to members of the Bench, as in some cases it does, there is indirect participation of the electorate in the interpretation of the law. But in some quarters there is the conviction that the people are not yet properly represented. In a city election, for example, one party may have only a small majority in each ward and yet secure all the representatives in the city council. An electorate of thousands of Democrats, or Republicans, may have only one representative, or none. This is true also of state and national legislatures.

Present methods of election, therefore, do not ensure representation for all large groups. To remedy the defect a scheme of proportional representation has been proposed whereby each minority has representatives whose numbers are proportionate to the size of its vote in comparison with the entire vote cast. This plan has been adopted in some American cities but not by any state, though it is used in some European countries.

Moreover, the fundamental basis of our electorate has been challenged as not being truly representative whether we use proportional representation or not. Our method is territorial; that is to say, representation is geographical. Its critics declare that a geographical division of the electorate does not bring together those who have similar interests and hence is not truly representative. The suggested alternative is representation based on occupational groups, the so-called guild system. By this system, which has never been tried, carpenters, for example, would elect their representatives, as would plumbers, lawyers, and other occupational groups. Smaller occupational groups would com-

prise one class so that in this manner they would be assured of representation.

The scheme is based on the assumption that community of interests lies along occupational lines and that only when occupations are represented are the various elements of the community really represented. It is based on the further implied assumption that occupation is politically, or at least legislatively, the most important basis of grouping. But the chief difficulty with the guild system is that it gives full play to special interests. Our social life is so complicated and the interests of one group are so inextricably intertwined with those of others that representation on an occupational basis would likely lead to confusion and additional conflict. Occupational blocs might gain control of the legislature and utilize their power solely in their own interests. The present territorial system encourages devotion to local interests, it is true, but the guild system would merely shift the emphasis to other lines.

We have already gone too far with the theory and practice that the representative represents, and should represent, the electorate which chooses him. He should represent the entire political unit, free to act for its best interests, with full responsibility for the exercise of his freedom. He should be a man who understands political problems better than do the majority of the electorate. In a sense he should be unrepresentative, for he should be the best man available for this function, and above rather than representative of the average intelligence and acumen.

The electorate must select legislators of integrity who have special ability for their task. They should be chosen on the basis of political qualifications rather than on that of loyalty to party. A professional and not merely a party loyalty should be demanded of representatives, who should represent their political unit rather than primarily their electorate. Fundamentally, however, the responsibility for inadequate representation lies with those who elect rather than with those who are elected. Seldom do three-fourths of the qualified voters come to the polls in a state or a national election, and only a small percentage, a fourth or a fifth at most, appear at the primaries.

In the primaries the candidates are selected; the primaries, therefore, determine the character of legislature and executive. In the United States about ninety-nine per cent of the electorate have access to primaries, and probably less than ten per cent makes use of the privilege. If excellent men are nominated it does not matter much what

candidates are chosen at the election. Yet nine voters out of ten record no decision at the primary. They stay at home and blame the ward boss for the results, but the responsibility is quite as much theirs as his.

Neither is the American electorate much concerned about exercising its prerogative at the general elections. In the presidential election of 1865, 83.51 per cent of the eligible vote was cast, while in the presidential election of 1920 only 52.36 per cent was cast—a bare majority. In the national election of 1924 only 50 per cent of the qualified voters registered a choice at the polls. In the 1924 elections in Great Britain 76 per cent of the voters appeared at the polls, and in the preceding election for members of the House of Commons 76 per cent of the electorate of England and Wales voted. In the new Irish Free State 60 per cent of adult men and women voted—a better showing than some twenty-five American states make. In the first election in the new German Republic 75 per cent of all Germans over twenty years of age voted. The number rose to 80 per cent in the 1924 elections and to 82 per cent in the presidential election of April, 1925. Over a twenty-year period an average of 75 per cent of the electorate in Australian states voted, while in New Zealand it was 80 per cent. In the 1916 referendum on military conscription 86 per cent of the New Zealand qualified vote was cast. In the 1923-24 elections the voting in New Zealand and in Queensland reached 84 per cent of the qualified electorate. Belgium, Holland, and Denmark range from 60 to 90 per cent efficiency, the average being 75 per cent, which is one-half better than the average for this country. France averages 70 per cent of the electorate, while Norway and Sweden are slightly higher—71 per cent in the 1920 election in Norway. In the 1922 elections the Swiss vote was 76 per cent efficient, and a later referendum vote polled 85 per cent. Italy does better than this country; it polled about 64 per cent of its vote in the parliamentary election of 1925. The Canadian provinces excel the states in this country, their average being about 70 per cent. Latin America is the only large section of the voting world which does not put the United States to shame in its voting record, and even here there are exceptions. Cuba makes twice as good a showing as Florida, while in a recent presidential election in Mexico the polled vote showed a percentage twice as high as the average for the Gulf states in this country. The Southern states have a high percentage of illiteracy due to the negro population, but Mexico, too, has a 70 per cent illiteracy. In Argentina and in Uruguay the vote is about 65 per

cent of the electorate, which is a considerably better showing than that made by this country — not excepting the 108 per cent of the total vote of New York City which was once polled in the days of Boss Tweed. But that is another story, and one which does a democracy even less credit.

The regret arising from the fact that only a small number of people vote comes from the implication that there is little interest in self-government and that the machine politicians have great opportunities. Those who are interested in matters of government are likely to vote, and an increase in voting strength may generally be taken as an index of the amount of interest in the choice of candidates.

But merely having more votes to count will not solve the difficulties of democracy. We need more intelligent voting, and above all we need an effective method of securing such candidates that there will be a motive to go to the polls and register a choice. The cure may be not in increasing the number of those who vote but in decreasing it, through requiring an understanding of political issues and not merely a knowledge of the technique of making a cross-mark on the ballot. There is much truth in Pope's couplet,

For forms of government let fools contest,
What's best administered is best.

The political process will receive more attention as analysis of political action becomes more acute. In a city, for example, there are various groups with interests which are not the same and sometimes are conflicting. The residents who wish industries kept out of a certain district may be in conflict with the manufacturers who would like to establish plants there. The railroads may have interests which are in opposition to those of a residential section though consonant with those of certain manufacturers. A proposed raising of the tax rates for the support of parks appeals differently to different sections of the electorate. Other interests cut across localities, as, for example, the matter of raising the age of compulsory education, though many political issues appeal differently to various social groups. "The State is the totality of institutions by which the common weal is secured."

LAW

5. THE SOURCES OF LAW

Law is an authoritative regulation of group life and of individual activities, with penalties for disobedience. In some instances it has been decided by the courts that a regulation is a law, although there are no means for enforcing its provisions; but generally a provision which is not enforceable is not regarded as a law. In early society law is indistinguishable from custom. In the more primitive societies there is no distinct legal code and no agency for carrying out legal provisions, but custom is enforced by public opinion, the authority of elders, chiefs, headmen, or by the individuals immediately concerned.

In later stages of social development a distinction is made between custom and law. In highly developed societies law is an agency to which appeal can be made when other sources of redress fail. It is a separate arm of government and is relatively independent of other departments of group life. It is strengthened by a bulwark of precedent. To follow precedent is to decide that the law is what it has been interpreted as being, and in common law precedent, through judicial interpretation, plays a large part.

Wherever law is highly developed there are courts for its administration, and these are presided over by judges whose function it is to interpret and apply the law. Since the interpretation of the law depends upon the judges, and since in many cases a law is susceptible of more than one interpretation, the function of the judiciary is an important one. So far as law has social applications and is designed to serve social purposes the judges are servants of society and responsible to it. Yet the training of the judiciary is almost solely along technical legal lines, with no emphasis upon the character or needs of society. The result is that many who are specialists in the field of law are not well informed about the society in which the law operates. Yet the welfare of the group must be taken into consideration if law is to serve society intelligently.

In many countries a written constitution imposes limits upon both the law-making body and the judiciary, so that the constitution is a guarantee of certain rights irrespective of the attitude of legislative assemblies or judicial bodies. But in this country constitutional provisions are interpreted by a court and not by a legislative body or by the people, and judges determine what the constitution means. In many instances more than one interpretation is possible, the character of the

interpretation depending upon the judicial mind. Where it is a matter of social import, and not merely a matter of procedure, the social philosophy as well as the legal knowledge of the judges influences their interpretations. This is notably the case when a Bill of Rights is in question, or when individual liberty or special privileges are issues. Justice Holmes of the United States Supreme Court, for example, frequently has given an opinion in opposition to those of other Justices on the Bench, because he approached constitutional issues with a different social attitude.

6. CONSERVATISM IN LAW

“ Even new laws are seldom or never complete innovations; they nearly always rest upon and presuppose a basis of existing custom and public opinion which harmonize more or less with the new laws, and have long silently prepared for their reception in the minds of the people. The most despotic monarch in the world could not force upon his subjects an absolutely new law, which should run counter to the whole bent and current of their natural disposition, outraging all their hereditary opinions and habits, flouting all their most cherished sentiments and aspirations. Even in the most seemingly revolutionary enactment there is always a conservative element which succeeds in securing the general assent and obedience of a community. Only a law which in some measure answers to a people’s past has any power to mould that people’s future. To reconstruct human society from the foundations upward is a visionary enterprise, harmless enough so long as it is confined to the utopias of philosophic dreamers, but dangerous and possibly disastrous when it is attempted in practice by men, whether demagogues or despots, who by the very attempt prove their ignorance of the fundamental principles of the problem they rashly set themselves to solve. Society is a growth, not a structure; and though we may modify that growth and mould it into fairer forms, as the gardener by his art has evolved blooms of lovelier shape and richer hue from the humbler flowers of the field and the meadow, the hedgerow and the river-bank, we can as little create society afresh as the gardener can create a lily or a rose. Thus in every law, as in every plant, there is an element of the past, an element which, if we could trace it to its ultimate source, would lead us backwards to the earliest stages of human life in the one case and of plant life in the other.”⁴

⁴ Frazer, *Folklore in the Old Testament*, pp. 350-351, one volume edition, New York, 1923.

The conservatism of legal forms is an axiom. Law books abound in Latin phrases, Norman French, and technical terms which only the initiated understand. An ordinary deed of transfer of real property bristles with ancient forms and superfluous expressions, rivaling the uncanny signs of a physician's prescription. The procedure in courts is so complicated and filled with so many technicalities that law schools offer special instruction in *Procedure*.

The conservatism of law is shown in many other ways, some of which are more disturbing than these ancient forms and processes. The conduct of criminal cases among English-speaking peoples, especially in the United States, is an example. The old trial by combat, out of which much of our trial by jury developed, still flourishes. The procedure is that of two contesting parties before a tribunal of judge and jury. They fight battles much as of yore, with the substitution of legal counsel and legal weapons for the sword. This, to be sure, is an improvement over the medieval system, but the victory depends sometimes upon the ability and agility of the respective contestants and the decision of right is often a matter of who has the greater pecuniary might.

Conservatism is found also in the use of the oath, a medieval procedure based on medieval conceptions. One state (Maryland) will not admit to the witness-stand a person who does not believe in rewards and punishments in a post-mortem existence. Thus theology is intruded into legal procedure. One may worship according to conscience, but one may testify only according to medieval dictates which survive in the modern ordeal of trial; and this despite the fact that no jury is bound to believe the statement of a witness whether made under oath or not. This is only one of many examples of the extent to which law is unresponsive to new social standards and new ethical conceptions.

7. CHANGES IN LEGAL METHODS AND IN LEGAL ATTITUDES

If law is to serve as the instrument of society it must be adaptable. Since society is constantly changing, law too, if it is to continue to serve adequately, must change in conformity with the new demands made upon it. There must be a continual reorientation of the law in keeping with the reorientation of group needs and aims. A law which fails to serve this purpose is to that extent inadequate. Already much has been done to make the law a more intelligent servant of the group. In many courts, particularly in the recently established Domestic or Family Courts and in the Juvenile Courts, psychological clinics have been in-

troduced. The recognition of the significance of the psychological equipment of the individual, and of the importance of his motives, interests, and complexes, does much to simplify the problems by appraising the conduct of the accused and ascertaining the treatment which will be of most benefit to him. The psychologist has brought home to judge and jury the fact that responsibility has a wide range. It differs among individuals and it is not the same at all moments of a man's life. Moreover, there are not merely degrees but kinds of responsibility: that of an adult differs in kind rather than in degree from that of a child, and that of the feeble-minded is different from that of the normal.

A change in legal attitudes is indicated in the use of indeterminate sentences. The one-crime-one-punishment idea is in the discard. In its place is the conception of the varied nature of crime and the idea of a punishment which befits the criminal and also provides the best security for society. Only recently have we learned to punish not the crime but the criminal. An appreciation of the difference in criminals leads to acknowledgment of the need for discrimination in punishment based on the nature of the criminal rather than the nature of the crime. More attention is being paid to the human element, relatively less to the sheer act.

We ask more insistently about the objects of punishment. An earlier age was satisfied with vengeance, but the present generation finds it insufficient reason for punishment. Hence the importance attached to measures which are reformatory as well as punitive, defensive rather than vindictive.

We inquire more diligently also into the nature of the crime. The old distinction between *mala in se* and *mala prohibita*, i.e., acts which are wrong in themselves and acts which are wrong only because prohibited, is not a distinction which satisfies social ethics today. Acts are not wrong in themselves, but only because they have undesirable social consequences; if an act is wrong only because prohibited it is not wrong at all, but is merely prohibited.

8. LAW AS AN INSTRUMENT OF SOCIETY

Law is essentially an instrument of society, and much is being done in the socialization of law and legal procedure. The establishment of a Public Defender is a step in this direction. Other public functionaries could serve in a similar capacity if they would attempt to ascertain the facts of the case rather than to stage a contest patterned on the old trial

by combat. In the treatment of juvenile offenders, for example, the court becomes a psychological, social, and educational clinic. There is an endeavor to treat each case on its merits, in a word, to humanize the proceedings rather than resolve them into formality and technicality.

Some courts apply the philosophy of an ounce of prevention. The probation officer is more intent on seeing that law is observed than on seeing that its violation is punished. Assistants to the judge of the Juvenile Court visit parents and acquaint them with the work of the court and the problems facing their children, thereby giving the parents a keener sense of responsibility.

Probably much more could be accomplished through similar channels by other courts. There appears to be no obstacle beyond that weightiest of all, the conservatism of men, to extending the function of courts so that they shall be as much concerned with obedience to law as they now are with punishments for broken laws. The courts which punish crime might be used to decrease it. The new responsibility would discover instruments more adequate to the demands. Our greatest need is a realization of the need for such preventive work.

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CHAPTER XXVI

INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION

In modern society practically all phases of economic activity involve group activity. The enterprise of running a railroad, for example, is not a one-man job; it can be carried on only by a large number of people united and organized for this function. Moreover, the enterprise involves a large number of people not connected with the administration or work of the railroad who yet benefit or suffer by reason of it. Indeed, if the railroad involved only those working for it, it would be a losing enterprise and would soon be defunct for want of patrons. The extent to which group activity is involved in economic enterprises is exemplified in the results of specialization. Each specialization brings a new alignment of interdependence, for every specialist is dependent upon others for his subsistence, or at least for the larger number of his goods; and his specialization makes others dependent upon him. When economic enterprise is carried on through specialization each is dependent upon others, and if one fails all are to some extent though in varying degrees affected. Conversely, for the most part improvement in the economic status of one brings improvement in the status of others, though at times improvement in the status of one group results in disadvantages to others. When the chauffeur displaces the coachman the smith suffers.

The social bearing of economic activity is apparent also if we view it from the historical angle. There is a continuity in economic organization which joins man to man, generation to generation, and century to century. Economic development is continuous and a knowledge of it is essential to an understanding of contemporary economic institutions. Our method of inheriting property, for example, can not be understood apart from the history of feudal England. The safeguards for international trade, the relations between capital and labor, and modern business methods can not be understood without a knowledge of their respective historical developments. Economic history is, indeed, merely a phase of social history, for all economic advance involves social agencies.

Trade is not possible without confidence, and confidence is not possible unless social attitudes are enduring. Money is essentially a group instrument. The credit on which in the more advanced economic stages big enterprises depend is at bottom a social instrument. Economic institutions, therefore, rest on social institutions and social development brings new economic developments which in turn necessitate social readjustments. A new social and political philosophy actuates those who initiate the French Revolution and a new social and political order ensues. The changes do not stop there but carry with them equally important modifications in the economic order. The struggle between the North and the South in the Civil War is, ostensibly at least, over states' rights, that is, over a constitutional question, yet important economic changes are the result of the struggle, the abolition of slavery being one of them. The problem of slavery is in fact twofold, the ethical and the economic aspects being inextricably intertwined. Together they give rise to a social problem and this in turn to a political problem. The new social attitudes regarding the rights of children have elicited legislation regulating their economic activities, even to the extent of an attempt to amend the Constitution of the United States, and in every country in which new social theories regarding the status of children have come into vogue they have influenced economic activity. The same is true of the social philosophy regarding the rights of women. Recognition of equality in social rights carries with it a recognition, though partial and tardy, of economic equality. A social conscience regarding the desirability of protecting motherhood and infancy results in new attitudes toward mothers and potential mothers employed in industry. In civilization as in primitive life the social separation between men and women leads to separation of economic tasks. Social discriminations tend to break down when economic discriminations disappear, and *vice versa*. So marked is the tendency for important social changes to elicit economic changes, and conversely, that it is difficult to find many exceptions to this law.

As social and intellectual activities expand and their demands include things which are not primarily economic goods, such as learning, art, poetry, drama — though even these have an economic phase — the new social values call for new economic adjustments. If specialists in these lines are to function they can not to any large extent be creators of economic goods as economic goods were previously defined and they must be maintained by other producers.

Poets as such produce no economic goods other than poetry and

they have no place in the economic order until the group assigns them one by giving them goods in exchange for their services, though their services are social rather than economic in the sense that "economic" previously bore. As soon as one thinks in terms of social services the problem of fair profits intrudes. Indeed it enters even when all members of society are economically productive.

We ask whether the laborer is worthy of his hire, but we ask also whether he is worth more than his hire. The problem of fair profits can not be answered solely on the economic plane, for that means merely what a man gets and not what he should get. Society is becoming more interested in what a man should get and is making provision accordingly.

A new social philosophy elicits laws of minimum wage and maximum hours, whatever economic justification there may or may not be for them. This is not encroaching on grounds where social idealism has no right to tread, for in contemporary civilization every economic enterprise utilizes social tools. It draws upon the past, appeals to the protection of the law, and utilizes the knowledge handed down through group life. The "rights" to which the worker or the capitalist appeals are rights only because society creates and countenances them. Withdrawal of social sanction leaves the claims of both laborer and capitalist mere empty pretense.

Economic development does not always lag behind or take its cue from social development. It has a momentum and develops along its own lines, bringing changes in the social order and creating new social problems. Usually, however, economic development makes the individual more dependent upon others. Transportation furnishes an example of this. In the early days when a man traveled on foot he relied on no one but himself; with the advent of the cart and wagon drawn by ox or horse he was forced to deal with others. When better highways made longer trips possible he became dependent upon inn-keepers, road-masters, smiths, and wheelwrights. When he used the automobile he became dependent upon more agencies and more individuals. The individual who participates in a highly evolved economic order loses the independence which one enjoys in the simpler stages where each man performs all the labor which contributes to the satisfaction of his needs. Specialization makes him dependent upon others and them upon him. When social conscience fails to keep pace with the new economic interdependence social development lags behind economic development. When man enters upon a new economic order in which there are greater

hazards as well as greater profits than in the previous order, he needs new insurance to cover the new risk.

In a highly developed economic order the fortune of the individual varies with the success, industry, and efficiency of his fellows. We thrive not merely because of our own exertions, but equally because of the exertions of others who, along with us, maintain the economic institutions. If their exertions cease our most assiduous efforts will not stave off starvation and poverty. Thanks to the contributions of the economic order the poorest paid workman of the present day commands luxuries not dreamed of by the wealthy and powerful lord of earlier centuries. Our own efforts are necessary to exalt us above our contemporaries, but the efforts of our contemporaries raise us above the economic plane on which our predecessors lived. Culture continuity and social interdependence make this possible.

Competition, then, is relative and commands coöperation, or it is predestined to a suicidal conclusion. In the present economic order a man can compete successfully with others only when he can secure a considerable amount of coöperation, and he who secures the greatest amount is the most successful. An unrestricted competition is properly called "cut-throat," since that is the inevitable finale. The only alternative to competition and coöperation is a return to that simple state in which each is dependent only upon himself and no one profits from the contributions of his fellows. Even savagery knows no economic order as simple as that.

Economic and social efficiency are closely related. No social group is properly adjusted if poverty stalks through the land; none can enjoy the fruits of its labors if all do not in some adequate manner participate in the results of social effort. Where dissatisfaction with economic rewards persists something is wrong either with the dissatisfied individuals or with the system. The source of the trouble should be ascertained and a remedy sought. Material goods are not good merely because they are material things or are capable of being converted into useful objects; they are good only when they are material for good. They should enhance human life and satisfy human needs.

What is the use of all or any of our material goods if they lead to no enrichment of human life? The value of the economic order can be interpreted only in terms of what it contributes to social and individual life, for there is no other criterion. It is, therefore, not merely the right but the duty of society to determine the basis for economic rewards. Indeed society is constantly doing this, though frequently it

does it in the traditional manner known as *laissez faire*. But *laissez faire* — “let things alone” — does not really mean let them alone; it means see that they continue as they have been, see that the rules of the game remain the same. Provide other rules, and the possibilities of *laissez faire* are different. The problem, then, is whether society should keep its present rules or revise them.

Getting what one earns means getting what society permits one to get under its present régime. Under a different régime one would get what one earns, but one would earn and receive something different. Moreover, owing to the interdependence of individuals and to the extent to which past generations contribute to present possibilities there is no way to determine solely in economic terms what a man does earn. What he earns by his unsupplemented efforts is so nearly nothing that it is inconsequential. The present order maintains the job from which the workman gets his pay and supports the enterprise by means of which the capitalist lives. Society creates and maintains land, labor, and capital so far as these mean material goods or material comforts which may be appropriated by individuals. Thus getting what one earns can mean only getting what under its present rules society awards one in return for one's efforts.

I. INDIVIDUALISM

The United States has been a land of individualism. The early settlements were made, in the main, by men with a spirit of adventure or by those who preferred freedom here to life in the home country, even at the expense of isolation and hardships. The spirit of independence waxed strong in the colonies and facilitated the separation from the mother-country. But life on these shores at the time of the Revolution was not democratic. The population consisted of privileged propertied classes, poor indentured people, and slaves, the first class being greatly in the minority but giving the tone to the social life and controlling political issues.

Yet freedom from restraint was available to those who had knowledge, determination, and a taste for adventure. To the west lay great stretches of forest filled with Indians, game, and potentially rich agricultural land. When the productivity of the land had been decreased through wasteful methods of agriculture the settler had only to move further west, cut clearings, and plant crops.

Having cleared the land he sold it and moved on. There was always opportunity to the west, and westward adventurous citizens took

their way. Men from the Atlantic seaboard or their descendants pressed beyond the slopes of the Alleghanies, settled in the valley of the Mississippi, crossed that river, conquered the prairies, and climbed the Rockies or went around them to the Pacific Coast. Finally, however, they reached the limits of migration. To those on the Pacific Coast no region farther west was available and for those in Alabama, Louisiana, or Texas there was no region for settlement farther south. The conquest of the continent was made with astounding rapidity, and it was accompanied with a wastefulness and extravagance no less astounding.

Millions of acres of timber were destroyed, which another generation could not restore by the most assiduous toil. The land was wastefully tilled, and its productivity utilized for immediate rather than perennial returns. Buffaloes and other wild animals were hunted almost or quite to the point of extinction. In a few generations the myriads of wild pigeons and other birds once common in parts of the country disappeared. In conquering a continent the pioneers robbed and mutilated it.

Men could not easily adapt themselves to the new order of things that ensued. It had always been possible to go elsewhere and find better economic opportunities. There was a creed to the effect that any man with enterprise and industry could make a fortune. Intent upon exploitation, the ambitious continued to look for easily gained wealth. The doctrine of every man for himself, which had proven adequate for those who were conquering a continent, was deemed adequate for those inheriting a continent already conquered. The conditions of industry but not the attitude toward those engaged in it had changed. The individual was left to his own resources, each man being regarded as the maker of his destiny. But the resources were not what they had been, and the destiny of the average man was bound to be somewhat different from that of his predecessors.

2. THE INDUSTRIAL REVOLUTION

A new force was under way in the Old World while the people of the New were gaining their independence from the mother-country. The Industrial Revolution which started in England about 1760 was destined to have far-reaching effects upon the new lands in America. The introduction of machinery transformed the old activities and added many new ones, changing the conditions of living as well as the means of making a livelihood. It brought large numbers of people to a single enterprise, creating new problems of housing, sanitation, and morals. It also

made large numbers dependent as never before upon the hazards of an industry and the will and whim of a manufacturer.

In particular the new machinery gave employment to large numbers of women and children, who in some instances could tend the machines as well as could men and who could be hired for less. In this way men sought to increase the total earnings of the family, but it meant also a lowering of men's wages, since the possibility of substituting women and children ensured a cheaper labor market.

Machine industry brought into existence the classes of capitalists and workers, employers and laborers. The latter found themselves helpless before the manufacturers, who sometimes paid low wages, dismissed at pleasure, and demanded twelve or fourteen hours of work a day from women and children as well as men. The organization of labor unions at the end of the eighteenth century and during the first half of the nineteenth was the first concerted effort upon the part of the workers to remedy conditions. Labor unions now include millions of members in every large civilized country, and they represent one of the most powerful organizations in the industrial world. They are federated in a national organization, the national federations having an international organization.

A more radical revolt against capitalism was instigated in 1848 by Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels in their famous *Communist Manifesto*. This is an assertion that the fundamental conflict in the modern world lies between capital and labor. It declares that all economic goods are created by the workers and in justice belong to them. Marx advocated a union of the workers of the world against the capitalists and the exploitation of the economic resources by the workers. He is the hero of the soviet régime in Russia, which since 1917 has put his doctrines into practice. At the present time (1927) we have little information as to how that régime is working, since there are practically no comprehensive first-hand accounts by competent unprejudiced observers. The communist movement, however, is not limited to Russia but has played a part in every industrial country, more particularly in the regions close to Russia — Central Europe, the Balkans, Turkey, and Georgia.

3. THE REWARDS OF LABOR

Occasionally one sees a watchman at a railroad crossing arriving in his automobile, and recently it was reported that the workmen at a certain factory had complained because the employer did not provide

parking space for their automobiles; but these phenomena are both recent and exceptional among the working classes, who have been without most of the luxuries possessed by the propertied capitalist class. Reflection upon the inequalities between workers and employers, between the "haves" and the "have-nots," gave rise to the socialist movement.

There are as many brands of socialism as of democracy or religion, ranging from absolute State control or ownership of all industries to plans which are but slight modifications of the present regulation of individual ownership. All of them agree, however, in advocating less unrestricted control of industrial resources by individuals and more control by the State. The motives which lead to the advocacy of socialism are various. Some of its proponents are alive to the economic inequalities characteristic of Western civilization and regard them as due to historical conditions for which the individuals concerned are not responsible and from which they should neither suffer nor profit at the expense of others. If men are essentially equal by virtue of their humanity, their rewards should be equal on the economic plane. That some contribute more and some less to the economic wealth of the community is not, they say, to the point. They urge that in a family, for example, all share about equally in the benefits of family resources, irrespective of the ability of individual members. We should not penalize people, they insist, for failure to possess qualities which they happen not to have.

Others feel that men should get what they earn and that only a system of socialism will give them this. Socialists of this persuasion would not mete out the same rewards to everyone but would give everyone the same economic opportunity. They say that each should profit according to his talents and not according to those of his ancestors or according to the luck which he has had in a venture. Hence it is irrational to give a gold mine to a man on whose land it chances to be or to allow a man to make a fortune out of goods on which he has a monopoly. This is not rewarding him according to his contributions to the economic order, but is apportioning his rewards by a turn of the wheel of chance.

Another school is more interested in the control of competitive industries which now involve waste of effort and duplication of tasks. An illustration is the delivery of milk in cities. Different dairies go over the same routes, each one duplicating the work of the others, though one large dairy could deliver the entire supply at little more than the cost involved in the case of each. When we consider the amount of duplication in stores and commercial establishments of various sorts and in the

delivery of goods, it is obvious that great savings could be made if these were operated by one concern, namely, the nation, state, or municipality. Some socialists advocate State control of big productive enterprises, such as mines, railroads, and large manufacturing plants. Many industries are already State controlled in some countries and every country has now taken over the postal service, to which most have added a parcel-post service. Many, too, have added to the post-office a savings department, thus engaging in an enterprise previously carried on solely by private banking corporations.

Most countries have gone far in the last half-century in legislation of socialistic trend. In almost every field there has been a socializing of industry and a supplanting of the old *laissez faire* method of unrestricted individual control. The State imposes laws regulating competition, hours of labor, minimum wage, the right of workers to organize and use collective bargaining, and the conditions under which the laborers work. These regulations do not remove competition, but they establish new rules for the game. Not even the most hardened anti-socialist advocates going back to the old system of entire absence of State control of industry. A modified socialism has come to stay and the signs point to a further extension of State control at least in certain fields.

Nor is it clear that we have achieved a just measure of rewards for services rendered. We pay a man a million dollars because some one discovered gold on his land; we pay a President of the United States a paltry sum, in comparison, for conducting our most important public enterprise. We pay millions to movie actors and usually nothing to those who discover a new method of medical treatment which means improved health to mankind. "It is incomparably more profitable to draw the Gumps for a comic supplement than to write the *Origin of Species*. There is more money in chewing-gum than in relativity. Lobsters and limousines are acquired far more rapidly by the skillful thrower of custard pies in a movie-picture studio than by the no less skillful demonstrator of electrons. The gate receipts of an international prizefight would support a university faculty for a year."¹ We reward yellow journalists magnificently, and starve artists, poets, and scientists. "Parliaments will vote huge sums to successful generals but never a penny to a great scholar or sculptor, poet or painter; for purely intellectual achievements are not as yet regarded as services to the State."² The

¹ Little, *The Fifth Estate*, The Chemical Foundation, p. 12, New York, 1926.

² Briffault, *The Making of Humanity*, p. 124, London, 1919.

man who improves the engine of an automobile has a handsome income for the remainder of his life, while he who improves community, nation, or civilization receives no economic reward for his services. If one selects from a community those who have advanced its interests and then singles out those who are rewarded handsomely, one finds little overlapping of the two groups. There is an irrational element in the present economic order.

We are an acquisitive society. A man is rewarded not for services but for acquisitiveness. The acquisitive man may be also a producer or he may not be. In many cases he produces nothing but acquires a great amount of economic goods by dealing in futures, manipulating the market, or creating a monopoly and extorting from the public the higher prices which he can demand.

Could we find an equitable basis rewards should be determined by the social function which a man performs. The man who coöperates with his fellows and enhances the good of all or of the many is worth more to society than he who takes from all or from the many, but by our present system we assign the former a mean house and the latter a palace.

4. SOME RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN THE INDUSTRIAL ORDER

During the present century there has been a considerable extension of the coöperative enterprises initiated in the preceding century. These are combinations of producers or of consumers organized for mutual advantage. They have flourished most abundantly in Denmark, Sweden, and Norway but have had some success in the United States, particularly in California, where the growers of figs, raisins, peaches, walnuts, oranges, and lemons, able to control a considerable proportion of these products, have disposed of their goods through coöperative enterprises. There are also extensive coöperative enterprises among the farmers of the Northwest, in Minnesota and the Dakotas; and in several cities there are consumers' coöperative stores.

A remarkable feature of our present industrial order is the part played by advertising. Advertising is used on a gigantic scale, and in many corporations it constitutes one of the largest items of expense, some concerns spending millions of dollars a year on advertisements. The aggregate sum spent in this country annually on newspaper advertising alone is probably more than a billion dollars. Much of this is merely competitive and so a sheer waste economically, but it is forced

upon a company which must compete with a strong rival. For the most part, too, advertising is economically wasteful since it leads to inflation of demand. This is particularly true with regard to luxury products, which advertising stimulates people to buy independently of their needs. Over-production leads to greater advertising, for the greater the surplus of goods, the greater the necessity of finding a larger market for them.

The World War had a considerable influence upon the status of labor in the countries involved. The armies of workers became as indispensable for the prosecution of the war as the soldiers in the field. It was necessary to keep the essential industries going at their maximum pace. Many concessions were made to organized labor, which in some cases also made concessions to capital. Owing to the great demand for labor, due both to shortage of men and to the need for greater output in essential industries, there was a rise in wages which left the workers at the end of the war in a better position than that which they had occupied previously.

The war resulted also in new curbs upon capitalism. A tax was levied on excess profits, and incomes and inheritances were taxed more heavily. Yet property remained as stable as ever, save in Russia, for only human lives were drafted, neither labor nor capital being subject to draft for war purposes. We are still more concerned about the rights of labor and capital than about human lives.

During the war many industrial enterprises which had worked on a competitive basis learned the elements of coöperation, and there was hope in some quarters that this spirit might continue. But the aftermath of the war leaves little basis for hope that coöperation will supplant competition. With minor changes the economic order in Western Europe is what it was before the war.

It is true, however, that certain changes already under way in the attitude toward labor were accelerated by the war, and some of them are likely to be permanent. Women were welcomed in many industries previously closed to them and in many quarters the principle of equal pay for equal work was established. The right of workmen in essential industries to a fair living wage was recognized, and we began to see that all industries which contribute to our economic welfare are essential. Indeed we are coming to perceive that a healthy economic body is a prerequisite to a healthy social body.

There has been a renewed and a more intelligent demand that the production of war materials be taken over by the government, so that no profits can be made out of these goods. Under the present industrial

organization, the manufacturers of munitions, steel, and other war supplies have much to gain from war, and there is reason to believe that they have sometimes been instrumental through influence in the press, in diplomatic channels, and in legislative and governmental circles, in bringing about a situation that results in war.

Whatever motives lie back of various labor movements, the most intelligent measures of industrial reform are those which have been advocated by members of the ranks of labor. An illustration is the result of the conference of the British Labor Party in 1918, which adopted a set of resolutions advocating, among other things, the following:

"That the task of social reconstruction to be undertaken by the government ought to be regarded as involving, not any patchwork, jerrymandering of the anarchic individualism and profiteering of the competitive capitalism of pre-war time — the breakdown of which, even from the standpoint of productive efficiency, the war has so glaringly revealed — but the gradual building up of a new social order, based not on internecine conflict, inequality of riches, and dominion over subject races or a subject sex, but on the deliberately planned coöperation in production, distribution, and exchange, the systematic approach to a healthy equality, the widest possible participation in power, both economic and political, and the general consciousness of consent which characterize a true democracy; and, further, in order to help to realize the new social order and to give legislative effect to the labor policy of reconstruction, this conference emphasizes the necessity of having in Parliament and the country a vigorous, courageous, independent and unfettered political party."

The conference recognizes "how far from efficient the capitalistic system has proved to be, with its stimulus of private profit, and its evil shadow of wages driven down by competition often below the subsistence level; . . . that it is vital for any genuine social reconstruction to increase the nation's aggregate production, not of profit or dividend, but of useful commodities and services; that this increased productivity obviously is not to be sought in reducing the means of subsistence of the workers, nor yet in lengthening their hours of work, for neither 'sweating' nor 'driving' can be made the basis of lasting prosperity, but in the socializing of industry to secure (a) the elimination of every kind of inefficiency and waste; (b) the application both of the most honest determination to produce the very best, and of more science and intelligence to every branch of the nation's work; together with (c) an improvement in social, political, and industrial organization, and (d) the indispensable marshaling of the nation's resources so that each need is met in the order of, and in proportion to, its real national importance.

"The conference holds it of supreme national importance that there should not be any degradation of the standard of life of the population; and it insists that it is the duty of the government to see to it, that when peace comes, the standard rate of wages in all trades should, relatively to the cost of living, be fully maintained.

"It should be made clear to employers that any attempt to reduce the prevailing rates of wages or to take advantage of the dislocation of demobilization to worsen the conditions of labor will lead to embittered industrial strife, which will be in the highest degree detrimental to the national interests; and the government should therefore take all possible steps to avert such a calamity."

It advocates, further, unemployment insurance, the complete emancipation of women, economically and civilly, the restoration of personal liberty, and the following political reforms: "complete adult suffrage; absolute equal rights for both sexes; effective provision for absent electors to vote and the best practicable arrangements for insuring that every minority has its proportionate representation; the same civic rights for sailors and soldiers as for officers; shorter Parliaments; the complete abandonment of any attempt to control the people's representatives by a House of Lords." There is a further protest against the disfranchisement of conscientious objectors.

"The most important of all the measures of social reconstruction must be a genuine nationalization of education, which shall get rid of class distinctions and privileges, and bring effectively within the reach, not only of every boy and girl, but of every adult male citizen, all the training, physical, mental, and moral, literary, technical, and artistic, of which he is capable.

"The Labor Party cannot be satisfied with a system which condemns the great bulk of the children to merely elementary schooling with accommodation and equipment inferior to that of the secondary schools, in classes too large for efficient instruction, under teachers of whom at least one-third are insufficiently trained; which denies to the great majority of teachers in the kingdom alike any opportunity for all-round culture, as well as for training in their art, an adequate wage, reasonable prospect of advancement, and suitable superannuation allowances; and which, notwithstanding what is yet done by way of scholarships for exceptional geniuses, still reserve the endowed secondary schools, and even more the universities, for the most part, to the sons and daughters of a small privileged class, while contemplating nothing better than eight weeks a year continuation schooling up to eighteen for ninety percent of the youth of the nation.

"The conference accordingly asks for a systematic reorganization of the whole educational system from the nursery school to the university, on the basis of social equality; the provision for each age, for child, youth, and adult, of the best and most varied education of which it is capable, and with due regard to its physical welfare and development, but without any form of military training; the educational institutions, irrespective of social class or wealth, to be planned, equipped, and staffed according to their several functions, up to the same high level for elementary, secondary, or university teaching, with regard solely to the greatest possible educational efficiency, and free maintenance of such a kind as to enable the children to derive the full benefit of the education given; and the recognition of the teaching profession, without distinction or grade, as one of the most valuable to the community."

Then follows a demand for adequate housing, temperance reform, and

control by the government of railways, canals, and coal and iron mines. "The supply of these minerals should henceforth be conducted as a public service (with a steady increasing participation in the management of the workers concerned), for the cheapest and most regular supply of industry of its chief source of power, the retail distribution of household coal, at a fixed price, summer and winter alike, and identical at all railway stations throughout the kingdom, being undertaken by the elected municipal district or county council for the common good."³

The labor movement in Great Britain has involved issues different from those in the United States and on the whole has been on a much more intelligent plane. The American Federation of Labor has been little concerned with social policies or with education or intelligent citizenship for workers, whereas these have played a large part in the British labor movement. The American labor movement has been concerned almost exclusively with matters of wages, while the British labor movement has been concerned also with politics and national and social policies. In America the labor movement has not identified itself with any political party or sought to constitute itself a separate party. In Great Britain the labor movement organized a political party which for a while was in control of the government, though it was at the time a minority party.

There is also a different attitude toward labor in the two countries. In Great Britain, as in Australia and New Zealand, the right to organize and to use collective bargaining is not disputed but is taken for granted. In this country these "rights" are still disputed among employers and the people.

However diverse our reaction to specific proposals for change, we now agree that society can no longer allow industrial development to take what was called its "natural" course. This course was "natural" only in the sense that it was permitted and fostered by the social order. Even if our desires be quite modest, they will necessitate the use of numerous and various means of control. The problem on which all others rest is: what kind of society do we want? We already know the partial answer, for we know several kinds which we do not want. A society in which men and women are so handicapped by the demands of the industrial system that they can not hope to realize the best there is in life, is a social order which we do not want. Labor can not live by bread alone. "But it can hardly be expected to make this discovery until it is assured of its supply of bread."⁴

³ From Hamilton, *Current Economic Problems*, pp. 878-887, Chicago, 1923.

⁴ Haldane, *Daedalus*, p. 31, New York, 1923.

"While the structure of our economic life now is pagan in its individualism, and puts a premium on greed and cunning, we see forces at work to modify it in fundamental respects by introducing the principle of coöperation. When this principle is embodied in the very structure and mechanism of society, the course of development will seem more clearly marked and more easy to attain."⁵ Society needs "the better and better apportioning of wages to work";⁶ for the making of men and women is at least as important as the making of goods.

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⁵ Wilson, *The Self and Its World*, p. 236, New York, 1926.

⁶ Carlyle, *Past and Present*, p. 16.

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CHAPTER XXVII

POVERTY

Abraham Lincoln said he knew God loved poor people else He would not have made so many of them. The poor we have always with us but human society has not always had them, poverty being an accompaniment of civilization and especially of wealth. There is no poverty in a primitive tribe unless we say, as perhaps in some cases we should, that all are in poverty. It is only in the higher stages of savagery, such as certain cultures in Africa and in Oceania, that there is poverty and only in such areas is there wealth. When the Eskimos were told that there were European cities in which people with abundance lived close to those without the comforts of life and without sufficient food, they could not comprehend the fact. Such conditions were beyond their experience and they were incredulous. Yet these same Eskimos, had they been living in one of those cities, might have been regarded as poverty-stricken, as living a precarious existence and in actual want. Civilization has its own standards of poverty, so that we regard as poor the man who in another age or by another people would be regarded as fortunate in his possession of goods and opportunities.

The standard of poverty, therefore, is relative, varying with cultures and changing with the times. Nor has poverty always been regarded as a regrettable phase of social life. On the contrary it has sometimes been looked upon as useful to the social order and as a blessing both to the poor and to those who could help them. This attitude prevailed during the Middle Ages among the upper classes who regarded almsgiving as a means of obtaining grace. The abolition of poverty would have deprived them of an important channel to the remission of sins and the acquisition of an abundance of grace. Mendicant Friars went about the country begging, not that they wished anything for themselves, but that others might obtain the favor of God by giving to the poor. Poverty was close to the heart of early Christianity and was practised, or pretended, in monasticism. Such a sympathetic humanist as Sir Thomas Browne complains that, "Statists that labour to contrive a commonwealth without poverty take away the object of our charity; not understanding only

the commonwealth of a Christian, but forgetting the prophecy of Christ. ('The poor ye shall have always with you.')

 And in 1801 Hannah More could say to the poverty-stricken women of Shipham: "Yet let me remind you that probably that very scarcity (which occasions your suffering) has been permitted by an all-wise and gracious Providence to unite all ranks of people together, to show the poor how immediately they are dependent upon the rich, and to show both rich and poor that they are dependent on Himself."

I. POVERTY IN WESTERN CIVILIZATION

There were poor people among the Hebrews and the ancient Egyptians, as also in Greece, Rome, and early Western Europe, and the poor are frequently referred to in accounts of life in medieval cities.

Contemplation of their lot and compassion for them were among the motives which led Sir Thomas More to write the *Utopia*. They were the incentive to the writing of *Piers Plowman* and in Wat Tyler they found a leader.

In the United States poverty was a relatively insignificant problem before the Civil War. There were poor people, but their poverty was due primarily to social and political rather than economic conditions.¹ Poverty has been largely a sectional problem. It flourished first in the New England manufacturing towns, where it still exists in large proportion. When manufacturing industries moved into the Middle Atlantic states poverty followed.

In the South, slavery accentuated the poverty of the "poor white trash" who were not owners of slaves, and the Civil War left them in much the same predicament. In the Middle West poverty is recent and it is still more recent on the Pacific Coast where it is confined for the most part to the larger cities. The poor are relatively fewer in the Pacific Coast, Rocky Mountain, and the Middle West states than in those east of the Alleghanies. This is due to the fact that the eastern section is the older and is the center of the manufacturing industries, while the region to the west is a newer land with greater economic opportunities.

It is due in part also to the fact that the more adventurous poor have gone west and prospered, leaving the thriftless paupers at home.

¹ Early in its history Harvard College received a contribution of a hundred and fifty pounds from a fund produced by the sale of indigent children who had been sent out of England as apprentices. Edward Eggleston, *The Transit of Civilization*, p. 227, New York, 1901.

Immigration has further complicated the matter, for the majority of immigrants have settled in the Eastern States and have increased the difficulty of maintaining the population at a reasonable standard of living. Thus immigrants tend to lower the wage scale and decrease the earnings of native-born Americans.

2. SOME CAUSES OF POVERTY

The cause of poverty is seldom, perhaps never, merely one factor; it is a complex of conditions, so that properly we should speak of the causes rather than the cause of poverty. A frequently cited cause of poverty is location in unfavorable geographical conditions, but geographical conditions are favorable or unfavorable according as a people are able to utilize them. Thus in aboriginal America some of the poorest people lived in the Mohave Desert and in Central California, while to-day portions of those desert regions are among the most fertile tracts of land in the United States; and the geographical conditions which made the Indians poor bring wealth to the present-day descendants of Europeans.

So far as their effect upon the welfare of individuals is concerned therefore, geographical conditions resolve into matters of culture or of individual ability. Where the culture is the same differences in geographical conditions may be a telling factor.² Where geographical conditions change abruptly in a given year so that the sources of food are not adequate, the majority of the population may suddenly be faced with famine. This occurs in India where a drought may endanger the lives of millions of people, as also in China where shortage of crops may mean starvation to many. It occurs on a smaller scale in every country in which the population has grown close to the margin of subsistence, so that abnormal conditions, too much or too little rain, or a change in air currents, may bring thousands to the brink of ruin. Yet even in such instances it is a matter of choice whether we say the cause of poverty lies in geographical conditions or in the failure of a population to adapt itself and its prospects to the hazards inherent in the environment.

Inadequate earnings also foster poverty. This is likely to be the case among the unskilled workers where wages are low, families are large, and there is no opportunity to save. Earnings must do more than cover the bare necessities of life if poverty is to be eliminated. A complicating cause is the fluctuation in the labor market. As the demand for

² See Chapter IX.

goods decreases there is less demand for services, and workers are discharged. If there is general industrial depression all can not find work elsewhere, and the man without a job is helpless.

The most common cause of poverty is sickness, which involves not only its own expense but also the loss of pay. If prolonged it may mean also the loss of the job, so that "upon horror's head horrors accumulate."

But the causes are interlocking. In many instances the sickness would not have come if there had been sufficient income to take proper precautions, to obtain rest when needed, to secure proper medical advice, care, and medicines; if there had been income enough for recreation, sufficient and proper food, proper housing, the needed clothing, and the ordinary comforts of living. Nor, in many cases, would the worker be reduced to poverty were there not so many dependent upon him, so many mouths to feed and bodies to clothe.

Added to these causes, which are called involuntary, and often coöperating and coëxisting with them, are voluntary causes — conditions for which the individual must be held partly or entirely responsible, such as indisposition to work, unwillingness to take a job which is not of the kind wanted, shiftlessness, sheer laziness, and inefficient work meriting discharge. Drunkenness is frequently a contributing cause, involving waste of money and strength, sapping morale, lowering efficiency, and leading to crime. Other causes lie in the constitution of the worker: physical disability, such as loss of a limb or of eyesight, or physical weakness. Old age lowers efficiency and the worker is poverty-stricken unless he has been able and sufficiently thrifty to lay by something against the enforced idleness of later life. Loss of the breadwinner brings dependents to the verge of poverty, and often they are unable to support themselves. Insurance alone will provide against such poverty upon the part of dependents unless the savings have been considerable, for current expenses are cumulative.

"The lives ground down by poverty! Here is the man with a large family, who can only earn his 18 shillings a week, and out of it must pay 7 shillings rent, 11 shillings a week to feed and clothe, say six or eight people. Little more than a shilling a week each. What chance has this family of recreation, or education, or even of proper physical development? Mere arithmetic forbids it, and shuts the door to the higher life.

"Or here, again, is a widow, with little ones to support, working ten hours a day to earn 10 shillings a week. What chance has she and

they? Are they not 'white slaves,' ground down by their circumstances, and driven by the fear of starvation as truly as any slave by the whip of his master?

"And here are the young girls, passing straight from school into the shop and the factory, and losing strength and vitality in hard, monotonous toil, from which there is no escape but through the gates of marriage or of death. What choice have they? and how is it not true that circumstances mould their lives?

"And the little children themselves, knowing the pinch of poverty from the day when the mother's arms are too busy to hold them, and their own limbs too feeble to support them: the children whose growth is checked from insufficient food and light, whose limbs are crippled from neglect, whose tempers are spoiled from injudicious training, and wills broken by harsh treatment—are not these the victims of circumstance? Enslaved for life, with never an opportunity of choice?

"It is little wonder that these are the facts which most impress us in our contact with the poor. 'What should we have been,' we think, 'but for the grace of God?' and by the grace of God we mean probably but for our happier circumstances, not the grace of God which moulds the heart from within. In which there is a quaint little underlying assumption that 'we' in our circumstances are very much better than 'they' in their circumstances. And so far as it is cleanliness against dirt, neatness against carelessness, sobriety against drinking habits, self-discipline against self-indulgence the assumption is justified."³

The writer quoted above assures us that the poor are not the victims of circumstance but are poor because they fail to make the most of their circumstances: "mere wealth or poverty have no power to make or mar a man." This is true, but the significant thing is that poverty makes the alternatives of a different sort than those presented to the man of wealth; the choice does not take place under comparable conditions and there are not the same things to choose, though there is always a measure of choice. Those who are poor and are brought up among the poor can improve their conditions, but they are handicapped by many elements in the environment.

3. THE RELIEF OF POVERTY

Only recently has there been a concerted and socially organized attempt to relieve poverty and offset its handicaps.

³ Bosanquet, *The Strength of the People*, pp. 52-54, London, 1902.

The first provision, aside from sporadic individual assistance, came in the form of poor-houses or work-houses where those were sent, the young and the old, who could not secure the necessities of life. These institutions have almost entirely disappeared, being rarely seen today except here and there as homes for the dependent aged. In their place are social agencies, welfare societies, or associated charities, which aim to help the needy in their home and industrial environment and to keep life going as normally as possible. Trained social workers investigate home conditions and recommend such relief as seems necessary and beneficial.

In addition to public organizations there are those founded and supported by philanthropy and others by religious, fraternal or nationality groups. The Jews, for example, have an excellent system of aid for the needy organized in every large city and efficiently administered so that rarely does a member of the Jewish faith come to a public agency for assistance. The Roman Church maintains numerous charitable organizations. Many Protestant denominations have similar organizations and most denominations provide for dependent pastors whose period of service is over, furnishing a pension or a home. Masons, Odd Fellows, and other fraternal organizations provide for dependent members and for dependent widows and children of members, either in institutions or in their own homes.

In several countries the government pensions dependent-aged who have neither property nor income, and several countries have provided a system of insurance against sickness and unemployment — a movement in which Germany took the lead nearly fifty years ago. Great Britain has adopted all of these measures except sickness insurance. In this country there are state institutions to which the dependent aged may go, and orphanages for children too young to work for a living, but no state has adopted the old age pension system which pays allowances to the aged instead of requiring them to go to a public institution, and none has adopted either sickness or unemployment insurance.

The aid given to the poor is implicit recognition of social responsibility for the existence of poverty. This is in contrast with the older view that poverty was due to the fault of the poor or to an act of Providence. The change in attitude is significant, for if society accepts responsibility for poverty, as it perforce must, then it will be more concerned with understanding it and with finding a remedy for it. The new attitude has already borne fruit in the motives which actuate the agencies that care for the needy. They are turning their attention more

earnestly to an understanding of the conditions which foster poverty and to investigations of its various aspects. They aim not merely to alleviate poverty, but to restore the worker to the industrial world and keep the family within the social world of normal activity. Their efforts are constructive as well as remedial, for they aim at a social regeneration of the poor. Their activity is not confined to dealing out doles, but they give help and advice which money can not buy and without which it is of little value. When we recognize that the problem of poverty is as much the concern of the public as are small-pox and taxes we shall be far along the road toward its solution.

4. THE PREVENTION OF POVERTY

Society is veering toward the attitude that an ounce of prevention is worth a pound of cure. In many ways poverty is socially and economically expensive. It lowers the standard of living, weakens morale, decreases confidence and self-respect, induces morbidity and despair, and slows up the machinery of production.

Whatever the cause, society eventually pays the bill. We are slow in realizing that it is more economical to prevent floods than to recover from them, to preserve forests than to replace them, to prevent diseases and epidemics than to wipe them out after they are under way, to remove ignorance than to counteract its evils. We are gradually learning these lessons, however, and we are coming to realize, albeit tardily, that it is better, safer, and cheaper to prevent poverty than to alleviate it.

There is no panacea for effecting this, but in numerous ways poverty can be decreased, and we can proceed with a working program looking toward its final elimination. The first essential in this task is the recognition that for most of the poverty which exists society is responsible. It is in large part because the social world is as it is that there are poor people in it. Except for physical and mental inefficiency, one man is born as poor as another. Society provides the opportunities that make advance possible, and it countenances, if it does not create, the conditions which prevent advance. In certain respects we are learning to alter those conditions. A free public health service, the care of the health of both pre-school and school children, and clinics for adults who can not pay for medical attention decrease poverty by decreasing sickness. Laws make employers responsible for accidents to employees incurred in the course of work, some states providing compulsory insurance against accidents involving injury or death to workers.

Professor John R. Commons has suggested that unemployment should be made a charge against employers as a class, a step which he believes would lead in a short time to its complete elimination. In support of this view he cites the fact that when employers were made responsible for accidents to employees casualties practically disappeared in many industries where previously they had been frequent. Similarly he suggests, if employers had to bear the cost of unemployment, they would discover a way to abolish it. Probably such would be the case; but there appears to be no justification for thrusting this burden upon employers, since employees as well as employers are responsible for unemployment, and the full responsibility lies with society. It would be more equitable to hold workers, employers, and the public responsible for the problem, for as a matter of fact all are responsible. We should then realize that the problem affects every phase of social life.

Since poverty is relative, we do not know where to establish the line, yet for practical purposes there must be an arbitrary line. Poverty can be stated only in terms of a standard of living, and the standard which can be maintained with a given income depends upon the size of the family. If people are entitled only to a certain minimum income, they are entitled to a family of only a certain size. Whether this be five or ten, or some other number, is a matter of considerable moment. Since the cost of food, clothing, and fuel varies in different localities, and the need for them varies with climate, there could be no uniform provision in terms of money, but there might be a common provision in terms of commodities to which all human beings are deemed entitled.

"If emotional appeals could have solved the problem it would have ceased to be a problem long ago. Its tragedy for the individual has long aroused humanity's pity. Such appeals have not, however, touched the business sense of the world. Men must be touched in what is said to be their most sensitive spot, the pocket-book, before many of them will give much serious attention to the matter."⁴

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⁴ Gillin, *Poverty and Dependency: Their Relief and Prevention*, p. 585, New York, 1921.

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CHAPTER XXVIII

MENTAL DEFICIENCY

Mental deficiency, like poverty, is relative. All minds are deficient in some respects and all deficient minds have some intelligence.

There is a wide range but there are no gaps between the lowest mentality and the highest. Between the mind of an idiot and that of a Plato there are innumerable kinds of minds, ranging from the lowest to the highest by imperceptible degrees. Moreover, mind is not a quantitative thing, like stature, for example, so that we can say how much of it a person has; it is rather a complex of qualities, potentialities, and tendencies which somehow work together or fail to function harmoniously. Mind, therefore, is a group of tendencies, a combination of qualities. Intelligence is the adaptation of means to end and the finding of more desirable ends.¹ A mind may show a high degree of adaptation to certain ends and a low degree, or none at all, to others. Some minds which readily adapt means to ends, at least within a certain range, are slow to discover new ends. What constitutes mind is, therefore, decided differently from time to time. What men consider a high type of mind depends largely upon the qualities which they value. Thus standards of mind and of mental deficiency are continually created. This will be the case as long as intellectual and moral standards change, for sheer efficiency is not equivalent to desirability, and the latter no less than the former is a phase of intelligence.

I. SOME CAUSES OF MENTAL DEFICIENCY

While recognizing the relativity of mental deficiency and the virtual impossibility of determining where border-line cases belong in a rigid classification, we can none the less distinguish between those who have ample mental endowment and those who are markedly deficient. We shall apply the term mental deficiency to inability to cope with the ordinary intellectual needs of the individual in his normal environment.

The difficulties raised by this definition, in which "normal," "needs," and "environment" are relative, are not unimportant, but

¹ See Chapter XXIII.

perhaps like the Scotch parson we must "face the difficulty squarely and pass on." We must solve some of our problems by closing our eyes for the time being to logical difficulties inherent in them, as in fact we do in everyday life.

The causes of mental deficiency, like those of poverty, seldom operate in isolation but are interlocking and overlapping. Among them poor health occupies a prominent place. The sane mind in the sound body is one of the fine ideals of classical civilization to which we should pay more heed than we do. A few geniuses defeat our anticipations and some physical weaklings, such as Spinoza, Darwin, Spencer, demonstrate that mind can accomplish wonders in a frail body; yet the fact remains that for the ordinary man, and perhaps for any man, physical incapacity is a handicap to intellectual achievement. It is difficult for an inefficiently functioning physical organism to house an efficiently functioning mind. The mind is dependent upon the body and its normal functioning, as is obvious in the case of poor health or incapacitating illness. Lack of proper physical exercise is also responsible for inadequate mental functioning. The physical activities of our ancestors involved tasks for the body from which our civilization frees us, but our bodies need the exercise which was a phase of life in preceding centuries.

Above all we need recreation. Primitive life has an element of abandon which gives the savage respite from the demands of daily routine. Civilization makes it more difficult to find this abandon in activities which give full play to the side of our nature which craves change, pleasure, and rest. In these lapses from ordinary tasks, scenes, and activities our minds are recreated, refreshed, and reinvigorated.

Along with the more complicated life of civilization and with the greater possibilities of losing our fortune or our fame goes worry. That worry, not work, kills people, is an old saying and a true one. An Edison can work eighteen hours a day, but he can not indulge in worry two hours a day, for it undermines mental and physical stamina. It is more prevalent than measles, almost as contagious, and much more destructive of morale. It drives many a man to suicide, nervous breakdown, or insanity. In modern civilization steadiness of purpose and activity characterizes only a few sturdy souls. Most people live under strain and stress which tries them and, too often, breaks them. They go in spurts rather than with regular pace, consuming great stores of energy to accomplish tasks in a minimum of time. The man who expends energy most rapidly accumulates goods most rapidly and snatches a fortune

from those who would build more slowly if more surely. Competition puts people on edge and often brings despair and mental ruin.

Many a mind is the scene of conflict and friction. The trouble is not so much that the individual can not get along in his social and physical environment as that he can not make his mental machinery work smoothly and placidly. Conflicting desires battle for supremacy without much likelihood that one will do more than down another in temporary victory. The individual consumes mental energy in attempting to realize a purpose with which other purposes conflict. An imperfect co-ordination or inadequate integration of mental faculties is a common phase of mental deficiency. In the mind which functions at its best mental life is harmonious. Our complex social life and the wide range of duties and opportunities have increased actual as well as potential mental conflict and mental deficiency.

2. FEEBLE-MINDEDNESS

Though we can not always identify feeble-mindedness, since there are no breaks in the range of intelligence, for our purposes we may define it as the mental inability of an individual to maintain himself in a normal condition in his environment.

The common symptoms of mental incompetence have been described as "a paucity of presentations; an imperfect memory; anomalies of the affective process and limitation of the faculty of attention."² There is also usually, if not always, a lack of ability to integrate mental attitudes and faculties in the normal manner, the mind being broken up, as it were, into unrelated departments, so that experience is not utilized.

There is reason to suppose that at least extreme cases of feeble-mindedness have a physical substratum, as is usually the case in the lower types of the feeble-minded known as idiots. "If one observes a group of idiots one finds that they display bodily abnormalities in great variety and in much higher proportion than would a group of persons of corresponding social status and of sound mind. Poor general development; deformities of head, trunk, and limbs; irregularities of muscular action, *e.g.*, paralysis, spasm or incoördination; defects of the organs of special sense and of speech, are common. After death the viscera may be found to be of less than normal weight and to present structural differences from the organs of healthy persons. The brain in particular may display, in some cases to the unaided eye and in some cases under the

² Sherlock, *The Feeble-Minded*, p. 71, London, 1911.

microscope, wide departures from the standard of normality which anatomy has provided us with." ³ The mean weight of the brains of idiots is less than the mean weight of those of normal persons, though some idiots have excessively large brains, as others have excessively small ones, too much brain being as disadvantageous as too little.

If there is a physical substratum for feeble-mindedness it is not surprising that it should be inherited — as seems to be the case. But many other factors obscure the conditions of inheritance so that what appears to be handed down in the germ plasm may really be otherwise induced in the organic medium. We know, for example, that in the case of many animals light, gravitation, and chemical agencies act upon the germ and influence the offspring. Some of these causes may be operative in mankind. We know also that the conditions of pre-natal development are important; but that insufficient nutrition during the pre-natal period causes feeble-mindedness is improbable.

Whatever the physical substratum, feeble-mindedness constitutes one of the serious problems of society. "The deficient capacity will be expressed in different ways according to the sex and the social status of the individual. If a worse fate does not befall her, the girl of the lower classes will become a slatternly drudge, while the one born in the purple will, perhaps, after suffering many things at the hands of her parents and tutors, engaged upon the task of moulding her to the conventional pattern of her class, cut the Gordian Knot by leaving home with the footman or the chauffeur. The boy, if compelled to earn his own living, will be the butt of his workshop, and will never be able to carry out other than the roughest forms of unskilled labour. With a suitable environment, he may become a hooligan, or a thief, or a deserter. Aided by the numerous advantages which the possession of adequate pecuniary resources confers, he may be able to enter upon a business or professional career which in due course may lead him to the almshouse, or the penitentiary; or, if no attempt has been made to turn his energies into profitable channels, he becomes a wastrel and a prodigal, distributing his means among the horde of rascals who will have attached themselves to him." ⁴ We are slowly developing a policy with regard to the treatment of the feeble-minded, for we are becoming acquainted with them and with the problems which their presence in society creates. Meanwhile these problems become more urgent each year.

³ *Ibid.*, pp. 92-93.

⁴ *Ibid.*, pp. 201-202.

3. PSYCHOLOGICAL TESTS

Some years ago Binet, a Frenchman, devised tests to be given to school children in Paris with a view to determining their intelligence by accurate methods. These tests consisted of questions and performances to each of which a numerical value was attached, the scores being added. Various trained users of the tests secured more uniform results than were secured by the ratings made by different teachers when they estimated the mental abilities of the children. Binet thought there was a limited number of mental abilities or of mental faculties and that a few tests would show to what extent individuals possessed them.

From time to time the tests have been revised to meet the needs of investigators, but they remain in principle the same as those used by Binet, the underlying reasons which now justify their use being much like those which influenced him. They are interpreted as showing not only the nature but the amount of intelligence.

They are now used in schools, juvenile courts, police courts, and immigration stations. They are the best means of ascertaining the existence of feeble-mindedness and the degree of it, and they constitute the most accurate device for classifying intelligence at the lower levels. They show, if not varying degrees, at least varying qualities of intelligence. A person deficient in one kind of intelligence may have more of some other quality, though some psychologists assert that individuals differ only in the amount of intelligence and that if a person has intelligence for one kind of mental activity he has a corresponding amount for any other; that is, if he can learn arithmetic he can learn Latin.

Tests given at intervals show that the relative intelligence of children remains much the same through a period of years. If a child tests well above the average at the age of six he is likely to test proportionately high at the age of eight and again at the age of ten; and conversely, if his intelligence quotient is below the average. This, however, does not signify that intelligence does not change, though often this is asserted on the basis of the scores; but it means that the intelligence increases in about the same ratio, so that the differences from the average or mean remain fairly constant. The average child makes progress, but the child with high intelligence makes more. Some consider intelligence quotients an indication of innate mental abilities, but the scores can not indicate this unless the subjects tested have had similar opportunities. Mental abilities, contrary to what is commonly said, are not born but made.

Mind does not develop in a vacuum but only in response to stimuli in an environment.

"In intelligence testing by the conventional method, we are dealing with complex conditions. The actual acquisitions measured, or sampled, obviously depend on the interest the individual has taken in the sampled line of investigation, and 'learning capacity' really covers this complex of capacity and interest. The acquisition depends, moreover, very distinctly on the opportunities for acquisition which have been offered. If, for example, we measure the acquisition which has been made by two individuals, in arithmetic, the differences may depend upon the actual differences in learning capacity, upon the interest taken in, and application to, the subject, and upon the actual extent and nature of the course in arithmetic, or other arithmetical training to which the individuals have been subjected. In all comparisons of individuals with regard to intelligence as tested, therefore, we must assume that the opportunities of the individuals have been equal, or else make direct corrections for the differences in opportunity. Obviously, then, intelligence testing is useful only when the tests are devised specifically for the classes of persons to whom they are to be applied; and the more generally applicable the tests, the less useful they are."⁵ In short, the tests test what they test and this is never sheer intelligence. They can not test mind as a something apart from environment, unless the environment has been much the same for all. All are feeble-minded who have no opportunities to react to an environment of intelligent beings.

Moreover the tests leave effort out of the reckoning. A man with little mind and a determination to use it makes a better thing of it than the man with more mind who makes no effort. Will is as important in accomplishment as is endowment. Or, rather, the will to utilize mind is itself an important phase of intelligence; and this phase is not taken account of by the tests. This explains why they are a better indication of what people will not do than of what they will do. We can predict that the feeble-minded will take no scholastic honors, but we can not foretell with the same assurance what a highly endowed individual will do.

A wise word regarding the intelligence tests comes from Professor Sisson: "I offer most humbly an addition to the calculus of the tests: let IQ still denote what the tests measure — *intellect*, then let us develop a quotient of applicability, to measure the degree to which the powers in question *fit* the demands of the situation or situations in hand,

⁵ Dunlap, *Social Psychology*, pp. 166-167, Baltimore, 1925.

— call that FQ or quotient of fitness; then something like a product of these two might give us a true intelligence quotient; we might call the final result GQ, — i.e., gumption quotient. I suspect it would be hard to find, but once found it would be of inestimable value.” That is, the tests should be “used with more than the intelligence which they measure.”⁶

Thanks in part to intelligence tests we are able to do much more for the feeble-minded than was formerly the case. Methods of instruction have been developed in institutions or in special classes in schools, where those who can not use the head are taught to use the hands. Thus many become self-supporting who otherwise would be merely social flotsam or worse, drifting into poverty and crime. In many cases the feeble-minded can flourish happily in an institution which provides special supervision and protection from the complex social world with the intricacies of which the dull mind can not cope. To leave such poorly endowed creatures at large is to permit them to become a menace to self and to others. They should be made sterile or at least segregated, and not be allowed to reproduce their kind and thus increase the burden of society.

4. INSANITY

Insanity must not be confused with feeble-mindedness. The latter is a low functioning of intelligence in which all the faculties may be present, but none of them in normal degree. Insanity is a breakdown of mind, in some or in all phases of mental life. In some cases it is temporary or recurrent, so that the individual may be normal one moment and insane, that is, irrational, the next. Feeble-mindedness is permanent, whereas some forms of insanity respond to treatment.

Insanity has long been recognized, but its nature is a matter of recent discovery. Until a century ago the insane were placed in the same category as criminals, and were loaded with chains and subjected to the worst indignities. Only in the latter part of the eighteenth century was there recognition that society had a moral obligation in the matter. The first English institution for the insane was established in 1751, the famous St. Luke's, though a hospital for the insane had been opened in Spain as early as 1410, and there appears to have been one in Jerusalem in the fifth century. At the present time all civilized countries have insane asylums.

⁶ Sisson, *The Use of Intelligence*, Reed College Bulletin, IV, No. 3, July, 1925, pp. 23-24, Portland, Oregon, 1925.

Insanity appears not to occur in savagery — if we except the running amok found among the Malays, and this is probably a phenomenon of social psychology rather than an example of genuine insanity⁷ — and it seems to increase in frequency as civilization advances.

Owing to the fact that we do not know what percentage of the insane are committed to institutions, and to the further fact that the census returns are not entirely dependable, especially for the earlier decades, it is impossible to secure an accurate account of the number of insane in this country at various periods. Since there has been a tendency to make better provision for them and to commit the dangerously insane to institutions, the apparent rate of increase, that is, the recorded rate, is not the real one. Indeed there may have been no increase. In 1880 there were 40,942 insane in institutions in this country, a rate of 81.6 per 100,000 population. Both absolute and relative numbers in the institutions increased by decades until in 1920 there was a total of 232,680 in institutions, a rate of 220.1 per 100,000.

Even though statistics do not incontestably establish the point, alienists believe that insanity is on the increase. "It is becoming apparent that the increasing amount of functional disorders as well as a considerable part of the increase of insanity is attributable in some way not yet clearly understood to the complexity of the conditions of modern life. This appears not to be due solely to strains of the newer industrial conditions, since the percentages of disturbances continue about the same for men and women. There is some indication that there is a composite strain put on the human organism by the whole of the individual's experience under peculiarly modern conditions."⁸ This seems to be

⁷ "The Boegis (the natives of the Celebes) have an ugly habit of suddenly giving way to an uncontrollable fit of rabid fury, known as 'amok,' generally prompted by jealousy. If one of these amiable people is put out by any little domestic difficulty, or by any other cause, he is seized with the 'amok' fever. . . . Friend or foe, man or woman, old or young, it makes little difference to the apparently demented savage whom he may meet. He will furiously attack without the slightest provocation and without discrimination whosoever crosses his path, and woe betide the unfortunate beings among whom a Boegis takes it into his head to 'run-a-muck.' Armed with fine krisses stuck in their waist-cloths, these Boegis are ugly customers to meet even on the best of terms; but, when 'amok,' they will kill or wound perhaps twenty or thirty people before they are secured, disarmed, or killed. In Macassar and other large towns the native police are armed with a long, two-pronged fork of bamboo, something like the humble 'clothes-prop'; and when they see an 'amok' Boegis, they place the fork against his throat and hold him at bay till he can be secured. The tragic scene assumes a ludicrous aspect, when the frantic savage is seen firmly pinned by the neck against a wall or tree, vainly endeavouring to release his head from the uncomfortable position, or being ignominiously forced along the street by an active policeman, skilled in the use of this bloodless weapon of defense." Carl Bock, *The Head-Hunters of Borneo*, pp. 22-23, 2d ed., London, 1882.

⁸ Parsons, *An Introduction to Modern Social Problems*, Chap. V, New York, 1924.

borne out by the fact that the rate of insanity is higher in cities than in the country, and that it increases with the size of the city, a condition correlated with the complexity of civilized life. Thus the returns of the Census for 1910 show the following number of admissions into hospitals for the insane in that year per 100,000 population in the respective groups:

	<i>Number of Admissions per 100,000 of Population</i>
Rural communities	41.4
<i>Population of City</i>	
2,500—10,000	70.2
10,000—25,000	75.6
25,000—50,000	86.5
50,000—100,000	77.2
100,000—500,000	89.9
500,000 and over	102.8

Here, too, interpretation is difficult, since cities have better facilities for taking care of the insane than do the country districts, and in the city there is more motive to detect insanity and to put the afflicted in institutions. Better medical facilities in the larger cities result in the detection of more cases of insanity, thus increasing the proportion of admissions. Whether the real incidence of insanity increases with the size of the city, as the figures on their face indicate, has not been satisfactorily determined.

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CHAPTER XXIX

DELINQUENCY

Delinquency also is relative. Like poverty and feeble-mindedness it runs the gamut from borderline cases to those which are extreme. Delinquency is a failure to conform with the prevailing social ethics, though not every degree of non-conformity is delinquency. Where we draw the line is arbitrary, though the extremes are easily distinguishable. A convenient test is conformity with law, but this, too, is arbitrary, for not all laws conform with social ethics and many phases of social ethics can be defied though the law is obeyed. A good law does not really make violators delinquents but merely means that they may be punished. Political offenders who break the law may be standing for higher social principles. The leader of a revolution is a traitor unless the revolution succeeds; if it fails it is a rebellion and its leader a criminal.

I. DELINQUENCY AND SOCIAL PROGRESS

Man is the only animal given to delinquency. Among societies of bees, ants, or wasps there is little or none. Now and then a member of the group may kill another, but this is not regarded as an offense and is not punished. Neither is delinquency a common trait among all groups of men, being almost absent in the lower cultures. Murder of a fellow-tribesman is not unknown, but it is a rare occurrence as compared with murder among civilized nations. The same is true of theft, assault, and other offences against the person. In the higher civilizations delinquency flourishes and, with exceptions, the higher the civilization the greater its incidence. There is more crime today than there was a century ago, and it became more frequent after the industrial and the political revolutions.

The reasons for the increase in delinquency lie to some extent in conditions inherent in civilization itself, which offers more opportunities for crime than does savagery. Where there is no money there is no embezzlement; where there is no property there is no malicious destruction of it; where there is no competition there is little incentive

to offenses against the person. A wide range of crimes is possible only in a highly developed civilization. The primitive group is small and almost all of its members are related by known blood ties. In civilization the social group includes more people and the individual comes into contact with many strangers. The circumstances which foster or restrain crime are therefore different in the small primitive tribe from what they are in the large civilized group. The changes which take place in civilization afford another reason for the difference. Whereas in savagery life goes on year after year, generation after generation, in much the same grooves, in civilization there are rapid changes in ideas and ideals, in the industrial, economic, and political order, in science and religion. Once adapted to the social order, the savage is indefinitely adapted to it; but not so the civilized man. With change in the social order the individual must adapt himself to new conditions. In particular new ideals supplant the old and new incentives appear. Rapid changes create conditions which facilitate crime.

In the ten-year period 1913-23 more than 85,000 people were criminally killed in this country, a number exceeding those killed in action in our army in the World War. The amount of crime has been increasing. In 1921 there were 9,500 homicides as against 9,000 in 1920. In 1923 there were 7,850 murders and 6,780 cases of manslaughter or other unlawful killings, a total of 14,640. The rate of crime in this country is higher than in any other civilized country. We have rather consistently been a lawless people.

2. POVERTY AND DELINQUENCY

The relation between poverty and crime is difficult to determine, since frequently shiftlessness or other untoward traits lead to the poverty which furnishes the motive or the excuse for the crime. Those who live on the verge of poverty are, of course, not always criminals, yet the fact remains that a man who has no food has a motive to steal which does not exist when food is abundant, and the wealthy are seldom thieves in the legal sense.

The nature of the moral offense is often complicated by the fact that the poor may have a class consciousness which gives them one standard of ethics toward their own class and another toward the wealthy. Many a thief who would scorn to steal from those as poor as himself considers it no moral offense if he takes what he can get from those whom he regards as robbers of the poor, though robbers by legal means.

3. FEEBLE-MINDEDNESS AND DELINQUENCY

Since feeble-mindedness is a frequent accompaniment of poverty, it is often impossible to dissociate the two factors when both enter into the offense. But a feeble mind means a feeble will, for will is inseparable from intelligence. The feeble-minded have less resistance to temptation, for they are less conscious of the nature of the situation and of the consequences of their actions.

Moreover, owing to less efficient intellectual equipment they can not adapt themselves to the social world in which they live and are inclined to follow the line of least resistance. It depends largely on companions and circumstances whether they take the straight and narrow path or walk on the highroad that leads to crime and its consequences. In many cases they can not distinguish between right and wrong, and among them the proportion of sex crimes is high. The high percentage of feeble-mindedness among criminals which many writers have described, however, seems to be due to a misunderstanding of the import of the intelligence tests. A revision of the tests leads to the inference that feeble-mindedness is perhaps not more frequent among the criminal classes than among the general population. But many of the feeble-minded are confined in institutions and so are precluded from becoming criminals.

4. INSANITY AND DELINQUENCY

Mental aberration is responsible for many crimes. Depression may lead to murder or to suicide, and epilepsy contributes to many criminal offenses. Some of these are impersonal, in the sense that they do not follow from a desire to injure a particular person but are merely the outburst of uncontrolled rage or cruelty. To paranoia, persistent delusion, many crimes are chargeable, especially those which lead to notoriety. The assassination of McKinley and the attempt upon the life of Roosevelt were of this class, as was the attack upon George III. The man who fired the pistol at his sovereign had no fault to find with the king, but he believed his own wickedness so extreme and portentous that it would involve the eternal damnation of the human race. To avert this calamity to mankind he thought he ought to die. Since suicide was a crime he would not kill himself but decided upon an act, the killing of the sovereign, which would merit his death and accomplish his object.

In this class, perhaps, should be placed the offenses committed by the intoxicated. The intoxicated man is in the mental condition of the insane, with the difference that he has voluntarily made himself deficient in intelligence. The intellect is clouded, the will is weak, knowledge of the consequences of one's act is in abeyance, and offenses are committed which would be abhorrent to the person when sober. The law is not inclined to punish as a crime an offense committed by an intoxicated person who is not aware of what he is doing. He should, however, be held responsible. Drunkenness is an offense against society, because the drunkard makes himself a nuisance and a source of danger. "The drunkard is as much a danger to society as a lunatic at large, which he is; and when he commits an offense in consequence of his drunkenness, he should be punished not so much in proportion to the gravity of the offense committed when drunk, as in proportion to the deliberateness of the intention with which he brought himself into this dangerous state."¹

5. THE PUNISHMENT OF CRIME

In primitive society the punishment of crime is usually left to the person injured or to his family, kinship group, or clan. Only when the crime is committed by one who is not a member of the tribe is the matter an affair in which the entire tribe is concerned. Primitive punishment, therefore, is little more than revenge.

The heinousness of the crime is the measure of retribution. A crime involving life is punished by the taking of life; one involving injury to person, by similar injury to person. Savages are seldom very exact in meting out punishment for offenses, but in the older Mediterranean civilizations, where punishment was rationalized, exact measures were enforced — "an eye for an eye, a tooth for a tooth." In Abyssinia the principle was carried to such an extreme that the punishment was sometimes more of a danger to the punisher than to the offender. Thus if a boy fell from a tree upon the head of another lad and injured or killed him, the father of the injured boy must fall from the same limb upon the lad who had been the cause of the injury or death. Another common feature of primitive punishment is its vicarious nature. Usually it is not necessary to punish the individual who committed the crime, but merely a member of the offender's clan, tribe, or family.

The ideas underlying these features of primitive punishment are

¹ Mercier, *Crime and Insanity*, p. 55, New York, 1911.

still present in our system of meting out justice, though submerged under forms and procedures which in part obscure their real nature. We regard crime as an offense against society, but petty crimes, at least, are seldom noticed unless the individual who suffers by reason of them or some other interested person brings the case to court. It is then considered the duty of the family, fraternal order, or political party to give the accused comfort and protection against the group of the offended person, the remainder of society.

We measure retribution in terms of the seriousness of the offense. Petty offenses are lightly punished; serious offenses are given weightier punishment; heinous offenses, the heaviest penalties. Punishment is reckoned in terms of dollars — without regard to the ability of the person to pay — days or months in jail, or years in a penitentiary. Particular virtue attaches to the number five: penitentiary sentences are likely to be for one, five, ten, fifteen years, and so on, in multiple units of five. If we were using a duodecimal system we should probably find other appropriate terms of imprisonment.

Though we do not aim at vicarious punishment or at family responsibility, we in fact often achieve this result. While the criminal is serving the term in jail or in the penitentiary, society — except in a few states — makes no provision for his wife or dependent family. If the wife has no independent means she as well as the husband is given hard labor, and through the imprisonment of the father dependent children are deprived of the income necessary for support. It is not the concern of society if the punishment given a man results in greater punishment of his dependents; it is not the concern of society if the punishment for one crime foments others by reason of the severe penalties visited upon the family of the criminal. One criminologist asserts that every crime punished is another crime encouraged and committed.

At present punishment is usually regarded as retribution for the crime committed or as protection for society, but an increasing amount of attention is being given to reforming the criminal and preparing him to resume his place in society. In some prisons much progress has been made by means of the merit system, in which record is kept of the behavior of the prisoner, who profits according to the amount of improvement he shows.

The indeterminate sentence is a further step in this direction. It provides a minimum penalty, and sometimes a maximum, the exact length of the term of imprisonment to be decided later in the light of indications as to whether the man is fit to live again in society. Properly

administered this is of great use, since there is no advantage to society in keeping a man in confinement who is really reformed and a prospective good citizen. Moreover, continued confinement after this stage is reached is detrimental to the character of the man and to society. In enlightened communities there is a growing tendency to use this form of sentence, which probably will soon be a common feature of penal systems, though in some places there is much dissatisfaction with the administration of both the parole system and the indeterminate sentence.

The parole is one of the intelligent methods of dealing with certain classes of offenders. Under this system a man may be dismissed from confinement before the term of commitment has expired, and in case of lapse in conduct may be returned without trial to serve out the sentence. It is not appropriate to migratory individuals who have no local attachments, but it is usually effective in the case of those who have local ties and interests and a motive to show probity. Sometimes a man is paroled without being sent to confinement. In case of lapse in conduct he is cited to the Court, which exercises its option of having him committed without trial for the period of the sentence.

Probation is another method of restraining criminals without confining them. Attached to many criminal courts is a probation officer who supervises those turned over to his care on probation. There is a growing tendency to use probation in the case of juvenile offenders.

These recent methods of punishing crime are indications that society is not content with the old methods. We have to deal not merely with crime but also with criminals, and we should be concerned primarily with the criminal rather than with the crime; for though many crimes are much the same, criminals differ greatly. Fit the treatment to the criminal rather than the punishment to the crime, is the motto of modern penologists. In order to do this it is necessary to know a great deal about the criminal and his environment. Many courts now have the assistance of a psychologist who investigates home and community conditions and studies the criminal as well. Remedial measures are most highly developed with regard to juvenile offenders, but they should be applied, with adaptations, to adult offenders also. Crime is not solely a matter of moral perversity but is intimately linked up with the mental life of the individual, being related to his immediate social life and his wider community interests. Some criminals may be born but many are made. There is food for reflection in Samuel Butler's suggestion that they be regarded as diseased persons, their ailments diagnosed, and then treated by "straighteners." Perhaps society needs moral straighteners as much

as health officers. Many a man starts on a career of crime without knowing that he is doing so, though a more discerning individual could inform him of the probable consequence of his acts. He takes certain steps, not in themselves very reprehensible, which lead to other untoward acts, and he becomes a criminal without being aware of the fact. Such a man may be dangerous to society, but he is not of the same type as the man who commits crime with a vicious urge the full import of which he realizes.

The prevention of crime is the primary desideratum. How this is to be accomplished we do not know, but there are means of decreasing crime. There is, for example, the habitual criminal, the man who returns to jail if released. Most criminals are repeaters, or, to use the technical term, recidivists. One criminologist says there are practically no first and only offenses, and though this assertion is extreme the records show that a large proportion of dismissed criminals return to jail or the penitentiary. A few years ago 66.8 per cent of the total population of Sing Sing prison were recidivists. "Nevertheless, it finds it mandatory to return to the general community within a period of five years 85.7 per cent of a group of prisoners, of whom 80.6 per cent are recidivists with an average record of 3.5 sentences."² The habitual criminal is a menace to the community and should not be at large. Perhaps, as Ruskin says, "Crime can only be truly hindered by letting no man grow up a criminal — by taking away the *will* to commit sin; not by mere punishment of its commission. Crime, great and small, can only be truly stayed by education — not the education of the intellect only, which is, on some men, wasted, and for others mischievous; but education of the heart, which is alike good and necessary for all."³

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CHAPTER XXX

RACE PROBLEMS

I. THE INCEPTION OF RACE PROBLEMS

The races of the present day have existed for many millennia, yet race problems are recent. In ancient times there was little perception of the nature of the physical differences which distinguished one group of people from another, though the faithfulness with which physical types are portrayed on Assyrian monuments and in Egyptian inscriptions, such as those at Luxor, shows that they were observed.

The Hebrews knew that the Ethiopian did not change his skin and the ancient Greek explained why it was black, but despite these practical recognitions there was no scheme of classification by which the various divisions of mankind could be marked off and their differences noted and recorded. Lack of scientific classification tended to obscure the exact nature of physical differences, and this is one of the reasons why there was little concern about race traits.

Another reason lies in the limited range of acquaintance with the physical types of mankind. The Greeks did not have many contacts with negroes, and though they knew of their existence and of the land in which they lived, they had no conception of the number or extent of the negro population. Likewise they had no direct acquaintance with Mongoloid peoples. A similar observation applies to all the early Mediterranean civilizations. In the early civilizations there was no race consciousness, for there was no knowledge of races and men were ignorant of the existence of great numbers of peoples unlike themselves in physical make-up.

One looks in vain for a consideration of the problem of race in early Christian centuries or in those immediately following the Renaissance. Not until European civilization made inroads into territory occupied by other races were there race problems, and even then they were unimportant. The negro was exploited on the west coast of Africa and the Indian on the east coast of America, but economic considerations rather than racial inspired trader and settler. The American Indian was believed the representative of the Lost Tribes of Israel and the negro was

of the race of Ham upon whom a curse had fallen, but these views were after-thoughts, the effect rather than the cause of the oppression of these peoples, and not the motive for the exploitation. Race problems became acute only when economic rivalries brought them to the fore as subservient to the purposes of the exploiters.

No one thought of the negro as inferior until Europeans found it profitable to exploit him. He was a slave in ancient times, but so also were members of other race groups. The American Indian was adjudged inferior until it was discovered that he would not submit to slavery, after which discovery his inferiority was a matter of little interest to the stronger peoples who took his territory. Until there was economic interest in exploiting Chinese no one considered them inferior. Out of economic clashes grew social conflicts and convenient theories of race superiority.

2. THE THREE RACES

In recent decades much interest has been shown by Western folk in the color divisions of peoples, the yellow, black, and white — or Mongoloid, Caucasoid, and Negroid. Each of these divisions comprises many millions of human beings, the yellow peoples occupying the area of Eastern Asia, the black peoples inhabiting Africa south of a fringe along the Mediterranean, the islands of the West Indies and the adjacent American continent, the Caucasoid peoples residing in Europe, Western Asia, North Africa, the New World and various islands of the South Seas, of which Australia and New Zealand are the most important.

The races have not remained within their original habitats. Negroes have been taken to other lands as slaves, their descendants numbering more than ten millions in the United States alone. Mongoloids have emigrated to other territory, to Hawaii and the United States, and would fain push out into other lands. Caucasoids have been the most migratory of all, pouring over Europe and into Asia, occupying the New World, settling in large colonies in South Africa — in short, penetrating every portion of the known world. They are the most widespread division of the human race, the most eager to take up new territory, and the most vigorous in elbowing other peoples out of the way.

This trenching upon the territory of others involves conflicts and foments race problems. Had the jostled folk been of the same race as the exploiters there would have been no race problems, though there would have been conflicts.

The fear that the yellow race or the black race, or the two combined,

will contest with the whites the supremacy of the planet is without foundation, unless the whites drive these peoples to protective alliances. There is no race consciousness among the respective races, although the demand for common protection against whites may foment it. Chinese do not love the Japanese more than do the Caucasoids, and the yellow peoples are neither psychologically nor politically a unit. Negroes have attempted an international organization to include all their peoples, but as yet the movement has not penetrated the consciousness of the rank and file and its existence is unknown to most members of the race. Neither have whites been able to resolve their differences and turn a combined front against any other division of mankind, but they are more interested in fighting one another than in developing Caucasoid solidarity. Race enters only insofar as it is dragged in by exploiters.

3. ECONOMIC CONFLICTS AS THE CAUSE OF RACE PREJUDICE

Illustrative of the influence of economic conflicts is the attitude in California toward Japanese and Mexicans, respectively. The majority of the Mexican immigrants in that state are racially no nearer the Caucasoid than are the Japanese; in fact, the Mexicans — that is, the Mexican Indians who comprise most of the immigration — are of the same race as the Japanese. Neither are the Mexicans in culture more like the Caucasoids, but, on the contrary, are further from them in this respect than are the Japanese, though the main complaint raised against the latter is their low standard of living. The number of Mexicans in the state greatly exceeds that of the Japanese, and for a long time they have been coming in much greater numbers than the latter. Yet there is no propaganda against the Mexicans, while there has long been a vigorous campaign against the Orientals, culminating in their total exclusion.

The economic situation is the basis for this difference in attitude. The Japanese are enterprising farmers and merchants and work independently in acquiring land and fortune. The Mexicans, on the other hand, show little initiative, are lazy and thriftless, seldom acquire land or conduct enterprises of their own, but are employed by the whites. They serve the economic purposes of employers and are welcome. The Japanese work for themselves, reap the profits of their labor, do not assist white employers and are not welcomed by them. Race difference is the reason assigned for opposition to the Japanese, but this is not the basis of the antagonism. There was much antipathy toward the Chinese

when they were immigrants to California and competed with white labor, but it has now disappeared.

A contemporary physical anthropologist gives the following interpretation of the anti-Asiatic prejudice: "While there has in recent years been considerable immigration or temporary immigration into Asia by members of European races, there has also been a corresponding emigration of Asiatics out of their own continent. Various efforts have been made to stop such counter migrations. The reason has usually been ultimately economic. The economic factors have, however, a biological background. The peoples of Eastern Asia have been compelled to exist for many generations under conditions which are much harder than those in Europe have been for a long time. The Asiatic can therefore exist under economic conditions which are impossible, or extremely distasteful, to the average European. It has been felt by many nations that the economic competition with Asiatics is unfair to their nationals and therefore they have, on various grounds, been excluded from certain countries. This policy of exclusion, though often it is called racial, is usually carried out on national and not true racial grounds. It has been seen in the course of the argument that physically there is comparatively little difference between some of the races of Europe and those of Asia, whereas in other races the difference is more profound."¹

4. THE NEGRO PROBLEM

In this country the presence of the negro constitutes the most serious race problem. For this problem the whites are responsible, since the coming of the negroes into this country was not voluntary. The far-reaching importance of certain acts is seldom apparent to the people who participate in or witness them. Doubtless no contemporary of John Smith foresaw the consequences of the introduction of negroes as slaves into Virginia more than three hundred years ago. Certainly no one who profited from slave labor was much concerned about consequences to a generation so far removed from the times as ours of the twentieth century. But here as elsewhere we reap as our predecessors have sown, and in this instance we reap abundantly.

Three factors make the presence of the negro a serious problem. In racial make-up he is distinct from the Caucasoid, and assimilation is difficult because of the dissimilarity in physical characteristics. His culture is different from that of the European, and his heritage is

¹ Buxton, *The Peoples of Asia*, p. 246, New York, 1925.

another type of civilization. There is no meeting-point in a common traditional past. The distribution of the negroes is further cause of difficulty. They are not evenly distributed through the country, but are segregated in the South Atlantic states, with radiations in the Gulf states and in adjoining states to the west and north. In three southern states, Alabama, Mississippi, and South Carolina, the negro population is greater than that of the whites. But this does not tell the whole story. In many counties in the southern states the negroes outnumber the whites two to one, or even ten to one. Many a county in the South includes more negroes than do several states west of the Mississippi combined. The populations of black and white have little in common and much to hold them apart.

In recent decades there has been a considerable shift in the center of negro population. Prior to 1910 it had been moving in a south-westerly direction, from Virginia a century ago to western Georgia in the early years of the present century. Since that time the center of population has been moving in a northeasterly direction, though more to the north than to the east. Since the World War there have been large migrations of negroes from southern states to northern or middle-western states, with new local problems in the sections to which the negroes have gone in large numbers. There are now large negro quarters in many cities in which few negroes were to be seen at the beginning of the century or a decade later.

The negroes are increasing in numbers, though not with the rapidity with which the whites increase. This is not due to lessened fertility of the negroes, but rather to the high mortality among them, especially in infancy. Everywhere in the South infant mortality among the whites has steadily decreased, while there has been little falling-off among the negroes. The discrepancy may diminish but it is not likely to disappear soon.

A solution of the negro problem has not been found. Either whites and negroes will continue as two distinct races living side by side but not fusing, or there will be amalgamation, the absorption of one by the other, or else a fusing into a hybrid race group. An alternative would be the segregation of negroes, but as there would be some difficulty in securing the territory, to say nothing of the difficulty of enforcing the segregation, this solution does not seem a likely one. Many discountenance the facilitation of amalgamation. There is strong opposition, at least upon the part of the whites, to the intermarriage of whites and negroes, and in every southern state marriage between individuals of

the two races is illegal.² There is not much intermarriage in states where the law interposes no obstacle, but in all parts of the country there is intermixture. One has only to travel through the land to discover that the physical repugnance of whites for negroes is not so considerable as is sometimes represented — the presence of hundreds of thousands of mulattoes is testimony to the contrary. Most of these mulattoes however, are the products of illicit unions. The prohibition against mixture, therefore, seems to be legal and social, rather than physiological or innately psychological. In view of this obvious intermixture which is taking place in spite of social or legal prohibitions, it is likely that in course of time complete amalgamation will be achieved, obstacles notwithstanding. Negroes and Caucasoids can not live side by side and maintain racial purity indefinitely.

The Jews are cited as an example of the persistence of a racial strain for millennia amid peoples who greatly outnumber them. The cases are not analogous, however, since the ties of religion and tradition hold the Jews together, whereas among the negroes there is no tie of a distinctive religion and no inheritance of a common culture tradition.

The inferiority of the mulatto is alleged by many, who say that he is worse than either of the parental strains. But this has not been shown to be supported by the facts. Many of the negroes who have achieved distinction in art, science or letters — the younger Dumas, Booker T. Washington, W. E. B. Du Bois, for example — are of mixed racial stocks. Even if the allegation were true, it would be more discreditable to the whites than to the blacks. Most mulattoes are the offspring of illegitimate unions, and if this implies a low status of the negro woman it does not exalt the moral status of the white man, and seems to indicate that the morals of the latter are no higher than those of the former. Socially mulattoes belong to the black race; but racially, of course, they are as much Caucasoid as Negroid. In intelligence tests, however, mulattoes outrank the apparently pure-blooded negroes.

As to the results of racial mixture, "There are no definite scientific data available which show that there are any important biological differences in the races of men, resulting in mixtures which in some cases can be classed as good and in others as bad. The good and bad results coming from certain mixtures are derived, so far as we now know, from the physical and mental character of the individuals concerned, and

² In several other states also intermarriage between whites and negroes is forbidden. Such is the case in Arizona, California, Colorado, Delaware, Idaho, Indiana, Missouri, Nebraska, Oklahoma, Oregon, and Utah. So far as the writer is aware, no state which has prohibited intermarriage between the races has subsequently rescinded the prohibition.

have little or nothing to do with racial factors. The social status of the classes in the races that intermarry plays an important part in the results of miscegenation. The Eurasian is usually cited as an example of a racial mixture which leads to a poor quality of offspring. The Hindu woman who so far forgets her caste as to marry a white man, and the white man who finds it possible to marry a Hindu, both usually belong in a social class below the average of each race. East thinks that, genetically, race-mixture is dangerous when two human stocks with equivalent hereditary endowments are considered, and that miscegenation is doubly dangerous when races differ in innate qualities. His argument is based mainly on the results of animal breeding. The evils resulting from such mixtures among animals have not been proved for man. . . . It should be remembered that the most diverse peoples have mingled since prehistoric times, and that these combinations have usually resulted in virile races.”³

How far the mass of negroes will eventually progress it is, of course, impossible to predict. However, a goodly proportion of the race in this country have shown marked improvement in the past few decades. This is due in part to the interest taken in them by whites, but probably much more to that which they are taking in themselves. They have had no race pride and little culture heritage, and so have been feeble imitators of European civilization. It is true that they have given us music, song, poetry, folklore, and dances, but these few swallows do not bring a culture spring.

A few leaders, of whom Du Bois is the ablest — and there are few more accomplished and cultured men in the country — have directed attention to the soul of the negro, appealing to race pride and to the potentiality for culture development. They wish to see the negro in the higher walks of life.

There is, on the other hand, the point of view represented at Tuskegee Institute under Booker Washington and his successor. The ideal of Booker Washington was the industrial development of the negro so that he might achieve economic independence or at least a better economic status.

There is no hint of social equality in the program outlined by Washington, who insisted that in things social the two races might remain as separate as the fingers on the hand yet in all things involving common interests might coöperate as readily as the fingers with the hand. Industrial schools for negroes have done much to improve their status in

³ Tozzer, *Social Origins and Social Continuities*, pp. 11-12, New York, 1925.

many parts of the South and some see here the beginning of a real upward climb.

The negro problem can not be solved by keeping the negro down. No hope of solution lies in that direction, but if there is one it lies in elevating him. The whites are not degraded when the negro is elevated, but on the contrary are degraded by reason of the degradation of the negro. This is demonstrated in the suffering of the whites from sex crimes. One hears most about the attacks of negro men upon white women, but more demoralizing to the whites are the loose relations between white men and negresses. This loose morality is not confined to the lower classes of whites, and no single influence in the South is so debasing as these low sex morals of both races.

The utmost must be done to improve the status of the negro in education, morals, and economic goods. He can not be exterminated and he can not be moved to new territory; we must live with him and he with us. His low standards bring ours down and his higher standards accrue to the good of white neighbors. If he were treated as an individual instead of as a representative of a race the problem of good relations would be easier. But the ordinary man has no time for discrimination, though it is of the essence of the situation. There are all sorts of negroes, as there are all sorts of whites, and each should be treated according to his merits rather than according to the shade of his epidermis.

In every state or country in which whites and negroes meet in large numbers there is a race problem. It exists in South Africa where the race problem of the Southern states is duplicated, nor are the peoples there any nearer a solution than are we in the United States. The negro-white problem is probably the most vexing one which modern society has to face in Africa or in North America, and no solution has yet been found. A generation does not know what is involved in the steps which it takes, but it invariably leaves to the next generation its mistakes as well as its successes; and the full import of "race" frictions can not yet be appreciated.

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(See further the bibliography at the end of the chapter on *Race*.)

CHAPTER XXXI

IMMIGRATION AND POPULATION

I. HUMAN MIGRATIONS

In the development of human society migration preceded immigration. Migration is the wandering of a group of people, the individuals changing locality rather than social adhesions. Immigration is the infiltration of individuals from one social group to another, usually from one national group into another. This is a trait of recent civilization, particularly of the last hundred years. Migration, on the contrary, is a trait of primitive folk, who frequently wander from place to place, sometimes in search of food, sometimes to escape a troublesome foe, sometimes, apparently, inspired by desire for adventure in new lands. There is evidence of the wanderings of peoples in Europe in prehistoric times. In England in the Bronze Age a people with long heads, building long mounds, were succeeded by a people with round heads who buried the dead in round mounds. In the stratified cave deposits of France and in the terramara settlements of northern Italy are evidences of the supplanting of a people of one physical type by that of another.

In the ancient historical civilizations, likewise, there is evidence of the migrations of peoples. The Old Testament describes the wanderings of the Hebrews, first in the Arabian Peninsula, then in Egypt, again in Arabia, straggling through that peninsula, and finally settling in the Promised Land west of the Jordan. Their Semitic cousins, the Arabs, have been wanderers from the earliest times of which we have record, and to this day, in many parts of Africa and the Arabian Peninsula, they lead much the same sort of nomadic life which characterized their ancestors in the seventh century A.D. when Mohammed proclaimed the doctrine of the one God. Thanks almost as much to their nomadic tendencies as to the militant elements of their religion, they carried the faith abroad and in a century had penetrated the whole of the Arabian Peninsula, crossed into Egypt, occupied the southern fringe of the Mediterranean, and entered Spain. Only the formidable check given the Moors by Charles Martel in 732 at Tours in southern France prevented

them from spreading over the plains of western Europe and imposing upon that continent a new race type and a new religion.

But only when there is a stable form of government in the land of destination can individuals change their national abode. Immigration was not possible until the various peoples had developed a measurable tolerance for those not of their national group. Thus England, the first country in Europe to show religious and political toleration, was the first to receive any considerable immigration, unless we include the immigration of the Jews into the Turkish Empire following the persecutions consequent upon the Crusades. England received many oppressed peoples from countries which did not tolerate freedom of belief. To her came many of the Huguenots fleeing from Catholic France, and in the time of Cromwell many of the oppressed Jews, a people who before this had been denied the hospitality of the British Isles.¹

2. CAUSES OF IMMIGRATION

Since the dawn of history no event has been of such importance in stimulating emigration as the discovery of new lands. With the finding of a new continent hopes rose, old ties weakened, and the spirit of adventure waxed strong. Settlers poured over to the Americas, and later to Australia, New Zealand, and South Africa. The era of immigration had begun.

The causes of immigration have varied, operating in different manner in different countries and differently at various times in the same country. The conditions which influence the immigrant most are sometimes in the country of birth and sometimes in that to which he is going, though usually a combination of these conditions dislodges him.

Frequently in the emigrant himself lies the cause of his going, a spirit of restlessness, discontent, and adventure, a desire to cross the seas and view new lands, to sever old ties and form new ones, to seek fortune abroad. The intolerance and oppression of home governments have added another stimulus. Intolerance at home brought to our shores many of the early German settlers, the Jews (especially from Poland and Russia), the Slavic peoples from central or southeastern Europe, and many of the subjects of the Turkish Empire who have taken up their abode in America. The glamour of new lands has made effective appeal since the Polo brothers visited Cipango and the empire of the great Mogul, bringing back marvelous tales of new lands in the East.

¹ See the author's *Messiahs: Christian and Pagan*, pp. 57-58, Boston, 1918.

The halo of romance beckoned many a spirit to disappointment and disillusion, but the glamour still clung to lands across the Atlantic. The tradition lives on in stories of the great natural resources of the new country, the industrial opportunities that lie ready at hand for the adventurer to grasp, the unlimited social and political opportunities.

Agencies of the transportation companies, or representatives of industries in this country, despite efforts of this government and often despite efforts from the government of the would-be emigrant, fostered the romance and catered to the extravagant expectations of the peasant. Friends and relatives who had returned from America told exaggerated stories of the life here and as proof of its opportunities exhibited gold watches and diamond rings.

The returned immigrants strutted about in American clothes with a cosmopolitan ease and an air of superiority which inspired envy in all observers. In the coffee house, the tavern, the social gathering, they told of the new life in the new land. Fellow-countrymen listened with attention and credulity and passed along the story with added embellishments. Letters from friends or relatives who had gone to America have been another important factor in inducing immigration. America symbolized opportunity, and appealed to men of ambition, whatever their nationality or walk in life.

We are not able to assess the influence upon our civilization of the unprecedented immigration which has come to our shores, but certain untoward effects can be discerned. The immigrants have not gone into the country districts, where they were most needed, but into the cities, where congested conditions already prevailed, and where they swelled the ranks of unskilled labor. They were not accustomed to American standards of living and their own standards were usually lower. The average age of immigrants was above that of the average native population and this made assimilation more difficult. They were not evenly distributed through the country, some sections having more, some less, than their proportionate share.

Moreover, the mass of immigrants have not gone to the sparsely settled regions of the country but to the most densely populated districts. Of the 10,356,644 foreign-born who were in this country in 1910, 46 per cent were in the North Atlantic section, 40.2 per cent in the North Central section, and 2.1 per cent in the South Atlantic section. The census of 1900, in which the sections of the country were divided along different lines, showed that 84.8 per cent of the foreign-born were in the North, 8.7 per cent in the West, and 5.4 per cent in the South.

The falling birth-rate in this country is partly, though only partly, attributable to immigration. The birth-rate shows the first appreciable decline about the year 1830, during the period when the effects of immigration were first strongly felt, and with slight variations it has diminished progressively with the increase in immigration. It is true that in recent decades the birth-rate has been falling in those countries from which the immigrants came, but there the cause was that same overcrowding which the stream of immigration helped to induce here. Moreover, in those sections in this country in which the immigrants settled most thickly the fall in the native birth-rate was most pronounced. In New England, the section which receives the largest proportion of immigrants, the native birth-rate is lowest. This correlation holds not only for states but even for counties in states in which a large number of immigrants have settled. If there had been no immigration it is not likely that the population of the country today would be much greater or less than it now is. Immigration merely means, so far as population is concerned, that we have filled the country with foreign-born instead of with native-born. Each immigrant decreased the number of native-born American children.

3. SOME PROBLEMS OF IMMIGRATION

Since the decade 1841-50 there has been a shift in the areas from which the immigrants to the United States have come. In that decade 95.9 per cent of the immigration came from northern and western Europe, 0.3 per cent from southern and eastern Europe. The proportion from northern and western Europe decreased in successive decades to 94.6 per cent (1851-60), 88.5 per cent (1861-70), 73.7 per cent (1871-80), 72.0 per cent (1881-90), 44.8 per cent (1891-1900) and 21.8 per cent in 1901-10, the last census decade preceding the World War. Meanwhile the percentage which the immigration from southern and eastern Europe formed of the total immigration rose from 0.3 per cent in the decade 1841-50 to 0.8 per cent, 1.5 per cent, 7.1 per cent, 18.3 per cent in successive decades, reaching 52.8 per cent in the decade 1891-1900, and 71.9 per cent in the decade 1901-10.

In 1921 a law was passed restricting immigration. Each country was allowed to send annually the number of immigrants equivalent to 3 per cent of the foreign-born from that country who were resident in the United States in 1910. The 1924 law admitted only 2 per cent and

shifted the basis from the census of 1910 to that of 1890. This decreased the proportion of permitted immigration from southern and eastern Europe. The law which goes into effect July 1, 1927, restricts the total annual immigration to 150,000, and the quota of each country "shall be a number which bears the same ratio to 150,000 as the number of inhabitants in continental United States in 1920 having that national origin bears to the total population."

4. MALTHUS' THEORY OF POPULATION

In the closing years of the eighteenth century Thomas Malthus, an English clergyman, wrote a book on population which was destined to have much influence on biological, economic, and sociological speculation. Both Wallace and Darwin say that Malthus' book turned their attention to problems of animal life, resulting in the theory advanced independently by them that struggle for existence and natural selection are the principal factors in the evolution of animal life. It gave food for thought to many early economists, among them Francis Place and John Stuart Mill, and its thesis influences many contemporary economists and sociologists.

The principle enunciated by Malthus is simple, as are most great principles, and is based on an observation which any person of his day could have made had he directed attention to the problem which engaged the mind of this investigator. Indeed it was to some extent anticipated by Benjamin Franklin, by whom Malthus may have been influenced and from whom he quotes as follows: "Were the face of the earth vacant of other plants it might be gradually sowed and overspread with one kind only, as for instance with fennel; and were it empty of other inhabitants it might in a few years be replenished from one nation only, as for instance with Englishmen." Malthus then points out that a population tends to increase in numbers faster than the means of subsistence. The form in which he states his thesis and some of his assertions regarding population are not acceptable, but the principle enunciated by him is incontestable: there is a tendency for population to outrun the means of subsistence and there is a limit to the population which a given territory can support.

It is obvious that a given area — an acre, for example — can not support an unlimited number of human beings. Intensive cultivation of the land increases the output of food; mechanical devices increase the productivity of labor; science invents new means of finding food, and

perhaps eventually will take it from the air. Men may live in high altitudes or dwell in deep subterranean abodes. If we grant all that our imaginations may claim for human potentiality in dealing with this acre of ground, including regions above and below it, the incontestable fact remains that men can not increase in population on that acre beyond a certain limit. If instead of an acre it is a million acres, a continent, or the entire planet, the problem is the same. In any case there are limits to the population which can be supported, limits even to the number who can find standing room or breathing space.

5. INCREASE IN POPULATION

The history of a country shows a falling-off in the rate of increase after a certain approximate saturation of population. In this country the decline in the birth-rate began about a century ago (approximately 1830), and this was roughly concurrent with a diminishing rate of increase of population, although the increase in absolute numbers was continuing. The falling-off in rate of increase has continued rather steadily ever since, being lower during the past quarter-century than during any preceding twenty-five-year period. Thus in the decade 1800-10 the population of the country increased 36 per cent, the increase in subsequent decades being, respectively, in percentage of total population, 33 per cent, 34 per cent, 33 per cent, 36 per cent, 23 per cent, 30 per cent, 25 per cent, 21 per cent, 21 per cent, and for the decade 1910-20, 15 per cent. Yet during this time the gain in absolute numbers went from 1,932,000 in the decade 1800-10 to 15,977,000 in the decade 1900-10, and to 13,739,000 in the decade 1910-20. Similarly the decennial rate of increase for England and Wales combined dropped from 18 per cent in the decade 1811-21 to 10.9 per cent in the decade 1901-1911.² A comparable decline in the rate of increase occurred in every European country during the last century.

An estimate of the annual increase in population for various countries during the period 1906-11, and of the length of time necessary for the population to double at that rate of increase, yields the following:³

² The birth-rate for England and Wales fell from 35.4 per 1000 population in 1875 to 18.3 per 1000 in 1925, the lowest recorded for that area except for the last war-years, 1917 and 1918. The death-rate meanwhile dropped from 21.4 to 12.2 per 1000. In 1925 the birth-rate for London was 18.0 and the death-rate was correspondingly low, both birth-rate and death-rate being higher in other large cities of Great Britain.

³ After East, *Mankind at the Crossroads*, p. 78, New York, 1923.

<i>Country</i>	<i>Annual Increase per 1000</i>	<i>Years to Double</i>
France	1.6.....	436
Norway	6.6.....	105
Sweden	8.4.....	83
Austria-Hungary	8.5.....	82
Spain	8.7.....	80
England	10.4.....	67
Japan	10.8.....	64
Holland	12.2.....	57
Germany	13.6.....	51
Rumania	14.8.....	47
United States	18.2.....	38
Australia	20.3.....	34
Canada	29.8.....	24

The highest rate of increase is in new countries — the United States, Australia, and Canada.

In 1790 the population of the United States was 3,929,314. It was 50,155,738 in 1880 and about 68,000,000 in 1890, having increased seventeen-fold in a century. If this rate of increase had continued to the present and should it then continue to 1990, the population of the country at that time would be about 1,040,000,000 — obviously an impossibility. The rate of increase must slow down, which means that there must be either a smaller number of children per adult or an increase in the death-rate.⁴

There is a relation between the birth-rate and the death-rate of a country, the two usually being related in direct proportion. Generally the countries which have a high birth-rate have a high death-rate, and those which have a low death-rate have a low birth-rate. The same relation is found within a given country. The economic classes having the highest birth-rate have also the highest death-rate, while those with the lowest death-rate have also the lowest birth-rate. The poorer classes have the largest number of children and the highest proportion of funerals — the biggest procession of cradles and coffins. This is particularly true of the negro population in the South, as contrasted with the whites.

The decreased birth-rate in the more densely populated countries, and in the more advanced as contrasted with the less advanced, is attributable in large part to late marriage, abstinence from marriage, or birth-control. Educated people are coming to feel individually, if not

⁴ The decrease in immigration would, however, greatly affect the above computation.

collectively, that limitation of population is the only solution of the problem. Hence people maintaining a high standard of living are more prone to limit the size of the family than are those with low standards, and educated people are more given to limitation than are the uneducated. In England doctors have the smallest families, then clergymen of the Church of England, and then teachers.

In the attitude toward optimum population and number of offspring there is need of a new ethics. The prevailing ethics with regard to these matters is a survival of the sentiment that a man is honored according to the number of his descendants, for this means a larger number to pay honor to his memory. But the world has such abundance of human material that it is doubtful if any man can be said to enhance the value of social or individual life merely by introducing more members into society. After a certain point each additional arrival lowers the standard of life, since fewer goods must suffice. The value of human life lies not in numbers of individuals but in the plane on which they live. When offspring mean the lowering of standards of living, as under many circumstances is the case, to bring them into existence is a social crime. We need not more people but better ones, not more descendants to contest a place on the planet, but human beings more capable of enjoying the blessing of the earth and avoiding its curses.

"If man should gain conscious and deliberate control of his fatal power of reproduction, if he could learn to bring his own kind back again into better adjusted perspective with Nature, by decreasing his reproductive exuberance to increase the possibilities of free and exalted living, he would be making what seems to many foolish people the Great Renunciation which would yet be in reality the Great Triumph of life."⁵

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PART VI

THE TREND OF SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT

INTRODUCTORY

In social life it is not so important to know where we are as in what direction we are moving and whither and why. To ascertain the trend of civilization and to predict the future, we must look into the past and at the same time observe the life and movement of the present. Society does not behave like a material body the motion of which can be accurately foretold by a study of the projectory and the momentum, but it is capable of taking direction and speed beyond our predictions. As late as June, 1914, for example, no one could really have known that the World War would begin in that year or in any subsequent year, for the potentiality of world peace as well as of a world war was present and no one could foretell the future relative strength of these two inconsistent ideals, each at large among the nations. But in 1914 one could assess the potentialities of these respective tendencies and foretell roughly the results in case one should triumph over the other.

Similar inconsistent forces are abroad in the world today, and one can now better than in 1914 predict the result if war should dominate. Yet when all is said, in social affairs we proceed largely in the dark. We understand a situation in retrospect better than in prospect. It is a commonplace that a proper estimate of events and personages can not be made by contemporaries. The historian must wait until events can be seen in perspective. He is closer to contemporary events, but their contours are blurred and their significance is enigmatical.

The ensuing chapters will assess some of the important changes which have taken place in social life. They will refer also to some of the methods used in the solution of social problems as well as to the ideals of social life cherished by dreamers of utopia, who, in attempting to separate the fundamental from the superficial, frequently have been the most practical students of society.

CHAPTER XXXII

THE DEVELOPMENT AND DIFFUSION OF CULTURE TRAITS

Historians and ethnologists agree on at least one principle, namely, that of continuity in the development of culture. The archeologist finds the continuity of culture exemplified in the records of prehistoric times, and as the evidence becomes more abundant one hiatus after another disappears. Indeed the numerous archeological objects which we now have, meager as they must be in representing the totality of the culture of prehistoric man, give an unbroken series of types of implements from the crudest eoliths to the most finished metal implements with all their intricacy of workmanship and decoration. The paleolith is but a slightly improved eolith; the later paleolith compares favorably with the early neolith; and the polished ivory and bone of late paleolithic times doubtless paved the way to the polishing and grinding of stone which mark the distinctive workmanship of the neolithic period. The hammering applied to soft stone is transferred to the soft metal, copper, and a new material is utilized. The accident of melting in the fire doubtless disclosed the possibility of true metallurgy and a chance fusing of molten copper and tin produced bronze. Man had now but to profit from his observations and to bring about designedly the conditions which had produced a bronze implement fortuitously. The way was then open to the forges of the early iron age, and these in turn made possible the finest steel work of our most perfected Bessemer implements.

In every field of human endeavor, social, political, artistic, literary, as fully as in material culture, one thing paves the way to another, man's progress through each stage of culture illustrating a continuity of development. Nothing is produced that was not already there in essence.

Everywhere, too, there has been a diffusion of culture traits. No area has developed wholly within itself all of the traits which it exhibits. Do we have an American language? If so, we did not invent it in the New World but merely gave a characteristic trend here to linguistic elements brought from the Old World. We employ an alphabet which has had but one origin among Western peoples. It was given to them by Phœnician traders who disseminated it about the Eastern Mediter-

anean from a people living in Asia Minor. Paper was first used in Asia Minor, or in Egypt, and the knowledge of how to make it has spread through the Western world from a single center of origin. We keep time by an astronomical calendar which we owe to Egypt and to Roman revision — none of the Western peoples invented it. The divisions of our day and night, the spaces on the faces of our watches, are not the inventions of the European peoples who use them, but the major divisions of the twenty-four-hour day into two parts originated in Egypt, and our duodecimal system of keeping time, twelve hours divided into sixty minutes which in turn are divided into sixty seconds, comes from Babylonia. The division of the circle into degrees and seconds is uniform throughout the Western world, but this duodecimal system, like that used on our timepieces, comes from Babylonia. We travel on wheels, but no Western country invented the wheel; this device, likewise, comes from the Eastern Mediterranean, probably from Babylonia. Egyptians rode in chariots before a wheel had moved on the continent of Europe or anywhere in the New World. Western nations are called "Christian" but the religion professed by their various populations did not originate among any one of them but came from an eastern source, the Hebrews.

Widespread traits which are Western in origin have in few cases been invented more than once. There may have been independent inventions of the telephone, but there were certainly not as many independent inventions of it as there are nations using it. Iron-clad vessels were first used in our navy, but they are no longer a peculiarity of the naval forces of the United States. This country produced the first submarine, but its present distribution would afford little index to the place of its origin. We originated the *aéroplane*, but now all nations use it. The French first made ascents in balloons, but during the World War the Germans were more actively engaged in ballooning, in the huge Zeppelins, than were any of the other combatants, and all of the nations used them. It is difficult to originate a new trait and it is impossible to keep it home. Culture traits are afflicted with *Wanderlust*; they go a-wandering.

An examination of culture areas in primitive society shows that diffusion has gone on there no less conspicuously than in civilization. We do not find one type of culture in a Plains tribe and a distinctly different sort among its neighbors. The culture of an Australian tribe has many affinities among neighboring tribes, and every African tribe shares many traits in common with adjacent peoples. Since we can not assume that each tribe in a given culture area would independently

invent each culture trait which it shares with its neighbors, we infer that diffusion has carried the traits through the area and that they had but one origin or, at most, but a few origins.

I. CONDITIONS FACILITATING THE SPREAD OF A CULTURE TRAIT

Diffusion is, of course, only the name of a process. Strictly speaking, traits do not spread from one area to another but are adopted by various peoples. Trait dispersion, therefore, is the adoption of the trait by the group in which it finds lodgment. Let us, then, turn our attention to some of the conditions which facilitate the spread of a trait, that is, the conditions which induce one group to adopt a trait from another.

No quality in a new trait is more compelling than its obvious utility. Thus fire-making devices are found in all cultures, the simplest of savages practising the making of fire. Even if one allows for many independent inventions of fire-making, still a tremendous influence must be given to adoption, or diffusion. The bow and arrow, so widely spread over contiguous territories, as, for example, the Americas, is an example of the appeal of obvious utility, as is the wide distribution of pottery, weaving, and the device of the wheel.

But the obvious utility of a trait depends upon its adaptability in the culture. The wheel has not spread everywhere; it is not found in the far North nor in the far South, nor is it used in the desert regions or on the tops of mountains. Neither has the device spread much where roads are not developed. Telephone, telegraph, and electrical appliances generally, obey the same law. They are adopted only in case they can be fitted into the culture.

Intellectual appeal is the dominant characteristic of certain other traits which have spread over large areas. Thus the theory of evolution, which we find in every culture, the most primitive as well as the most advanced, is attractive because of its intellectual appeal. The spread of Darwinism in Western civilization is due primarily to its intellectual qualities, and perhaps this appeal is what makes fundamentalism attractive to many and has secured its spread among men of other types of intelligence. The doctrines of Copernicus and those of Newton and Einstein have traveled far because of their intellectual appeal.

More immediate in its operation is the sensory appeal, a quality accountable for the widespread character of many traits. Tobacco crossed the ocean and penetrated the entire world, and the use of opium

has been adopted in many regions. Alcoholic stimulants have made a similar appeal, and so also have the milder drinks, tea and coffee.

Esthetic or dramatic appeal has carried many elements to far parts and given them wide acceptance. Art designs travel over large areas of savagery and penetrate all of Western civilization. A given *motif* in art may spread over hundreds of square miles, as occurred, for example, with the totemic heraldry of the Northwest Coast and with the animal *motifs* prevalent in Oceania. In this class, too, comes ceremonialism, which has spread over the Plains area, the Southwest, the Australian continent, and throughout the world of Christendom. Fraternal and patriotic organizations make their appeal partly through their ceremonialism, and many elements in folklore spread because they appeal to the sense of the dramatic.

Equally effective is the comic. The comic element in folklore, such as the trickster or the stupid ogre, secures acceptance in a new audience, and the trait extends its geographical boundaries. Western civilization is well aware of the merit of a joke, for laughter is contagious and so is the joke which stimulates it. People with a sense of humor carry away a funny story or an amusing anecdote and recount it to others.

2. THE PROCESSES OF ASSIMILATION

A trait may be assimilated by a culture although not produced by that culture. Savages may utilize matches though they are not able to manufacture them. European civilization utilizes coffee, tea, and bananas, but it does not produce them. Tea and tobacco, for example, have been assimilated to the social habits and the eating habits of the English people, although they do not cultivate the tea or the tobacco plant. The production of an article is on another plane. Thus the cultivation of maize and tobacco has been assimilated and improved by the descendants of Europeans in the New World, but not to any extent by the peoples of the Old World.

A transplanted trait frequently, though not invariably, functions differently when taken to a new culture. Among most Indian tribes tobacco had a religious significance as well as a social significance, but in the European cultures it retains only the social significance. The incense which is burned in the Buddhist temples of China and Japan has, when introduced into European culture, merely an esthetic significance. Many of the traits connected with our celebration of Christmas were of pagan origin, but they function in our culture as part of a ceremonial or religious complex.

Educational institutions may be built and may flourish without any inkling on the part of their occupants of the nature or function of education. One finds the buildings, the machinery, the physical equipment, the outer accoutrements — but little genuine education. The routine is copied, but the content, the educational reality, is lacking.

3. SPECIFIC CREATIVE TALENTS IN THE VARIOUS CULTURES

Assimilation and adaptation imply an ability to create. Indeed each is itself a creation in which the materials for the new trait are furnished from abroad rather than originated at home. The manufacture of matches is a creative activity, whether it is stimulated by an industry abroad or is solely a home product.

No culture is an unbroken uniformity, but variations exist in all cultures, primitive or advanced, which provide stimuli for further change. By appreciation of their further possibilities many new traits have come into existence, the new, of course, being but a modification of the old. Inventions are made in all civilized countries. No country has a monopoly upon inventiveness, but all have an ability to originate new traits, and all have need of patent offices.

Nor is creative ability limited to Western European civilization. Every culture with which we are familiar has proven its ingenuity. The Hebrews were law-givers and formulators of ethical codes, while their contributions to religion are an outstanding accomplishment. The Egyptians modified the calendar, developed priesthood, were skilled craftsmen, practised agriculture and domestication, carried pottery to a high point of development, showed genius for government and organization, and were theologians, physicians, surgeons, and artists of no mean ability. Babylonians and Assyrians excelled in law, education, engineering, finance, astronomy, and elaborated cosmogonies and cosmologies. The Greeks gave new impetus to philosophy, literature, science, art, history, politics, ethics, and international law. The Romans were engineers, legalists, financiers, and empire builders. This list of traits, of course, does not exhaust the specific accomplishments of the cultures mentioned but merely indicates some of the lines of their creativeness.

The lowly cultures, likewise, have contributed specific culture traits. Australia has given us the boomerang, multipronged spears, spear-throwers, artfulness in taking game, magico-religious ceremonies not duplicated elsewhere, and peculiar kinship systems. Polynesia has con-

tributed its institution of the *tabu*, its cosmogonies, its art, skill in navigation, dances, and so on. From the New World came many products and traits unknown to the pre-Columbian Old World, such as the birch-bark canoe, the *kayak* of the Eskimo, the *travois* of the Plains area, tobacco, and various agricultural products, such as maize, the potato, the tomato, and chocolate.

Moreover, the various cultures within the New World have made specific contributions. The sculpture and carvings of the Eskimos have no counterpart elsewhere; the dog-driving developed by them is unique; their type of watercraft and double-bladed paddle are found nowhere else. No other peoples carved such designs as are found on the Northwest Coast, and no other peoples made such blankets as the Chilkat wove. The type of sun-dried clay dwellings in the Southwest is peculiar to that part of the world, as are their art designs, their religious beliefs, the coiffure, and the mythological lore. Equally specific are the cultures which flourished in ancient Mexico, in Colombia, in Peru, in Brazil, on the pampas of Argentina.

Civilization, then, is a matter of culture areas and these are interdependent rather than absolutely independent of one another. They borrow traits, but they make these over, and they are likewise capable of developing new traits out of their own culture context.

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CHAPTER XXXIII

WIDENING HORIZONS

I. THE ENLARGING HORIZON

Much interest was aroused a few years ago by Korzybski's book, *The Manhood of Humanity*,¹ the thesis of which is that man alone is a time-binding animal. Plants and trees are merely cell-binding, incorporating elements from their environment and fashioning these into a living thing, the tree or plant. They are limited to chemical and physical action and settle down in one spot where they remain, not going forth to seek the world but waiting for it to come to them. Animals, on the other hand, are space-binding. They, too, incorporate elements of the world around them, chemically converting portions of the external environment into their own organism, much as plants do. Unlike plants they do not remain in one spot awaiting the arrival of the elements which they need, but invade adjacent territory seeking what they may devour to their enhancement. The plant can not overcome the obstacle of distance, but the animal can; and it binds into a contributing unity the area about it, within which it moves in comparative freedom from the limitations of distance to which the plant is subject. Man has the potentialities of plants, being cell-binding, and those of animals, being space-binding.

Man has also a third quality which Korzybski denies to plants and animals, for he is time-binding as well. That plants are to an extent time-binding and that this is a trait of the beasts, we would be forced to admit if we examined the relevant facts, but man possesses this quality in preëminent degree; no other animal makes use of the past to the extent that he does. In the main the beasts utilize only their own experiences, whereas man employs not only his own past but also that of other men. Tradition, for example, is the utilization of a past which is gone but not forgotten. Every savage tribe makes use of its past when it manufactures stone implements, indulges in art and mythology, or instructs the youth in the lore of tribal life. As we see in the writings

¹ New York, 1921.

f Hesiod, Plato, Herodotus, and Thucydides, the earliest historical civilizations also utilized the past.

But at no time has the utilization of the past been so extensive as in contemporary civilization. We have heaped up treasures from the past in monumental proportions, beside which the accretions of former times and civilizations dwindle into insignificance. The past which the Greeks or the Romans knew is small compared with that which we command. "Greek thought is always limited by the finitude of Greek experience. The definite, the limit, plays a large part in its rational ideal. Euclid's straight line, a mathematical thinker has remarked, is that which is bounded by two extreme points, not a segment of an infinite line."²

Our sense of the remoteness of the past distinguishes our culture from primitive culture and the early civilizations. A primitive tribe pictures the beginnings of things, but it has no measure of their remoteness and offers no estimate of the lapse of time since the posited beginnings. Their "grandfather's grandfather's time" was the remotest day a Yedda ever mentioned. In the early civilizations, similarly, there was no measure of the remoteness of the time lying back of civilization. The Hebrews, for example, described the beginning of the world and of human life, but they dated the creation — if they dated it at all — only a few generations before their own day. In the last century scientists immeasurably enlarged our conception of the age of the earth, and we view the past in terms of millions of years. Whereas our great-grandfathers thought that human life had existed for approximately six thousand years, we trace human history back to at least a hundred thousand years ago.

We have extended also our idea of the future. Men of abandon and daring imagination, such as Bernard Shaw and H. G. Wells, describe the life of centuries to come. The rest of us may not be able to accompany them on their pilgrimages, but we nevertheless build in terms of the future. Whereas our remote ancestors limited their gaze to affairs of the day, thinking at most of the immediate morrow, we infer the future from present tendencies and adapt our enterprises to larger horizons. The modern city is planned with an eye to future needs; the modern manufacturer looks ahead to distant future markets; modern legislators, if they are wise, model laws to fit a future day. More than ever before men plan a life career and not merely the work of a year or a

² Hobhouse, *Social Development: Its Nature and Conditions*, p. 255, New York, 1924.

decade. Programs of scientific investigation may extend through ten to twenty years. Always there have been individuals who have lived ahead of their times, but today, due to the expansion of our horizons, there is a greater tendency to plan for future needs which must be imaginatively conceived; and the possibilities of achievement have been enormously enhanced. In 1833 the head of the United States Patent Office offered his resignation on the ground that the limit of human inventiveness had been reached and there would be no further need of his services. Today the head of the Patent Office is more likely to request additional assistance to meet the increasing demands upon his department.

2. THE ENLARGING GEOGRAPHICAL HORIZON

Along with expansion of the temporal horizon has gone enlargement of the geographical horizon. The savage lives in a world bounded by tribal borders or extending little beyond them. Neither his knowledge nor his imagination encompasses much expanse of territory beyond the narrowly circumscribed limits of his wanderings and those of his fellows. In the Andaman Islands, for example, the natives had scarcely heard of the existence of tribes fifty miles away and they knew nothing of the more remote peoples of the island. "As a general rule it may be said that no man knew anything of any of the natives living more than twenty miles from his own part of the country."³ A comparable limitation is typical of savages everywhere unless they have learned from Europeans. For the ancient Greek the known world comprised the land bordering the Mediterranean, which, small as it seems to us, was a wide expanse than the world in which the ancient Egyptian, Babylonian, or Hebrew lived. For the man in medieval times the world was not much larger than Europe. When Columbus crossed the Atlantic and found new lands beyond the borders of the known world, geographical horizons increased. The Crusades had paved the way, by introducing Europe to the Near East, and the adventures of the Polo brothers in the Far East had stirred men's minds to the realization of marvels in lands previously far beyond their ken. But the adventures of the Polos were familiar to few, for printing was not thriving and there was meager opportunity to spread the news. By the sixteenth century, however, printing was common in the cities of Europe and books could travel as well as tell of travel. Men on sailing vessels traveled faster and farther than did books, passing beyond the New World and en-

³ Brown, *The Andaman Islanders*, p. 87, Cambridge, 1922.

circling the globe which earlier generations had believed flat, with boundaries beyond which one could not go and return. Their circum-navigations acquainted them with new lands, including many islands which yielded facts as wonderful as the fancies of fairy tales. In these bracing currents from wider horizons, "Englishmen of the sixteenth century breathed a new atmosphere intellectually and spiritually," coming under a new stimulus, compounded of many elements, each of them new and inspiring.

"The main factor of the European Renaissance, of the New Birth of the intellect, was a passion for extending the limits of human knowledge, and of employing men's capabilities to new and better advantage than of old. New curiosity was generated in regard to the dimensions of the material world."⁴

3. ENLARGING HORIZONS OF KNOWLEDGE

In many other respects the horizons of knowledge were enlarging while the limits of time and space were being extended. Because of the greater opportunities of the world into which he is born the man of today learns more than did his predecessors a generation ago. He peers into twilight realms and now sees distinctly forms which were blurred and evanescent to those who looked with the eyes of a former century. Figuratively as well as literally the man of today sees farther, smaller, and larger than did the man of an earlier century. He knows more and his knowledge is more accurate; he has finished tasks begun by predecessors and has embarked on new careers.

With the resources and instrumentalities of historical research, for example, the historian of today has larger possibilities in his field than had his predecessor. Thanks to science, theoretical and applied, there are more possibilities for the future than could be claimed by those living in previous decades. With our added information about prehistoric archeology and ethnology wider roads of opportunity are open to the anthropologist, though the routes are more devious than they were a century ago. Biologists, physicians, and anatomists possess greater opportunities than were available to their predecessors. But though the world of knowledge enlarges man does not reach its boundaries, for these continually recede.

Increased knowledge quickens all fields of learning, and annually they yield richer returns. Opportunities to increase knowledge grow

⁴ Lee, *Great Englishmen of the Sixteenth Century*, p. 28, London, 1904.

with the sum of attained knowledge. Each step in advance gives added impetus; the more men learn the faster they learn. Meanwhile the world of knowledge has grown apace, expanding at every point until now it is vastly more encompassing than it was a century ago. Man started in a small world of knowledge, expanded it into a cosmos, and now lives in an infinite universe. The potentialities have been many times multiplied and the opportunities are correspondingly greater. Certainly "no one has ever come within sight of an ultimate limit to man's capacity to know," and "in the nature of the case a limit recognized as such would thereby be transcended."⁵

4. ENLARGING SOCIAL AND POLITICAL HORIZONS

Our social and political horizons likewise are expanding. History and anthropology describe social and political institutions over a large range of human life and give us new temporal and cultural horizons. Some men know more about the institutions of other peoples than about their own, and some are more familiar with life in the past than with contemporary events. The social and political ideas of modern man extend beyond the limits of his group and embrace the world of men, past and contemporary. Concurrently his thought reaches farther into the future than did that of his ancestors.

5. ENLARGING ECONOMIC HORIZONS

The size of the economic world likewise has been augmenting. At first it comprised merely the tribe. In the course of time economic relations through trade were established with neighboring tribes and later with more remote ones. But no period of the past compares with the present in the flare of its economic horizon.

From what part of the world do our contemporaries not derive economic goods? The dinner table of civilized man is set in the midst of an economic world the horizons of which meet around the globe. From Brazil or the Dutch East Indies comes his coffee; his rice from Texas, Louisiana, India, or China; his pepper from lands equally distant; his salt from the Pacific Coast; his beefsteak from Australia, Montana, Canada, or Argentina. Securing and distributing these commodities involves a system of industry which embraces the world. Modern man lays tribute upon all latitudes and longitudes, as all of them lay tribute

⁵ Wilson, *The Self and Its World*, p. 187, New York, 1926.

upon him. His economic world is as greatly in excess of that of the ancient Roman as are the geographical and the temporal worlds. In the realm of economic theory similar changes have occurred. The economic theory of early man, if he had one, was influenced only by his next-door neighbors. The twentieth-century economist is influenced by the economic theories of men in all parts of the globe. An economist shares ideas with economists the world over, and the thought of one influences that of others however distant.

6. THE SIGNIFICANCE OF ENLARGING HORIZONS

The potentialities of the modern world are bewildering in their multiplicity.

More servants wait on man
Than he'll take notice of.

The horizons of an earlier day have receded into distances which in a sense are neither remote nor dim but are near in influence though distant as measured by the old standard of the meter stick. We live, think, and plan for a future in a larger world; we apply old knowledge and seek new knowledge in a world more ample than that in which our ancestors lived and wrought. Larger horizons remake social and individual life, for they give greater scope to effort. They supplant the doctrine of "thus far shalt thou go and no farther," with "farther canst thou go and still farther." They turn attention from contemplation of limitations to a survey of the possibilities in human existence and from man as a record of achievements to man as a promise of unlimited potentialities. Human potentiality must be expressed not merely in terms of status but also in terms of dynamics, in terms of trend as well as of position.

The mechanisms and organizations in modern civilization which make efforts cumulative are not found in the simpler cultures. In the simpler cultures there is no incentive to put forth exertion beyond the needs of the immediate occasion, for there is no profit in such labor. Only a limited amount of food can be utilized, and only a limited amount of labor can be used to create goods. Our larger markets make it possible to create goods far beyond the needs of the immediate group and thus a new incentive to industry is furnished. With the development of a more complex material civilization there are more channels for activity, more possible creations, and the nature of these goods makes it possible to create them long in advance of the projected need for them.

Among a people who are nomadic there is a low limit to the value of accumulation, which among a people having permanent abodes may be practically unlimited. Knowledge also can accumulate if there are writing and books in which it can be recorded, but the limits of cumulation are much narrower in a culture where all knowledge must be carried in the head. Organization of specialists over large areas, as in scientific and other learned societies, makes possible an interplay of ideas and a mutual fertilization and enrichment which is not possible in the cruder cultures where no such specialization is possible and no such organization of specialists could be achieved. Thus in a thousand ways our life makes possible a cumulation of effort and goods, intellectual and material, which previously could not be realized.

"What distinguishes a cultured man from a savage is the ability to 'extend himself,' so to speak, over more of the universe and to get more out of life. . . . There will be more interests and occupations and therefore more chance for the individuality of a greater number of men. . . . There will be as well a greater wideness of mind in every man."⁶

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⁶ C. Delisle Burns, *Political Ideals: Their Nature and Development*, p. 212, Oxford, 1915.

CHAPTER XXXIV

THE DRIVE AND THE DRAG OF SOCIAL LIFE

There are characteristic modes of behavior which distinguish one species of animals from another. The tendency to behave in a characteristic manner we may call the drive of the species.

The individual, too, acts according to a pattern which distinguishes him from others. The tendency to carry out one's program is the drive of the individual. Drives are more characteristic of man than of other animals, and in him they are more complex. It is not likely that he will soon abandon those characteristic types of behavior which have been human traits since the dawn of history. Among these drives are the tendency toward group life and the tendency for the group to increase in numbers, to unite for defense and offense against other species of animals, and to struggle against or compete with other human groups.

I. SOME UNTOWARD PHASES OF THE DRIVE

Life would go on at least comparatively smoothly and well were it merely a matter of carrying out one drive; but there are many drives and they are not always harmonious. Hence in a world of changing circumstances there is the danger that a drive will counter desirable tendencies.

As the ingestion of food involves the risk of admitting poisons into the system and thus of defeating its own end, so a drive involves the risk of injury to the agent. Since a drive is a tendency toward a certain type of behavior, if it is to redound to the unqualified benefit of the carrier it must be controlled, for the uncontrolled drive brings collision or mishap. The intelligence of both species and individual is largely proportional to ability to control the drives. Self-control, therefore, is to that extent control of one's fate.

The danger which results from drives is in part the maladjustment with the world in which they have play. Since many drives are abroad in a group, as life becomes more complex there is increasing risk that

some of them will be out of adjustment with others. Fewer drives are present in the smaller and less evolved groups than in the larger and more developed one, and consequently there are fewer maladjustments in the former. Similarly drives are more likely to result in conflict in the highly developed personality than in the mediocre. The maladjustment, or at least the potentiality of it, is wont to increase with the number and strength of the drives. In many respects the man with highly developed intelligence needs more careful adjustment to environment than does the one with meagre intellectual equipment, because the former is more diverse in his interests and activities and encounters more possible maladjustments.

2. THE TENDENCY FOR THE DRIVE TO INVOLVE A DRAG

As an illustration of the danger that a drive will pass over into a drag we may recur to the problem of population.¹

Under most circumstances in the struggle for existence there is virtue in mere numbers. Hence, other things being equal, those species which are most numerous and which leave the largest number of progeny have a survival advantage over those which breed more slowly. With exceptions, the lower animals breed rapidly. Some, like the fishes, have an exceedingly large number of offspring each year, and some, like the birds, which do not have large numbers of offspring in any one year, breed at least annually. Among the higher animals man is almost alone in breeding only after prolonged infancy and adolescence and at all seasons of the year. In human society the numbers of a given group increase unless obstacles prevent, but when the population has reached a certain point other factors intrude which tend to check it. Increase in numbers forces members of a tribe to new lands unless new means of subsistence are found in the home territory. Since a given territory can support only a limited number of people, increase in numbers beyond that point makes clashes with other tribes inevitable. In this respect modern nations are not different from primitive peoples. Before and during the World War certain German writers, for example, pointed to the need for new lands as an outlet for the rapidly increasing population of Germany. Had its population been less than the resources of the country could support, the German government would have had less interest in colonies abroad and in the annexation of territory; and if this had been the case other European countries would have been less fearful

¹ See chapter XXXI.

of German aggression. Had France possessed a rapidly growing population pressing hard upon the national resources, Germany would have had greater fear of French aggression. One of the principal causes of alarm at Japanese activities comes from the knowledge that Japan needs new lands for her rapidly growing population, which is already too large for comfortable accommodation within the limits of the islands of the archipelago.

It is a vicious circle: the increasing population of a country engenders in other nations the fear of a war with the over-populated country; and, as a means of protection, the other nations advocate a high birth-rate, on the assumption that protection against numbers is to be found in numbers. Thus growing population foment war, and the exigencies of war encourage the doctrine that a large population is necessary for military protection.

Up to a certain point increase in population aids social progress, but when the point of saturation is reached, further increase retards it. Competition falls to a lower plane of mere struggle for the food necessary to life, inducing over-crowding and lowering physical and moral stamina. Slum sections arise in which an elevated or an elevating humanity is impossible. Population is usually straining toward this point, and when it has reached it there is need for a new ethics. In the main our ethics with regard to increase in population implies that increase in numbers is good in itself. The older ethics regards the increase of human beings as inevitable, as a divinely established order of nature, whose laws must not be interfered with.

But nature herself is always interfering with her laws, and, of course, this interference is one of her laws. We need a reminder that all human action is "natural"; it is time to sweep aside the cobwebs of superstition which are but the survivals of a cruder ethics from earlier days. We need not more members of society but better ones, not more mouths to feed but more returns for the labor expended.

"As arrows in the hand of a mighty man,
So are the children of youth.
Happy is the man that hath his quiver full of them:
They shall not be ashamed,
When they speak with their enemies in the gate."

But this doctrine of *Psalms* 127 was for a warring people and not for men who seek peace and wish to ensue it. Fitter to our day is the sentiment of *Ecclesiastes* 16:

"Desire not a multitude of unprofitable children, neither delight in ungodly sons.

Though they multiply, rejoice not in them, except the fear of the Lord be with them.

Trust not thou in their life, neither respect their multitude,

For one that is just is better than a thousand;

And better it is to die without children than to have them that are ungodly."

It has been said that "the time has come when each country needs a considered national policy about what size of population, whether larger or smaller than at present, or the same, is most expedient. . . . The time may arrive a little later when the community as a whole must pay attention to the innate quality as well as to the mere numbers of its future members."²

But the problem of suitable numbers can not be settled apart from a knowledge of the quality of the individuals who constitute the population. The desired number of citizens depends to some extent upon their character.

The factors which control population and the conditions which involve drag in this phase of social life are, moreover, not constants but variables, for the suitable limits of population shift from time to time. A hunting and fishing tribe living a nomadic life and requiring a large amount of territory for securing means of subsistence can greatly increase in numbers when domestication and agriculture make the food supply more ample and more assured. A community which develops industry and applied science can maintain larger numbers than was previously the case. New knowledge and new devices remove or lighten the old drag, but if the tendency to increase goes on without reckoning with the limitations the group merely solves one problem of population to be faced with a similar problem in larger terms. A limitation upon population there will always be and failure to reckon with the facts will result in drag.

3. ECONOMIC DRIVE AND DRAG

Many economic and industrial enterprises are examples of the tendency for drive to involve drag. The Industrial Revolution illustrates a drive for economic goods which became a drag upon the social body because other values were swept aside in the struggle to amass property and attain economic power. Since the Industrial Revolution there has been a tendency to strive for wealth without taking account of weal, either the common weal or that of the man of wealth. Men accumulate

² Keynes, *The End of Laissez-Faire*, The New Republic, 48: p. 40, Sept. 1, 1926.

riches without inquiring into the extent to which they impoverish themselves or society. Sometimes they realize, usually too late in life, that wealth is not all, and too commonly they fail to perceive the futility of accumulations which do not redound to the greater good of anyone. The economic drive reckons little of the cost and seldom stops to balance losses against profits. It proceeds on the assumption that all things are measured in pecuniary terms, seemingly unaware of the impossibility of reckoning certain goods in terms of money and equally unaware of the feasibility of gauging values from other angles.

What profit men derive from gaining the whole world or any part of it and losing their own souls, is a problem worth contemplating; and whether the economic game is worth the candle of human happiness is a pertinent problem.

4. NATIONALISTIC DRIVES

Of much importance to contemporaries is the nationalistic drive which characterizes the larger political units. There was a time in European history when the first loyalty was to Church, lord, king, or class. With the growth of towns a loyalty to one's municipality developed which frequently overrode other loyalties. Patriotism is often merely the expansion of a narrow local pride to a larger geographical area. For the most part the patriotic individual knows neither the land nor the people in the country which he upholds. The Englishman who fights for "King and Country" seldom knows either. In all probability he knows only a small locality within his country and only a small portion of his social class.

The nationalistic drive distorts men's views of human worth to such an extent that they can no longer see a man as an individual and estimate him at his true value, but must see him as English, German, French, American, or some other national. This, to say the least, distracts attention from other and more important qualities.

The graver dangers of the nationalistic drive are war and international anarchy, conditions amid which we of Western civilization have lived as long as we have had a civilization. Loyalty to country is fine, but even if the supreme loyalty it is not the only one. Indeed loyalty to country, if it is real and not spurious, involves loyalty to principles which embrace countries. If the nationalistic drive solves some problems, it leaves others unsolved and creates new ones, many of which are a drag upon social progress.

5. THE DRIVE MUST BE CONTROLLED

Social life has momentum and inertia in nearly all of its phases. It gathers strength as it moves and once under way it tends to keep its plane and direction of motion.

The Industrial Revolution gains impetus and attains such inertia that not all our combined energies would suffice to stay it. A similar statement applies to nationalism and to most persistent tendencies. But the persistent tendency is likely to become perverse unless controlled by a larger scheme of social purposes. As society becomes more complex there is a proportionally greater need for the integration of all its forces. In particular there is the need, though we make little response to it, of integrating the various forms of authority which compel obedience. Biological, ethical, political, economic, and educational demands must be reconciled.

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CHAPTER XXXV

SOCIAL REALITY AND SOCIAL IDEALISM

I. THE SEARCH FOR REALITIES

Through the greater part of human history man has lived and moved in a fog of unrealities, amid superstition, fallacy, misunderstanding, misconception, and the crotchets of a crooked mind. He has not been guided by logic, but has been led hither and yon by caprice and illusion, following a gleam that proved to be false or setting out for a promised land which was really only a mirage to entice him. The story of primitive peoples is largely an account, if somewhat distorted in the telling, of misconception and intellectual misadventure. The savage is practical while utilizing tools and implements, but a sadly superstitious man, because so optimistic, in thinking that other devices than these material objects will assist in the taking of game or the killing of men. He relies upon magic and dreams and upon omens taken from flying birds or crawling lizards. The tales about ancestors, the stories about fabulous animals or personages, fill his mind with pictures which to him represent a reality deeper than that of the crass world revealed by the senses. Hence he trusts other agencies than the objective ones about him, and believes in powers which he can not see, touch, feel, or hear, regarding them as responsible for happenings about him with which he must reckon. Man has been not so much a knowing as a believing animal, inclined to trust opinion above experience. He has been slowly rousing from his stupor, although the mass of men today are not essentially different from their remote forebears. Only the select few rise above the superstitions of the day and think independently, insisting upon knowing facts instead of being content to garner opinions.

But though the awakening has been millennia slow, and the transition has been one of degree rather than an abrupt change, the fact remains that men have acquired a new consciousness of the realities. The drift of the times is toward a rigid realism. We want to know not a half-way truth but the whole truth; not the semblance but the fact; not the pretence but the reality. Realism has acquainted man with the world about him and has given him intimate and accurate knowledge

of many processes of which previously he had only an inkling or a misconception.

To be sure of our ground in dealing with the world we must be sure of the world with which we are dealing. If we hope for protection from malign forces, we must comprehend their nature and action. A rigid realism is the only sure foundation of hopes and promises, and the only one which will endure, because it alone contains elements which are not merely for the day but will outlive superstition, fear, and baseless pride.

2. THE SEARCH FOR SOCIAL REALITIES

There is need for realism in dealing with the world of material things, and there is not less need for it in dealing with social matters, for if man is led astray in the world of nature he is the more easily led astray in the world of human nature, and he is as much dependent upon the latter as upon the former. Early social programs were not cast in a world of social realism but in one of unrealities, of hopes and preconceptions which gave little heed to facts. Indeed the early formulators of social programs would not have known what was meant by "adhering to the facts," for they were absorbed in the fictions. If the hopes of men so often were vain, this was not because in their very nature they were impossible of fulfilment, but rather because the hard facts which eventually must be reckoned with were not taken into account.

Social theory has substituted for a mythical past known facts and inferences from known facts. Hesiod devotes most of his account of social evolution to a mythical past when men were supposedly different from his contemporaries. Plato searches for the realities when working out a scheme of social reconstruction, but his account of social evolution harks back to stages of which he and his contemporaries knew nothing. This method of working with insoluble unknowns lasted almost until the present century. During the past two thousand years a world of rich realities lay about men, but they did not see them, preferring rather to peer into the dark recesses of a past which yielded them no certain information. In contrast, modern social theory seeks first and last the realities of life, contemporary and historical. It analyzes conditions which lie near at hand and evokes from them the lurking lessons. Though here and there social theory still retains preconceptions and a predisposition to flee from facts, our social practice proceeds toward a more rigid realism. The hope of applied sociology

lies in cultivating this avid appetite for the realities of human existence in the here and now.

This, to be sure, is not sufficient, but it is necessary if we are to proceed on safe and solid ground. Applied sociology, therefore, would know actual human life and thought, actual difficulties, actual hopes and aspirations, actual reactions to environment. The relief of poverty, for example, must proceed through an understanding of the poor as well as through a knowledge of poverty. It must be based on knowledge of the physical, mental, and moral constitution of the individual to whom relief is brought. It must have reference also to the actual as distinct from the presupposed result, else it proceeds blindly. Social agencies, indeed, are a recent phase of civilization and they have come as much in response to a recognition of the social realities as in response to humane promptings. It is in part because we perceive the high cost of poverty that we seek to alleviate it, finding it cheaper as well as better to take measures to prevent the deterioration of physical and moral stamina for which it is responsible.

We perceive the possibilities latent in childhood, potentialities long unsuspected, and give children a larger meed of freedom and a wider field of opportunities. We perceive the potentialities in the lives of women and admit them, though tardily, to the full privileges of economic, political, religious, and educational life. We perceive the economic, social, political, and moral cost of slavery and finally dispense with it. We were slow in discovering that slavery makes slaves and dependents of masters, degrading them as well as the slaves, but eventually a finer sense of the realities brought this fact home to us. We were long in discovering that political servitude is belittling to rulers as well as to the ruled, but finally through a keener sense of the results of the political order we awoke to this fact also.

A mere sense of the realities was not sufficient to attain these results or any one of them, but always a sense of the realities was in the background if not in the foreground and was an agency making for improvement.

3. THE SERVICE OF STATISTICS

Statistics has been something to conjure with and also a sort of scarecrow to frighten off trespassers who have not undergone the appropriate initiation rites before entering the temple.

The elements of the statistical approach, however, are familiar and at times are employed by all of us. Statistics is a quantitative or numer-

ical statement of phenomena. We may know, for example, that village A is larger than village B, but may not know how much larger. A count of the inhabitants informs us that B has a population of 5,000 and A of 10,000. We have now reduced the estimate of population to precise quantitative terms and have provided a basis for a determination of the difference in population which we find is 5,000; as regards population, therefore, the relation of the one to the other is as 1 to 2. In similar manner the relative standing in population can be measured with regard to any other village whose population is known. We use statistics also to ascertain the fluctuations of phenomena, as, for example, the increase in population from decade to decade and from year to year, and to ascertain quantitative relations between fluctuating phenomena. By the use of statistics we can ascertain the relation between increase in population and in wealth or in birth-rate, death-rate, number of houses, and so on *ad infinitum*.

Statistics is useful in many ways and for some purposes it is indispensable. It gives an accurate picture of phases of the world in which we live, of the extent to which fluctuations occur, and of the extent to which phenomena are concurrent or sequential. Owing to its formal accuracy it fascinates some, who wave it over social life as if it were a magic wand. Its magic is the magic of numbers and that of the disclosure of the concomitance of phenomena. It is one of the most useful tools of investigation which we possess and it can work wonders by way of revealing quantitative data; but it can not do all things needful. Frequently it is interpreted as showing the prevalence of certain causes or as a means of detecting cause. But it is doubtful whether, as statistics, it ever demonstrates more than the concomitance or the sequence of phenomena. A statistical examination of the physical traits of quadrupeds, for example, would show that with four feet there are associated two nasal apertures, but it does not follow that one is the cause of the other. When statisticians point out the concomitance of phenomena in the social world, such as the association of certain geographical limitations or climatic conditions with traits of culture, or the way a people vote and their views on religious questions, and so on, and ask us to accept the concomitance as demonstrating causal relation, we may remind them of nasal apertures and feet. Those, also, who point out the concomitance of Western civilization with certain physical characteristics might reflect on the concomitance of feet and nose. Peoples who dwell in tipis believe the earth flat, and nearly all Copernicians live in houses, but this is probably not a causal relation. Even

when statistics goes further and shows that when people give up tipi life and dwell in houses there is a great increase in the proportion of Copernican devotees, it is doubtful if the facts can be interpreted as indicating a causal influence of dwellings upon beliefs about the motion of the earth and its relation to the heavenly bodies.

There are, therefore, some rather important, if not always obvious, limitations in the use of statistics. There is the difficulty of selecting the really significant phenomena. There is, also, the problem of interpreting the significance of concomitance, once it has been established. Many statistical tests are meaningless because the workers have not chosen significant factors. Chanticleer and his barnyard associates thought his crowing the cause of the rising of the sun, and the sequence established by statistics is sometimes as misleading.

But statistics is supreme in its own sphere, that of quantitative relations and of coincidence, concomitance, and sequence. In so far as we are concerned with these as a means of obtaining a clearer picture of the world of social phenomena, statistics is indispensable. It is well to remember, however, that the mathematical treatment of figures is a treatment merely of figures and not of the objective facts, for the numbers are only symbols. Nothing emerges from the statistical machine that was not put into it. "The workers of the new school with their elaborate equipment of technique have temporarily shifted the emphasis of statistical work from the purpose of the inquiry to the process by which it is conducted, from the stubborn facts to the subtle figures, from the material to the mathematics. The cart is before the horse, and the horse is running away."¹

4. THE VALUE OF METHOD AND TECHNIQUE

"The method of science," it has been said, "is impersonal. It is useful and true as a method in the hands of all who are capable of using it. Its virtues reside in its efficacy as a tool rather than in the results achieved through it by this or that individual or group of individuals."² That is to say, some methods are right and others are wrong; some yield fruitful results, some are valueless. Good methods may be appropriate only in their respective fields, and few are equally valuable in all fields. In particular the natural sciences have developed carefully

¹ Leonard P. Ayres, *The Dilemma of the New Statistics*, Journal of the American Statistical Association, 22: p. 6, March, 1927.

² Quoted from an article on *Social Science and Social Development*, The Texas Review, 1924.

formulated methods, partly logical, partly empirical, partly mathematical, but the methods of the social sciences are still largely in the formative stage. This is especially true of sociology.

Mere method, however, is seldom enough. Statistics is one of the most valuable methods the sociologist has, but the selection of significant data and the analysis of concrete social situations are more important than the juggling of figures. However accurate the method, it will yield but indifferent results if there is a loose assembling of data or if there is a false analysis of the situation. This applies to all methods of treatment — historical, psychological, anthropological, and others.

The possibilities of proceeding by mere method and technique, however perfect these may be, are, indeed, definitely limited. Profitable work is inspired by something over and above method and technique which, for want of a better term, we may call interpretative insight. The student of natural science no less than the student of social science seeks certain results, in achieving which he must utilize good method but of which good method in itself is no guarantee. The scientist is, or ought to be, as Osler says, "compact with imagination," and this holds equally for the man whose field is social science.

Each works as a creative artist if he works fruitfully, establishing new relations, testing accepted ones, and setting up new goals of effort. It was not primarily method but insight which enabled Bryce to see the structure of American political and social institutions, as it was insight and imagination which guided Newton and Einstein. It was not Darwin's method which gave him his theory, but his insight, a flash of intellectual intuition, which revealed the conditions under which animals live and which inspired him to collect the evidence bearing on their evolution. In every field method is important, but it should be a servant, not a master. It can never be more than a means to an end, if the end is fruitful and not merely formal.

"Reasoning," it has been well said, "is half insight, and the other half analysis and synthesis: the evidence, be it ever so well analysed and classified, is useless to any one without insight. And one may suspect that no man is altogether without insight although many neglect to use it. But reasoning is not to be described in terms of anything else; and if a man does not know at all what the process may be no further words will be of any use. . . . It is the method by which communication is made every day easier and our knowledge of natural forces more useful. There is enough of it for all men to understand what it is; the only

trouble is that with respect to some subjects it is not commonly used. But in all subjects it is the process by which we discover what we did not know before. The general laws concerning its use are to be found in Logic. . . . Like all psychological processes, reasoning has typical forms and pathological varieties.”³

5. THE LIMITATIONS OF REALISM

Realism is important, but as a matter of fact absolute realism does not exist, save as an empty conception. We may move only in the realities, but we have a more lively sense of some of them than of others. If all we want is realities, then the fact that men have thirty-two teeth is worth as much to sociology as the fact that they have group life; for the fact that men use toothpicks is as well established as the fact that nations have wars. Yet we could scarcely justify dwelling on the former facts merely because they are facts. The problem remains, What of it? Further, whether we wish to do so or not, we must select in order to deal with the vast array of phenomena with which we are confronted in an endeavor to be realistic. To select, however, is to apply values, to assert, if only implicitly, that some things are worth more to us for the purpose in hand than are others. A selective realism is the counterpart of a creative idealism; for if selection takes place it must have a rationale — unless it relies on the hazards of chance, and chance is blind.

Creative idealism does not dispense with realism but gives new emphasis to it. It maintains its position in order to make ampler use of the real. We do not, for example, stress the rights of man because we want to move in the realm of rights, but because we want new attitudes to exist among real men, though these real men may be of the future rather than of the present. We do not idealize international relations because we want to escape the realities, but because we want to bring into existence a new world of realities and remove some of the existing maladjustments. Such idealism seeks not merely to follow the realities, but to control and transform them as well.

It has been said that research in applied science may lead to reforms, but research in pure science leads to revolutions. Ideas seem somehow to control the world. Indeed, the “practical” man has been defined as “the most theoretical of all men, but one whose theories are seldom proved and are often not susceptible of proof.”

³ C. Delisle Burns, *Political Ideals: Their Nature and Development*, pp. 307-308, Oxford, 1915.

6. IDEALISM AS A BASIS FOR REALISM

Idealism, therefore, may inspire a new realism. Indeed, to close our eyes to the existence of idealism is to be blind to a portion of the realities, since idealism exists as surely as do "real" things. If anything is "real" idealism is. The need for constant adaptation elicits it and maintains it, and enables one generation to transmit it to another. It lurks as a potentiality in social life, for "an ideal is not a goal, but only a mark of direction."⁴

Realism and idealism are interrelated. Often they are woven so closely together that it is difficult to determine where the one leaves off and the other begins. Realism should be founded in idealism, and idealism should be based upon realism, for they can not be kept in separate watertight compartments. What profits it to accept the realities if we are to do nothing but accept them? And why should we be idealistic if we do not bring our idealism to bear on the realities? The two should be not merely categories but forces with weight and momentum which move toward larger integrations.

Social idealism will remain, because without it the meaning of life pales. It is a phase of human life itself and therefore a phase of the realities. It marks man off, even in the crudest cultures, from the animals, and exalts him above them. The beasts, in fact, often are well adapted to the realities about them, but superimpose upon these no idealised state which is not yet on sea or land, no future which is different from present and past, no system of behavior which is not already a part of the world in which they live. Hence they live less abundantly because they live for the day only and because they live for no larger realities than those which are actual. Idealism posits a different order of reality and aspires to make it actual.

7. ETHICS

Every group has ethical standards. Ethical ideas are a reflection of conduct, though some individuals do not measure up to the approved standards and any individual may at moments lapse from the ideals of the group. All peoples attach more importance to some forms of life than to others and have a hierarchy of values. The value in terms of which other values are reckoned is the highest good, and all values which contribute to the highest good are part of the ethical system. A sociology

⁴ Karl Pearson, *Grammar of Science*.

which leaves ethics out of the reckoning omits an indispensable factor of social life and gives no information in one of its most important fields. Indeed a satisfying sociology is subordinate to a satisfying ethics, for no one wishes to drag out his days in a social order in which values are irrelevant.

8. ETHICS AND CUSTOM

A rudimentary ethics is little more than customary morality. Indeed the word "ethics" comes from a Greek word signifying "custom," and the word "morality" is derived from a Latin word having a similar meaning. To be consonant with one's group is to be "ethical" and "moral," and to be out of accord with it is to be "unethical" and "unmoral" or "immoral." Conformity with prevailing standards is the key to early ethics.

But, as philosophers use the term, ethics transcends group custom. It advocates customs which would be better for the group, aiming to change ideal into actual custom. Instead of subordinating ethics to group custom, a forward-looking social program subordinates group custom to ethics, setting up standards in accordance with which the group could reach a higher plane of action and aim. Group opinion may insist that each shall keep his place, thus perpetuating the traditional stratification of society, whereas ethics may insist that these traditional "places" should be arranged on a different scheme than that which prevails in the group. Ethics, therefore, is a challenge to the existing order.

Since the ethical standards of groups differ, being, in fact, as numerous as are the cultures of mankind, a comparison of them may be profitable. Such an approach gives a perspective of conduct and standards, and enables us to understand our own ethics better.

Some critics insist that only the comparative method provides an adequate basis for ethics, while others declare that comparison can provide no new standards. There is, say the latter, no science of ethics but only a science of conduct and of the cultural, historical, and psychological conditions which underlie it. It is true that if we used no ethical standards at the start we could profit little from such a survey; in fact the selection of the material implies that in part we know in advance what is ethical. Comparative ethics, however, gives us a fuller knowledge of the motives under which men act and of the aims prevalent in various cultures.

9. SOCIAL ETHICS

The sociologist wishes to know the rights and duties of the individual in society and the right and wrong of social activities. He is concerned not so much with inherent right and wrong as with the effect upon society of conduct adjudged right or wrong. Social ethics is supplementary to individual ethics, and is applicable to individuals as members of a social group. Not infrequently, however, social ethics appears to be antithetical to individual ethics, for often the rights of society and those of the individual conflict. Duty to society may be detrimental to the individual when fulfilment of the aim of the former thwarts that of the latter. The individual, for example, may wish to exercise his artistic abilities without restraint and society may object that this abandon to esthetics is a social injury.

In case of conflict — and conflict is all too common — which is paramount, individual or social code? What does the individual owe to the group, and what does the group owe to the individual? Shall the individual prefer group ethics to individual ethics? Shall the group say that its might is also its right?

10. THE SPHERE OF DUTIES

There are various spheres of duties. Duties to self may not be first in point of importance, but they appear to be first in individual development. The individual who does not prefer his existence to his non-existence does not survive. To continue his survival, and to ensure development of potentialities, he must affirm the duties to self.

Soon he finds that he has duties to others, to members of a group on which he is immediately dependent. The group may be a family, a clan, a community, a class, or a profession. Toward members of his group the individual is expected to behave in different manner than toward others, for his social relations with them are unique. There are, too, duties to tribe or nation. A man is a member of a larger political unit in which his rights are guaranteed and to which he owes the duties of patriotism.

But the tribe or nation is not the largest unit, for it also belongs to a larger sphere, namely, civilization. Some consider the duties which a man owes to his civilization paramount to those owed to tribe or nation. And does he not have duties to mankind as well? Is he not in a social, humanitarian, and ethical sense a member of the human race? Can he answer the question, Who is my neighbor? without remembering that all men are descended from a common ancestor, all are closely

akin in ideals, needs, and psychic and moral composition? Are a man's duties exhausted when he gives what he owes to family, tribe, nation, and civilization, or is there a larger realm of duties which includes fellow-man?

The sphere of man's ethical duties has been enlarging. At first including only the small local unit or family group, it extends to the tribe, the confederacy, the nation, and to aliens who share his civilization. Slowly it dawns upon the conscience of civilized man that the so-called "lower" peoples are human beings essentially like himself. Finally he recognizes duties to conquered peoples and to those of the simpler cultures.

II. ETHICS AN INTEGRAL PART OF SOCIOLOGY

A sociology which omits ethics is incomplete. We want to know not merely what social groups do but what they should do; not merely how man behaves toward his fellows within his group and without it, but how he should behave toward them. To know that he obeys authority is not enough: ought he to obey it? To know what man is, is not sufficient; we wish to know also what he should be.

Ethics calls in question our rating of cultures and groups as lower or higher. Is that culture higher which realizes its aims with least friction and most completely, or must we take cognizance also of the nature of the aims and the character of the means used in attaining them? Is that culture high which permits free development of individual life, even though there is little social and political development? Or is the individual elevated, irrespective of personal worth, by virtue of being a member of a highly developed society?

History and anthropology furnish examples of almost all conceivable organizations of life, both individual and social. But it is not enough to know them; we must be able to evaluate them and to choose among them.

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CHAPTER XXXVI

LITERATURE AND THE PROSPECT OF UTOPIA

Literature is the reflection in language in artistic form of the culture of a people and of their ideas, ideals, and values. Etymologically it connotes knowledge and use of letters, but the use of letters is much more recent than literature.

All pre-literate (unlettered) peoples had a literature. A knowledge of writing no more creates literature than do printing and shorthand, however useful in embodying and perpetuating it these devices may be. Conversely the printing of a thing under the designation of literature does not make it such but merely blazons forth the pretension. In every culture group there is a literature, that of the simpler cultures consisting of tales, tradition, mythology, folklore, and local history. Many of the best literary works of the present time are pre-literate productions which we now preserve by printing. Such is much of the Old Testament, the works of Homer and Æsop, many of our fairy tales and children's stories, many of our proverbs, the German *Nibelungenlied*, the Scandinavian *Sagas*, the *Avestas*, and other Sacred Books of the East.

I. LITERATURE AS A REFLECTION OF CULTURE

These ancient literatures give important information regarding the cultures of the respective peoples. Nearly all that we know about the early Hebrews is gleaned from their sacred books, the Old Testament. For an understanding of ancient Persia, India, Babylonia, Egypt, the literature is as important as the archeology. The use of ancient literature by students of ancient history turned the attention of students of European history to the importance of literature in our own culture, and historians of European civilization now study the literature of the times with which they are concerned. They interpret it not merely as a record of the period, as source material which reflects the culture, but also as one of the forces which make for change. According to H. Taine, the literature of a people is a reflection of its environment, physical and social, and this appears to be true of most cultures. There is a difference in the temper of the literatures of cold and those of warm lands. In the

literatures of northern Europe, particularly in the early creations which antedate influences from the South, gloom, destiny, duty, and stern discipline play a prominent part. By contrast, the literature of southern lands is light-hearted and merry, singing of love, tenderness, abandon to leisure, and wanderings of body and spirit. The gloom of northern fogs is not there; in its place are vivacity, exuberance of spirit, inconsistency, and sensuousness.

Since literature reflects the intellectual concepts of the times in which it was written, in order to understand it one must know the intellectual development of the people. The literature of Homer, for example, can be understood only by reference to the intellectual concepts then in vogue. The animism and transcendentalism of the poets of European civilization is in part the result of their ignorance of the science of the day. Keats was trained in medicine and Shelley in chemistry, but few poets have been scientific men and of necessity they have looked beyond science for inspiration. The moral ideas of the times, also, are reflected in literature. The heroes of the *Iliad* and those of the *Odyssey* would have been different had the early Greeks shared the ethics of a later day. Measured by Aristotelian standards Homeric heroes were not always heroic. And the traits which enhanced the glories of Solomon and David do not befit the present.

A system of ethics, like that of Aristotle, is the ordered thought of an individual, whereas a poem, the *Iliad*, or a play of Æschylus, reflects the prevailing customs of the group. "What the poet relates may be fiction, what he mentions is apt to be history." This unconscious testimony is usually an expression of the truth, and not a perversion of it for a purpose, as is often the case in historical writings where it is necessary to weigh the motives of the historian, those of a Herodotus or a Thucydides no less than those of a modern writer. Bunyan's *Pilgrim's Progress*, to take a more recent example, is a social document which records the habits and modes of life of the new burgher-class. "Christian's house and the Town of Destruction, Vanity Fair with its chaffer and gossip, the talk of the pilgrims by the way, are the best pictures we possess of middle-class life in seventeenth century England."

Contemporary social life is portrayed despite the fact that "nothing was farther from Bunyan's thought than social delineation." So, too, "our modern books do far more than illustrate phases of history: through them, the higher consciousness of the age dimly feels its way. For the author-leader, critic, — opposer of his generation though he

may be — is yet always mysteriously compelled to utter the age he may despise. Reading these books chronologically, we follow the unconscious changes in public sentiment: its varying emphases, theories, advances, recoils. . . . The great social literature before 1880 reveals the gathering of the forces. To discover the issue was the work of that period. . . . If, as some surmise, a new and troubling ideal is astir in society, no fear but in the fullness of time the poet will come to voice it. Meanwhile, prose, the more flexible instrument, the art-form of democracy, which can solace itself with problems when faith is denied, thrills with the contemporary interest which poetry disregards.”¹

In some cases, indeed, the literature is the most faithful reflection of the social spirit. The social ideals struggling for recognition in England after the French Revolution found voice in men of imagination like Paine and Godwin, but most of all in her poets, notably, in Shelley; and for a quarter of a century the most eloquent statement of the new social ideals was in the verse of English poets. It shifted then to the prose writers of the Victorian Age, who for fifty years were more keenly alive to the gravity of the social situation than were any other group of men in England. Politicians were not disturbed; even philanthropists seemed unconcerned about the causes of the various evils which they sought to mitigate rather than to remove. Artists were equally indifferent to the world about them, seeking from within the inspiration which would illuminate their path. “Political economy throve and grew fat in many volumes, doing much fine work, but building on a foundation far narrower than that actual humanity whose varying impulses are irreducible to obedience to the cleverest set of mechanical laws. Only the great prose authors felt the irregular pulses of the fevered social organism, and mourned, pleaded, and hoped. . . . The age of vision belonged to the poets, the age of problem to the essayists and novelists; the age of experiment, in which we live, to the men of action.”² Carlyle fulminated in vain, Ruskin pleaded with a generation blind to its own interests, Matthew Arnold sought to enlighten an age more intent upon inducing anarchy than upon spreading culture. In America, too, poets and prose writers voiced the new ideals. Lowell sought to rouse an age content to have “Truth forever on the scaffold, Wrong forever on the throne.” Whitman voiced the need for individual expression and a remaking of the man spoiled by civilization, while Emerson and Thoreau sent out clarion calls to awake and bestir.

¹ Scudder, *Social Ideals in English Literature*, pp. 87-88, 120, 126, New York, 1898.

² *Ibid.*

2. CHANGING TIMES BRING A NEW LITERATURE

Literary expression is closely related to the culture of a people and changing times inaugurate a new literature.

Hesiod's *Works and Days* reflects the changes in a civilization that received influences from Ægean and more remote lands. The writings of Plato show a sensitiveness to stimuli from many quarters. St. Augustine's *City of God* embodies ideas developing in the Christian Church. The Renaissance calls forth a literature with a new spirit better adapted to the influences then abroad. The transition to a day with more independence from Greek and Roman influences is marked by the appearance of a new literature. Reflections from a new ethical and intellectual background on the conditions of the poorer classes in England result in *Piers Ploughman* and the *Utopia*.

The Industrial Revolution, which vitally affected personal and social relations was reflected in literature, the new problems being presented in the novels of Dickens and his successors.

When socio-political revolutions were under way in America and in France, with reverberations in other countries, the writings of Voltaire, Turgot, Condorcet, St. Pierre, and Diderot recorded the change and stimulated the movement. As was pointed out above, in England such writers as Paine, Shelley, and Godwin made literature a vehicle of socio-political doctrines.

The social revolution which was concurrent and inextricably intertwined with the political and the industrial revolutions likewise found expression in literature at the end of the eighteenth and during the first decades of the nineteenth century. At about the same time people were becoming interested in the history of their own nation and in that of others. This interest was reflected in the political and social philosophy to which for the most part it was subordinate. In response to the interest in history came historical novels. Their prototypes may be found in the utopias of Campanella, More, and Harrington, with reverberations in the irony of Swift; but with Scott the historical novel received its literary baptism. The vogue lasted for the remainder of the century but is now in abeyance, possibly to be revived with new technique and for a new purpose. The novels of the present day which make the strongest appeal have a modern setting. Problem plays and problem novels are produced in unprecedented numbers. We are much concerned with problems of sex, religion, education, political structure, economic and social clashes, and the perplexity of the times is abundantly reflected in the literature.

3. LITERATURE AS ART

Literature is art and in some quarters there is a disposition to regard it as merely art. But nothing is merely art. Art, too, has a background in historical conditions and its setting in the culture, so that literature is never mere artistry. It is an artistic way of expressing ideas or of presenting facts. There is always an intellectual inside to the artistic outside of literary expression. "Literary classics . . . are penetrative analyses of human nature and the motives that drive men to action. Like experimentation they imply theoretical construction. Inherent in every classic is a view of life and hence a philosophy. The larger conception may not be consciously before the writer at the time, but it controls his selection of theme, development of plot, and shaping of the *dénouement*. To bring out the underlying philosophy of a literary masterpiece is to reveal, so far as its thought content is concerned, its permanent significance and value. . . . The helpfulness of literature lies very largely in its analogical or metaphorical interpretations of experience. The wisdom literature of the world is compressed philosophy, embodying in vivid and arresting form the profoundest reflections of mankind." ³

4. THE PROSPECT OF UTOPIA

"Utopia," the title which Sir Thomas More gave to his book, means literally "No Place," or "Nowhere," the word being derived from two Greek words. It is possible, however, that More intended a play on the sound of "eutopia," which means "Good Place," for, though his book treats of Nowhere, and in that sense is Utopia, it also treats of a good place, as More conceives his Utopia to be, and is Eutopia. The word "utopia" frequently connotes the impractical, imaginary, and unrealizable, but we shall use it in this chapter in the sense of the non-existent but desired. Thus interpreted, utopia is not a mushroom growth but a plant of long life nourished by the thought of successive generations through many centuries. It has yielded abundant and diverse fruits, dependent in part upon the times and the civilization. Indeed the search for utopia is not a mere historical fact, but is a phase of the thought underlying contemporary civilization. In the last hundred years more utopias have been written than in the preceding two thousand, and the end is not yet. The following presentation is from the historical approach, for opinions are better understood when we know their antecedents, their concomitants, and their consequents.

³ Wilson, *The Self and Its World*, p. x6, New York, 1926.

5. EARLY UTOPIAN THOUGHT

Utopias do not flourish among primitive folk. None have been reported from savagery save some associated with messianic manifestations, and these are a special feature of savage life which have their inspiration in ideas received from European civilization.⁴

They have had little play in the early historical civilizations, which were more concerned with past and present than with future. Among the Hebrews, only in the writings of the prophets is much attention given to the reconstruction of society; the reforms advocated are mainly political and nationalistic, and are narrowly limited in scope. The Christians anticipated an early end of the world and to them mundane affairs were of little importance. They were not hopeful of a utopia which would include all mankind.

The early Greek writers, like the peoples in savagery and in other early civilizations, turned their attention to the past and placed there the happy state from which man had fallen, and there was little attempt to take this Golden Age out of the past and project it into the future, until the time of Plato, who, in his *Republic* and *Laws*, pictured the ideal future society of a reconstructed city-state. Aristotle followed his example.

In essence the Stoics were utopian. They declared that the individual determined the good or ill of things, since, by virtue of having control of his will, each individual held in his own hands the secret of salvation from earthly ills. They insisted also upon the reality of a world society, considering all men citizens of a world order in which the right of each should be recognized by all.

The Romans were too practical to indulge in utopias. Although influenced by Greek thought, that of Plato, Aristotle, and the Stoics, they did not take kindly to utopian schemes, offering neither criticism nor condemnation — save in so far as these are implicit in the writings of the Roman Stoics, Seneca, Cicero, and Marcus Aurelius.

6. CHRISTIAN UTOPIANISM

The primitive Christians had little interest in a world order, for their thought was of another world; but one of the greatest of the Church Fathers, St. Augustine, turned attention to things of this world

⁴ See the author's *Messiahs: Christian and Pagan*, Chap. V, Boston, 1918.

as well as to those of the world to come. St. Augustine had been interested in history and in the conditions which had brought about the fall of Rome. This he attributed, not to the pacificism and obstructionist tactics of the early Christians, but rather to the heathenism of Rome. His ideal was a world society, more inclusive and more integrated than that of the Stoics, which would partake also of a world to come, in which all men would be united spiritually in a City of God. Thus earth was made a stepping-stone to heaven, but also heaven existed for the sake of earth.

Campanella, a Spanish Jesuit priest who labored in Italy early in the seventeenth century, was much influenced by Plato and Aristotle. He introduces us to a *City of the Sun* in which men live in a cosmopolitanism far broader than that of his times. Maps and models acquaint the citizens with all parts of the earth and even with the structure of the solar system. They become familiar also with the customs of other peoples. In addition to this cosmopolitanism, there is a political reconstruction in which reason dominates caprice and the wisest men are the rulers.

The *Utopia* of Sir Thomas More is, however, far more interesting and remains today the greatest work of genius of the kind since Aristotle. By way of introduction More calls attention to the severe punishments meted out to criminals. Men ought, he says, to look into the causes of crime. When they do so they learn that in contemporary England crime is forced upon men as a means of maintaining life. There is no food because there is no work, and there is no work because an Industrial Revolution has deprived the agricultural laborer of his occupation. Weaving has supplanted agriculture, and sheep-raising has claimed the land for pasturage. Fewer people can be supported on a given area of land than was the case when agriculture was practised, and less labor is demanded for the care of the sheep than for the care of crops. Many have no means of obtaining a livelihood, hence they move from place to place, vainly seeking work where there is none to be found.

After thus commenting on the state of England, More proceeds to describe the ideal community. The story of *Utopia* is related by a traveler who has visited far-off lands in the days of More's sovereign and patron, Henry VIII, a period when exploring new lands and sailing new seas were stirring adventures. The island kingdom of *Utopia* supports an order of society in which every man and woman works. All live in similar houses in cities having straight streets; there is only one

style of house construction, and all the cities are alike. Life in the city alternates with that in the country, so that all may become acquainted with the activities essential to society and a social division between town and country can not develop. Labor is reduced to six hours a day, this being sufficient in a society in which all work. Slaves perform the more menial tasks. War, money, and jewelry are absent. It is a communistic society, with no individual property in land or houses.

Harrington, a writer of Cromwell's day, was interested primarily in political problems, which at that time were unusually acute because of the challenge to the royal succession. He proposed a system of government modeled somewhat after that which flourished in Venice in the days of the Doges. Although he acknowledged that aristocracy had its shortcomings he considered it the best form of government yet devised.

7. THE UTOPIA OF SCIENCE

An early seventeenth century writer, Sir Francis Bacon (later Lord Bacon of Verulam), gave new trend to the utopian ideal by basing utopia on science. In *The New Atlantis* Bacon pictures an order of society in which all is well because science has attained high development. Man conquers nature and possesses all conceivable goods. He probes the deeps, builds towers from which to study meteorological conditions, learns the laws of the weather and predicts it, scans the heavens and discovers the secrets of planets and stars. He studies plants and by selection produces new varieties. He experiments with animals and produces breeds not found in nature. Specialization adds to the efficiency of the worker. Experts study the new discoveries and the new ideas with a view to selecting those which can be utilized for the improvement of society. When natural forces do man's bidding, what more can one ask? Surely for poor humanity this is eutopia.

The idea of a utopia constructed by science appealed to subsequent writers. In particular it was elaborated by Lord Lytton in a work called *The Coming Race*. The "Coming Race" lives underground and possesses wonderful powers. They have mastered the secrets of electricity, so that by means of it they have illumination, power of flight, and other wonderful abilities unknown to men on earth. But the perusal of Lytton's fantastic tale leaves one with the conviction that a heaven of electricity is not equivalent, as he appears to take it to be, to a heaven electrified. Social relations play a subordinate part in his scheme.

The scientific ideal is again prominent in Bellamy's *Looking Back-*

ward, a book probably more widely read by contemporaries of the writer than any work of the last century. Bellamy pictures a world in which material conveniences are widely disseminated. He does not forget the spread of awnings which protect pedestrians on the street from rain or scorching sun and make it unnecessary for each individual to carry an umbrella, and he does not forget electricity. He tells of men who sit at home and "listen in" to sermons over an improved "telephone."

But though Bellamy laid much stress on the increase of industrial and mechanical means and efficiency, he was not content with giving society superior material equipment but pointed to the need for social reconstruction. In particular he would do away with our method of allowing each to get all he can by the present rules of the game, and would have all supported out of, and all contributing to, a common fund.

In his early imaginative pictures of the future H. G. Wells is concerned with material things. He describes moving sidewalks and stairways and other ingenious devices. He brings men from Mars who have tremendous powers not possessed by the inhabitants of this world. Applied science, he suggests, will dispel the ills of this world and provide an easy promenade over the rough places of labor which now give no surcease of sorrow. A similar hope still exercises a subtle fascination over the mind of this facile writer, but he no longer exploits it in the gross form introduced to us in *Anticipations* and *The Men from Mars*. He is concerned in his later writings, in *New Worlds for Old*, for example, with social reconstruction, which is to be on the lines of the socialists' program. His *Outline of History* and the sequel to its last chapter, *The Salvaging of Civilization*, call attention primarily to the necessity for a world State in which men will think and act in larger terms.

8. OTHER UTOPIAS

The last half of the eighteenth century was rife with speculations about the rights of man and the causes of the inequalities among men. The idea of a life according to nature, which influenced Rousseau and his followers, found embodiment in St. Pierre's description of Arcadia, a land of classic simplicity, where we hear the quiet splash of comforting fountains, the gurgle of bubbling springs, the footsteps of fawns and sibyls, and the rustle of leaves in a quiet retreat undisturbed by the clamor of the busy work-a-day world. Shepherds play their pipes and

nymphs dance on the green to the rhythm of the music. Esthetic activities predominate, beauty fills every crevice, happiness lingers idly in every niche.⁵ The dying echoes of St. Pierre's *Arcadia* come more than a century later from a Paris pastor, Charles Wagner, in the *Simple Life*. But the simple life has given place to the strenuous life, as existence has become more complex.

Another writer of the latter half of the nineteenth century had a greater influence upon the thought of his day than can be claimed for Wagner. This was Samuel Butler, an eccentric character who saw life acutely and with considerable detachment and then described it in inverse order, standing it on its head, so to speak, in *Erewhon*. Butler's ironical account of the part which machines had come to play in the civilization of *Erewhon*, making the people dependent upon them and reducing them to a parasitical existence, is perhaps the most telling description in literature of the dominance of machines in modern civilization.

9. THE UTILITY OF UTOPIA

Schemes of utopia have not been futile but have stimulated many thinkers and many practical men. The thought of Plato has persisted through the centuries modifying social practice and social theory. More's *Utopia* has exercised an influence in every century since it was written. Harrington's *Oceana* was the model for a constitution drawn up in one of the colonies of the New World though never put into effect. It is a safe surmise that the writings of H. G. Wells have influenced the actions of more than one statesman. Utopian ideals which have become a part of a people's heritage influence their social programs.

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⁵ The St. Pierre here referred to is Jacques Henri Bernardhin de St. Pierre (1737-1814), and should not be confused with Charles Irénée Castel, Abbé de St. Pierre (1658-1743), who wrote the essay on *Eternal Peace*, which was published in 1713.

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CHAPTER XXXVII

SOCIAL PROGRESS

Change is characteristic of all phases of existence. When it moves in a given direction and old forms are succeeded by new, there is evolution. But not all changes lead to evolution, for some are cyclical, turning back upon themselves. Nor is evolution always progress; it may be simply change in a given direction.

Progress refers to something over and above mere change, and raises the question of whether the evolution is proceeding from better to worse or from worse to better or is neither improvement nor deterioration. Some evolution is progress, some is the antithesis of progress, and some is neither progress nor retrogression.

I. PROGRESS AS INCREASE IN POWER

Herbert Spencer, like Thomas Aquinas, defined progress as increase in complexity, and many have accepted this interpretation. But though increase in complexity frequently accompanies progress it can not be accepted as equivalent to it or even as an indication of it.

Increase in complexity is sometimes merely increase in complexity. The conception is purely quantitative, whereas progress refers to quality and can not be reduced to quantity. In an indirect way complexity frequently aids progress, since by finding more means of accomplishing his purposes man is more likely to accomplish them, and insofar as complexity implies a larger tool-chest of more varied possibilities it is at least potential progress.

But complexity often proves a handicap to progress, for when there are manifold activities some may be directed to cross-purposes. We seek salvation by one instrument and thereby impair the efficiency of another, and we become absorbed in one phase of life and neglect other possibilities. As social life grows more complex it becomes increasingly difficult to integrate the various aims and prevent a conflict of purposes. Civilization is charged with conflict much of which is disintegrating. We come nearer to the meaning of progress by defining it as increase

in power. Man's culture has increased in complexity, but it would be worse rather than better if it had not increased in power. Indeed it is desirable that it should not increase in complexity when it increases in power.

The superiority of modern man over paleolithic man does not lie in the greater variety of the arts, implements, and ideas of the former but in the increase in power which modern man achieves through his more ample equipment.

The value of these lies neither in their multiplicity nor in the intricacy of their relations to one another and to culture, but in the added control over nature which they make possible. The superiority of civilization over savagery lies not in the number of the tools possessed by civilized man but in their efficiency. A dozen types of hatchets afford no superiority over one type unless some one of the dozen has a greater efficiency than the old type. Complexity often provides a wider field for choice of means and so indirectly leads to progress, but in this case it is not the end but a means to the end. Power, though essential, does not ensure progress. Power as such means only an increase in abilities, the possibility of completing larger tasks or of executing tasks with more expedition.

So far as increase in power merely multiplies the activities now represented in society it is a doubtful test of progress. We need not merely more power but a new direction of power and a new control of the power already developed. Increase in the number and in the efficiency of our scientific devices, for example, does not necessarily yield progress. What are we to do with these devices? We see and hear greater distances, but do we see and hear better things or to better purpose? In a word, what advantages do we derive from the greater power which we now have?

2. PROGRESS AS THE SATISFACTION OF NEEDS

The criterion of progress is not increase in complexity or in power, for neither of necessity satisfies our needs. To give man abundance of what he does not need or to increase the power of agencies which satisfy no fundamental desire, is to confer a doubtful boon. The criterion of progress is the satisfaction of human needs. This criterion has its difficulties, for needs vary from culture to culture and from century to century; but the extent to which they vary is limited, and in all cultures the fundamental needs of men are similar and perhaps essentially the same.

There is everywhere the need for food, protection, congenial companionship, and efficient devices in dealing with the social world and with extraneous groups. Everywhere men feel the need for communicating their ideas to others and receiving ideas in return. Everywhere they feel the need for esthetic and intellectual activities, amusement and abandon from the labors and monotonies of daily routine.

There is a similarity in human nature the world over, once we penetrate beneath externals. Men achieve progress when they succeed in satisfying their real needs. This does not mean that they always make progress when they achieve what they aim at, for frequently they aim at the wrong thing. They may think they need this or that, when really they need something else — as subsequent experience demonstrates. If, however, they are satisfying an actual need they are on the path of progress.

3. THE SUPERIORITY OF CIVILIZATION OVER SAVAGERY

Why have so many social philosophers considered the savage superior to the civilized man? There is a specious force in the argument that the status of the savage is more desirable than that of the civilized man. Wheat and iron, to use Rousseau's phrase, had not civilized the lowly cultures and neither had they ruined them. Savagery is innocent of many of the ills and evils abundant in civilization. There is less crime, accident, poverty, disease, and worry. There is no exploitation of labor by capital; there are no strikes, no nervous wrecks, no pickpockets. The advantages of savagery over civilization are many, though those most frequently cited are negative — the absence of ills which afflict the body social in civilization, — the credits of savagery consisting largely in the absence of debits. That, to be sure, is in its favor and the importance of the fact should not be minimized.

But one need not labor the point that in many respects savagery is inferior to civilization. The savage is without writing and the higher mechanical inventions and devices. He has art abundantly, but he lacks the highly developed esthetic activities. His intellectual accomplishment is meager, his economic organization is simple.

The culture world of the savage and that of the civilized man are markedly different. But though the culture of the civilized man constitutes a more desirable environment, this is not to the credit of the individual in civilization but is due to a difference in social heritage. "There is a kind of dependence upon the community which is essential to the

whole mental development of man. It is to his social environment that he must look for that inherited knowledge and skill which the animal inherits in its physical organism. Every human being begins again practically at the beginning: nothing is his, when he enters life, of the vast acquisitions made by his ancestors. But he finds it waiting for him, stored in the social community into which he is born. In its language, its institutions, its knowledge, its skill, there awaits him the inheritance prepared for him."¹ We are superior to the savage only in the sense that we are superior to Aristotle; to wit, we have been born into a different kind of world. We are probably inherently inferior to savages, for civilization brings into existence more incompetent individuals than savagery could afford.

The instrument of social progress is tradition, through which society transmits the ideas and activities of men. The cumulative and selective nature of tradition makes progress a possibility. Insofar as tradition eliminates undesirable elements from social life and preserves and enhances the desirable, it makes progress a reality, an amplification of life and its possibilities.

4. PROGRESS INVOLVES INTEGRATION OF SOCIAL FORCES

A well developed feature of culture may go off on a career of its own, heedless of other needs. Art developed to a high plane in the Magdalenian period of paleolithic times, but work in stone did not keep pace. The Greeks developed esthetic capacities to a high point, but gave little heed to political or social programs. The Industrial Revolution of the last half of the eighteenth century stimulated industry, but retarded social progress. A culture trait can run amuck and do much damage to innocent bystanders. Anarchy in social life results when a trait pursues its way according to its own will, without thought of social consequence.

Independence, moreover, means potential conflict. If industrial activity goes ahead without reckoning with other social needs or activities, social conflicts are inevitable. Nationalism is useful for a while, but inevitably leads to conflicts between nations and also within the nation, challenging obligations to family and fellow-man. Political doctrines may conflict with ethical demands.

To ensure progress, then, there must be an integration of all phases of social life. We may slip back in some phases while making progress in others. How is the advancing political order reconciled with the de-

¹ Bosanquet, *The Strength of the People*, p. 38, London, 1902.

mands of the new economic régime, the new science, the new religion, and the new ethics? Automobiles ensure more rapid transportation, but what of the thousands of deaths for which they are responsible annually,² and what of the automobile slavery which they bring to the weak minded and the weak willed? Automobiles are not wholly a good until the use of them is integrated with other phases of our life and culture. Maladjustment is a frequent concomitant of social development. To ensure progress, therefore, we must see all of social life in perspective. We are disposed to estimate the value of a new device or idea by comparison with the supplanted one, but we must evaluate it also in terms of its total effect upon all of social life. High explosives may be good when used to dislodge stumps and masses of rocks, but are not necessarily a boon to humanity when men pitch them about among themselves with design to kill. Indeed, we might be happier had we no more destructive weapons than the war club exploited by the savage and no better armor than his. It is doubtful if the development of our offensive and defensive weapons has exalted the human race. Mark Twain's story of the *Mysterious Stranger* should be more widely read. The development of our war devices would be ludicrous were it not so pathetic; man has expended such energy to make his life on this planet less tolerable than nature would allow it to be! Human nature drags across the trail of progress miseries spared us by nature, even a nature "sharp in tooth and claw."

5. THE FALL OF CIVILIZATIONS DOES NOT DISPROVE PROGRESS

A great deal has been written about the "revolutions" of civilization. Civilization has been pictured as moving to a certain peak and then sliding back, to start again and again fall back. This view prevailed among the Hindus, and it has been held by many European writers.

But the rise and fall of civilizations does not imply a limit to prog-

² During 1925 more than 20,000 people were killed in the United States by automobiles, and twice this number were seriously injured. "The growing use of the automobile has had a positive tendency to increase crime materially. It is a new lure that is hard to withstand. Men and women mortgage their homes and their beds to get them, and of course boys borrow and steal them. The indiscriminate use of the automobile in crowded cities has added largely to the coroner's returns, and many accidents appear in the tables as murders, although the only element even of homicide is careless or reckless driving. Sometime life may adjust itself to the automobile, but it will be a long time before men, women, and children can withstand the lure and before the accidents incident to the use of the automobile be materially reduced." Clarence S. Darrow, *Crime and the Alarmists*, Harper's Monthly Magazine, 153: p. 542, Oct., 1926.

ress. In spite of such revolutions, of falls as well as rises, indefinite progress is possible if each civilization embodies the best which was produced in preceding civilizations. Progress may continue in spite of recurrent lapses; it is a question of fact whether or not it does.

We do not know the limits of human progress. Man, it appears, can progress as far as he will. This does not mean that he achieves progress by merely willing it, for the willing must be intelligent; the volition must choose means as well as ends, and there must be a cheerful readiness to pay the price.

6. PROGRESS AND THE INDIVIDUAL

Social progress alone will not make life more significant and satisfying for the individual, for though he lives in a better world he is not better off if he fails to utilize the larger opportunities about him. How often does one imagine a man living in a crude culture environment, like that of the Eskimos or the natives of Australia, viewing our civilization and yearning for its possibilities! How happy he would be! must be one's thought. How happy we should be, as compared with him, or as compared with the man of medieval times! Yet we are not always happy. Indeed, in our own society seldom are those the most happy who have most. Many suffer the misfortune of being overfed with goods. Some are surfeited with fortune and opportunity, until to them nothing is opportunity and opportunity is nothing. The Veddas of Ceylon live a simple life in rock shelters, yet the lust of life shines through the assertion of the old Vedda who declared: "It is pleasant for us to feel the rain beating on our shoulders, and good to go out and dig yams and come home wet and see the fire burning in the cave and sit around it."⁸ The society in which everybody is poor and nobody knows it, is likely to be happier than one in which everybody is wealthy and everybody knows it.

However ample the social opportunities they must be utilized by conscious effort. The individual "must learn and work and actively possess himself of all that he desires to partake in; he must consciously submit mind and body to discipline, before the community will, or indeed can, yield his inheritance to him.

"It is this condition attached to his inheritance which prevents man's natural and inevitable dependence upon the community from degenerating into a *habit* of dependence. He must look to it for all possi-

⁸ Seligmann, *The Veddas*, p. 84.

bility of mental progress; but then, again, he must wrest its gifts from it by his own toil; and just so far as he does so he is capable of rational independent life. . . .

"What is the best thing the community can do for its members? Pretty much what Nature does. To respond to their exertions when wisely applied — to yield to their conquest of her. But it can be kinder than Nature. It can safeguard to some extent the physical well-being of individuals from overwhelming disaster; it can equalize food supplies, ward off enemies, guard against fire, prevent, and to some extent cure, disease — always provided that it can secure the active coöperation of individuals. For though the community place its whole strength at the disposal of the individual, he may still decline to avail himself of it. Further, by active nay, even aggressive, instruction and education, the community may open the eyes of the backward and induce them to enter upon new interests and responsibilities; but the one thing the community cannot do is to 'give' — gratis, without asking for any exertion in the taking — a good life, even a portion of good life, to its members." ⁴

Whatever the nature of the social order, therefore, the individual must do his part. To sit idly by is to stagnate; to fret over the ills of life is to forego advantages while yet there is time to enjoy them; to harp on ills is to lose feeling for the finer things; and to revel only in the finer things with eyes blind to the ills of life is to see only a part of the world in which we live. "To see life steadily and see it whole," — this is one of the prerequisites to a happy and cheerful sojourn on the little planet where men must play their rôles before the glaciers settle down upon them and close the last chapter of human history.

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⁴ Helen Bosanquet, *op. cit.*, pp. 38, 58-59.

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CONCLUSION

Sociology is the study of the behavior of men in social groups and of the activities of the groups, but no field of social life belongs exclusively to sociology. Many of its data are described by the respective social sciences, which are avenues to the investigation of the various phases of social life. Sociology is not a synthesis of them but a point of view which embraces them all. Although social life is not everywhere the same but may be said with more truth to be everywhere different, nevertheless within certain areas and certain periods of history similar social groups are found, similar at least if contrasted with social life in other areas and centuries. Hence we epitomized social life in primitive society, in the Oriental civilizations, in ancient Greece and Rome, and in early Western European civilization.

The social phases of these cultures were presented descriptively rather than in a supposititious, or fictitious, evolutionary line. When we depart from historical processes, such as are recorded for the Mediterranean and later civilizations, we are on the quicksands of speculation. But a description of the forms of social life is not enough and sociology consists also of the theories of social life which have flourished in the various cultures.

The speculations of savages are not very enlightening; more stimulating are the theories developed in the ancient civilizations, those of Hebrews, Hindus, Greeks, and Romans. The Greeks, especially Plato and Aristotle, are the founders of modern social theory. Their writings and those of the Stoics stimulated the early Christian theorists. But early Christian thought seems strange to us, for it developed in an atmosphere far different from that in which we live. Since men saw civilization disintegrating and expected an almost immediate end to the world, it is not surprising that they considered social life a matter of little importance. Better a mansion in the skies than a precarious abode on an earth soon to disappear in a universal conflagration. The Renaissance stimulated men's imaginations and social theory was rebuilt on the foundations of Platonism, Aristotelianism, and Stoicism. "There

was a boundless enthusiasm for the newly discovered art and literature of ancient Greece. Men were fired by a new resolve to make the best and not the worst of life upon earth." In the last half of the eighteenth century political and industrial revolutions turned men's thoughts to new problems and suggested new solutions. Since that time social theory has been much influenced by the intellectual environment, the prevailing science, politics, and biology. In the last hundred and fifty years most phases of social life have been remade, ideas, disciplines, institutions, and procedures.

Modern problems take us directly to the physical conditions amid which social life must exist. The geographical environment impinges upon men from every angle, but we do not know its influence until we know the culture. The culture meets it and is met by it, counters it and is countered by it. Race is not an explanation of culture differences, since a race type is not constantly correlated with a given phase of culture, and a specific culture may permeate different race types. Heredity has possibilities as an instrument for social reconstruction, but selection can only make one physical type more frequent than another. Heredity serves social life only as groundwork. Economic forces are directive but not determinative, though there is always the play of economic motives.

A more important phase of social life is the social psychology, the cultural and psychological forces which permeate groups and constitute their fundamental characteristics. A social group is an entity. It is not the sum or the average of the individuals who compose it, as the individual is not the sum or the average of the cells which compose his organism. The group functions as an entity and must be conceived as such. Crowd psychology is an instance of such functioning of the group.

Language and custom unify the group and increase its solidarity. A similar end is served by tradition and opinion, which are elements in the environment to which individuals react. The larger social group, the nation, welds its members into a functioning unity. The relations between nations are the basis of internationalism, and war is one result of the failure of nations to function harmoniously in the larger international world of which they are a part.

The conditions and forces mentioned above create many of the problems of modern society, but others also deserve special consideration. The family, which is a social unit in every tribe or nation, ancient or recent, primitive or advanced, is being reconstructed. Religion, as old as the family, is likewise being remoulded amid new conditions. Edu-

cation has been remade and will continually be remade in view of new knowledge and new needs. Political institutions are in the crucible and what they will eventually become remains to be seen. Industrial organization is still in the pains of a revolution and in every land there is dissatisfaction with the present economic arrangement and the inadequate adjustments. Poverty is a phase of modern life which cries to heaven for amelioration and not wholly in vain. Weak minds as well as vigorous ones constitute our social heritage and we are beginning to seek and perhaps to find a rational attitude toward mental deficiency. Crimes flourish and claim attention and energy. Recently race problems have assumed unwonted proportions and we wonder whether men are to be drawn into new conflicts to the disregard of the values of civilization and personality. We admit thousands of immigrants into a country in which we have not yet provided work and sustenance for all who are here. We increase in population as though the world and its resources were unlimited, though we have at least, if also at last, begun to reflect upon the situation and to suggest solutions.

But is there no formula in which the trend of development can be summed up? No formula will suffice, but certain tendencies can be discerned. Geographical, economic, intellectual, and ethical horizons enlarge as man develops from tribal society into city-state, provincial, and national life. The scope of his vision grows with the passing of the centuries. There is, moreover, a tendency for social life to maintain its path of development and realize its potentialities. That growth along one line often proves a drag upon other phases of social life, is a fact which should not occasion surprise. There are changes also in the methods of approaching the study of social phenomena, for there is an increasing tendency to seek the realities rather than to work with presuppositions.

Concurrently with the thirst for realities increasing attention is given the idealisms of men. Though at first glance this appears to be attempting inconsistent and irreconcilable tasks, there is no inconsistency in this procedure. Idealism is a phase of social reality, for men delight in utopias. These castles in the air are sometimes brought to earth and insofar as they influence social standards or behavior they are an important factor of social change and accordingly must be taken into consideration. We wish to know whether society is making progress, whether, all things considered, it is accomplishing more desirable results.

Admitting that the future is a matter of prophecy what can one say of progress in the past and in the present?

Only, we believe, that there has been progress in some things but not to the same extent, if at all, in others; that in some lines men make progress but in others pay heavily for it; that occasionally the progress which redounds to the good of some exacts a heavy tribute from others. Yet power and potentiality are phases of progress and man now possesses these in such ample degree that he can make of earth either a heaven or a hell. He is the maker of his destiny and to him belongs the credit for his success, the responsibility for his failure.

INDEX

- Adams, John, 60, 122, 193
 Adaptation, to environment, 82-83
 Advertisers, Advertising, 279-281
 Aeschylus, 406
 Aesop, 405
 Africa, South, 358
 Age, aged, 10-11, 30-31
 Allport, Floyd, 147
 Amalgamation, 355-357
 Amphictyony, 209
 Anesthetics, 252
 Ancestor worship, Chap. II-III
 Andamanese, 9, 12-17
 Animals, 387-388
 Aquinas, Thomas, 59, 417
 Archeology, 374
 Aristotle, 53, 54, 59, 61, 287, 406, 410, 411, 427
 Armenians, 206
 Atom, 149, 151, 154
 St. Augustine, 58, 408, 410-411
 Aurelius, Marcus, 55, 410
 Australia, 10-11, 15

 Babylonia, 375
 Bacon, Francis, 215, 412
 Bagehot, Walter, 83, 144
 Balzac, 175
 Bascom, John, 73-74
 Becker, Carl, 123, 199
 Behavior, 155, 157, 160-161, 170, 193
 Bellamy, Richard, 412-413
 Bentham, Jeremy, 75-76
 Bias, 108
 Binet, 336
 Birth-rate, 363, 365-367
 Blutsverband, 37
 Bock, Carl, 339
 Bodin, Jean, 54, 59, 60
 Bosanquet, Helen, 255, 276, 327, 420, 423
 Boss, Political, 293
 Bown, A. R., 13-16
 Bradley, Francis C., 161
 Breasted, James H., 26
 Briffault, Robert, 125, 139, 261, 314
 Browne, Sir Thomas, 56, 268, 323, 382
 Bryce, James, 83, 294, 398
 Buckle, Henry J., 80, 81, 84
 Buddhist, 24

 Bunyan, John, 406
 Burbank, Luther, 215
 Burns, C. Delisle, 216, 218, 386, 398
 Butler, Samuel, 414
 Buxton, L. H. Dudley, 354

 Cabaton, 135
 Campanella, Tomasso, 113, 408, 411
 Career, 236
 Carlyle, Thomas, 82, 320, 407
 Carnegie, David, 256
 Carr-Saunders, Alexander M., 118
 Caucasoids, 99-103
 Cause, 396-397
 Charities, 328-329
 Chatterton-Hill, George, 85-86
 Children, 10-11, 12, 15, 27, 38-40, 43, 262, 268, 327, 395
 Chinese, 353-354
 Christianity, 251-258
 Church, 253ff
 Cicero, 410
 Citizens, 161, 287
 City, 340
 Civilization, 5-8, 29, 37, 43, 101-102, 105, 183-184, 186, 194, 223, 235
 Clement, of Alexandria, 58
 Collars, 178
 Commons, John R., 330
 Communism, 39, 59, 75, 312, 413
 Company, of soldiers, 153
 Comparative Method, 401
 Competition, 309
 Complexity, 417-418
 Comte, August, 78
 Concomitance, 396-397
 Condorcet, 408
 Conflict, 402
 Confucius, 48
 Conway, Sir Martin, 159, 163, 166
 Copernicus, 376
 Cornejo, 131
 Courts, 299, 303
 Courts, Juvenile, 301, 303
 Credits, 271
 Crew, 150-151
 Crowd, 291
 Crusades, 40, 361, 382
 Cultures, 5-7, 175-177

Curriculum, 265, 269-270

Custom, 7, 12

Dakotas, 12, 158

Dalton, 115

Dante, 59, 215

Darrow, Clarence S., 421

Darwin, Charles, 81, 113, 116, 159, 215, 333,
364, 398

Dealy, 131

Death-rate, 366

Descartes, René, 215

Deserts, 94

De Staël, Madame, 117

Development, social, 91

Dibblee, E., 275

Dickens, Charles, 166, 408

Diderot, 408

Dietz, Johann, 41

Diffusion, 374-377

Divorce, 235, 241-243

Dostoevsky, 227

Drummond, 86

Drunkenness, 345

Du Bois, W. E. B., 356-357

Dunlap, Knight, 147, 337

Durkheim, Émile, 69, 78, 85, 135-136

Dwellings, 396-397

East, 365

Edison, Thomas, 215

Editorials, 278, 281-282

Education, 27, 51-52, 237-238, 318, 336

Edwards family, 110-111

Eggleston, 324

Einstein, 215, 376, 398

Elections, 293-298

Ellis, Havelock, 367

Ellwood, Charles, 131, 136

Emerson, Ralph W., 407

Emotionalism, 164-165

Engels, Friedrich, 312

England, 365-366

Environment, physical, 405-406

Environment, social, 190

Epictetus, 117

Epidemics, 279-280

Eskimos, 11, 14, 287-288, 323, 379

Esperanto, 177

Essenes, 58

Esthetics, 377

Evolution, 252-253, 258, 364, 417

Facts, 399

Family, 19-27, 29-31, 34-35, 59, 330, 346

Feudalism, 38

Fichte, 80

Folklore, 17

Fontenelle, 60-61

Fourier, Charles, 69-71, 73

Franklin, Benjamin, 284, 364

Frazer, Sir James G., 300

Fuller, Thomas, 185

Fu-shi, 19, 48

Galton, Sir Francis, 116

Gibbon, 61

Giddings, Franklin, 131, 136

Gillin, 330

Ginsberg, Morris, 147

Godwin, Thomas, 407-408

Gold, 96

Gooch, G. P., 60

Government, 289

Graduate School, 263-264

Green, Thomas H., 135

Gregariousness, 157

Grotius, 211

Guild system, 295-296

Haddon, Alfred C., 104

Haldane, J. B. S., 319

Hall, G. Stanley, 281

Hamilton, Walton H., 319

Happiness, 414

Harrington, James, 60, 408, 412, 414

Headlines, 277-278

Hebrews, 49, 203-204, 224, 251, 351, 360

Hegel, George W., 69, 78-80

Herder, 78-79

Herodotus, 50, 54, 79, 180, 380, 406

Heroes, 228

Hesiod, 49, 380, 394, 408

Hindus, 357

Hobbes, Thomas, 63, 215

Hobhouse, Leonard T., 84, 153, 175,
381

Hobson, John A., 214

Homer, 29, 117, 215, 405-406

Huxley, Thomas, 113

Idealism, 47

Ideals, 116

Ideas, 172

Idiots, 334

Illegitimacy, 244, 246

Imperialism, 202

Independence, 266-267

Indians, 106, 325

Individual, 158-160, 164-165, 170

Inheritance, 335

Instincts, 130, 144-147

Institute of Current World Affairs, 283-
284

Insurance, 329-330

Integration, 264-265, 420-421

- Intelligence, 107
 Interdependence, 148-153, 217, 249, 306-308, 384-385
 Interests, 298
Intichiuma, 15
 Introspection, 139
 Inventions, 378-379
 Ipuwer, 26

 Japan, 257
 Japanese, 353-354
 Jefferson, Thomas, 60, 67
 Jews, 356, 361
 Jowett, 33, 225
 Jukes family, 110-111

 Kant, Immanuel, 78, 210
 Keats, John, 406
 Keller, Albert G., 85
 Kent, Frank R., 294
 Keynes, John M., 390
 Kidd, Benjamin, 85
 King, 250
 Knowledge, influence on environment, 95-96
 Korzybski, Alfred, 380
 Kropotkin, Count, 86
 Kumi, 23
Kuo-Chia, 21

 Labor, 316-319
 Labor, American Federation of, 319
 Labor Party, British, 317ff
 Lacombe, P., 147
 Lactantius, 158
Laissez-faire, 310, 314
 Langdon-Davies, John, 111
 Languages, Indo-European, 173
 Laplace, 215
 Laughter, 191
Laws (of Plato), 52-53
 League of Nations, 213
 Le Bon, Gustave, 163
 Lee, Sir Sidney, 383
 Leibnitz, 215
 Lincoln, Abraham, 189, 198, 202, 323
 Lippmann, Walter, 276
 Literature, 200
 Little, 314
 Living, standards of, 362, 367
 Livy, 34
 Locke, John, 63
 Locke, William J., 227
 Lowell, James R., 407
 Lucretius, 56-57
 Lyell, Sir Charles, 184
 Lynching, 169-170
 Lytton, Edward B., 412

 Macaulay, Thomas B., 69
 Machinery, 120
 McDougall, William, 145-147
 MacIver, Robert M., 136, 147
 Maladjustment, 421
 Malthus, Thomas, 364
 Market-place, 32-33
 Marriage, 112, 240-241
 Martin, William D., 167
 Marx, Karl, 122, 312
 Megasthenes, 24
 Mendel, Gregor, 113-115
 Mendelism, 113-116
 Mercier, 345
 Mexicans, 353
 Miall, Bernard, 41
 Mill, James, 75
 Mill, John Stuart, 69, 75, 84-85, 364
 Mind, 332ff
 Molecule, 149, 151
 Mongoloids, 100-102
 Montesquieu, Charles S., 54, 61-63, 67, 80
 More, Sir Thomas, 324, 408, 409, 411, 414
 Morley, John (Viscount), 214
 Motto, 168
 Murder, 343
 Murray, Sir Gilbert, 31, 227

 Nation, 151-153
 Nature, 389, 413-414, 423
 Negroids, 100-101, 103, 351
 Newton, Sir Isaac, 116, 215, 376, 398
 Nordics, 105

 Old Testament, 405
 Origin, 58
 Osler, Sir William, 184, 216, 265, 398
 Otis, 60
 Owen, Robert, 72-74

 Paine, Thomas, 407-408
 Parole, 347
 Parsons, 339
 Parties, political, 156, 292ff
 Patriotism, 290, 391
 Peace Conference, 276
 Pearson, Karl, 400
 Pebody, Charles, 278
 Personality, 261, 270
 Petrie, W. Flinders, 42, 179
 Phalanx, 70
 Philosophy, 409
 Place, Francis, 71-72, 364
 Plains area, 12, 14-15, 147, 222
 Plato, 50-54, 59, 113, 146, 380, 394, 408, 410, 411, 414, 427
 Plutarch, 133
 Pope, 298

- Population, 388-390, 429
 Poverty, 338
 Problems, 234
 Profiteering, 281
 Progress, 429-430
 Property, 65, 123
 Proudhon, Pierre J., 74-75
 Psychology, 129-130, 137-138, 147-149
 Psychology, mass, 163
 Psychology, social, 130, 144ff
 Punishment, 302
- Race, 201
 Radin, Paul, 224
 Raleigh, Sir Walter, 270
 Reasoning, 398
 Recall, 295
 Recidivists, 348
 Relativity, 268-269
 Religion, 243
 Renaissance, 427-428
 Renan, E., 198
 Reporters, reporting, 275ff
 Research, 267
 Responsibility, 282, 284
 Revolution, 342
 Revolution, French, 307, 407-408
 Revolution, Industrial, 67-68, 121, 236-237, 390, 392, 408, 411
 Rewards, 314-315
 Rhythm, 138
 Ricardo, 74
 Ridicule, 192
 Bill of Rights, French, 63-65
 Robinson, 348
 Rogers, James E., 283
 Rome, 253
 Rousseau, Jean J., 62-63, 67, 68, 210, 413
 Ruskin, 270-271, 348
 Russia, 256
- Saint-Simon, 68-69, 78, 117
 Savagery, 186-187, 194, 221-223, 229, 235, 240, 333, 342-343, 385-386, 393, 410, 419-422
 Science, 383
 Sciences, social, 233, 427
 Scudder, Vida D., 407
 Self-preservation, 132, 138
 Seligmann, C. G., 422
 Seneca, 410
 Shakespeare, William, 167, 215
 Shaw, George Bernard, 381
 Shelley, 406-408
 Sherlock, 334-335
 Shibboleth, 174
 Sickness, 326
 Sieyès, 60
- Sisson, Edward O., 125, 337-338
 Slavery, 35, 59
 Small, Albion W., 131
 Smith, Adam, 73-74
 Smith, C. A., 252
 Socialism, 313-315
 Socrates, 54
 Songs, 16-17
 Specialization, 51, 306, 385-386
 Spencer, Herbert, 59, 78, 81-84, 113, 333, 417
 Spinoza, Benedict, 116-117, 333
 Stars, 92
 State, the, 197, 208
 Statistics, 339-340
 St. Pierre, Abbé, 210, 408
 St. Pierre, Bernardin, 413-414
 Stuckenberg, 131
 Sunday newspaper, 274
 Survivals, 42
- Taine, H., 405
 Tarde, Gabriel, 131
 Tertullian, 58
 Tests, Intelligence, 102-104, 344
 Theory, 394
 Thoreau, 407
 Thucydides, 50, 54, 79, 225, 380, 406
 Tocqueville, Alexis de, 267
 Tozzer, Alfred M., 357
 Trade, 212, 384-385
 Tradition, 380
 Trial, 301
 Turgenev, 140
 Turgot, 122, 408
 Turkey, 19
 Twain, Mark, 421
 Tyler, 324
- Ujigami, 22
 Uniform, 43
- Value, 400, 403
 Veddas, 8, 381, 422
 Vinogradoff, Paul, 38-40
 Virgil, 215
 Voltaire, 62, 408
 Voting, 297-298
- Wagner, Charles, 414
 Wallace, Alfred R., 364
 Wallas, Graham, 179-180
 War, 122-125, 133-134, 152-153
 War, Civil, 206, 324
 War, Spanish-American, 206
 War, World, 188-189, 205-206, 255, 263, 373
 Washington, Booker T., 356, 357

Washington, George, 184, 188-189, 202
Waste, 311, 315
Watson, John, 161
Wells, Herbert G., 284, 381, 413-414
Weyl, Walter, 184
Will, 337
Wilson, George A., 320, 384, 409

Women, 245-246
Zangwill, Israel, 134, 226-227
Zarathustra, 25
Zeno, 54-55
Zimmern, Alfred E., 33


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